Positioning

The crew was completing a positioning flight (RUS1050) from Leipzig to Zurich on behalf of FSH Luftfahrtunternehmen but under contract of Cirrus Aviation. On final approach to Zurich-Kloten Airport, the crew encountered poor visibility due to foggy conditions. Despite the RVR for runway 14 was estimated to be 275 metres (below minimums of 400 metres for a CAT II approach if aircraft and crew are qualified), the crew decided to continue the approach, descended below the MDA until the aircraft struck the ground between both runways 14 and 16. The aircraft rolled for few dozen metres then lost its undercarriage and came to rest in a frosty field. Both pilots escaped with minor injuries and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. At the time of the accident, the vertical visibility was 300 feet, the horizontal visibility was 200 metres with freezing fog, an OAT of -3° C and a dew point of -4° C.

The aircraft departed Tampico-General Francisco Javier Mina Airport on a positioning flight to Las Potrancas Aerodrome located near Aldama, Tamaulipas. On approach to runway 02, the crew encountered marginal weather conditions with low clouds. As the aircraft was not properly aligned, the captain decided to initiate a go-around procedure and to make a left turn. At low height (about 800 feet), the aircraft struck a hill located to the left of the aerodrome and crashed. All three occupants were killed.

Few minutes after takeoff from La Paragua, the pilot encountered engine problems and elected to make an emergency landing. The aircraft crash landed and was damaged beyond repair. The pilot escaped uninjured.

The fire tanker airplane was on a cross-country positioning flight and collided with mountainous terrain while maneuvering in a canyon near the destination airport. Witnesses who held pilot certificates were on a mountain top at 7,900 feet and saw a cloud layer as far to the south as they could see. They used visual cues to estimate that the cloud tops were around 5,000 feet mean sea level (msl). They noted that the clouds did not extend all the way up into the mountain canyons; the clouds broke up near the head of some canyons. When they first saw the airplane, they assumed that it came from above the clouds. It was proceeding north up a canyon near the edge of clouds, which were breaking up. They were definitely looking down at the airplane the whole time. They saw the airplane make a 180-degree turn that was steeper than a standard rate turn. The wings leveled and the airplane went through one cloud, reappeared briefly, and then entered the cloud layer. It appeared to be descending when they last saw it. About 2 minutes later, they saw the top of the cloud layer bulge and turn a darker color. The bulge began to subside and they observed several smaller bulges appear. They notified local authorities that they thought a plane was down. Searchers discovered the wreckage at that location and reported that the wreckage and surrounding vegetation were on fire. The initial responders reported that the area was cloudy and the visibility was low. Examination of the ground scars and wreckage debris path disclosed that the airplane collided with the canyon walls in controlled flight on a westerly heading of 260 degrees at an elevation of 3,400 feet msl. The operator had an Automated Flight Following (AFF) system installed on the airplane. It recorded the airplane's location every 2 minutes using a GPS. The data indicated that the airplane departed Prescott and flew direct to the Twentynine Palms VORTAC (very high frequency omnidirectional radio range, tactical air navigation). The flight changed course slightly to 260 degrees, which took it to the northeast corner of the wilderness area where the accident occurred. At 1102:57, the data indicated that the airplane was at 11,135 feet msl at 204 knots. The airplane then made three left descending 360-degree turns. The third turn began at 6,010 feet msl. At 1116:57, the last recorded data point indicated that the airplane was at an altitude of 3,809 feet heading 256 degrees at a speed of 128 knots.

