Hong Kong

China Airline’s flight CI642 was scheduled to operate from Bangkok to Taipei with an intermediate stop in Hong Kong. The crew had carried out the sector from Taipei to Bangkok, passing through Hong Kong on the previous day. On that flight, the crew were aware of the Severe Tropical Storm (STS) ‘Sam’ approaching Hong Kong and the possibility that it would be in the vicinity of Hong Kong at about the scheduled time of arrival on the following evening. Weather information provided at the preflight briefing for the return flight indicated the continuing presence of STS ‘Sam’ with its associated strong winds and heavy precipitation. The flight departed from Bangkok on schedule with 300 passengers and 15 crew on board, with an estimated time of arrival (ETA) of 1038 hour (hr) in Hong Kong. The commander had elected to carry sufficient fuel to permit a variety of options on arrival – to hold, to make an approach, or to divert. If an immediate approach was attempted, the aircraft would be close to its Maximum Landing Weight (MLW) involving, in consequence, a relatively high speed for the approach and landing. Throughout the initial stages of the flight and during the cruise, the commander was aware of the crosswind component to be expected in Hong Kong and reviewed the values of wind direction and speed which would bring it within the company’s crosswind limit as applicable to wet runways of 24 kt. In the latter stage of the cruise, the crew obtained information ‘Whisky’ from the Automatic Terminal Information Service (ATIS) timed at 0940 hr, which gave a mean surface wind of 320 degrees (º) / 30 knots (kt) maximum 45 kt in heavy rain, and a warning to expect significant windshear and severe turbulence on the approach. Although this gave a crosswind component of 26 kt which was in excess of the company’s wet runway limit of 24 kt, the commander was monitoring the gradual change in wind direction as the storm progressed, which indicated that the wind direction would possibly shift sufficiently to reduce the component and thus permit a landing. Hong Kong Area Radar Control issued a descent clearance to the aircraft at 1014 hr and, following receipt of ATIS information ‘X-ray’ one minute later, which included a mean surface wind of 300º at 35 kt, descent was commenced at 1017 hr. Copies of the information sheets used by Air Traffic Control (ATC) as the basis for ATIS broadcasts ‘Whisky’ and ‘X-ray’ are at Appendix 1. The approach briefing was initiated by the commander just after commencing descent. The briefing was given for an Instrument Landing System (ILS) approach to Runway 25 Right (RW 25R) at HKIA. However, the active runway, as confirmed by the ATIS was RW 25L. Despite the inclusion in the ATIS broadcasts of severe turbulence and possible windshear warnings, no mention was made in the briefing of the commander’s intentions relating to these weather phenomena nor for any course of action in the event that a landing could not be made, other than a cursory reference to the published missed approach procedure. The descent otherwise continued uneventfully and a routine handover was made at 1025 hr to Hong Kong Approach Control which instituted radar vectoring for an ILS approach to what the crew still believed was RW 25R. At 1036 hr, after having been vectored through the RW 25L localizer for spacing, CI642 was given a heading of 230º to intercept the localizer from the right and cleared for ILS to RW 25L. The co-pilot acknowledged the clearance for ILS 25L but queried the RVR (runway visual ranges); these were passed by the controller, the lowest being 1300 m at the touchdown point. The commander then quickly re-briefed the minimums and go-around procedure for RW 25L. At 1038 hr, about 14 nautical miles (nm) to touchdown, the aircraft was transferred to Hong Kong Tower and told to continue the approach. At 1041 hr, the crew were given a visibility at touchdown of 1600 metres (m) and touchdown wind of 320º at 25 kt gusting 33 kt, and cleared to land. The crew of flight CI642 followed China Airline’s standard procedures during the approach. Using the autoflight modes of the aircraft, involving full use of autopilot and autothrottle systems, the flight progressed along the ILS approach until 700 ft where the crew became visual with the runway and approach lights of RW 25L. Shortly after this point the commander disconnected the autopilot and flew the aircraft manually, leaving the autothrottle system engaged to control the aircraft’s speed. After autopilot disconnect, the aircraft continued to track the runway centreline but descended and stabilized slightly low (one dot) on the glideslope. Despite the gustiness of the wind, the flight continued relatively normally for the conditions until approximately 250 ft above the ground at which point the co-pilot noticed a significant decrease in indicated airspeed. Thrust was applied as the co-pilot called ‘Speed’ and, as a consequence, the indicated airspeed rose to a peak of 175 kt. In response to this speed in excess of the target approach speed, thrust was reduced and, in the process of accomplishing this, the aircraft passed the point (50 ft RA) at which the autothrottle system commands the thrust to idle for landing. Coincidentally with this, the speed decreased from 175 kt and the rate of descent began to increase in excess of the previous 750-800 feet per minute (fpm). Although an attempt was made to flare the aircraft, the high rate of descent was not arrested, resulting in an extremely hard impact with the runway in a slightly right wing down attitude (less than 4º), prior to the normal touchdown zone. The right mainwheels contacted the runway first, followed by the underside of the right engine cowling. The right main landing gear collapsed outward, causing damage to the right wing assembly, resulting in its failure. As the right wing separated, spilled fuel was ignited and the aircraft rolled inverted and came to rest upside-down alongside the runway facing in the direction of the approach. The cockpit crew were disorientated by the inverted position of the aircraft and found difficulty in locating the engine controls to carry out engine shut down drills. After extricating themselves, they went through the cockpit door into the cabin and exited the aircraft through L1 door and began helping passengers from the aircraft through a hole in the fuselage. Airport fire and rescue services were quickly on the scene, extinguishing the fuel fire and evacuating the passengers through the available aircraft exits and ruptures in the fuselage. As a result of the accident, two passengers were found dead on arrival at hospital, and six crew members and 45 passengers were seriously injured. One of the seriously injured passengers died five days later in hospital.

Following a normal takeoff roll, the pilot-in-command started the rotation. During initial climb, at a height of about 100 feet and at a speed of 122 knots, the engine n°4 went into Beta range and lost power. The crew elected to regain control but the aircraft rolled to the right, causing the right wing to struck the grassy area along runway 13. Out of control, the aircraft plunged in the Kowloon Bay and came to rest 500 metres offshore. Six occupants were rescued while six others were killed.

China Airlines' scheduled passenger flight CAL605 departed Taipei (TPE), Taiwan at 02:20 for the 75-minute flight to Hong Kong-Kai Tak (HKG). The departure and cruise phases were uneventful. During the cruise the commander briefed the co-pilot on the approach to Hong Kong using the airline's own approach briefing proforma as a checklist for the topics to cover. The briefing included the runway-in-use, navigation aids, decision height, crosswind limit and missed approach procedure. He paid particular attention to the crosswind and stated that, should they encounter any problem during the approach, they would go-around and execute the standard missed approach procedure. The commander did not discuss with the co-pilot the autobrake setting, the reverse thrust power setting or their actions in the event of a windshear warning from the Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS). Weather reports indicated strong gusty wind conditions, rain and windshear. On establishing radio contact with Hong Kong Approach Control at 03:17, the crew were given radar control service to intercept the IGS approach to runway 13 which is offset from the extended runway centreline by 47°. After intercepting the IGS localiser beam, the pilots changed frequency to Hong Kong Tower and were informed by the AMC that the visibility had decreased to 5 kilometres in rain and the mean wind speed had increased to 22 kt. Two minutes before clearing CAL605 to land, the air traffic controller advised the crew that the wind was 070/25 kt and to expect windshear turning short final. During the approach the pilots completed the landing checklist for a flaps 30 landing with the autobrakes controller selected to position '2' and the spoilers armed. The reference airspeed (Vref) at the landing weight was 141 kt; to that speed the commander added half the reported surface wind to give a target airspeed for the final approach of 153 kt. Rain and significant turbulence were encountered on the IGS approach and both pilots activated their windscreen wipers. At 1,500 feet altitude the commander noted that the wind speed computed by the Flight Management Computer (FMC) was about 50 kt. At 1,100 feet he disconnected the autopilots and commenced manual control of the flightpath. A few seconds later at 1,000 feet he disconnected the autothrottle system because he was dissatisfied with its speed holding performance. From that time onwards he controlled the thrust levers with his right hand and the control wheel with his left hand. Shortly afterwards the commander had difficulty in reading the reference airspeed on his electronic Primary Flying Display (PFD) because of an obscure anomaly, but this was rectified by the co-pilot who re-entered the reference airspeed of 141 kt into the FMC. Shortly before the aircraft started the visual right turn onto short final, the commander saw an amber 'WINDSHEAR' warning on his PFD. A few seconds later, just after the start of the finals turn, the ground proximity warning system (GPWS) gave an aural warning of "GLIDESLOPE" which would normally indicate that the aircraft was significantly below the IGS glidepath. One second later the aural warning changed to "WINDSHEAR" and the word was repeated twice. At the same time both pilots saw the word 'WINDSHEAR' displayed in red letters on their PFDs. Abeam the Checkerboard the commander was aware of uncommanded yawing and pitch oscillations. He continued the finals turn without speaking whilst the co-pilot called deviations from the target airspeed in terms of plus and minus figures related to 153 kt. At the conclusion of the turn both pilots were aware that the aircraft had descended below the optimum flight path indicated by the optical Precision Approach Path Indicator (PAPI) system. The air traffic controller watched the final approach and landing of the aircraft. It appeared to be on or close to the normal glidepath as it passed abeam the tower and then touched down gently on the runway just beyond the fixed distance marks (which were 300 metres beyond the threshold) but within the normal touchdown zone. The controller was unable to see the aircraft in detail after touchdown because of water spray thrown up by it but he watched its progress on the Surface Movement Radar and noted that it was fast as it passed the penultimate exit at A11. At that time he also observed a marked increase in the spray of water from the aircraft and it began to decelerate more effectively. The commander stated that the touchdown was gentle and in a near wings level attitude. Neither pilot checked that the speed brake lever, which was 'ARMED' during the approach, had moved to the 'UP' position on touchdown. A few seconds after touchdown, when the nose wheel had been lowered onto the runway, the co-pilot took hold of the control column with both hands in order to apply roll control to oppose the crosswind from the left. The aircraft then began an undesired roll to the left. Immediately the commander instructed the co-pilot to reduce the amount of applied into-wind roll control. At the same time he physically assisted the co-pilot to correct the aircraft's roll attitude. Shortly after successful corrective action the aircraft again rolled to the left and the commander intervened once more by reducing the amount of left roll control wheel rotation. During the period of unwanted rolling, which lasted about seven seconds, the aircraft remained on the runway with at least the left body and wing landing gears in contact with the surface. After satisfactory aerodynamic control was regained, the co-pilot noticed a message on the Engine Indicating and Crew Alerting System (EICAS) display showing that the autobrake system had disarmed. He informed the commander that they had lost autobrakes and then reminded him that reverse thrust was not selected. At almost the same moment the commander selected reverse thrust on all engines and applied firm wheel braking using his foot pedals. As the aircraft passed abeam the high speed exit taxiway (A11), the commander saw the end of the runway approaching. At that point both he and the co-pilot perceived that the distance remaining in which to stop the aircraft might be insufficient. At about the same time the co-pilot also began to press hard on his foot pedals. As the aircraft approached the end of the paved surface the commander turned the aircraft to the left using both rudder pedal and nose wheel steering tiller inputs. The aircraft ran off the end of the runway to the left of the centreline. The nose and right wing dropped over the sea wall and the aircraft entered the sea creating a very large plume of water which was observed from the control tower, some 3.5 km to the northwest. The controller immediately activated the crash alarm and the Airport Fire Contingent, which had been on standby because of the strong winds, responded very rapidly in their fire vehicles and fire boats. Other vessels in the vicinity also provided prompt assistance. After the aircraft had settled in the water, the commander operated the engine fuel cut-off switches and the co-pilot operated all the fire handles. The commander attempted to speak to the cabin crew using the interphone system but it was not working. The senior cabin crew member arrived on the flight deck as the commander was leaving his seat to proceed aft. The instruction to initiate evacuation through the main deck doors was then issued by the commander and supervised by the senior cabin crew member from the main deck. Ten passengers were injured, one seriously.

The crew was completing a local training flight in Hong Kong on behalf of the Royal Hong Kong Auxiliary Air Force. An engine failed en route and the aircraft crashed in the Tolo harbour, north of Hong Kong. Both pilots were rescued and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

A Hawker Siddeley HS-121 Trident 2E passenger jet, registered B-2218, was damaged beyond repair in a landing accident at Kowloon Bay, Hong Kong. There were 78 passengers and seven crew members crew members on board. The airplane operated on CAAC flight 301 from Guangzhou-Baiyun Airport (CAN) to Hong Kong-Kai Tak International Airport (HKG). As the aircraft neared runway 31 the right outboard trailing edge wing flap struck the innermost approach light and the right main landing gear tyres hit the facing edge of the runway promontory. The right main gear was torn from the wing. The aircraft became airborne again and next contacted the ground 600 metres down the runway. It then veered off the runway to the right, yawed to the right and slid diagonally sideways across the grassed runway strip. The nosewheel and left main gear collapsed, and the aircraft continued until it crossed the parallel taxiway and slid sideways over the edge of the promontory into Kowloon Bay. The aircraft came to rest in the water with the rear extremity of the fuselage supported on a ledge of stone blocks that jutted out from the promontory. Part of the forward fuselage, including the flight compartment, was partially detached from the remainder of the fuselage and hung down at a steep angle into the water from control cables and secondary structure. A fire started in the centre engine intake duct. Weather at the time of the accident was poor including rain and fog with 450 m visibility. Seven occupants, six crew members and one passengers, were killed.

After takeoff from Hong Kong-Kai Tak Airport runway 13, while climbing, smoke was seen from the rear of number 4 engine. The propeller was feathered and the crew contacted ATC. About a minute after takeoff, the crew requested the permission to return for an emergency landing on runway 31. After being cleared to descend to 2,000 feet, the airplane went out of control and crashed into the sea off the Waglan Island. The aircraft was destroyed upon impact and all four occupants were killed. They were completing a cargo flight from Hong Kong to UK with an intermediate stop in Bangkok.

Flight CX033 was a scheduled flight from Hong Kong to Bangkok with an additional en-route stop at Saigon to transport a backlog of passengers. A Check captain joined the flight. The co-pilot was flying the aircraft from the left-hand seat whilst the pilot-in-command occupied the right-hand seat to assess his performance. The Check captain occupied the jump seat behind the co-pilot from where he could monitor the performance of both pilots. At 10:31 the aircraft commenced to taxi out for takeoff on runway 13. A wind check of 010/10 kt was passed by the tower and acknowledged by the aircraft when the takeoff clearance was given. At 10:34 a rolling takeoff was commenced. The co-pilot, who was piloting the aircraft, increased the power to 1.5 EPR after which the engineer set the engines at maximum power. The aircraft accelerated normally but at a speed of slightly under 120 kt (as reported by the co-pilot) heavy vibration was experienced. The vibration increased in severity and the co-pilot decided to discontinue the takeoff. He called "abort", closed the power levers, applied maximum symmetrical braking and selected the spoilers. The abort action was stated to have been taken promptly except that there was a delay of 4-5 sec in applying reverse thrust which was then used at full power throughout the remainder of the aircraft's travel. No significant decrease in the rate of acceleration occurred until after an indicated airspeed of 133 kt had been attained, there was then a slow build-up of speed to 137 kt over the next 2 sec after which deceleration commenced. Both pilots were applying full brakes but neither of them felt the antiskid cycling. The aircraft continued to run straight some distance after initial braking was applied but then a veer to the right commenced. Opposite rudder was used but failed to check this forcing the use of differential braking to the extent that eventually the right brake had been eased off completely, whilst maximum left braking, full left rudder, full lateral control to the left, and nose-wheel steering were being applied, These actions were only partly effective and the aircraft eventually left the runway and entered the grass strip. The turn to the right continued until finally the aircraft crossed the seawall. All four engines separated on impact with, the sea, the nose of the aircraft was smashed in and the fuselage above floor level between the flight deck and the leading edge of the wing was fractured in two places. The aircraft spun to the right and came to rest some 400 ft from the seawall. A passenger was killed while 33 other were injured.

Thai Airways International Flight 601, a scheduled passenger service from Taipei International Airport, Formosa, to Hong Kong International Airport, departed from Taipei at 0540 hours with an estimated enroute time of 1 hour 27 minutes, and an endurance of 4 hours 19 minutes. The flight was made at flight level 260 and was entirely normal except that, because of turbulence expected from a severe tropical storm, the passenger seat belts were on for the majority of the flight. No turbulence of any importance was in fact experienced. At 0638 hours, when approximately 170 miles from Hong Kong, Flight 601 made contact with Hong Kong airways control and received clearance to descend to flight level 70. At 0658 hours they contacted Hong Kong approach control, which later cleared them to descend to 2 500 feet using an altimeter setting (QNH) of 999 mb, and informed them that there was a heavy rain shower at Hong Kong and that the visibility was very reduced to 2 km. The co-pilot flew the aircraft manually from the right-hand seat, whilst the Captain monitored the approach from the left hand seat and handled the R/T communications, the third pilot, who was acting as the system operator, also monitored the flight instruments. Rhe approach controller provided radar guidance to position the aircraft for an ILS approach to runway 31 and when it was at about 8 miles from touchdown, cleared the pilots to contact the precision controller. This controller cleared them to continue their ILS approach, informed them that there was heavy rain at the field and told them the overshoot procedure to be adopted should this become necessary. The aircraft remained well within the approach safety funnel 2° either side of the localiser centerline and 1/2° above or below the glide slope, until 3 miles from touchdown, the PAR controller having provided information on weather, overshoot instructions and distance from touchdown as shown on the R/T transcript at Appendix C. In his 3 miles distance advisory, the PAR controller informed the pilot that he was just a little to the right; this appeared to be corrected and the aircraft returned to the centre line. At about 2 3/4 miles, the aircraft descended momentarily below the glide slope safety funnel but returned quickly towards the glide slope before the PAR controller had made any advisory comment. At 1 1/2 mile the aircraft was again a little right of centre line and at this time also interference from the heavy rain began to obscure PAR reception, firstly in elevation and, shortly after one mile, also in azimuth. Correlation of the flight recorder readout and the R/T transcript indicates that-approximately 2 seconds after receiving the 1 1/2 mile advisory that he was a little to the right, the co-pilot made a left turn of 14°. Eight seconds later, the PAR controller advised him that he was coming back to the centre line and almost immediately he began a right turn of similar dimensions. Five seconds after this, the PAR controller save the 1 mile advisory and the information that the aircraft was going left of centre after which the aircraft increased its rate of turn to the right. On hearing the 1 mile advisory, the captain reinforced it by telling the co-pilot to move to the right and a moment or two later, when looking across the cockpit, saw the sea about 100 ft below through the copilot's side window. He immediately attempted to make a pull-up, but the aircraft struck the surface, bounced slightly, and settled on the water about 3 925 ft before the ILS reference point of runway 31 and about 100 ft left of the ILS centre line. According to the survivors the impact was not unduly greater than that of a heavy landing but the starboard wing and undercarriage broke away, the latter ripping open the underside of the fuselage; in addition, the rear end of the fuselage broke open. As a result of this damage the aircraft sank very rapidly and 14 of the passengers did not escape from the fuselage and were drowned, 6 were dead on arrival at hospital, 4 were missing and later found drowned. The remaining passengers and the crew were rescued by nearby surface vessels and a helicopter.

The aircraft was on a flight from Hong Kong to Saigon with an intermediate stop in Đà Nẵng, carrying 6 crew members and 65 soldiers on leave. During the takeoff roll on runway 13, at a speed of 150 km/h, the flight engineer reported a loss of pressure on engine number one and instructed the pilot to abandon the takeoff procedure. The copilot, who was in the left seat, reduced engine power when, in the mean time, the captain who was seating in the right seat, started the rotation. In stall condition with an asymmetrical thrust, the airplane climbed to a height of 100 feet then banked left and struck a 2 meters high sea wall with its left wingtip. It flew another 250 meters then crashed into the Kowloon Bay. Both pilots and 10 passengers survived while all 59 other occupants were killed.

Shortly after take off from Hong Kong-Kai Tak Airport, while climbing in foggy conditions, the aircraft struck the slope of Mt Parker located 4 km south of the airfield. A passenger was injured while 14 other occupants were killed. The aircraft was on its way to Taiwan with US soldiers joining their base following a permission period.