Crash of an Ilyushin II-18V in Sverdlovsk: 107 killed

Date & Time: Nov 16, 1967 at 2103 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
CCCP-75538
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Sverdlovsk – Tashkent
MSN:
184 0070 02
YOM:
1964
Flight number:
SU2230
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
8
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
99
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
107
Aircraft flight hours:
5326
Aircraft flight cycles:
2111
Circumstances:
After takeoff from Sverdlovsk-Koltsovo Airport, while climbing by night at a height of some 150 meters, one of the engine failed. For unknown reason, the crew was unable to shut down the engine and feather its propeller. Due to high drag, the airplane banked right then started an uncontrolled descent until it crashed at a speed of 440 km/h in a field located 2,900 meters past the runway end. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and debris were found on a distance of 320 meters. None of the 107 occupants survived the crash. The accident occurred one minute after rotation.
Probable cause:
The exact cause of the engine failure could not be determined. However, it was reported that the engine failure occurred at a critical stage of flight, which was considered as a contributing factor.

Crash of a Boeing 707-131 in Cincinnati: 1 killed

Date & Time: Nov 6, 1967 at 1841 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N742TW
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
New York – Cincinnati – Los Angeles
MSN:
17669
YOM:
1959
Flight number:
TW159
Crew on board:
7
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
29
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
18753
Captain / Total hours on type:
6204.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
1629
Copilot / Total hours on type:
830
Aircraft flight hours:
26319
Circumstances:
TWA Flight 159 was a scheduled domestic flight from New York to Los Angeles with an intermediate stop at the Greater Cincinnati Airport. It departed the ramp at Cincinnati at 1833 hours Eastern Standard Time. As it was approaching runway 27L for take-off, Delta Air Lines, Inc., DC-9, N-3317L, operating as Flight DAL 379, was landing. As DAL 379 was completing its landing roll, the crew requested and received clearance for a 180° turnaround on the runway in order to return to the intersection of runway 18-36 which they had just passed. After turning through approximately 90°, the nosewheel slipped off the paved surface and the aircraft moved straight ahead off the runway during which time it became mired. The throttles were retarded to idle, and power was not increased again. At 1839:05 hours as DAL 379 was in the process of clearing the runway, TWA 159 was cleared for take-off. The local controller testified that before TWA 159 began moving, he observed that DAL 379 had stopped. He stated that although DAL 379 appeared to be clear of the runway, he requested confirmation from the crew who replied, "Yeah, we're in the dirt, though." Following this report the controller stated "TWA 159 he's clear of the runway, cleared for take-off, company jet on final behind you." Take- off performance had been computed as V1 132 knots, VR 140 knots, V2 150 knots. In fact DAL 379 was stopped on a heading of 004' and located 4 600 ft from the threshold of runway 27L with its aft-most point being approximately 7 ft north of the runway edge, the aft-most exterior lights located on the wing tip and the upper and lower anti-collision lights being approximately 45 ft from the runway edge. The crew of TWA 159 did not have DAL 379 in sight when they commenced the take-off roll. The co-pilot was performing the take-off and the pilot-in-command drew his attention to DAL 379 as the aircraft appeared in their landing lights they could see that it was off the runway by Some 5-7 ft. As TWA 159 passed abeam of DAL 379 the co-pilot experienced a movement of the flight controls and the aircraft yawed. Simultaneously there was a loud bang from the right side of the aircraft. The last airspeed he had observed was 120 knots and assuming that the aircraft was at or near V1, and that a collision had occurred, he elected to abort the take-off . He stated that he closed the power levers, placed them in full reverse, applied maximum braking, and called for the spoilers which the pilot-in-command operated. Directional control was maintained but the aircraft ran off the end of the runway, rolled across the terrain for approximately 225 ft, to the brow of a hill, and became airborne momentarily. It next contacted the ground approximately 67 ft further down the embankment, the main landing gear was torn off and the nosewheel was displaced rearward, forcing the cabin floor upward by approximately 15 in. The aircraft slid down the embankment and came to rest on a road approximately 421 ft from the end of the runway. The accident occurred at approximately 1841 hours, in darkness. A passenger was killed, another was seriously injured, five others were slightly injured. The aircraft was written off.
Probable cause:
The Board determined that the probable cause of the accident was the inability of the TWA crew to abort successfully their take-off at the speed attained prior to the attempted abort. The abort was understandably initiated because of the co-pilot's belief that his plane had collided with a Delta aircraft stopped just off the runway. A contributing factor was the action of the Delta crew in advising the tower that their plane was clear of the runway without carefully ascertaining the facts, and when in fact their aircraft was not at a safe distance under the circumstance of another aircraft taking off on that runway.
Final Report:

Crash of a Convair CV-880-22M-3 in Hong Kong: 1 killed

Date & Time: Nov 5, 1967 at 1035 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
VR-HFX
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Hong Kong - Saigon - Bangkok
MSN:
22-00-37M
YOM:
1963
Flight number:
CX033
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
11
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
116
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
7031
Captain / Total hours on type:
1320.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
6812
Copilot / Total hours on type:
1107
Aircraft flight hours:
11369
Circumstances:
Flight CX033 was a scheduled flight from Hong Kong to Bangkok with an additional en-route stop at Saigon to transport a backlog of passengers. A Check captain joined the flight. The co-pilot was flying the aircraft from the left-hand seat whilst the pilot-in-command occupied the right-hand seat to assess his performance. The Check captain occupied the jump seat behind the co-pilot from where he could monitor the performance of both pilots. At 10:31 the aircraft commenced to taxi out for takeoff on runway 13. A wind check of 010/10 kt was passed by the tower and acknowledged by the aircraft when the takeoff clearance was given. At 10:34 a rolling takeoff was commenced. The co-pilot, who was piloting the aircraft, increased the power to 1.5 EPR after which the engineer set the engines at maximum power. The aircraft accelerated normally but at a speed of slightly under 120 kt (as reported by the co-pilot) heavy vibration was experienced. The vibration increased in severity and the co-pilot decided to discontinue the takeoff. He called "abort", closed the power levers, applied maximum symmetrical braking and selected the spoilers. The abort action was stated to have been taken promptly except that there was a delay of 4-5 sec in applying reverse thrust which was then used at full power throughout the remainder of the aircraft's travel. No significant decrease in the rate of acceleration occurred until after an indicated airspeed of 133 kt had been attained, there was then a slow build-up of speed to 137 kt over the next 2 sec after which deceleration commenced. Both pilots were applying full brakes but neither of them felt the antiskid cycling. The aircraft continued to run straight some distance after initial braking was applied but then a veer to the right commenced. Opposite rudder was used but failed to check this forcing the use of differential braking to the extent that eventually the right brake had been eased off completely, whilst maximum left braking, full left rudder, full lateral control to the left, and nose-wheel steering were being applied, These actions were only partly effective and the aircraft eventually left the runway and entered the grass strip. The turn to the right continued until finally the aircraft crossed the seawall. All four engines separated on impact with, the sea, the nose of the aircraft was smashed in and the fuselage above floor level between the flight deck and the leading edge of the wing was fractured in two places. The aircraft spun to the right and came to rest some 400 ft from the seawall. A passenger was killed while 33 other were injured.
Probable cause:
The probable cause of the accident was:
- Loss of directional control developing from separation of the right nose-wheel tread,
- Inability to stop within the normally adequate runway distance available due to use of differential braking, impaired performance and an increase in tailwind component and aircraft weight over those used in calculating the aircraft's accelerate/stop performance.
Final Report:

Crash of a Sud-Aviation SE-210 Caravelle 10R in Haslemere: 37 killed

Date & Time: Nov 4, 1967 at 2202 LT
Operator:
Registration:
EC-BDD
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Málaga – London
MSN:
202
YOM:
1966
Flight number:
IB062
Region:
Crew on board:
7
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
30
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
37
Circumstances:
Iberia flight IB062 left Málaga, Spain, at 19:30 UTC on a flight to London-Heathrow Airport, United Kingdom. The weather at the time was slightly misty with intermittent drizzle but there was reasonable visibility. The aircraft was cleared to descend to FL210 after passing latitude 50 °N and was given a routing via Ibsley and Dunsfold. After passing conflicting traffic, the aircraft was recleared to FL110 and directed to turn right on to 060° for Dunsfold. Passing abeam Fawley the aircraft was further cleared to FL60 and, in acknowledging this instruction, the crew reported leaving FL145. Just under 4 minutes later the aircraft was cleared to proceed direct to Epsom on its own navigation. The flight crew acknowledgement this instruction. All the while the aircraft had been in a continuous descent, until it impacted trees on the southern slope of Blackdown Hill, approximately 48 km south-southwest of Heathrow Airport. The aircraft continued for hundreds of yards, passing across a meadow where it killed 65 grazing sheep. It then broke through a large hedge and parts of the aircraft fell off destroying a garage, and damaging parts of the roof of Upper Blackdown House as the aircraft disintegrated. None of the 37 occupants survived the crash.
Probable cause:
Accident investigators failed to find the reason for the continued descent. A possible misreading of the altimeters was examined in detail. The aircraft was fitted with three-pointer altimeters with warnings to indicate when the aircraft was below 10,000ft. The aircraft descended continuously at a steady rate over a period of 13 1/2 minute and the pointers would have been in continuous motion throughout, increasing the likelihood of misreading. The cross hatching in this type of altimeter first appears in a window in the 10,000ft disc at an indicated altitude of 26,666ft and the edge of the cross hatching would have been visible within 2 minutes of the aircraft beginning its descent. At 10,000 feet the cross hatching completely fills the window and it remains filled as long as the aircraft is below 10,000ft. Thus the cross hatching would have been visible to the crew for a period of about 9 1/2 minutes before the aircraft passed through FL60. According to the investigation report, it is not difficult to read an indication of 6,000ft as 16,000ft with this type of altimeter if particular note is not made of the position of the 10,000ft pointer. Evidence against the possibility of a simple misreading of this sort is the message from the aircraft to ATC reporting passing FL145. indicating that at this time the crew knew that they were below 16,000ft. This evidence indicates that down to this level there had been no misreading or misinterpretation but it does not dispose of the possibility that the crew subsequently suffered a mental loss of sequence and transposed themselves in time and space back to some altitude above 16,000ft. This has been known to, happen in the past, the investigators noted. Nevertheless, there is no evidence to show that it happened on this occasion. In conclusion, the accident was due to the aircraft having continued to descend through its assigned flight level down to the ground. No reason could be established for the continued descent.

