Landing (descent or approach)

The pilot-in-command (PIC) of the of the airplane was the flight department's chief pilot, who was in the right seat and monitoring the approach as the non-flying pilot. The second-in-command (SIC) was a captain for the flight department, who was in the left seat and the flying pilot. On arrival at their destination, they were vectored for an instrument-landing-system (ILS) approach to a 6,001-foot-long runway. Visibility was 1-1/4 miles in rain. The autopilot was on and a coupled approach was planned. After the autopilot captured the ILS, the airplane descended on the glideslope. The PIC announced that the approach lights were in sight and the SIC stated that he also saw the lights and disengaged the autopilot. The SIC turned on the windshield wipers and then lost visual contact with the runway. He announced that he lost visual contact, but the PIC stated that he still saw the runway. The SIC considered a missed approach, but continued because the PIC still had visual contact. The PIC stated, "I have the lights" and began to direct the SIC. He then "took over the controls." The airplane touched down, the speed brakes extended and, approximately 1,000 feet later, the airplane overran the runway. The PIC stated that he was confused as to who was the PIC, and that he and the SIC were "co-captains." When asked about standard operating procedures (SOPs), the PIC advised that they did not have any. They had started out with one pilot and one airplane, and they now had five pilots and two airplanes. The PIC later stated that they probably should have gone around when the flying pilot could not see out the window. The PIC added that the windshields had no coating and did not shed water. One year prior, while flying in rain, his vision through the windshield was blurred but he did not report it to their maintenance provider. Manufacturer's data revealed that the windshield was coated to enhance vision during rain conditions. The manufacturer advised that the coating might not last the life of the windshield and provided guidance to determine both acceptable and unacceptable rain repellent performance.

The aircraft departed Copenhagen-Kastrup AIrport on a flight to Palanga with 48 passengers and a crew of 4 on board. Following an uneventful flight, the crew started the descent. At an altitude of about 2,000 feet, the crew selected the landing gear down. However, the right-hand main gear extended but did not lock down and the landing gear doors did not close. The approach was abandoned and the crew initiated a go-around. During the second attempt to land, the crew recycled the system but the warning remained so the decision was taken to divert to Vilnius. On approach, the crew attempted to release the undercarriage using a backup system, but the undercarriage control panel still showed an unsafe warning. The right engine was shut down and the propeller was feathered prior to landing. Upon touchdown, the right main gear collapsed. The aircraft veered off runway and came to rest 40 metres further, some 1,150 metres pas the runway threshold. All 52 occupants evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The accident flight was a scheduled domestic flight from Copenhagen Airport, Kastrup (EKCH) to Aalborg Airport (EKYT). The flight was uneventful until the landing gear was selected down during the approach to EKYT runway 26R. The nose landing gear and the left main landing gear (MLG) indicated down and locked. The right MLG indicated “in transit” (not down and locked). The Aalborg Tower was informed about the problem with the right MLG indication. A go-around was initiated at 1100 feet MSL with a climb towards 2000 ft. The flight crew consulted the Quick Reference Handbook (QRH). An alternate landing gear procedure was initiated. The right MLG indication remained in “transit”. A mayday call was made to Aalborg Tower and they were informed about the unsafe landing gear. The flight crew reset the alternate gear extension system and subsequently they tried to make a normal gear up selection. The nose landing gear and the left MLG retracted normally, however the right main landing gear indication remained in “transit”. A second attempt to use the alternate landing gear extension procedure was performed without any changes to the right MLG indication. The aircraft entered a holding pattern in order to reduce the amount of fuel and at the same time to brief the passengers about the situation and to prepare the passengers for an emergency landing. Passengers seated at rows 6, 7 and 8 seats D and F were reseated away from the right propeller area. During the approach the flaps were selected to 10° and the landing gear horn started. The warning horn continued throughout the remaining flight. During the emergency landing the left MLG touched down on the runway first, followed by the right MLG. Shortly after the right MLG contacted the runway the right MLG collapsed. The aircraft departed the runway to the right and came to rest on a heading of 340° at 1357:26 hrs.

The four engine aircraft departed Kisangani on a cargo flight to Bukavu with an intermediate stop in Goma, carrying 3 passengers, 5 crew members and a load consisting of 18 tons of palm oil. After landing, the aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining distance and overran. While contacting petrified lava, it lost its undercarriage and came to rest, bursting into flames. The aircraft was totally destroyed and all 8 occupants were killed. It was reported that the certificate of airworthiness expired last March and was not renewed since.

The pilot stated that he was on a repositioning flight to Tampa, Florida. He was cruising at 11,000 feet msl when, with no warning or spool down time, the engine failed. The engine indications instantly went to zero. The pilot declared an emergency to the air traffic controller and was advised that the nearest airport was 29 miles away. He maneuvered the airplane toward the airport and went through the engine failure procedures. The attempts to restart the engine were unsuccessful. The pilot configured the airplane for best glide speed. After gliding for 22 miles, the airplane's altitude was about 300 feet msl. The pilot slowed the airplane to just above stall speed before impacting small pine trees pulling back on the yoke and stalling the airplane into the trees. The engine was examined at Pratt and Whitney of Canada, with Transportation Safety Board of Canada oversight. The engine compressor turbine blades were fractured at varying heights from the roots to approximately half of the span. Materials analysis determined the blade fractures to display impact damage and overheating. The primary cause of the blade fractures could not be determined. There were no other pre-impact anomalies or operational dysfunction observed to any of the engine components examined. Impact damage to the blade airfoils precluded determination of the original fracture mechanism.

