Ferry

The pilot stated that while in level flight the left engine failed and he observed a fire warning light and shut the engine down, the right engine then began to run rough and lose power. He then restarted the left engine but neither developed enough power to sustain flight. He executed a forced landing on a highway and struck a vehicle and a fire erupted. Examination of the left engine revealed a cross threaded fuel nozzle fitting and soot patterns aft of it. No cause for the right engine failure was found. No evidence of an annual inspection was found.

VH-NYG had departed Tamworth three days before the accident on an extended passenger charter through Sydney, Moree, Emerald, Brisbane, Moree, and Tamworth. On the day of the accident, the pilot had submitted a flight plan nominating a charter category, single pilot, Instrument Flight Rules flight from Brisbane to Moree, then Tamworth. The flight plan indicated that the aircraft carried 1400 Ib (635 kg) of fuel and had an endurance of 211 min. The aircraft, with four passengers on board, departed Brisbane at 0902 hours and landed at Moree at 1010 after an uneventful flight. All four passengers left the flight at Moree. The pilot reported taxiing at Moree to Dubbo Flight Service at 1047 and called airborne at 1050. At 1117 hours the aircraft was given a clearance to enter the Tamworth Control Zone on descent from 10000 ft. The pilot was told to expect a right downwind leg for runway 30. At 1125 the pilot requested a change of runway to runway 18, stating that there was a fuel flow problem with the left engine. The aerodrome controller (ADC) issued a change of runway (runway 18) to the aircraft, asking the pilot whether emergency conditions existed. The pilot answered in the negative and about 30 sec later informed the ADC that he was conducting one left orbit. The orbit was commenced at about 300 ft above ground level (agl) and approximately above the threshold of runway 18. The orbit was flown with an angle of bank of about 60°. The aircraft developed a high rate of descent during the orbit and rolled wings level in a pronounced nose-down attitude after turning through almost 360°. The aircraft then struck the ground in a grassed paddock about 350 m short of the threshold of runway 18 and in line with the right edge of the flight strip. The aircraft, largely intact, slid in the direction of the runway for 53 m before coming to rest. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

The twin engine aircraft departed East Midlands runways 27 on a ferry flight to Manchester. During initial climb by night, the aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed at a speed of 160 knots and disintegrated in a field near the airport. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

The flight was from Monongahela to Pittsburgh to Teterboro, NJ, then return to Pittsburgh and back to Monongahela. The flight departed Monongahela with 100 gallons of fuel; 160 gallons were added at Pittsburgh; and 80 gallons were added at Teterboro. The pilot wanted to add more fuel at Teterboro but the owner did not due to the higher cost of fuel and the fuel gage indications. During the return trip no fuel was added at Pittsburgh because the pilot did not have a credit card provided by the owner or money to buy fuel. The flight experienced a two-engine power loss due to fuel exhaustion while approaching the Monongahela Airport. Subsequent examination of the cockpit fuel gages showed a total of 125 gallons in the left tank and 90 gallons in the right tank; the reading remained the same with or without power.

Witnesses reported 1st attempt to takeoff was aborted after aircraft swerved left and right. On 2nd try, aircraft lifted off about halfway down runway. After lift-off, it rolled right, right wing hit ground and aircraft crashed. Investigations revealed rudder trim was 7.9 to 8.3 units (79% to 83%) nose right. Simulator tests with that setting resulted in consistent right wing collisions with ground after liftoff. Crew's checklist referred to mech checklist for critical items to check before takeoff. Mech checklist and 50 of 54 flight instruments had been removed from aircraft, leaving 2 airspeed indicators, altimeter and standby gyro horizon. In 60 simulated takeoffs in this configuration, there was evidence of insufficient attitudinal ref to recognize rolling of aircraft before sufficient altitude was attained. FAA's designated airworthiness rep (dar) had inspected aircraft three days before and issued ferry permit. He lacked FAA mechanical certification and experience with large aircraft. FAA order 8000.62 and ac 183.33 lacked specific guidance for selection, training and oversight of dar activity. Also, lack of guidance concerning minimum equipment list. Pilot not current or medical qualified to fly aircraft.

On a previous flight, low power was noted in the right engine, the right engine fuel flow was 5 to 8 gal/hr less than the left engine and the right engine temperature (itt) was about 500° less than the left. A decision was made to ferry the aircraft to a maint facility to have the right engine examined. The pilot took off on a 5,186 feet runway (unrway 02C) with a light tail wind in 95° temperature, though the airport had longer runways (7,702 feet, 8,000 feet and 8,500 feet). A witness noted the aircraft lifted off at the end of the runway (charts showed the takeoff roll with normal power should have been about 3,100 feet). Witnesses reported the aircraft remained low (nearly hitting a 55 feet light standard) until it rolled right and 'dropped like a rock.' Impact occurred in a right wing low attitude about 2 miles from the departure end of runway 02C. The aircraft was extensively damaged by impact and fire; no preimpact part failure was found. Both engines had evidence of engine rotation at the time of impact. The operator's lead mechanic had reported for duty about 3 hours before the accident flight, but he had not been informed of the engine problem before the aircraft took off. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

About 5-10 min after takeoff the pilot leaned the mixture on a rough running engine. About 30 minutes later the left engine began to overspeed. The pilot was unable to feather the prop. The pilot returned toward the departure point with max power on the right engine. Unable to reach the airport, an emergency landing was made on a highway, directional control was lost, and the airplane collided with trees. Last annual was in 1978. Left propeller start lock pin blade L3 corroded, in extended position. Left propeller pitch control cable separated, frayed, corroded. General deterioration of piston rings and #6 conrod. Right prop governor control cables corroded, frayed. Right engine #5 intake pipe connection and hose missing. All compression rings pistons #1 and #5 severely worn, top two compression rings piston #2 seized. No record that the airplane had been inspected by an a&p mechanic or FAA approved airframe repair station. Pilot stated flight manual not available or used during ground or flight operations.

While approaching Iceland on a ferry flight from Frobisher Bay, the crew declared an emergency due to fuel shortage and requested the permission to divert to Keflavik Airport. On final approach to runway 29, both engines failed simultaneously. The aircraft stalled and crashed on a road located 1,500 meters short of runway. Both pilots were injured and the aircraft was destroyed.

The aircraft suffered an incident in Ecuador few days prior to this accident and damages were reported to the undercarriage. A ferry flight to Calgary was arranged so the aircraft could be repaired by technicians by De Havilland Canada. The flight from Quito to Calgary was completed with the undercarriage down. Upon touchdown on runway 28 at Calgary Airport, the nose gear collapsed. The airplane slid on its nose and came rest, bursting into flames. In a hurry, both pilots escaped the cabin and did not stop both engines. Hydraulic fluids ignited and the aircraft was totally destroyed by fire. Both pilots were uninjured. Dual registration FAE064 and HC-BFH.

The crew was completing a ferry flight from Malmyzh to Kirov following spraying operations and made an intermediate stop in Kaksinvai. He departed Kaksinvai at 1715LT on the second leg and attempted risky manoeuvre at very low height when the aircraft struck trees and crashed in a wooded area located 15 km east of Shurma, bursting into flames. Both pilots and the sole passenger (an aircraft mechanic who was in the second pilot's seat) were killed. At the time of the accident, the crew was intoxicated.