Crash of a Handley Page HPR.7 Dart Herald 214 in Curitiba: 21 killed

Date & Time: Nov 3, 1967 at 1130 LT
Operator:
Registration:
PP-SDJ
Survivors:
Yes
Site:
Schedule:
São Paulo – Curitiba
MSN:
190
YOM:
1965
Country:
Crew on board:
5
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
20
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
21
Captain / Total flying hours:
14104
Captain / Total hours on type:
2568.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
5963
Copilot / Total hours on type:
2021
Aircraft flight hours:
3191
Circumstances:
The aircraft, registration PP-SDJ, took off from São Paulo-Congonhas Airport, at 1015 hours Z, with Curitiba-Afonso Pena, Paraná, as its destination, carrying five crew members and twenty passengers. In accordance with its approved IFR flight plan, the aircraft was to fly Airway Green 3 at flight level 130, and at a speed of 300 km/h. The flight time on the São Paulo-Curitiba segment was estimated to be 1:00 hour. After the take-off from São Paulo the flight proceeded in accordance with the approved flight plan in visual meteorological conditions (VMC) as far as the vicinity of Paranagul. There the aircraft changed to instrument flight (IMC) in moderate turbulence. At that moment one of the ADF was set on the Paranagul marine NDB (NX-320 kc/s) and the other on the Paranagud NDB (PG-340 kc/s). Without a correct fix being obtained over Paranagua the position report was transmitted at 1117 hours Z to Curitiba Control and the aircraft changed heading, approaching Curitiba on a magnetic heading of 283°. The ADFs were then set respectively on the frequencies of the Curitiba NDB (CT-390 kc/s) and the Bacacheri NDB (BI-300 kc/s). The pilots found it necessary to change the ADF frequencies several times on the São Paulo-Curitiba segment and finally one ADF was set on the Curitiba NDB and the other on Broadcasting Station ZYM-5 (560 kc/s). In reply to the position report Curitiba Control cleared the aircraft to descend to flight level 70 and report when having the Bacacheri NDB at 30°: the aircraft flew in IMC conditions and moderate turbulence with its airborne radar and VOR switched off. At 1126 hours Z the pilot reported his position to Curitiba Control as having the Bacacheri NDB at 30° and he was instructed to proceed and hold above Curitiba NDB and descend to flight level 50. At 1128 hours Z the pilot reported over Curitiba NDB and initiated the downwind leg (IFR descent pattern phase for touchdown on Curitiba-Afonso Pena runway 15). After this radio message the aircraft left the magnetic heading 283° relating to the São Paulo-Curitiba segment to intercept the downwind leg on a heading of 359° in the descent pattern. Seventeen seconds later when the aircraft had executed approximately 45° of a turn to the right, it collided on a heading of 325° with a hill at an altitude of 4 635 ft. At the moment of impact the aircraft was executing a turn with slight bank to the right. Two crew members and two passengers survived while 21 other occupants were killed. The aircraft was destroyed.
Probable cause:
The accident was then consequence of pilot error through improper procedure in instrument flight. The following contributing factors were reported:
- Lack of a dynamic programme for aircraft accident prevention,
- Non-confirmation over Curitiba-Afonso Pena NDB,
- Inaccurate position relative to Curitiba-Bacacheri NDB,
- Failure to use VOR equipment,
- Failure to execute all the phases of the descent, with assumed interception of downwind leg without confirmation of position,
- Momentary radio-direction finding indication of inaccurate fix.
Final Report:

Crash of a Douglas DC-3 in Vietnam: 16 killed

Date & Time: Oct 24, 1967
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
B-1541
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Phan Rang - Pleiku
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
13
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
16
Circumstances:
Crashed in unknown circumstances somewhere in Vietnam while completing a flight from Phan Rang to Pleiku. All 16 occupants were killed.

Crash of a PZL-Mielec AN-2TP in Vetluga: 14 killed

Date & Time: Oct 20, 1967 at 0935 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
CCCP-29320
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Gorki – Vetluga – Kalinina – Sharya
MSN:
1G77-03
YOM:
25
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
18
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
14
Aircraft flight hours:
997
Aircraft flight cycles:
1626
Circumstances:
After liftoff at Vetluga Airport, while climbing, the aircraft stalled and struck the runway surface. The undercarriage were torn off and the airplane crashed in flames. Twelve passengers and both pilots were killed while six other passengers were injured. The aircraft was destroyed.
Probable cause:
MTOW exceeded by 680 kg and the CofG being out of the envelope, too far aft, caused the aircraft to stall on takeoff. The crew decided to takeoff with 18 passengers, well above the permissible number.

Crash of a Douglas C-47B-45-DK in São Paulo

Date & Time: Oct 14, 1967
Operator:
Registration:
PP-VBH
Survivors:
Yes
MSN:
17036/34301
YOM:
1945
Country:
Crew on board:
0
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
Suffered a ground accident at an unknown airport in São Paulo. There were no casualties.

