Ferry

The captain of the airplane elected to take off on a three engine ferry flight without authorization. During the three engine climb out with the n°3 propeller feathered, the n°2 engine caught fire and he could not extinguish the fire. He attempted to return and during the descent the n°1 engine failed. He then intentionally ditched the airplane in the ocean, and received fatal injuries. The airplane was not recovered from the ocean and no determination of cause could be ascertained.

On completion of temporary repairs following a forced landing accident in a paddock, a permit to fly was issued authorising a ferry flight from the accident site to a nearby strip. During the take off roll the pilot was unable to maintain directional control and the aircraft crossed a drain before striking a fence and overturning. An inspection of the aircraft did not reveal any defect which could have contributed to the loss of directional control. Following the landing accident the property owner had rotary-hoed the paddock to a depth of 10 centimetres. Using a motor vehicle, the pilot compacted a 2.5 metre wide strip along the centreline of the paddock, which sloped approximately 3 degrees down to the north. At the time of the takeoff to the north the wind was from the north-east at 5 knots. The pilot selected a takeoff power setting of 53 percent of the maximum power available which effectively increased the take off ground roll required by approximately 170 metres.

While level after descending, the right engine quit. Pilot feathered the propeller, advised ATC, and was diverting to alternate when left engine quit. He positioned the left engine boost pump to high and low with negative results, but did not feather the propeller. Position of boost pumps, when engines quit, was not determined. Aircraft landed on overpass that was under construction. There was fuel leakage after accident due to aircraft damage. Fuel quantity was sufficient. Examination of aircraft revealed right engine flexible duct from turbocharger to plenum chamber separated due to loose clamp. Hose was installed and club prop installed for each engine run. Both engines operated normally. Induction air hose was pulled during right engine run. Engine ran rough due to excessive rich mixture. No determination could be made for the reason of the left engine power loss.

Flight was a 3-engine ferry with the #4 engine shut down. During takeoff roll at V1 the #2 engine overheat light came on. According to the copilot the pilot reduced throttle slightly and continued the takeoff. After lift-off the pilot aborted the takeoff. The airplane could not be stopped on the remaining runway and collided with antennas, approach lights and a construction site 1,180 feet from the departure end of the runway. Postcrash exam of the 3 operating engines did not reveal any evidence of mechanical failure or malfunction. A failed resistor was found in the #2 engine electronic engine control (eec). This would cause the unit to over-schedule fuel to the engine resulting in hotter engine operating temperatures. Retarding the throttle would reduce fuel flow to within normal ranges for engine operation. Under conditions that existed at the time of the accident, the airplane would have a 3-engine rate-of-climb of 1,398 fpm, and a 2-engome rate-of-climb of 350 fpm. The captain was killed while the copilot was seriously injured.

Immediately after takeoff at 200-300 feet agl, a portion of fabric separated from the right aileron. While maneuvering the aircraft the pilot's control wheel became free, and he elected to ditch using full rudder and differential power. Examination of the pilot's control wheel aileron control chain revealed that the chain failed due to overload. The right seat was occupied by a mechanic employed by the operator and held a private pilot certificate with single and multi engine rating. He stated that he suggested to the pilot that his controls were functioning normally, but the pilot disagreed and proceeded to ditch the aircraft. Examination of the right control yoke revealed aileron movement in the correct direction.

An IFR flight was terminated with a visual approach. Conditions were conducive to airframe icing. The aircraft was being positioned empty, with a cg at 22.1% mac. On short final, at approximately 400 feet agl, 35° of landing flap was selected. The aircraft was observed to pitch downward to an unusual attitude and to enter a steep descent. A partial recovery was observed before the aircraft impacted a dirt hill 500 feet short of runway 28. Examination of the airframe after the accident revealed 1/2 to 3/4 inch of rime ice adhering to the leading edge of the horizontal stabilizer. No ice was found on any other portion of the airframe. Evidence in the cockpit indicated that engine, pitot, and windshield anti-ice systems were on, but wing/empennage deice was off. No evidence of a powerplant or systems malfunction was found. Both pilots were killed.

After landing at Rio de Janeiro-Santos Dumont Airport, the aircraft encountered difficulties to stop within the remaining distance. It overran and came to rest in the Guanabara Bay. Both pilots were seriously injured and the aircraft was destroyed.

During cruise flight, the right engine suddenly lost oil pressure. The pilot could see that oil was coming out of the engine area. The pilot shut the engine down. Due to high gross weight, the airplane was unable to maintain altitude on the remaining engine. The airplane was ditched in the ocean and not recovered. The pilot was rescued a day later.

Two minutes after takeoff from Salzburg-Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart Airport runway 16/34, while climbing to a height of 3,300 feet, the crew initiated a right turn when the aircraft collided with a private Cessna 172 registered OE-DLC and carrying four people. Both aircraft entered a dive and crashed few km west of the airport. All six people in both aircraft were killed.

The CASA 212 was bought by Geoterrex in 1983 and registered in Canada in 1985. The plane had been extensively modified for aerial survey work. These modifications consisted of two probes mounted on the fuselage above the cockpit and extending 10 feet in front of the aircraft nose, a l6-foot tail boom, and two wing tip pylons. The probes, pylons, and tail boom served to support a wire loop antenna which ran around the aircraft. In July 1988 the plane was prepared for a ferry flight across the Atlantic to Nantes, France. For the purposes of this ferry trip, the survey loop antenna and the wing tip pylons had been removed and stowed in the main cabin area. For this configuration a special ferry permit was necessary, but the company did not apply for one. On July 31, 1988 the aircraft departed Ottawa and arrived at Goose Bay later that day. On 2 August 1988, the aircraft departed Goose Bay at 09:05 UTC and arrived at Narsarsuaq, Greenland at 12:50 UTC. The aircraft was refuelled and departed one hour later at 13:50 UTC for Reykjavik, Iceland, at a planned altitude of FL130. Although the pilot’s instrument rating had expired and the co-pilot did not possess one, the crew filed an IFR flight plan to Reykjavik. The weight of the aircraft was about 3,000 pounds above the maximum authorized takeoff weight on takeoff from Narsarsuaq. At Reykjavik, the crew flew an ILS approach to runway 20. During the approach, the flaps were set at approximately 25 degrees, 15 degrees above the approved maximum of 10 degrees. Approximately one-half mile from the runway threshold, the aircraft entered a steep turn to the right, and the nose of the aircraft dropped sharply. The aircraft continued to turn to the right through 270 degrees and descended rapidly until it struck the ground approximately 900 feet short of the runway threshold. The aircraft burst into flames shortly after impact.