Crash of a Piper PA-31-310 Navajo near Coromoro: 2 killed

Date & Time: May 3, 2014 at 1023 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
C-GSVM
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Bucaramanga - Bucaramanga
MSN:
31-109
YOM:
1968
Country:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Captain / Total flying hours:
4000
Captain / Total hours on type:
1400.00
Aircraft flight hours:
11000
Circumstances:
The twin engine aircraft departed Bucaramanga-Palonegro Airport at 0804LT on a geophysical mission over the Coromoro Region, Santander. At 1000LT, the last radio contact was recorded with the pilot. While flying in marginal weather conditions (low clouds), the aircraft impacted the slope of a mountain located near Coromoro. The wreckage was found two days later at an altitude of 4,500 metres, some 98 km south of Bucaramanga. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and both occupants were killed, among them Peter Moore, co-founder of Oracle Geoscience International and Neville Ribeiro, the pilot.
Probable cause:
Controlled flight into terrain after the pilot was flying under VFR mode in IMC conditions. It was determined that the accident occurred after the pilot suffered a loss of situational awareness while flying under VFR mode in low clouds conditions.
Final Report:

Crash of a Piper PA-46-310P Malibu near Niekerkshoop: 2 killed

Date & Time: Apr 22, 2014 at 1121 LT
Operator:
Registration:
ZS-LLD
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Cape Town – Swartwater
MSN:
46-8408063
YOM:
1984
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Captain / Total flying hours:
1569
Captain / Total hours on type:
163.00
Aircraft flight hours:
2029
Circumstances:
On 22 April 2014 at approximately 0716Z the Commercial pilot accompanied by a passenger departed Cape Town International Airport (FACT) on an IFR flight to Swartwater in the Limpopo Province. Approximately 16 minutes after take-off with the aircraft climbing through an altitude of 13500 feet to 17000 feet, the Air Traffic Controller advised the pilot that the aircraft’s Mode C transponder started transmitting erroneous altitude data and indicating that the aircraft was descending whereas the pilot thought he was ascending. The pilot notified the ATC that the aircraft was not descending and attempted to rectify the problem by recycling the Mode C transponder that however didn’t resolve the problem. As the transponder information was intermittent during the IFR flight to Swartwater, the ATC requested the pilot to descent to the VFR flight level FL 135. The pilot then requested Area West for approval to ascent to flight level (FL 195) which was approved. It appears that the pilot was unaware that the pitot static tube system that supplies both pitot and static air pressure for the airspeed indicator, altimeter and triple indicator was most probably blocked by dust or sand. The aircraft exceeded the Maximum Structural Air Speed (VNO) of the aircraft and the VNE air speed of 1 hour 44 minutes and 9 minutes respectively. The VNO of 173 airspeed and VNE of 203 airspeed exceedance resulted in the catastrophic inflight breakup of the aircraft. The wreckage was found scattered in a 1.58km path in mountainous terrain. Both occupants on board the aircraft sustained fatal injuries.
Probable cause:
The aircraft exceeded the Maximum Structural Cruising Speed (VNO) and Calibrated Never Exceed Speed VNE airspeed due to the fact that erroneous airspeed and altitude data information indicated on the cockpit instruments as a result of blockage of the pitot tube by dust and sand. The fact that the pilot switched off the transponder was considered as a contributory factor.
Final Report:

Crash of a Comp Air CA-8 in Jämijärvi: 8 killed

Date & Time: Apr 20, 2014 at 1540 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
OH-XDZ
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Jämijärvi - Jämijärvi
MSN:
01
YOM:
2008
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
10
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
8
Captain / Total flying hours:
1029
Captain / Total hours on type:
43.00
Aircraft flight hours:
809
Aircraft flight cycles:
3015
Circumstances:
The Tampere Skydiving Club (TamLK) organized the skydiving event “Easter Boogie” at Jämijärvi aerodrome, in the Satakunta region, on Sunday 20 Apr 2014. The event started on Maundy Thursday, 17 Apr 2014 and was planned to end on Easter Monday, 21 Apr 2014. The aircraft reserved for the event were Finland’s Sport Aviators’ Comp Air 8 airplane (CA8, OH-XDZ), which was intended to be used to take skydivers up to 4 000 m, and the Tampere Skydiving Club’s own Cessna U206F (OH-CMT), to be used for jumps from lower altitudes. On Sunday morning the cloud base hampered skydiving operations, which is why the activity started with student jumps from the Cessna. The pilot of the accident flight flew two flights on the Cessna. Once the weather improved he began to fly on the OH-XDZ. He flew two flights on it before he took a lunch break. Another pilot flew four flights on the airplane, following which it was topped up with 240 l of fuel. After refuelling the pilots changed duties again and the pilot of the accident flight flew yet another skydiving flight, landing at 15:25. Ten skydivers boarded the airplane for the accident flight. Takeoff occurred at 15:28 from northern runway 27 of Jämijärvi aerodrome. The airplane climbed to 4 230 m AGL by making a wide, left turn. The pilot steered the aircraft to the jump run, which was over the southern runway. Some of the skydivers sitting at the rear rose to their knees, and two of them cracked the jump door open so as to check the jump run. The skydivers then gave instructions to the pilot as regards correcting the jump run. The pilot adjusted the heading following which he reduced engine power to idle, reducing airspeed to approximately 70-75 kt. Nonetheless, the skydivers noted that they had overshot the jump line and requested that the pilot take them to a new run. The skydivers closed the door. The pilot increased engine power and, according to his account, simultaneously began to turn to the left at a 20-30 degree bank angle. He did not order the skydivers to return to their seats as he was homing in on the new jump run. At the end of the turn the occupants of the aircraft felt a downward acceleration which the skydivers experienced as a force pushing them towards the cabin ceiling. Approximately three seconds later the situation returned to normal. According to the pilot the airspeed was approximately 100 kt when they encountered the vertical acceleration. A moment later the pilot noticed that the airplane was in a descent and that the airspeed had suddenly risen to over 180 kt IAS. According to the pilot the airspeed peaked at 185 kt. He attempted to end the descent by pulling on the control stick. The aircraft levelled out or went into a shallow climb. He reduced engine power to idle to decrease the airspeed. The pilot said that the pitch control stick forces were relatively high. The aircraft returned to level flight, or to a gentle climb. The longitudinal control force suddenly decreased and the airplane suddenly flipped forward past the vertical axis. One of the surviving skydivers said that he heard a crushing sound roughly at the same time; how-ever, he was unsure of the precise point in time of the sound. The aircraft became uncontrollable and began to rotate around its vertical axis, akin to an inverted spin. According to eyewitness videos the aircraft was turning to the left. The videos show that the right wing was buckled against the fuselage and that a vapour trail of fuel was streaming from the damaged wing. While the aircraft was spinning its left wing, which was intact, was pointing upwards and the airplane was falling with its right side forward. Shouts of “open the jump door, bail out immediately” were heard inside the airplane. The pilot concluded that the aircraft was so badly damaged that it was no longer possible to