On approach to Madison-Dane County-Truax Field, the pilot encountered technical problems with the right main gear that remained stuck in its wheel well. He decided to retract the gear and to complete a wheels-up landing. The twin engine aircraft belly landed and slid for few dozen metres before coming to rest. Both occupants escaped uninjured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The airplane landed hard on a rough airstrip located in the Helmand Province in Afghanistan. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair but all occupants escaped uninjured. Due to Taliban presence in the vicinity of the accident area, the airplane was deliberately destroyed by fire.

The aircraft departed Kongolo on a cargo flight to Goma with 12 passengers, a crew of 3 and a load consisting of 9 tons of cassiterite on board. Ten minutes after takeoff, the crew informed ATC about engine problem and decided to return to Kongolo. On approach, the aircraft stalled, collided with trees and crashed in a wooded area located 3 km short of runway. A young boy aged two survived while 14 other occupants were killed. Not sure if the image here above refers to this accident.

En route from Calí to Villagarzón, the crew contacted ATC and reported technical problems with the left engine. After being cleared to divert to Pasto-Antonio Nariño Airport, the crew modified his route and started the descent. On approach, the flaps were lowered at 38° and the speed was reduced to 250 km/h. After the gears were selected down, the speed increased to 270 km/h so full flaps was selected. After touchdown on runway 02 which is 2,312 metres long, the aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining distance. It overran, went down a 15 metres high embankment and came to rest, broken in two and with its left wing torn off. All 53 occupants were rescued, among them few were injured.

On 12 August 2007, about 05:20, the flight crew showed up and prepared for the flight of Gimpo/Jeju/Gimhae/Gimpo at the crew lounge of the Gimpo Airport. For a flight duty of the flight 103 (Gimpo to Jeju section), the flight crew departed from the Gimpo Airport at about 06:50 and arrived at the Jeju Airport at about 08:15. For the flight 502 (Jeju to Gimhae section), they departed the Jeju Airport at 08:49. While the aircraft passing through an altitude of 9,500 feet), RUD CTRL caution lights and #2 RUD HYD caution lights illuminated. Accordingly, the pilots followed and carried out the procedures) of QRH (Quick Reference Handbook). Referring to the pilots’ statements, #2 RUD HYD caution lights illuminated constantly during the flight; however, RUD CTRL caution lights illuminated intermittently. As it reached a cruising altitude of 15,000 feet, the pilots notified the condition of malfunctions and actions taken according to the QRH to a mechanic stationed at the Gimhae Airport. The pilots received a clearance from the Gimhae Approach Control for ILS RWY 36L then circling approach to RWY 18R. At the final approach course of ILS DME RWY 36L, after visually identifying the runway, the captain received a clearance for conducting a circling approach on initial contact with the Gimhae Control Tower. Referring to the pilots’ statements and the data of Flight Data Recorder (hereinafter referred to as "FDR"), from 09:33:57 until 09:34:03 (for the time of turning from the final approach course of ILS to enter a downwind for circling approach), the caution lights of Elevator Feel, RUD CTRL, Pitch Trim and other warning lights illuminated on the caution and warning lights panel. However, the pilots stated that they couldn’t recall all the caution lights illuminated at the time, and did not take any measures considering the illuminating lights as "nuisance.") The first officer who was a pilot flying continued the circling approach, and aligned his aircraft with the runway 18R on the final approach course. After aligned with runway 18R, the aircraft heading was at 178 degrees magnetic. At that time, according to the ATIS information, the wind direction/speed was 130 degrees at 13 knots gusting to 18 knots, ceiling 4,000 feet, and it was mostly cloudy. According to FDR record, at 09:38:08, about 2 feet above the runway, the rudder started to be applied to the right side. Concurrently, the pilot moved the control wheel to the right. At that time, the aircraft heading changed from 174 degrees to 175 degrees. At 09:38:09, the main landing gear of the aircraft touched down on the runway, and the aircraft heading was at 174 degrees. From the point where the main landing gear touched down, the aircraft continued to drift left into the wind. Initially the pilots applied right rudder in an attempt to maintain runway center-line. Rather then apply left wing down, the control wheel input was toward the right. According to the Cockpit Voice Recorder (hereinafter referred to as "CVR"), at 09:38:11, as the captain kicked onto the rudder pedal and said, "Why, why, Ah?" and the first officer replied, "it doesn’t respond.") At 09:38:13, the nose landing gear touched down, and the pilots started to apply brakes. At 09:38:15, all of sudden, the deceleration rate dropped. According to the tire marks, the aircraft departed the left edge of the runway at 3,500 feet from the end of runway. At 09:38:19, the groaning sound of one of the pilots, "Uh. Uh" was recorded on CVR. After 09:38:15, the heading direction of the aircraft was increasing to the left. According to CVR, at 09:38:25, there was a recorded voice of the captain, "Oh, no, Gosh,"and then at 09:38:27, with a sound of crash, the captain’s screaming sound, "Ah!" was recorded. The aircraft collided into a concrete drainage ditch, which is located 340 feet away from the centerline of the runway 18R and 4,600 feet away from the end of runway, and then it came to rest. When the aircraft stopped in the concrete drainage ditch, the pilots shut off the right engine, declared emergency to the air traffic control tower, and instructed the passengers to perform emergency evacuation.