Crash of a De Havilland DH.106 Comet 4B off Demre: 66 killed

Date & Time: Oct 12, 1967 at 0325 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
G-ARCO
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
London - Athens - Nicosia - Cairo
MSN:
6449
YOM:
1961
Flight number:
BE284
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
7
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
59
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
66
Captain / Total flying hours:
14563
Captain / Total hours on type:
2637.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
6318
Copilot / Total hours on type:
2471
Aircraft flight hours:
15470
Circumstances:
G-ARCO left London-Heathrow Airport at 2145 hours on 11 October 1967, operating British European Airways (BEA) flight BE284 to Athens. It carried 38 passengers and 2 154 kg of freight, including 920 kg for Nicosia. The aircraft arrived at Athens at 0111 hours on 12 October and reached its parking area on the apron at about 0115 hours. Six Athens passengers were disembarked. At Athens the flight became Cyprus Airways flight CY 284 for Nicosia. Four passengers and the captain remained on board the aircraft whilst it was refuelled and serviced for the flight to Nicosia. The Captain and the two First Officers continued with the aircraft but the cabin staff was changed, the new staff being those of Cyprus Airways. Twenty-seven passengers joined the aircraft at Athens for the flight to Nicosia. From the evidence of the BEA and Olympic Airways staff at Athens the aircraft's transit was normal. It was refuelled to .a total of approximately 17 000 kg and only one minor defect, relating to the Captain's beam compass, was recorded in the technical log. This defect was dealt with by the ground crew. The baggage for the passengers joining the aircraft for the flight to Nicosia and the freight was placed in holds 1 and 2; the baggage and freight from London to Nicosia remained in holds 4 and 5. The aircraft taxied out at 0227 hours and was airborne on schedule at 0231 hours; it was cleared by Athens Control to Nicosia on Upper Airway Red 19 to cruise at flight level (FL) 290. After take-off it climbed to 4 000 ft on the 180' radial of Athens VOR and then turned direct to Sounion, which it reported crossing at 0236 hours. At 0246 hours, the aircraft reported that it was crossing R19B at FL 290 and was estimating Rhodes at 0303 hours. At 0258 hours at an estimated position 3fi041'N, 27O13'E, the aircraft passed a westbound BEA Comet which was flying at FL 280. Each aircraft saw the other; the Captain of the westbound aircraft has staked that flight conditions were clear and smooth. G-ARC0 passed Rhodes at 0304 hours and at 0316 hours reported passing R19C at FL 290 and that it estimated passing abeam of Myrtou, Cyprus, at 0340 hours. This message was not received by Athens direct but was relayed by the westbound aircraft. G-ARC0 was then cleared by Athens to change to the Nicosia FIR frequency. The recording of the R/T communications with Nicosia shows that G-ARC0 called them to establish contact; the time of this call was 0318 hours + 9 seconds and it is estimated that the aircraft would then have been at a position 35° 51'N 30°17' E, approximately 15 NM to the east of R19C. Nicosia replied to the aircraft with an instruction to go ahead with its message but no further transmission was heard. Nicosia continued to try to contact the aircraft but without result and overdue action was therefore taken. At 0440 hours R.A.F. Search and Rescue aircraft took off from Akrotiri; at 0625 hours wreckage from G-ARC0 was sighted in the vicinity of R19C, the last reported position. None of the 66 occupants survived the crash.
Probable cause:
The aircraft broke up in the air following detonation of a high explosive device within the cabin. A high explosive device detonated within the cabin while the aircraft was cruising at FL290. The explosion severely damaged the aircraft causing an out-of-control condition followed by structural break-up at a lower altitude.
Final Report:

Crash of a Vickers 808 Viscount in Bristol

Date & Time: Sep 21, 1967 at 0859 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
EI-AKK
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Dublin - Bristol
MSN:
422
YOM:
1959
Region:
Crew on board:
4
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
17
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
5005
Captain / Total hours on type:
1300.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
2200
Copilot / Total hours on type:
592
Aircraft flight hours:
18375
Circumstances:
Before leaving Dublin no landing forecast for Lulsgate was available but the forecast conditions for Filton, 10 miles north of Lulsgate, were well above the company minima of 260 ft critical height and 800 rn RVR. About 25 minutes before commencing the approach to land and whilst the aircraft was on the airway near Strumble, the latest weather conditions for Lulsgate obtained by radio from air traffic control, showed that there was 3/8 cloud at 1 000 ft, visibility was 1 500 m with the sun tending to disperse cloud and mist. After leaving the airway, the aircraft was positioned by Lulsgate radar for an approach to runway 28 on a right-hand base leg. At 0752 hours GMT before the final approach was commenced, the latest weather conditions were passed by the Lulsgate rabar controller who was also the approach controller, these conditions showed a surface wind northerly 8 to 10 kt, QFE 979, QNH 1 001, visibility in mist 1 800 m. During the final turn on to the approach at 6 miles, the aircraft drifted to the left of the extended centre line which was regained closing from left to right during the final descent. At five miles from touchdown, still to the left of the centre line, a descent from 1 500 ft (QFE) was commenced at a rate of 300 ft per mile with advisory altitudes being passed every half mile. The air was calm and the commander was able to achieve a high degree of precision during the approach; heights were accurately flown during the descent and the aircraft's track, cow verging on the centre line, was steady, When the aircraft was between 3 and 34 miles from touchdown, the controller informed it that visibility had deteriorated to 1 200 m. At two miles, when steering 2950, the aircraft intercepted the approach centre line and its heading was corrected to 290°; at one and a half miles at 500 ft, a further heading correction was made on to 287°. A drift to the right, away from the centre line, became apparent when the aircraft was between 1 and 12 miles from touchdown and the controller gave further corrections to the left to 285° and 280°. At one mile from touchdown at 350 feet, a further left correction to 275° was given but the aircraft continued to track to the right of the centre line. At half a mile from touchdown, when the talk-down was complete, the controller informed the aircraft it was well to the right of the centre line and that it should overshoot if the runway was not in sight. Shortly afterwards the aircraft was seen, by a controller, heading towards the control tower before commencing its corrective turn to the left. The commander, who was at the controls of the aircraft, said it was possible to refer to the ground and natural horizon until passing through about 650 ft when a thin layer of cloud followed by misty conditions required the remainder of the approach to be made on instruments. Whilst descending through 300 ft, the commander asked the co-pilot if he could see anything but just as he replied in the negative the commander saw the approach lights ahead and to his left and he promptly commenced an 'St turn to line up with them. As he did so he called for 400 of flap and less power in order to reduce the airspeed from 130 kt to about 112 kt. During this phase, he lost contact with the lights "for some seconds" but he elected to continue the approach because the last reported visibility was 1 200 rn and he was confident the runway lights would shortly appear ahead. When they came into view the aircraft was over the left-hand side of the runway and not properly aligned with it; the commander said he attempted to turn on to the runway centre line as he flared out for the landing. During this manoeuvre, although he was not aware of it, the starboard wing tip and No. 4 propeller struck the runway; the aircraft then touched down on all its wheels with considerable port drift. The commander took overshoot action, applying full power, calling for 20° of flap and the undercarriage to be raised; the airspeed had, in the meanwhile, fallen below 100 kt. The commander realised that the aircraft was not accelerating normally and saw that it was headed towards buildings on the northern perimeter of the aerodrome; rather than risk flying into these obstructions, he flew the aircraft on to the ground with its undercarriagi retracting. The aircraft touched down starboard wing first, ground-looped tb the right as it slid along the remaining section of the adjacent runway, then crashed tail first through a fence. Ten of the occupants of the passenger cabin were injured, three of them seriously; fire did not break out; rescue and fire vehicles arrived promptly on the scene. The accident occurred at 0759 hours.
Probable cause:
The accident was caused by an attempt to align the aircraft with the runway at too low a height following the commander's incorrect decision to continue the approach when visual guidance became obscured below critical height. A crash landing became necessary during an attempted overshoot after the aircraft had touched the ground and sustained damage during a turn at a low height.
Final Report: