Crash of a Let L-410UVP in Nyagan

Date & Time: Dec 2, 1996
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
RA-67436
Survivors:
Yes
MSN:
84 11 40
YOM:
1984
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
13
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
On final approach to Nyagan Airport, the crew realized he was not properly aligned with the runway but decided to continue. Upon touchdown, the right wing struck the runway surface. The aircraft rolled left and right for about 800 metres then veered off runway and came to rest in a ravine. All 15 occupants were injured, six seriously.
Probable cause:
It was determined that the aircraft was unstable during final approach for unknown reasons and that the crew failed to initiate a go-around procedure while the landing manoeuvre was obviously missed.

Crash of a De Havilland DHC-6 Twin Otter 300 in Medellín: 14 killed

Date & Time: Nov 30, 1996 at 1032 LT
Operator:
Registration:
HK-2602
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Site:
Schedule:
Medellín – Bahía Solano – Quibdo
MSN:
746
YOM:
1981
Flight number:
VX148
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
13
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
14
Captain / Total flying hours:
4611
Captain / Total hours on type:
3311.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
2060
Copilot / Total hours on type:
733
Aircraft flight hours:
35696
Aircraft flight cycles:
48915
Circumstances:
After takeoff from runway 01 at Medellín-Enrique Olaya Herrera Airport, the aircraft encountered difficulties to gain sufficient height. About three minutes after liftoff, the aircraft struck the slope of Mt Padre Amaya located 8 km from the airport. The wreckage was found 30 metres below the summit. A passenger was found alive while 14 other occupants were killed.
Probable cause:
Failure of the crew in the flight technique applied during the take-off phase, by not evaluating the performance of the aircraft, considering the high weight in front of the obstacles to climb over on the ascent trajectory.
The following contributing factors were reported:
- Errors presented in the dispatch, since the weights were not totaled correctly, possibly due to errors in the handling of cargo and unaccompanied luggage.
- Attitude of complacency on the part of the crew, due to excellent meteorological conditions that caused an excess of confidence in the planning of the flight on the part of the crew.
Final Report:

Crash of a Boeing 767 in Moroni: 125 killed

Date & Time: Nov 23, 1996 at 1515 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
ET-AIZ
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Addis Ababa – Nairobi – Brazzaville – Lagos – Abidjan
MSN:
23916
YOM:
1987
Flight number:
ET961
Region:
Crew on board:
12
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
163
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
125
Captain / Total flying hours:
11525
Captain / Total hours on type:
4067.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
6570
Copilot / Total hours on type:
3042
Aircraft flight hours:
32353
Aircraft flight cycles:
12623
Circumstances:
Ethiopian Airlines flight ET961 had taken off from Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, at 08:09 hours UTC for a scheduled flight to Abidjan, Ivory Coast via Nairobi, Kenya; Brazzaville, Congo; and Lagos, Nigeria. Twenty minutes after takeoff, at about 08:29 UTC, one passenger stood up from his seat and ran up the aisle to the cockpit, and two other passengers followed him heading for the cockpit. While rushing to the cockpit one of the men said "Everybody should be seated, I have a bomb!". Then they opened the cockpit door and stormed in. They declared to the pilots that there were eleven hijackers on board and beat the First Officer and forced him out of the cockpit. They then grabbed the fire axe and fire extinguisher bottle from their respective stowages and ordered the pilot-in-command to change direction and fly to Australia. The pilot-in-command explained to the hijackers that he had not enough fuel to reach Australia and demanded to make a refueling stop at Mombasa. The hijackers refused the refueling stop and continued arguing with the pilot-in-command. They insisted that they had learned from the inflight magazine that the B767 could fly 11 hours without refueling. After passing Dar es Salaam one of the hijackers ordered him to fly away from the coast, head to Australia and indicating to the altimeter not to descend below FL390. The pilot-in-command turned left towards the Comoros Island. The lead hijacker was sitting in the first officer's seat and was fiddling with the aircraft's controls, kicking the rudder, whilst also drinking whisky. The pilot-in-command kept on telling them that he was running short of fuel pointing to the fuel quantity indicators, but the hijackers did not listen. The leader continued fiddling with the controls, trying to turn the aileron and pulling the reverse thrust lever at random. As the flight came over the Comoros Islands the pilot-in-command saw the Moroni International Airport runway and circled 15-20 nm south of the field. Then the LOW FUEL CAUTION came on. The pilot-in-command pleaded to land because of low fuel. The hijackers were unconcerned and only insisted that the pilot not descend below FL390. At about 11:41 UTC the right engine ran down to wind milling speed. The pilot-in-command showed the red warning message for the right engine on the EICAS to the hijacker. At this moment, the hijacker left the right seat and went to the cabin door to discuss with the other two hijackers. This gave the captain the opportunity to pick up his microphone and address the passengers: "....ladies and gentlemen this is your pilot, we have run out of fuel and we are losing one engine this time, and we are expecting crash landing and that is all I have to say. we have lost already one engine, and I ask all passengers to react ..... to the hijackers ....". The hijacker then came back to the cockpit and hit the microphone out of the pilot's hand. After the right engine failed, the pilot started to descend the aircraft in order to increase speed, but the hijacker again interfered and violently played with the controls which resulted in improper control inputs. As a result the autopilot was disconnected and the flight became erratic with the airspeed varying between 216 and 336 kts. As the pilot regained control of the aircraft, the left engine went dead. The hijacker kept on instructing the pilot not to descend and again went to the cabin. Upon returning to the cockpit he saw that the altitude was decreasing, and angrily shouted at the pilot not to go any lower. The pilot said that the fuel was already finished and that the engines were without power. This time the hijacker instructed the captain not to touch the controls, and threatened to kill him. The captain said, "I am already dead because I am flying an airplane without engine power." The first officer, who had earlier been forced out to the First Class cabin, got up and, via the right aisle, went to the rear of the aircraft where he saw that a lot of economy class passengers had their life jackets on and that some had already inflated them. The first officer, along with the cabin crew members, helped the passengers to deflate the life jackets and showed them how the jackets should be re-inflated and how to assume the brace position during impact. While returning to the front of the aircraft, they repeated the same instructions as many times as they could. About less than 2 minutes before the ditching, the co-pilot forced his way to the cockpit shouting "let me help the pilot ...". After adjusting his seat and seat belts the pilot asked him for help since the controls were heavy. The hijackers still kept on struggling with the controls. By now, the aircraft was descending into the Indian Ocean over the Comoros Islands. The aircraft now had only standby instruments and RAT (Ram Air Turbine). The altimeter was indicating 150 feet and the airspeed was 200 kts. By this time the flight crew had been left alone to assume control. They turned the aircraft to the left in order to parallel the waves. However, the aircraft brushed the water in a left-wing-low attitude. It was then held straight and level after which it broke into four sections and came to rest in the sheltered waters 500 metres off Le Galawa Beach. Of the 175 occupants, 6 crew members and 119 passengers were fatally injured in the accident. Six crew members and 38 passengers sustained serious injuries, 2 passengers sustained minor injuries and 4 passengers received no injury.
Probable cause:
The Investigation Committee determines that the cause of this accident was unlawful interference by the hijackers which resulted in loss of engines thrust due to fuel exhaustion.
Final Report:

Crash of an Antonov AN-32A in Baykit

Date & Time: Nov 22, 1996 at 1306 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
RA-48104
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Tura – Vanavara – Baykit – Yeniseysk
MSN:
16 02
YOM:
1988
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
5
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
22
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The aircraft was damaged beyond repair when it veered off runway and the crew tried to get back on the runway without help. The aircraft went out of control, crossed the runway and hit the mast of a powerline and a parapet with more than 3.5 g, suffering structural damage. All 5 crew members and 22 passengers (19 of them illegal ones) escaped unhurt.

Crash of a Beechcraft 1900C-1 in Quincy: 12 killed

Date & Time: Nov 19, 1996 at 1701 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N87GL
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Chicago – Burlington – Quincy
MSN:
UC-087
YOM:
1989
Flight number:
UA5925
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
10
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
12
Captain / Total flying hours:
4000
Captain / Total hours on type:
700.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
1950
Copilot / Total hours on type:
800
Aircraft flight hours:
18446
Aircraft flight cycles:
26797
Circumstances:
The Beechcraft 1900C, N87GL, was in its landing roll on runway 13, and the Beechcraft A90, N1127D, was in its takeoff roll on runway 04. The collision occurred at the intersection of the two runways. The flight crew of the Beechcraft 1900C had made appropriate efforts to coordinate the approach and landing through radio communications and visual monitoring; however they mistook a Cherokee pilot's transmission (that he was holding for departure on runway 04) as a response from the Beechcraft A90 to their request for the Beechcraft A90's intentions, and therefore mistakenly believed that the Beechcraft A90 was not planning to take off until after the Beechcraft 1900C had cleared the runway. The failure of the Beechcraft A90 pilot to announce over the common traffic advisory frequency his intention to take off created a potential for collision between the two airplanes.
Probable cause:
The failure of the pilots in the King Air A90 to effectively monitor the common traffic advisory frequency or to properly scan for traffic, resulting in their commencing a takeoff roll when the Beechcraft 1900C (United Express flight 5925) was landing on an intersecting runway. Contributing to the cause of the accident was the Cherokee pilot's interrupted radio transmission, which led to the Beechcraft 1900C pilot's misunderstanding of the transmission as an indication from the King Air that it would not take off until after flight 5925 had cleared the runway. Contributing to the severity of the accident and the loss of life were the lack of adequate aircraft rescue and firefighting services and the failure of the air stair door on the Beechcraft 1900C to be opened.
Final Report:

Crash of a Tupolev TU-134B-3 in Đà Nẵng

Date & Time: Nov 16, 1996
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
VN-A114
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
MSN:
66220
YOM:
1984
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
0
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
While taxiing at Đà Nẵng Airport, the nose gear collapsed and apparently punctured the cockpit, injuring a crew member. The aircraft was considered as damaged beyond repair.

Crash of a PZL-Mielec AN-2T in Most Pyssa: 14 killed

Date & Time: Nov 14, 1996 at 1302 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
RA-40309
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Koslan – Vazgort – Puchkoma – Chuprova – Vazgort – Most Pyssa – Koslan
MSN:
1G221-39
YOM:
1986
Flight number:
410
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
13
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
14
Circumstances:
While parked at Most Pyssa for a short period of time (a 20 minutes stop), on a flight from Vazgort to Koslan, weather conditions deteriorated with snow falls. The crew failed to remove the snow from the aircraft prior to departure. After takeoff, while climbing, the crew initiated a turn to the left when the aircraft stalled and crashed in a wooded area, bursting into flames. The copilot survived while 14 other occupants were killed.
Probable cause:
The crew decided to takeoff without proceeding to a pre-departure cleaning of the aircraft that was contaminated with snow. At low height and speed, the aircraft stalled during the first turn and crashed.

Crash of an Ilyushin II-76TD in Charkhi Dadri: 37 killed

Date & Time: Nov 12, 1996 at 1840 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
UN-76435
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Shymkent - New Delhi
MSN:
10234 13428
YOM:
1992
Flight number:
KZA1907
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
10
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
27
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
37
Captain / Total flying hours:
9229
Captain / Total hours on type:
1488.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
6822
Copilot / Total hours on type:
409
Aircraft flight hours:
2643
Circumstances:
The Ilyushin II-76TD departed Shymkent Airport on a regular schedule service (flight KZA1907) to New Delhi-Indira Gandhi, carrying 27 passengers and 10 crew members. Following an uneventful flight, the crew was cleared to start the descent to New Delhi via route G452 and was instructed to maintain FL150. At 1833LT, a Boeing 747-168B operated by Saudi Arabian Airlines (Saudia) departed New Delhi-Indira Gandhi Airport on a flight to Jeddah (flight SV763) with an intermediate stop in Dhahran, carrying 289 passengers and 23 crew members. After takeoff, its crew was instructed to climb to FL140 via the same route G452. For unknown reasons, the Kazair crew continued the descent below FL150 until both aircraft faced each other and collided at 1840LT at FL140, seven minutes after the B747 takeoff. After the collision, both aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed in an open field located about 3 km Charkhi Dadri, some 80 km west of New Delhi-Indira Gandhi Airport. Both aircraft were destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire and all 349 occupants in both aircraft were killed.
Probable cause:
It was determined that the collision was the consequence of the failure of the Kazair crew to follow the assigned altitude of 15,000 feet while approaching New Delhi. The crew of the Kazair II-76 was instructed by ATC to continue the descent to Indira Gandhi Airport via the same route G452 but at an altitude of 15,000 feet (14,000 feet for the Saudia B747). For unknown reasons, the Kazair crew continued the descent below FL150 without clearance until both aircraft faced each other and collided. During the minutes preceding the accident, both Kazair and Saudia crew have been informed by ATC about other traffic.
Final Report:

Crash of a Boeing 747-168B in Charkhi Dadri: 312 killed

Date & Time: Nov 12, 1996 at 1840 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
HZ-AIH
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
New Delhi - Dhahran - Jeddah
MSN:
22748
YOM:
1982
Flight number:
SV763
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
23
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
289
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
312
Captain / Total flying hours:
9837
Captain / Total hours on type:
104.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
7779
Copilot / Total hours on type:
1952
Aircraft flight hours:
40035
Aircraft flight cycles:
14927
Circumstances:
The aircraft departed New Delhi-Indira Gandhi Airport at 1833LT on a flight to Jeddah with an intermediate stop in Dhahran, carrying 289 passengers and 23 crew members. After takeoff, the crew was instructed to climb to FL140 via route G452. Seven minutes after takeoff, while cruising at an altitude of 14,000 feet, the aircraft collided with a Kazakhstan Airlines (Kazair) Ilyushin II-76TD that was descending to New Delhi Airport. Registered UN-76435, it was completing flight KZA1907 from Shymkent with 27 passengers and 10 crew members on board. After the collision, both aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed in an open field located about 3 km Charkhi Dadri, some 80 km west of New Delhi-Indira Gandhi Airport. Both aircraft were destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire and all 349 occupants in both aircraft were killed.
Probable cause:
It was determined that the collision was the consequence of the failure of the Kazair crew to follow the assigned altitude of 15,000 feet while approaching New Delhi. The crew of the Kazair II-76 was instructed by ATC to continue the descent to Indira Gandhi Airport via the same route G452 but at an altitude of 15,000 feet (14,000 feet for the Saudia B747). For unknown reasons, the Kazair crew continued the descent below FL150 without clearance until both aircraft faced each other and collided. During the minutes preceding the accident, both Kazair and Saudia crew have been informed by ATC about other traffic.
Final Report:

Crash of a Boeing 727-231 off Ejirin: 144 killed

Date & Time: Nov 7, 1996 at 1703 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
5N-BBG
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Port Harcourt - Lagos
MSN:
20054
YOM:
1969
Flight number:
ADK086
Location:
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
10
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
134
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
144
Aircraft flight hours:
64956
Aircraft flight cycles:
44613
Circumstances:
After takeoff from Port Harcourt Airport, the crew was cleared to climb to FL240. At 15:47 the flight established initial contact with Lagos Approach Control, and was assigned a transponder code. At 15:54 the flight reported crossing SEPER point. After this position report, the flight appeared not to be maintaining a listening watch, as it gave no reply to two consecutive calls from Approach Control, and then after some time replied to a transmission not meant for it. At the same time a Triax Airlines Boeing 727 (Flight TIX185) had departed Lagos and was flying at FL160 towards Enugu. The Lagos controller had terminated contact with the Triax aircraft when the ADC crew requested to descend. The permission to descend was delayed to allow a corporate jet (5N-APN) to pass beneath the 727 at FL210. At 15:59 Lagos Approach Control then cleared the flight to FL160 and subsequently requested the flight to contact Lagos Radar. The flight was identified by Lagos Radar 41 miles south-east of the airport, and instructed it to fly the heading of 320° to avoid Triax flight 185, and to descend to FL50. At 16:02.50 Lagos Radar instructed the aircraft two times in succession to maintain heading 300. The captain then took over control from the copilot by stating: "I have it." At 16:03.08 the flight reported: "I have the traffic... and I continue my heading to 330 to avoid him". This was the last transmission. The records of the FDR show that flight 086 was maintaining a steady coordinated turn towards heading 330 for the first 10 seconds of the last 50 seconds of the flight. After 15 seconds, the airplane was put in bank angle of 43.2°. It maintained this configuration for 10 seconds before the bank angle increased to 68.8 degrees. This attitude was observed for 5.5 seconds before it was further increased to 83 degrees. The airplane must have suffered from high speed stall and gone into a roll with a nose down attitude. The aircraft appeared to be recovering just before it impacted the lagoon water because it succeeded in reducing the vertical acceleration from 8.44 to 2.1 G and the bank angle to 61.6°. But it did not have sufficient height to make a full recovery and crashed in the lagoon about 7,5 km west of Ejirin. The wreckage was found in the afternoon of the following day. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all 144 occupants were killed.
Probable cause:
It was determined that the accident was the consequence of the untidy traffic separation by the radar controller which resulted from the vectoring of ADK086 towards the track of the opposite traffic TIX185. The error of judgement by the pilot of ADK086 to continue his turn to heading 330 to avoid TIX185 and his subsequent collision avoidance manoeuvre constituted the remote causes of this accident.