Scheduled Revenue Flight

As the flight made a visual approach to the airport from the south over the sea, at night, the pilot changed his navigation radio from the VOR to the ILS system for runway 10 and lost DME reading from the VOR located on a hill north of the localizer course. The localizer showed the flight was south of the localizer course, and without DME from the VOR the pilot believed he was much closer to the island and the airport than the aircraft actually was. As the pilot attempted to make visual contact with the airport and maintain clearance from the hills he allowed the aircraft to descend and crash into the sea about 3 miles southwest of the airport. The pilot had not filed a FAA flight plan for the scheduled commuter flight. The pilot had been flying the route for 5 days and had no previous experience in the area. The pilot reported he had no mechanical malfunctions with the aircraft systems, flight controls, or engines. No FAA Operations inspectors had conducted surveillance on the company's flight operations in the Caribbean since service had begun in December 1996.

After touchdown at Uruapan-General Ignacio López Rayón Airport, the crew started the braking procedure and activated the reverse thrust systems when control was lost. The aircraft veered off runway to the right, lost a landing gear and came to rest. All 12 occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The aircraft was completing a flight from Norilsk to Krasnoyarsk with intermediate stops in Podkamenaya Tunguska and Shushenskoye, carrying 23 passengers and 4 crew members on behalf of KrasAir (Krasnoyarskie Avialinii). While approaching Shushenskoye, the crew encountered poor weather conditions with a visibility limited to 400 metres due to snow falls. In such conditions, the crew lost his orientation and was unable to locate the destination airport. The captain decided to attempt an emergency landing when the aircraft crash landed in the taiga about 18 km from the airport. All 27 occupants were rescued, among them one passenger was slightly injured. The aircraft was written off.

The Propair Inc. Super King Air 200 (serial number BB-153), with two pilots and ten passengers on board, was preparing to make a charter flight under instrument flight rules from Sept-Îles to Dorval, Quebec. At 1700 eastern standard time (EST), the co-pilot, in the left seat, began the take-off roll on runway 09. At an indicated airspeed of about 90 knots, 5 knots below rotation speed (VR), the aircraft began to drift to the left, toward the runway edge. The copilot attempted unsuccessfully to correct the take-off track using the rudder. At around 100 knots, just before the aircraft exited the runway, the co-pilot pulled the elevator control all the way back and initiated a climb. At about the same moment, the pilot-in-command throttled back, believing that a collision with the snowbank at the runway edge was inevitable. The aircraft descended until it struck the snow-covered surface to the north of the runway and slid on its belly before coming to rest on a heading opposite to the take-off heading. The pilot-in-command was slightly injured. The aircraft sustained considerable damage. The occupants used the main door to evacuate the aircraft.

After touchdown, the crew started the braking procedure when the aircraft went out of control, veered off runway and came to rest in a ditch. All 21 occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The flight was being vectored for the approach to runway 3R at Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport (DTW) when the aircraft descended and impacted the ground. The aircraft struck the ground in a steep nose-down attitude in a level field in a rural area about 19 nm southwest of DTW. The flight carried 26 passengers and 3 crew members. There were no survivors and the airplane was destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. The investigation revealed that it was likely that the airplane gradually accumulated a thin, rough glaze/mixed ice coverage on the leading edge deicing boot surfaces, possibly with ice ridge formation on the leading edge upper surface, as the airplane descended from 7,000 feet mean sea level (msl) to 4,000 feet msl in icing conditions, which may have been imperceptible to the pilots. The pilots had been instructed by air traffic control to slow to 150 knots and according to flight data recorder information, the airplane began to show signs of departure from controlled flight as it decelerated from 155 to 156 knots while in a flaps-up configuration. The investigation disclosed that the FAA failed to adopt a systematic and proactive approach to the certification, and operational issues of turbopropeller-driven transport airplane icing. The icing certification process has been inadequate because it has not required manufacturers to demonstrate the airplane's flight handling and stall characteristics under a sufficiently realistic range of adverse ice accretion/flight handling conditions. The aircraft manufacturer had issued a revision in April, 1996 to the approved flight manual which included activation of the leading edge deicing boots at the first sign of ice formation. The airplane operator did not incorporate the procedure, because it was contrary to the company's trained procedures and practices and of the belief that enacting the changes would result in potentially unsafe operation. Investigators' discussion with management personnel at each of the seven U.S.-based operators of the aircraft indicated that at the time of the accident only two of these operators had changed their procedures to reflect the information in the revision. The FAA, at the time of the accident, did not require manufacturers of all turbine-engine driven airplanes to publish minimum airspeed information for various flap configurations and phases and conditions of flight. During Safety Board investigators postaccident interviews with company pilots, there were inconsistent answers on the complex and varied minimum airspeed requirements established by the company for both icing and nonicing conditions. It was also noted that the pilots uncertainty of the appropriate airspeeds might have been associated with the language used, the different airspeeds and criteria contained in the guidance, the company's methods of distribution, and the company's failure t o incorporate the guidance as a formal, permanent revision to the flight standards manual.

At about 1038 hours on Tuesday 7 January 1997, Polynesian Airlines’ DHC-6 (Twin Otter) 5W FAU collided with the western slopes of Mt Vaea, Apia, in conditions of low cloud and heavy rain. The aeroplane was on a scheduled flight from Pago Pago to Fagali’i, and was being flown to Fagali’i by visual reference after having made an instrument approach to Faleolo. The captain and two passengers lost their lives in the accident. The first officer and one passenger survived.

After landing at Kupang-El Tari Airport, the twin engine aircraft went out of control, veered off runway, lost its left wing and came to rest. All six occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Shortly after takeoff from Banjarmasin-Syamsudin Noor Airport, while climbing, the crew informed ATC about an engine fire and was cleared to return for an emergency landing. On final approach, the aircraft became unstable, rolled left and right then lost height and crashed on a factory located 2 km short of runway. A passenger was seriously injured while 16 other occupants as well as two people in the factory were killed.

On final approach to Fort Chipewayn Airport, the twin engine aircraft was unstable and rolling left and right. Upon landing, the right propeller struck the runway surface. The right engine partially torn off and the right wing was severely bent. The aircraft came to a halt few dozen metres further. All 14 occupants escaped uninjured.