Crash of a De Havilland DHC-3 Otter in Campbell River: 8 killed

Date & Time: Sep 27, 1995 at 1910 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
C-FEBX
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Triumph Bay – Campbell River
MSN:
38
YOM:
1954
Country:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
9
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
8
Captain / Total flying hours:
9002
Captain / Total hours on type:
1251.00
Aircraft flight hours:
16428
Circumstances:
The single-engine turbine Otter on amphibious floats departed Triumph Bay, British Columbia, at 1634 Pacific daylight saving time (PDT) with one pilot and nine passengers on board for a visual flight rules (VFR) flight to Campbell River. At 19:01:59 the pilot called Campbell River Flight Service Station (FSS) and reported that he was seven nautical miles (nm) northwest of the airport, inbound for Campbell River. Radar data from Comox indicate that, when this call was made, the aircraft was actually 11 nm northwest of Campbell River, just south of the Narrows (see map, Appendix A). At 19:02:40, the pilot was given the 1900 PDT Campbell River weather observation, which was as follows: ceiling 300 feet overcast and visibility two miles in light rain and fog. The pilot requested a special VFR (SVFR) clearance to enter the Campbell River control zone. Clearance for SVFR was delayed by Comox air traffic control (ATC) until an instrument flight rules (IFR) aircraft on approach to Campbell River had landed. At 19:03:54, the IFR aircraft reported breaking clouds at 900 feet above sea level (asl), which would be approximately 550 feet above ground level, on the ILS approach to runway 11 at Campbell River (airport elevation is 346 feet). This information was acknowledged by the turbine Otter pilot. The IFR aircraft landed at 1904, and the turbine Otter was issued an SVFR clearance at 19:04:45. Radar data indicate that, at that time, the aircraft was about one mile northwest of Tyee Spit, a frequently used, alternate landing site (water) for company aircraft when weather conditions preclude landing at Campbell River airport. Radar data indicate that, at 1906, after passing by Tyee Spit, the aircraft turned southbound and flew directly toward the airport. At about 2 1/2 miles from the airport, at 19:07:40, the aircraft turned right to a heading of approximately 310/ magnetic and flew in that general direction for about two minutes. The aircraft was on a track that was approximately parallel to the extended runway centre line, tracking outbound from the airport with the localizer and the Campbell River (YBL) non-directional beacon (NDB) to the left. The aircraft passed abeam the YBL NDB, which serves as the final approach fix (FAF) for the ILS approach to runway 11, and continued outbound. At 19:09:40, at about three miles outside the beacon, the aircraft turned left to a southerly heading toward the localizer and the YBL NDB. At 19:10:08, the pilot radioed that he was seven miles northwest; this was the last transmission received from the aircraft. At 19:10:25, radar contact was lost. The aircraft crashed into the northwest side of a 1,047-foot mountain at about the 860-foot level, in straight-and-level flight on a heading of 183/ magnetic. The pilot and seven of the passengers received fatal injuries. The two remaining passengers received serious injuries. The accident occurred at 1910 PDT during the hours of official daylight, at latitude 50/01'N, longitude 125/22'W. Official sunset in Campbell River was at 1908, and night was at 1940 PDT.
Probable cause:
The pilot progressively lost situational awareness while attempting to navigate in conditions of low visibility or in cloud and was unaware of the rapidly rising terrain in his flight path. Contributing to this accident were the existing visual flight regulations and the prevailing industry attitudes and practices which did not provide adequate safety margins. Contributing to the severity of the injuries was the detachment of the passenger seats at impact.
Final Report:

Crash of an Antonov AN-24RV in Mörön: 42 killed

Date & Time: Sep 21, 1995 at 1230 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
BNMAU-10103
Survivors:
Yes
Site:
Schedule:
Ulan Bator - Mörön
MSN:
5 73 101 03
YOM:
1975
Flight number:
OM557
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
6
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
37
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
42
Circumstances:
The crew initiated the descent to Mörön Airport in marginal weather conditions when the aircraft struck the slope of a mountain located 12 km from the airport. A passenger was seriously injured while 42 other occupants were killed.
Probable cause:
Controlled flight into terrain after the crew decided to initiate the descent prematurely. Lack of crew discipline and lack of visibility were considered as contributing factors.