The pilots were scheduled to fly the aircraft, a BAe Jetstream 32, on scheduled flight EXC403 from Pajala Airport to Luleå/Kallax Airport. This was the third flight together for the day. Before takeoff they noted that the flight was planned without passengers. Since the co-pilot was shortly to undergo an Operator’s Proficiency Check and the commander had long flying experience, including as an instructor, the commander decided to take the opportunity to have the co-pilot train flying with simulated engine failure. The takeoff from Pajala was at 17.57 hrs with the co-pilot as Pilot Flying. During the climb the commander reduced thrust on the right engine to simulate engine failure. This was done by moving the engine control lever to its rear stop. The commander understood this to represent what is termed ”simulated feather” in which an engine generates no drag and causes the least possible resistance. The exercise passed off without problem and the co-pilot had no difficulties in handling the aircraft. It was decided to practise flying with simulated engine failure during the landing as well. During the approach to Luleå/Kallax Airport when the aircraft was at an altitude of about 3500 feet the commander accordingly reduced thrust on the right engine once again. The co-pilot understood that the whole landing, including touchdown, would be with one engine on reduced thrust. However, the commander’s intention was to restore normal thrust on the right engine before touchdown. Prior to landing the reference speed (Vref1) had been calculated at 107 knots IAS2 and the flaps lowered 20°, based on the calculated landing mass of 5 640 kg. During the approach when the aircraft was at about 3500 feet, the commander reduced right engine thrust. According to the FDR recording thrust was reduced initially to just over 19 % and subsequently, for six minutes, further to just under 11% at the same time as altitude decreased to 900 feet. The co-pilot flew the aircraft in a right turn to runway 32 and started his final 2 nautical miles from the runway threshold at a height of 900 feet. The final was entered with a somewhat higher glide angle than normal. As the aircraft approached the runway threshold the thrust on the right engine had decreased to approximately 7%. The approach took place with applied rudder and opposite banking to counteract the lateral forces generated by the asymmetrical thrust. During the approach the co-pilot experienced an inertia in the ailerons that he had never experienced previously. Shortly after the aircraft had crossed the runway threshold and was about 5 metres above the runway, both the co-pilot and the commander felt how the aircraft suddenly yawed and rolled to the right. Neither pilot remembers hearing the stall warning sounding. Despite application of full aileron and rudder the pilots were unable to stop the aircraft’s uncontrolled motion. This continued until the right wing tip hit the ground. The fuselage then struck the ground. The aircraft slid on its belly about 50 metres alongside the runway before stopping. The pilots hastily evacuated the aircraft. The accident was observed by the air traffic controller who immediately alarmed the airport rescue service, which arrived at the accident scene within a minute or so. After its arrival the commander boarded the aircraft and turned off the fuel supply and the main electricity, whereafter the rescue service covered the aircraft with foam. The accident occurred on 17 September 2003 at 18.28 hrs in position 6532N 02207E; 20 m above sea level in daylight.

The accident flight was the first flight after maintenance personnel replaced the forward elevator trim cable. When the flightcrew received the airplane, the captain did not address the recent cable change noted on his maintenance release. The captain also did not perform a first flight of the day checklist, which included an elevator trim check. Shortly after takeoff, the flightcrew reported a runway trim, and manually selected nose-up trim. However, the elevator trim then traveled to the full nose-down position. The control column forces subsequently increased to 250 pounds, and the flightcrew was unable to maintain control of the airplane. During the replacement of the cable, the maintenance personnel skipped a step in the manufacturer's airliner maintenance manual (AMM). They did not use a lead wire to assist with cable orientation. In addition, the AMM incorrectly depicted the elevator trim drum, and the depiction of the orientation of the cable around the drum was ambiguous. The maintenance personnel stated that they had completed an operational check of the airplane after maintenance. The Safety Board performed a mis-rigging demonstration on an exemplar airplane, which reversed the elevator trim system. An operational check on that airplane revealed that when the electric trim motor was activated in one direction, the elevator trim tabs moved in the correct direction, but the trim wheel moved opposite of the corresponding correct direction. When the manual trim wheel was moved in one direction, the elevator trim tabs moved opposite of the corresponding correct direction.

About 5 miles west of the airport, the flightcrew advised the approach controller that they had visual contact with the airport, canceled their IFR clearance, and proceeded under visual flight rules. A witness heard the airplane approach from the east, and observed the airplane at a height consistent with the approach minimums for the VOR approach. The airplane continued over the runway, and entered a "tight" downwind. The witness lost visual contact with the airplane due to it "skimming" into or behind clouds. The airplane reappeared from the clouds at an altitude of about 200 feet above the ground on a base leg. As it overshot the extended centerline for the runway, the bank angle increased to about 90-degrees. The airplane then descended out of view. The witness described the weather to the north and northeast of the airport, as poor visibility with "scuddy" clouds. According to CVR and FDR data, about 1.5 miles from the runway with the first officer at the controls, and south of the extended runway centerline, the airplane turned left, and then back toward the right. During that portion of the flight, the first officer stated, "what happens if we break out, pray tell." The captain replied, "uh, I don't see it on the left side it's gonna be a problem." When the airplane was about 1/8- mile south of the runway threshold, the first officer relinquished the controls to the captain. The captain then made an approximate 60-degree heading change to the right back toward the runway. The airplane crossed over the runway at an altitude of 200 feet, and began a left turn towards the center of the airport. During the turn, the first officer set the flaps to 20 degrees. The airplane reentered a left downwind, about 1,100 feet south of the runway, at an altitude of 400 feet. As the airplane turned onto the base leg, the captain called for "flaps twenty," and the first officer replied, "flaps twenty coming in." The CVR recorded the sound of a click, followed by the sound of a trim-in-motion clicker. The trim-in-motion audio clicker system would not sound if the flaps were positioned beyond 3 degrees. About 31 seconds later, the CVR recorded a sound similar to a stick pusher stall warning tone. The airplane impacted a rooftop of a residential home about 1/4-mile northeast of the approach end of the runway, struck trees, a second residential home, a second line of trees, a third residential home, and came to rest in a river. Examination of the wreckage revealed the captain's airspeed indicator reference bug was set to 144 knots, and the first officer's was set to 124 knots. The flap selector switch was observed in the "UP" position. A review of the Airplane Flight Manual revealed the stall speeds for flap positions of 0 and 8 degrees, and a bank angle of 60 degrees, were 164 and 148 knots respectfully. There were no charts available to calculate stall speeds for level coordinated turns in excess of 60 degrees. The flightcrew was trained to apply procedures set forth by the airplane's Technical Manual, which stated, "…The PF (Pilot Flying) will call for flap and gear extension and retraction. The PNF (Pilot not flying) will normally actuate the landing gear. The PNF will respond by checking appropriate airspeed, repeating the flap or gear setting called for, and placing the lever in the requested position... The PNF should always verify that the requested setting is reasonable and appropriate for the phase of flighty and speed/weight combination."

The aircraft departed Milan-Linate Airport on a positioning flight to Genoa to pick up passengers for Amsterdam. Shortly after takeoff from runway 36R, while in initial climb, the aircraft collided with a flock of pigeons that struck both engines. The crew declared an emergency and reported technical problems without giving any other details. He was cleared for an immediate return and initiated a turn to the east. One minute and 25 seconds after takeoff, the aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed on a factory located 750 metres southeast from the runway 36R threshold. The aircraft was totally destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire and both pilots were killed.

The aircraft overran the departure end of the runway while landing on Runway 33. The 5,200-hour pilot reported that while on the base leg, the annunciator light for the "low pitch stop" propeller system on the right side illuminated. The pilot pulled the circuit breaker and left it out, as per the pilot operating handbook (POH). During the landing-roll, the pilot encountered a severe yaw to the right. The pilot added power to the right engine and realigned the airplane down the centerline. He then applied brakes and reverse thrust. The pilot stated that " it felt like I had no braking action and then felt the right side grab and brake, but not the left." The combination of right side braking and the right low pitch system malfunction caused considerable adverse yaw, jerking the plane to the right. The pilot applied power again and straightened the nose of the airplane. He then made the decision to go around, but at this point did not have adequate airspeed or runway length to safely accomplish a go around. He applied the brakes again, and the airplane immediately yawed to the right again, at which time the pilot was unable to compensate before the airplane caught the edge of the runway. The airplane went into the grass, where the pilot attempted to control the direction of the airplane and bring it to a complete stop. Examination of the hydraulic brake hoses from the left and right main landing gears revealed that both hoses appeared to have been damaged with a hand tool.

The pilot was conducting a charter positioning flight from Hamilton Island Marina to Whitehaven Beach, Whitsunday Island. At approximately 1615LT, pilot was landing the aircraft towards the south, about 600 metres off the beach, to avoid mechanical turbulence associated with terrain at the southern end of Whitehaven Beach. He reported that the approach and flare were normal, however, as the aircraft touched down on the right float, the aircraft swung sharply right and then sharply left. The left wing contacted the water, and the aircraft overturned. The pilot exited the upturned aircraft through the left rear passenger door and activated a 121.5 MHz distress beacon.