Private

According to the pilot's written statement he departed runway 05 and the airplane veered "sharply" to the right. The pilot assumed a failure of the right engine and turned to initiate a landing on runway 23. Seconds after the airplane touched down it began to veer to the left. The pilot applied power to the left engine and right rudder, but the airplane departed the left side of the runway, the right main and nose landing gear collapsed and the airplane came to rest resulting in substantial damage to the right wing. The pilot reported that he had failed to configure the rudder trim prior to takeoff and that there were no preimpact mechanical malfunctions or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation.

The twin engine aircraft departed Lincoln-Estancia La Nueva Airport on a private flight to Buenos Aires, carrying one passenger and one pilot. While descending to Buenos Aires-Aeroparque-Jorge Newbury Airport, the pilot was unable to intercept the ILS for runway 13 because of an excessive speed of 260 knots and a too high angle of descent. In such conditions, he could not configure the aircraft for approach and landing (flaps) in accordance with the information in the BE 300 flight manual. He completed a left turn at a speed of 228 knots and descended below the glide before initiating a second turn to the right when control was lost. The aircraft entered a dive and crashed onto two houses located in Nordelta, about 26 km northwest of the airport. The aircraft and two houses were destroyed and both occupants were killed, among them Gustavo Andres Deutsch aged 78 who was the former owner of the defunct airline LAPA.

Witnesses reported observing the airplane flying slowly toward the airport at a low altitude. The left engine was at a low rpm; "sputtering," "knocking," or making a "banging" noise; and trailing black smoke. One witness said that, as the airplane passed over his location, he saw the tail "kick" horizontally to the right and the airplane bank slightly left. The airplane subsequently collided with trees and impacted a field 1/2 mile north of the airport. Disassembly of the right engine revealed no anomalies, and signatures on the right propeller blades were consistent with power and rotation on impact. The left propeller was found feathered. Disassembly of the left engine revealed that the spark plugs were black and heavily carbonized, consistent with a rich fuel-air mixture; the exhaust tubing also exhibited dark sooting. The rubber boot that connected the intercooler to the fuel injector servo was found dislodged and partially sucked in toward the servo. The clamp used to secure the hose was loose but remained around the servo, the safety wire on the clamp was in place, and the clamp was not impact damaged or bent. The condition of the boot and the clamp were consistent with improper installation. The time since the last overhaul of the left engine was about 1,050 hours. The last 100-hour inspection occurred 3 months before the accident, and the airplane had been flown only 0.8 hour since then. It could not be determined when the rubber boot was improperly installed. Although the left engine had failed, the pilot should have been able to fly the airplane and maintain altitude on the operable right engine, particularly since he had appropriately feathered the left engine.

The commercial pilot and his wife departed New York in their turboprop airplane on a crosscountry flight to Florida. About 1 hour 40 minutes into the flight and while cruising at flight level (FL) 280, the pilot notified air traffic control (ATC) of an abnormal indication in the airplane and requested a descent to FL180. The responding controller instructed the pilot to descend to FL250 and turn left 30°, and the pilot acknowledged and complied with the instruction; he then again requested a lower altitude. Although the pilot declined emergency handling and did not specify the nature of the problem, the controller independently determined that the flight had encountered a pressurization issue and immediately coordinated with another ATC facility to clear nearby traffic. The controller then issued instructions to the pilot to descend to FL200 and change course; however, the pilot did not comply with the assignments despite acknowledging the instructions multiple times. The pilot's failure to comply with the controller's instructions, his long microphone pauses after concluding a statement over the radio, and his confusion were consistent with cognitive impairment due to hypoxia. Further, the pilot's transmissions to ATC indicated impairment within 2 minutes 30 seconds of reporting the abnormal indication, which is consistent with the Federal Aviation Administration's published time of useful consciousness/effective performance time ranges for the onset of hypoxia. Military airplanes were dispatched about 30 minutes after the pilot's final transmission to ATC to intercept and examine the airplane. The pilots of the military airplanes reported that the airplane appeared to be flying normally at FL250, that both occupants appeared to be asleep or unconscious, and that neither occupant was wearing an oxygen mask. Photographs taken from one of the military airplanes revealed that the airplane's emergency exit door was recessed into the fuselage frame, consistent with a depressurized cabin. The military airplanes escorted the airplane as it continued on a constant course and altitude until it approached Cuban airspace, at which point they discontinued their escort. Radar data indicated that the airplane continued on the same flight track until about 5 hours 48 minutes after takeoff, when it descended to impact in the Caribbean Sea north of Jamaica. The flight's duration was consistent with a departure with full fuel and normal cruise endurance. Some of the wreckage, including fuselage and engine components, was recovered from the ocean floor about 4 months after the accident. Data recovered from nonvolatile memory in the airplane's global air system controller (GASC) indicated that several fault codes associated with the cabin pressurization system were registered during the flight. These faults indicated that the overheat thermal switch (OTSW), which was associated with overheat protection, had activated, which resulted in a shutdown of the engine bleed air supply to the cabin pressurization system. Without a bleed air supply to maintain selected cabin pressure, the cabin altitude would have increased to the altitude of the outside environment over a period of about 4 minutes. The faults recorded by the GASC's nonvolatile memory and associated system alerts/warnings would have been displayed to the pilot, both as discrete system anomaly messages on the crew alerting system (CAS) and as master warning and/or master caution annunciations. A witness report indicated that the pilot was known to routinely monitor cabin altitude while flying in the airplane and in his previous pressurized airplanes. Based on his instrument scanning practices and the airplane's aural warning system, he likely would have observed any CAS message at or near its onset. Thus, the CAS messages and the associated alerts were likely the precipitating event for the pilot's call to ATC requesting a lower altitude. The pilot was likely not familiar with the physiological effects of hypoxia because he had not recently been in an altitude chamber for training, but he should have been familiar with the airplane's pressurization system emergency and oxygen mask donning procedures because he had recently attended a transition course for the accident airplane make and model that covered these procedures. However, the pressurization system training segment of the 5-day transition course comprised only about 90 minutes of about 36 total hours of training, and it is unknown if the pilot would have retained enough information to recognize the significance of the CAS messages as they appeared during the accident flight, much less recall the corresponding emergency procedures from memory. Coupled with the pilot's reported diligence in using checklists, this suggests that he would have attempted a physical review of the emergency procedures outlined in the Pilot's Operating Handbook (POH). A review of the 656-page POH for the airplane found that only one of the four emergency checklist procedures that corresponded to pressurization system-related CAS messages included a step to don an oxygen mask, and it was only a suggestion, not a mandatory step. The combined lack of emergency guidance to immediately don an oxygen mask and the rapid increase in the cabin altitude significantly increased the risk of hypoxia, a condition resistant to self-diagnosis, especially for a person who has not recently experienced its effects in a controlled environment such as an altitude chamber. Additionally, once the pilot reported the problem indication to ATC, he requested a descent to FL180 instead of 10,000 ft as prescribed by the POH. In a second transmission, he accepted FL250 and declined priority handling. These two separate errors were either early signs of cognitive dysfunction due to hypoxia or indications that the pilot did not interpret the CAS messages as a matter related to the pressurization system. Although the cabin bleed-down rate was 4 minutes, the pilot showed evidence of deteriorating cognitive abilities about 2 minutes 30 seconds after he initially reported the problem to ATC. Ultimately, the pilot had less than 4 minutes to detect the pressurization system failure CAS messages, report the problem to ATC, locate the proper procedures in a voluminous POH, and complete each procedure, all while suffering from an insidious and mentally impairing condition that decreased his cognitive performance over time. Following the accident, the airplane manufacturer revised the emergency procedures for newly manufactured airplanes to require flight crews to don their oxygen masks as the first checklist item in each of the relevant emergency checklists. Further, the manufacturer has stated that it plans to issue the same revisions for previous models in 2017. The airplane manufacturer previously documented numerous OTSW replacements that occurred between 2008 and after the date of the accident. Many of these units were removed after the GASC systems in their respective airplanes generated fault codes that showed an overheat of the bleed air system. Each of the OTSWs that were tested at the manufacturer's facility showed results that were consistent with normal operating units. Additionally, the OTSW from the accident airplane passed several of the manufacturer's functional tests despite the presence of internal corrosion from sea water. Further investigation determined that the pressurization system design forced the GASC to unnecessarily discontinue the flow of bleed air into the cabin if the bleed air temperature exceeded an initial threshold and did not subsequently fall below a secondary threshold within 30 seconds. According to the airplane manufacturer, the purpose of this design was to protect the structural integrity of the airplane, the system, and the passengers in case of overheat detection. As a result of this accident and the ensuing investigation, the manufacturer made changes to the programming of the GASC and to the airplane's wiring that are designed to reduce the potential for the GASC to shut off the flow of bleed air into the cabin and to maximize the bleed availability. Contrary to its normal position for flight, the cockpit oxygen switch was found in the "off" position, which prevents oxygen from flowing to the oxygen masks. A witness's description of the pilot's before starting engine procedure during a previous flight showed that he may not have precisely complied with the published procedure for turning on the oxygen switch and testing the oxygen masks. However, as the pilot reportedly was diligent in completing preflight inspections and checklists, the investigation could not determine why the cockpit oxygen switch was turned off. Further, because the oxygen masks were not observed on either occupant, the position of the oxygen switch would not have made a difference in this accident.

The private pilot was inbound to the airport, attempting to conduct a straight-in approach to runway 33. Due to the prevailing wind, traffic flow at the time of the pilot's arrival was on runway 15. Another airplane was departing the airport in the opposite direction and crossed in close proximity to the accident airplane. The departing traffic altered his course to the right to avoid the accident airplane while the accident airplane stayed on his final approach course. The two aircraft were in radio communication on the airport common traffic advisory frequency and were exercising see-and-avoid rules as required. Witnesses reported that as the airplane continued down runway 33 for landing, they heard the power increase and observed the airplane make a left-hand turn to depart the runway in an attempted go-around. The airplane entered a left bank with a nose-high attitude, failed to gain altitude, and subsequently stalled and impacted terrain. It is likely the pilot did not maintain the necessary airspeed during the attempted go-around and exceeded the airplane's critical angle of attack. The investigation did not reveal why the pilot chose to conduct the approach with opposing traffic or why he attempted a landing with a tailwind, but this likely increased the pilot's workload during a critical phase of flight.

On 18 August, 2014 at 10:02am local time (1402Z) UTC a fixed wing, twin-engine, Cessna 3 4 0 A aircraft, United States registration N340MM, serial number 340A0635, crashed into waters while on a left base to runway 06 at Grand Bahama International Airport (MYGF) Freeport, Grand Bahama, Bahamas. The aircraft departed Ormond Beach Municipal Airport (KOMN) at 8:51am local time (1251Z) for Grand Bahama International Airport (MYGF) on an Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) flight plan with the pilot and three passengers aboard. Sometime after 9:00am (1300Z) an IFR inbound flight plan on N340MM was received by Freeport Approach Control from Miami Center. Upon initial contact with Freeport Approach Control the pilot was given weather advisory, re-cleared to Freeport VOR and told to maintain four thousand feet and report at JAKEL intersection. He was also advised to expect an RNAV runway six approach. After the pilot’s acknowledgement of the information he later acknowledged his position crossing JAKEL. Freeport Approach then instructed the aircraft to descend to two thousand feet and cleared him direct to JENIB intersection for the RNAV runway six (6) approach. After descending to two thousand feet the pilot indicated to Freeport Approach that he had the field in sight and was able to make a visual approach. Freeport Approach re-cleared the aircraft for a visual approach and instructed the pilot to contact Freeport Control Tower on frequency 118.5. At 9:57am (1357Z) N340MM established contact with Freeport Tower and was cleared for the visual approach to runway six; he was told to join the left base and report at five (5) DME. At 10:01am (1401Z) the pilot reported being out of fuel and his intention was to dead stick the aircraft into the airport from seven miles out at an altitude of one thousand five hundred feet. A minute later the pilot radioed ATC to indicate they “were going down and expected to be in the water about five miles north of the airport.” Freeport Tower tried to get confirmation of the last transmission but was unable to. Several more calls went out from Freeport Tower to N340MM but communication was never reestablished. Freeport Control Tower then made request of aircrafts departing and arriving to assist in locating the lost aircraft by over flying the vicinity of the last reported position to see if visual contact could be made. An inbound aircraft reported seeing an aircraft down five miles from the airport on the 300 degree radial of the ZFP VOR. Calls were made to all the relevant agencies and search and rescue initiated. The aircraft was located at GPS coordinates 26˚ 35.708’N and 078˚ 47. 431 W. The aircraft received substantial damage as a result of the impact and crash sequence. There were no survivors.

The twin engine aircraft, owned by Lawrence R. Liptack, crashed in flames in an open field located northeast of Bowie, Texas. The pilot and owner, aged 51, was killed with his son aged 10. The multi-engine airplane was about 500 ft above ground level (agl) and on a left base landing approach when a witness saw the airplane suddenly point straight down, begin spinning, and make three complete rotations before impacting terrain in a partially nose-down attitude. The airplane came to rest upright, and was mostly consumed by an immediate post impact fire. A post accident examination of the wreckage revealed no evidence of preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. A pilot operating another pipeline patrol airplane in the vicinity reported frequent severe-to-extreme turbulence about 1,000-2,000 ft above ground level. Data from an on-board GPS unit indicated that, while on the base leg of the airport traffic pattern for landing, the accident airplane's airspeed decayed 10 knots below the manufacturer's recommended approach speed for turbulent conditions. An autopsy performed on the pilot found significant existing atherosclerotic disease (60 to 80 percent) and described evidence of an acute, premortem, nonocclusive thrombosis of the left anterior descending coronary artery. The medical examiner's conclusion stated it "appears the decedent likely suffered an acute cardiac event while piloting his aircraft" and "died primarily due to hypertensive and atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease and that his multiple blunt force injuries likely contributed to his death." It is likely that the pilot was incapacitated due to the acute cardiac event and lost control of the airplane during the approach to land.

According to the pilot, she was flying an instrument landing system approach when she noted that the glide slope was out of service. She transitioned to a localizer-only approach and continued. Night, instrument meteorological conditions prevailed with a 400-foot ceiling. She noticed that the airplane was "high and fast" on final approach, so she used speed brakes and flaps to slow the airplane and descend to the minimum descent altitude. As the airplane descended below the ceiling, she observed runway lights and attempted to land on the runway. The airplane landed long, departed the runway at the departure end, and struck an embankment before coming to rest. An inspector from the Federal Aviation Administration examined the airplane and confirmed substantial damage to the fuselage, wings, and empennage. The pilot reported no pre-impact mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.

The pilot was departing the private, fly-in community airport on a personal flight. He was familiar with the airport/fly-in community and was instrumental in its development. Fog was present at the time, and, according to witnesses, it was "rolling up the valley," which was a frequent event at the airport. The witnesses observed the airplane lift off the runway, drift to the left, and disappear into the fog with the landing gear extended. They heard the engine running normally, with no change in sound, until the crash. They heard two distinct "booms" about 4 to 6 seconds apart. They ran down to the departure end of the runway to look for a crash site and could not see the wreckage or any smoke or fire due to the fog. The wreckage was located on elevated terrain in a heavily wooded area, about 1,500 feet north of the departure end of the runway. The elevation at the crash site was about 250 feet higher than the elevation at the departure end of runway. A swath through the treetops leading to the main wreckage was indicative of a near-level flight path at impact. An examination of the airframe and engine did not reveal any evidence of a preexisting mechanical malfunction or failure. A review of the weather by a NTSB meteorologist revealed that the departure airport was at the edge of an area of low-topped clouds. Airport remarks included "Mountainous terrain all quadrants."

Shortly after take off from Saint John Harbour, the single engine aircraft went out of control and crashed on the shore of the Athlone Island, bursting into flames. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire and all four occupants were injured.