recover from the dive. He unbuckled his seat belts and opened the pilot’s door on his left at approximately 2 000 m. The pilot jumped out at approximately 1 800 m and opened his emergency parachute. Even though twists had developed in the parachute’s lines, the pilot managed to untangle them. The skydiver sitting at the rear of the seat positioned next to the pilot (skydiver 3) noted that it would be impossible for him to make it to the jump door. Therefore, he chose the pilot’s door as a point of exit. It was extremely difficult to get to the door because the airplane was spinning. The skydiver sitting at the front of the seat positioned next to the pilot (skydiver 2) followed skydiver 3 on his way to the cockpit door and pushed skydiver 3 out of the door. Following egress, skydiver 3 immediately hit his head on airplane structures. The blow momentarily blurred his field of vision but he remained conscious. The Automatic Activation Device (AAD) opened the reserve parachute almost immediately after egress, at approximately 250 m. While skydiver 2 was still behind skydiver 3 he grabbed the control stick, intending to reduce the g-forces caused by the spinning and make it easier to bail out of the airplane. He soon realized that the airplane did not respond to stick movements and exited through the pilot’s door immediately behind skydiver 3. The skydiver who had occupied the furthest forward position (skydiver 1) assisted skydiver 2 in exiting through the door. The AAD of skydiver 2 opened his reserve parachute at approximately 200 m. After skydiver 2 had bailed out neither skydiver 1, situated closest to the pilot’s door, nor the remaining seven skydivers in the rear of the cabin managed to bail out. The airplane collided with the ground at 15:40 and caught fire immediately. The pilot landed approximately 300 m downwind from the wreckage. Skydiver 3 landed on a dirt road, some 60 m from the wreckage and skydiver 2 in the woods, approximately 40 m from the wreckage.
Probable cause:
The cause of the accident was that the stress resistance of the right wing’s wing strut was exceeded as a result of the force which was generated by a negative g-force. The force which resulted in the buckling of the wing strut was the direct result of a negative (nose-down) change in pitching moment, in conjunction with an engine power reduction intended to decrease the high airspeed. The buckling was followed by the right wing folding against the fuselage and the jump door. The aircraft entered into a flight condition resembling an inverted spin, which was unrecoverable. It was impossible to exit through the jump door.
The contributing factors were the following:
1. There was a fatigue crack on the wing strut. Because of the damage to the aircraft it was not possible to investigate the mechanism of the fatigue crack formation. It is possible that, in addition to the stress caused to the aircraft by short flights and high takeoff weights, the temperature changes caused by the exhaust gas stream as well as vibration contributed to the fatigue cracking.
2. The nature of skydiving operations generated many takeoffs and landings in relation to flight hours. A significant part of the operations was flown close to the maximum takeoff weight. These factors increased the structural stress.
3. The pilot’s limited flight experience on a powerful turboprop aircraft, his inadequate training as regards aircraft loading and its effects on the centre of gravity and airplane behavior, the high weight of the aircraft and the aft position of the CG in the beginning of a new jump line and, possibly, the pilot’s incorrect observation of the actual visual horizon contributed to the onset of the occurrence. During the turn to a new jump run the aircraft began to descend and very rapidly accelerated close to its maximum permissible airspeed. The pilot did not immediately realize this.
4. The structural modifications on the wing increased the loads on the aircraft and the wing struts. Their effects had not been established beforehand. The kit manufacturer was aware of the modifications. No changes to the Permit to build were applied for in writing regarding the modifications. Neither the build supervisor nor the aircraft inspectors were aware of the origin or the effects of the modifications.
Final Report:

Crash of a Piper PA-31-350 Navajo Chieftain in Stonehaven

Date & Time: Apr 9, 2014 at 1447 LT
Operator:
Registration:
N66886
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Wick – Le Touquet
MSN:
31-7405188
YOM:
1974
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
3188
Captain / Total hours on type:
19.00
Circumstances:
The aircraft was on a ferry flight from Seattle in the USA to Thailand via Canada, Greenland, Iceland, Scotland and across Europe. However the flight crew abandoned the aircraft in Greenland late in December 2013 after experiencing low oil pressure indications on both engines. This may have been due to the use of an incorrect grade of oil for cold weather operations. The aircraft remained in Greenland until 28 February 2014, when a replacement ferry pilot was engaged. Although the engine oil was not changed prior to departing Greenland, the flight continued uneventfully to Wick, in Scotland. Following some maintenance activity on the right engine, the aircraft departed for Le Touquet in France. However, approximately 25 minutes after takeoff, the engines successively lost power and the pilot carried out a forced landing in a ploughed field. Examination of the engines revealed that one piston in each engine had suffered severe heat damage, consistent with combustion gases being forced past the piston and into the crankcase.
Probable cause:
The aircraft began experiencing engine problems, leading to the forced landing, approximately 25 minutes after departing Wick, in Scotland. However, it is possible that these problems may have originated prior to the aircraft arriving in the UK. The low oil pressures in both engines, reported by the crew on the flight leg to Greenland, may have been due to the wrong grade of oil, W100, being used in what would have been very low temperatures experienced in December in Canada and Greenland. Despite supplies of multigrade oil being sent to Greenland, the engine oil was not changed. This was due to the fact that the pilot noted normal engine indications combined with the lack of maintenance facilities. Thus the aircraft continued its journey with the same oil in the engines with which it left Seattle; this was confirmed by the subsequent analysis of the oil. No further oil pressure problems were observed, although it is likely the aircraft would have been operating in warmer temperatures at the end of February in comparison with those in December. The engine manufacturer suggested that engine damage could have occurred as a result of operating the engines at low temperatures with the wrong grade of oil. Whilst this may have been the case, it is surprising that any damage did not progress to the point where it became readily apparent during the subsequent flights, via Iceland, to Wick. In fact the pilot did report rough running of the right-hand engine, but the investigation revealed a problem only with the No 4 cylinder compression, which led to replacement of this cylinder. Since the compressions in all the cylinders were presumably assessed during the diagnosis, it must be concluded that any damage in the No 3 cylinder of the right engine was not, at that stage, significant. Ultimately, it was not possible to establish why pistons in both engines had suffered virtually identical types of damage, although it is likely to have been a ‘common mode’ failure, which could include wrong fuel, incorrect mixture settings (running too lean) and existing damage arising from the use of incorrect oil in cold temperatures. The oil analysis excluded the possibility of the aircraft having been mis-fuelled with Jet A-1 at Wick. No conclusion can be drawn regarding the possibility of one of the pilots having leaned the mixtures to an excessive degree, although this would require that either high cylinder head temperature indications were ignored, or that the temperature gauges (or sensors) on both engines were defective. The engines would have begun to fail when the combustion gases started to ‘blow by’ the pistons, causing progressive damage to the piston crowns, skirts and rings. This would have also caused pressurisation of the crankcases, which in turn would have tended to blow oil out of the crankcase breathers. In the case of the left engine, the pressurisation was such that the dipstick was blown out of its tube, resulting in more oil being lost overboard. This may have accounted for the more severe damage to the left engine, having lost more oil than the right. The detached No 1 cylinder base jet oil nozzle in the left engine may have contributed to a slight reduction in the oil pressure, but is otherwise considered to have played no part in the engine failure.
Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 208B Grand Caravan near Kwethluk: 2 killed

Date & Time: Apr 8, 2014 at 1557 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N126AR
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Bethel - Bethel
MSN:
208B-1004
YOM:
2002
Location:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Captain / Total flying hours:
593
Captain / Total hours on type:
1.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
14417
Copilot / Total hours on type:
5895
Aircraft flight hours:
11206
Circumstances:
The check airman was conducting the first company training flight for the newly hired second-in-command (SIC). Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) data showed that, after departure, the airplane began a series of training maneuvers, consistent with normal operations. About 21 minutes into the flight, when the airplane was about 3,400 ft mean sea level, it began a steep descent and subsequently impacted terrain. An airplane performance study showed that the airplane reached a nose-down pitch of about -40 degrees and that the descent rate reached about 16,000 ft per minute. Numerous previous training flights conducted by the check airman were reviewed using archived ADS-B data and interviews with other pilots. The review revealed that the initial upset occurred during a point in the training when the check airman typically simulated an in-flight emergency and descent. Postaccident examination for the airframe and control surfaces showed that the airplane was configured for cruise flight at the time of the initial upset. Examination of the primary and secondary flight control cables indicated that the cables were all intact at the time of impact. Trim actuator measurements showed an abnormal trailing-edge-up, nose-down configuration on both trim tabs. The two elevator trim actuator measurements were inconsistent with each other, indicating that one of the actuators was likely moved during the wreckage recovery. Based on the supporting data, it is likely that one of the actuators indicated the correct trim tab position at the time of impact. Simulated airplane performance calculations showed that, during a pitch trim excursion, the control forces required to counter an anomaly increases to unmanageable levels unless the appropriate remedial procedures are quickly applied. Given the simulated airplane performance calculations, the trim actuator measurements, and the check airman's known training routine, it is likely that the check airman simulated a pitch trim excursion and that the SIC, who lacked experience in the airplane type, did not appropriately respond to the excursion. The check airman did not take remedial action and initiate the recovery procedure in time to prevent the control forces from becoming unmanageable and to ensure that recovery from the associated dive was possible.
Probable cause:
The check airman's delayed remedial action and initiation of a recovery procedure after a simulated pitch trim excursion, which resulted in a loss of airplane control.
Final Report:

Crash of a Lockheed C-130J Hercules near Karauli: 5 killed

Date & Time: Mar 28, 2014
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
KC-3803
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Agra - Gwalior
MSN:
5640
YOM:
2010
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
5
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
5
Circumstances:
The four engine aircraft departed Agra-Kheria Airport at 1000LT on a combined exercice with a second C-130, carrying five crew members. The goal of the mission was to simulate drops at low altitude. At a height of about 300 feet, the aircraft encountered wake turbulences from the preceding airplane. It is believed that the crew attempted to gain height when control was lost. The aircraft crashed in the rocky bed of a river near Karauli. The aircraft was destroyed and all five occupants were killed. Built in 2010 and delivered to IAF in April 2011, the aircraft was one of the six examples ordered by IAF.

Crash of a Socata TBM-700 in the Ridgway Reservoir: 5 killed

Date & Time: Mar 22, 2014 at 1400 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N702H
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Bartlesville – Montrose
MSN:
112
YOM:
1996
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
4
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
5
Captain / Total flying hours:
908
Captain / Total hours on type:
9.00
Aircraft flight hours:
4848
Circumstances:
About 3 months before the accident, the pilot received about 9 hours of flight instruction, including completion of an instrument proficiency check, in the airplane. The accident flight was a personal cross-country flight operated under instrument flight rules (IFR). Radar track data depicted the flight proceeding on a west-southwest course at 15,800 ft mean sea level (msl) as it approached the destination airport. The flight was cleared by the air traffic controller for a GPS approach, passed the initial approach fix, and, shortly afterward, began a descent as permitted by the approach procedure. The track data indicated that the flight became established on the initial approach segment and remained above the designated minimum altitude of 12,000 ft msl. Average descent rates based on the available altitude data ranged from 500 feet per minute (fpm) to 1,000 fpm during this portion of the flight. At the intermediate navigation fix, the approach procedure required pilots to turn right and track a north-northwest course toward the airport. The track data indicated that the flight entered a right turn about 1 mile before reaching the intermediate fix. As the airplane entered the right turn, its average descent rate reached 4,000 fpm. The flight subsequently tracked northbound for nearly 1-1/2 miles. During this portion of the flight, the airplane initially descended at an average rate of 3,500 fpm then climbed at a rate of 1,800 fpm. The airplane subsequently entered a second right turn. The final three radar data points were each located within 505 ft laterally of each other and near the approximate accident site location. The average descent rate between the final two data points (altitudes of 10,100 ft msl and 8,700 ft msl) was 7,000 fpm. About the time that the final data point was recorded, the pilot informed the air traffic controller that the airplane was in a spin and that he was attempting to recover. No further communications were received from the pilot. The airplane subsequently impacted the surface of a reservoir at an elevation of about 6,780 ft and came to rest in 60 ft of water. A detailed postaccident examination of the airframe, engine and propeller assembly did not reveal any anomalies consistent with a preimpact failure or malfunction. The available meteorological data suggested that the airplane encountered clouds (tops about 16,000 ft msl or higher and bases about 10,000 ft msl) and was likely operating in IFR conditions during the final 15 minutes of the flight; however, no determination could be made regarding whether the clouds that the airplane descended through were solid or layered. In addition, the data suggested the possibility of both light icing and light turbulence between 12,000 ft msl and 16,000 ft msl along the flight path. Although the pilot appeared to be managing the flight appropriately during the initial descent, it could not be determined why he was unable to navigate to the approach fixes and maintain control of the airplane as he turned toward the airport and continued the descent.
Probable cause:
The pilot's loss of airplane control during an instrument approach procedure, which resulted in the airplane exceeding its critical angle of attack and entering an inadvertent aerodynamic stall and spin.
Final Report:

Crash of a Piper PA-61 Aerostar (Ted Smith 601) in Aurora: 1 killed

Date & Time: Mar 19, 2014 at 1650 LT
Operator:
Registration:
N90464
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Aurora - Aurora
MSN:
61-0261-051
YOM:
1976
Location:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
26000
Aircraft flight hours:
1975
Circumstances:
The pilot's friend reported that the pilot planned to fly his recently purchased twin-engine airplane over his friend's home to show it to him and another friend. The pilot's friends and several other witnesses reported observing the pilot performing low-level, high-speed aerobatic maneuvers before the airplane collided with trees and then terrain. A 1.75-liter bottle of whiskey was found in the airplane wreckage. A review of the pilot's Federal Aviation Administration medical records revealed that he had a history of alcohol dependence but had reportedly been sober for almost 4 years. Toxicological testing revealed that the pilot had a blood alcohol content of 0.252 milligrams of alcohol per deciliter of blood, which was over six times the limit (0.040) Federal Aviation Regulations allowed for pilots operating an aircraft.
Probable cause:
The pilot's operation of the airplane while intoxicated, which resulted in a loss of airplane control.
Final Report:

Crash of a Boeing 777-2H6ER in the Indian Ocean: 239 killed

Date & Time: Mar 8, 2014 at 0130 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
9M-MRO
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Kuala Lumpur – Beijing
MSN:
28420/404
YOM:
2002
Flight number:
MH370
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
12
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
227
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
239
Captain / Total flying hours:
18423
Captain / Total hours on type:
8559.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
2813
Copilot / Total hours on type:
39
Aircraft flight hours:
53471
Aircraft flight cycles:
7526
Circumstances:
The Boeing 777-2H6ER took off from Kuala Lumpur Airport runway 32R at 0041LT bound for Beijing. Some 40 minutes later, while reaching FL350 over the Gulf of Thailand, radar contact was lost. At this time, the position of the aircraft was estimated 90 NM northeast of Kota Bharu, some 2 km from the IGARI waypoint. More than 4 days after the 'accident', no trace of the aircraft has been found. On the fifth day of operation, several countries were involved in the SAR operations, in the Gulf of Thailand, west of China Sea and on the Malacca Strait as well. All operations are performed in coordination with China, Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia and Philippines. No distress call or any kind of message was sent by the crew. The last ACARS message was received at 0107LT and did not contain any error, failure or technical problems. At 0119LT was recorded the last radio transmission with the crew saying "All right, good night". At 0121LT, the transponder was switched off and the last radar contact was recorded at 0130LT. Several hypothesis are open and no trace of the aircraft nor the occupant have been found up to March 18, 2014. It is now understood the aircraft may flew several hours after it disappeared from radar screens, flying on an opposite direction from the prescribed flight plan, most probably to the south over the Indian Ocean. No such situation was ever noted by the B3A, so it is now capital to find both CVR & DFDR to explain the exact circumstances of this tragic event. Considering the actual situation, all scenarios are possible and all hypothesis are still open. On Mar 24, 2014, the Malaysian Prime Minister announced that according to new computations by the British AAIB based on new satellite data, there is no reasonable doubt that flight MH370 ended in the South Indian Ocean some 2,600 km west of Perth. Given the situation, the Malaysian Authorities believe that there is no chance to find any survivors among the 239 occupants.

***************************

According to the testimony of 6 Swiss Citizens making a cruise between Perth and Singapore via Jakarta, the following evidences were spotted on March 12 while approaching the Sunda Strait:
1430LT - latitude 6° S, longitude 105° E, speed 17,7 knots:
life jacket, food trays, papers, pieces of polystyrene, wallets,
1500LT:
a huge white piece of 6 meters long to 2,5 meters wide with other debris,
1530LT:
two masts one meter long with small flags on top, red and blue,
2030LT - latitude 5° S, longitude 107° E, speed 20,2 knots.

This testimony was submitted by these 6 Swiss Citizens to the Chinese and Australian Authorities.

On April 21, 2016, it was confirmed that this testimony was recorded by the Swiss Police and transmitted to the Swiss Transportation Safety Investigation Board (STSB), the State authority of the Swiss Confederation which has a mandate to investigate accidents and dangerous incidents involving trains, aircraft, inland navigation ships, and seagoing vessels. The link to the STSB is http://www.sust.admin.ch/en/index.html.

***************************

On July 29, 2015, a flaperon was found on a beach of the French Island of La Réunion, in the Indian Ocean. It was quickly confirmed by the French Authorities (BEA) that the debris was part of the Malaysian B777. Other debris have been found since, in Mozambique and South Africa.

On May 12, 2016, Australia's TSB reported that the part has been identified to be a "the decorative laminate as an interior panel from the main cabin. The location of a piano hinge on the part surface was consistent with a work-table support leg, utilised on the exterior of the MAB Door R1 (forward, right hand) closet panel". The ATSB reported that they were not able to identify any feature on the debris unique to MH-370, however, there is no record that such a laminate is being used by any other Boeing 777 customer.

***************************

On September 15, 2016, the experts from the Australian Transportation Safety Bureau (ATSB) have completed their examination of the large piece of debris discovered on the island of Pemba, off the coast of Tanzania, on June 20, 2016. Based on thorough examination and analysis, ATSB with the concurrence of the MH370 Safety Investigation Team have identified the following:
- Several part numbers, along with physical appearance, dimensions, and construction confirmed the piece to be an inboard section of a Boeing 777 outboard flap.
- A date stamp associated with one of the part numbers indicated manufacture on January 23, 2002, which was consistent with the May 31, 2002 delivery date for MH370,
- In addition to the Boeing part number, all identification stamps had a second 'OL' number that were unique identifiers relating to part construction,
- The Italian part manufacturer has confirmed that all numbers located on the said part relates to the same serial number outboard flap that was shipped to Boeing as line number 404,
- The manufacturer also confirmed that aircraft line number 404 was delivered to Malaysian Airlines and registered as 9M-MRO (MH370)

As such, the experts have concluded that the debris, an outboard flap originated from the aircraft 9M-MRO, also known as flight MH370. Further examination of the debris will continue, in hopes that further evidence may be uncovered which may provide new insight into the circumstances surrounding flight MH370.
Probable cause:
Due to lack of evidences the exact cause of the accident could not be determined.
Final Report:

Crash of a Beechcraft 90 King Air in the State of Apure

Date & Time: Mar 3, 2014
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The crew was performing an illegal flight with narcotics on board and entered illegally the Venezuelan airspace. The crew was forced to land in an open field by Venezuela Army Forces and the aircraft crashed, bursting into flames. While the aircraft was destroyed by a post crash fire, the fate of both occupants remains unknown.