Crash of a Fokker 50 in Tawau: 34 killed

Date & Time: Sep 15, 1995 at 1222 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
9M-MGH
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Kota Kinabalu - Tawau
MSN:
20174
YOM:
1990
Flight number:
MH2133
Location:
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
4
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
49
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
34
Captain / Total flying hours:
4892
Captain / Total hours on type:
427.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
1162
Copilot / Total hours on type:
962
Aircraft flight hours:
10848
Aircraft flight cycles:
17483
Circumstances:
Flight MH2133 A Fokker 27 mark 050 bearing registration 9M-MGH was a scheduled domestic flight from Kota Kinabalu to Tawau, Sabah. The departure from Kota Kinabalu was delayed by approximately 30 minutes due to late arrival of the aircraft operated by a different set of flight crew from Labuan. The flight took off from Kota Kinabalu at 0419 hrs on an Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) flight plan via Airway W 423 direct to Tawau Very Omni Range (VOR) at flight level (FL) 170 with 53 persons on board. The departure out of Kota Kinabalu was uneventful and the weather en-route was insignificant. At 0442 hrs the flight established radio contact with Tawau Tower “MH 2133 we are maintaining FL 170, TMA 40, VTW 0505, presently at 94 DME VTW”. The controller then passed the weather for Tawau which was, “surface wind calm, visibility more than 10 km, rain north to north east, scattered 1600 feet and scattered 2700 feet, broken at 14000 feet, Temperature 30 degree C and QNH 1009 mb, Runway 17”. At 0443 hrs another aircraft call sign TSE 809 (a Cessna 206) flying along the same route as MH2133 but at 9500ft established radio contact with Tawau Tower, TSE 809 then reported that the flight was 65 DME from Tawau VOR. This was immediately followed by Tawau Tower asking MH2133 to report position from Tawau VOR which MH 2133 replied “57 DME and requested descent”. The controller then cleared MH 2133 to descend to 10500 feet. At this point in time there was also another aircraft MH2135 (a Boeing 737) heading towards Tawau cruising at FL 230 and cleared by the TOWER to descent to FL 180. MH 2135 was also notified by the TOWER of the Expected Approach Time (EAT) of 0530 hrs. At 0457 hrs TSE 809 reported that the flight was 44 DME from Tawau VOR. On hearing this transmission, MH 2133 requested a lower descend clearance, as it was 30 DME from Tawau VOR. It must be noted that at this juncture, MH 2133 was ahead of TSE 809 but at a higher altitude. The controller then asked TSE 809 whether there was any objection for MH2133 to descent through its level and become number One (1). Despite the fact that TSE 809 had no objection for MH 2133 to become number One (1), MH 2133 was asked by the controller to still maintain 10500 feet. At 0458:23 hrs, MH 2133 asked “MH 2133 confirm maintain 10500 feet?”. TOWER then replied “Affirm maintain 10500 number 2 in traffic”. At 0458:36 hrs MH 2133 again asked “MH 2133, 26 DME confirm we are still number 2?” TOWER then replied- “Station calling…. say again - MH 2133 then repeated “2133 Maam, and are 25 DME maintain 10500, confirm we are number 2?”. TOWER – responded “That’s affirm 2133, Expected Approach Time 0520 hrs”. At 0459:05 hrs MH2133 asked TSE 809 to check position and whether there would be any objection for the aircraft to descend through its level. TSE 809 replied that they had no objection and MH 2133 was subsequently cleared to descend to 7000 feet. The descent into Tawau by MH 2133 from the cruising altitude of 10500 feet was initiated at about 21 DME. The flight crew discussed the descent technique they were going to use and were aware of all their action. At 0501:15 hrs, as the flight reported leaving 9000 feet and passing 16 DME, the flight crew advised the controller that they had the airfield visual. MH2133 was then cleared for visual approach runway 17. At 0502:48 hrs, MH 2133 reported passing 3500 feet. The aircraft was then configured for landing where landing gears were selected down and flaps set at 25 degrees. The aircraft speed was still fast and since it was also high on the approach, the commander assured the co-pilot “Runway is long so no problem Eh”. On passing 2000 feet and on short final, the copilot reminded the commander “speed, speed check, speed check Ah”. The rate of descent was in excess of 3000 feet per minute and its pitch angle was around minus 13 degrees. The excessive rate of descent triggered the aircraft Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) sink rate and pull up warnings. The commander ignored these warnings and insisted that he should continue with approach for a landing. The aircraft first touched down on the runway at 0505 hrs. Its first tyre marks (nose wheel) on the runway was at approximately 3400 ft from the threshold. It then bounced and at 4500 ft point, its left main wheel made a light contact with the runway surface. It subsequently bounced up again and its main wheels made a firm contact at 4800 ft point, thus leaving only 800 ft of runway remaining. The aircraft continued onto the grass verge, momentarily left the ground and hopped over the runway perimeter fence. It subsequently crashed at 571 feet from the end of the runway at almost right angle to the runway. There were a number of explosions followed by a fire. The aircraft was totally destroyed.
Probable cause:
The most probable cause of the accident was due to the commander’s insistence to continue with an approach despite the fact that the runway available after touchdown was not sufficient enough for the aircraft to stop. The perception regarding economic consideration which put pressure on him to save fuel and adhere to schedules was a contributing factor.
Final Report:

Crash of an Antonov AN-26 in Jalalabad: 3 killed

Date & Time: Sep 11, 1995
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
YA-BAO
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Kabul - Jalalabad
MSN:
143 05
YOM:
1985
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
6
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
40
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Circumstances:
On final approach to Jalalabad, both engines failed simultaneously. The aircraft stalled and crashed in a field located few km short of runway 13. Three passengers were killed.
Probable cause:
It is believed that the double engine failure was the consequence of a fuel exhaustion.

Crash of a Casa 212 Aviocar 200 in La Macarena: 22 killed

Date & Time: Sep 9, 1995 at 0715 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
FAC-1152
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Villavicencio - La Macarena
MSN:
306
YOM:
1983
Country:
Crew on board:
4
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
18
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
22
Circumstances:
While approaching La Macarena Airport, the crew encountered poor weather conditions and limited visibility due to rain falls and fog. Unable to establish a visual contact with the airport, the crew initiated a go-around procedure. Few minutes later, a second attempt to land was also abandoned. During a third attempt, the crew failed to realize his altitude was insufficient when the aircraft collided with a hill located about 8 km from the airport and came to rest upside down. A passenger was seriously injured while 21 other occupants were killed. Few days later, the only survivor died from his injuries.

Crash of an Embraer EMB-120RT Brasília in Carrollton: 8 killed

Date & Time: Aug 21, 1995 at 1253 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N256AS
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Atlanta - Gulfport
MSN:
120-122
YOM:
1989
Flight number:
EV529
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
26
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
8
Captain / Total flying hours:
9876
Captain / Total hours on type:
7374.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
1193
Copilot / Total hours on type:
363
Aircraft flight hours:
17151
Aircraft flight cycles:
18171
Circumstances:
Atlantic Southeast Airline Flight 529 was climbing through 18,000 feet, when a blade from the left propeller separated. This resulted in distortion of the left engine nacelle, excessive drag, loss of wing lift, and reduced directional control. The degraded performance resulted in a forced landing. While landing, the airplane passed through trees, impacted the ground, and was further damaged by post impact fire. An exam of the left propeller revealed the blade had failed due to a fatigue crack that originated from multiple corrosion pits in the taper bore surface of the blade spar. The crack had propagated toward the outside of the blade and around both sides of the taper bore. Due to 2 previous blade failures (separations), a borescope inspection procedure had been developed by Hamilton Standard to inspect returned blades (that had rejectable ultrasonic indications) for evidence of cracks, pits and corrosion. The accident blade was one of 490 rejected blades that had been sent to Hamilton Standard for further evaluation and possible repair. Maintenance technicians, who inspected the blade, lacked proper NDI familiarization training and specific equipment to identify the corrosion that resulted in fatigue. The captain and seven passengers were killed.
Probable cause:
The in-flight fatigue fracture and separation of a propeller blade resulting in distortion of the left engine nacelle, causing excessive drag, loss of wing lift, and reduced directional control of
the airplane. The fracture was caused by a fatigue crack from multiple corrosion pits that were not discovered by Hamilton Standard because of inadequate and ineffective corporate inspection and repair techniques, training, documentation, and communications. Contributing to the accident was Hamilton Standard's and FAA's failure to require recurrent on-wing ultrasonic inspections of the affected propellers. Contributing to the severity of the accident was the overcast cloud ceiling at the accident site.
Final Report:

Crash of a GAF Nomad N.22B in Jérémie

Date & Time: Aug 20, 1995 at 1455 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
N4826M
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Port-au-Prince - Jérémie
MSN:
102
YOM:
1979
Flight number:
HXA501
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
12
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
On August 20, 1995, about 1455 Atlantic standard time, a Government Aircraft Facilities N22B, registered to International Jet Center, operated by Hanaer Express as flight 501, collided with trees following loss of control, during the landing roll at the Jeremie Airport, Jeremie, Haiti. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time and a VFR flight plan was filed for the scheduled, domestic, passenger flight. The airplane was substantially damaged and the airline transport-rated captain and first officer, and 12 passengers were not injured. The flight originated about 1405, from the Port-Au-Prince International Airport, Port-Au-Prince, Haiti.
Probable cause:
The pilot not flying (PNF) captain who was seated in the right seat stated that the approach and touchdown were normal. During the landing roll with both propellers in reverse, the left propeller uncommanded came out of reverse. The airplane veered to the right and the first officer attempted to correct with left rudder and brake while the captain moved the right engine power lever from the reverse position. The airplane continued off the runway and the right wing then collided with trees.

Crash of an Embraer EMB-110P1 Bandeirante on Mt Nevado del Huila: 8 killed

Date & Time: Aug 14, 1995 at 0943 LT
Operator:
Registration:
HK-2594
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Neiva - Cali
MSN:
110-310
YOM:
1980
Flight number:
ARE413
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
6
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
8
Captain / Total flying hours:
5892
Captain / Total hours on type:
91.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
451
Copilot / Total hours on type:
187
Aircraft flight hours:
29923
Circumstances:
The twin engine aircraft departed Neiva-Benito Salas Airport at 0922LT on a regular schedule flight to Cali, carrying six passengers and two pilots. After departure, the crew was cleared to climb under VFR to the altitude of 14,500 feet. The last radio communication was recorded at 0940LT and three minutes later, while cruising in clouds at the altitude of 14,271 feet, the aircraft struck the slope of Mt Nevado del Huila (5,750 metres high). SAR operations were initiated but the wreckage was found 10 days later only, at an altitude of 4,350 metres. The aircraft was destroyed and all eight occupants were killed.
Probable cause:
Investigations were unable to determine the exact cause of the accident due to lack of evidences. CVR, FDR, ATC communication and debris analysis failed to determine a possible cause to the accident. The following factors were reported:
- The crew deviated from the planned route,
- Reporting of inaccurate positions on the points that had projected in the Flight Plan,
- Using a route on a flight level that requires the use of oxygen both for individuals and crews.
Final Report:

Crash of a Boeing 737-2H6 on Mt San Vicente: 65 killed

Date & Time: Aug 9, 1995 at 2014 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N125GU
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Miami – Guatemala City – San Salvador – Managua – San José
MSN:
23849
YOM:
1987
Flight number:
GU901
Country:
Crew on board:
7
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
58
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
65
Captain / Total flying hours:
9828
Copilot / Total flying hours:
4696
Aircraft flight hours:
16645
Aircraft flight cycles:
20323
Circumstances:
Following an uneventful flight from Guatemala City, the crew was cleared to start the descent to San Salvador-Comalapa Airport but encountered poor visibility due to the night and heavy rain falls. In thunderstorm activity, the crew was cleared to modify his route while descending to the airport. After being cleared to descend to 5,000 feet, the GPWS alarm sounded. The captain applied full power when the aircraft struck trees and crashed in a dense wooded area located on the Mt San Vicente (Chichontepec Volcano - 2,181 metres high), about 25 km northeast from runway 25 threshold. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all 65 occupants were killed.
Probable cause:
The probable cause of the accident was the flight crew's lack of situational awareness in relation to the 7,159 foot obstruction, the flight crew's decision to descend below the MSA while deviating from a published transition or approach, and the ambiguity of position information between both the flight crew and the air traffic controller which resulted in the controller's issuance of an altitude assignment that did not provide terrain clearance. Contributing to the accident was the failure of the First Officer to direct his concern of reported positions to the Captain in a more direct and assertive manner and the failure of the controller to recognize the aircraft's reported position relative to obstructions and give appropriate instructions/warnings. An ineffective CRM program at Aviateca also contributed to the accident.
Final Report:

Crash of a Britten-Norman BN-2A-21 Islander in Fane

Date & Time: Jul 29, 1995
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
P2-MBM
Survivors:
Yes
MSN:
503
YOM:
1977
Location:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
11
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
On final approach to Fane Airport runway 19, the twin engine aircraft lost height, struck the ground few metres short of runway threshold and came to rest upside down. All 12 occupants were injured and the aircraft was written off. Runway 19 is 1,480 metres long and has a 12° slope. Takeoff and landings can be completed in one direction only.