Crash of a Cessna 404 Titan in Lockhart River: 5 killed

Date & Time: Mar 11, 2020 at 0919 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
VH-OZO
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Cairns – Lockhart River
MSN:
404-0653
YOM:
1980
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
4
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
5
Captain / Total flying hours:
3220
Captain / Total hours on type:
399.00
Circumstances:
On 11 March 2020, a Cessna 404 aircraft, registered VH-OZO, was being operated by Air Connect Australia to conduct a passenger charter flight from Cairns to Lockhart River, Queensland. On board were the pilot and 4 passengers, and the flight was being conducted under the instrument flight rules (IFR). Consistent with the forecast, there were areas of cloud and rain that significantly reduced visibility at Lockhart River Airport. On descent, the pilot obtained the latest weather information from the airport’s automated weather information system (AWIS) and soon after commenced an area navigation (RNAV) global satellite system (GNSS) instrument approach to runway 30. The pilot conducted the first approach consistent with the recommended (3°) constant descent profile, and the aircraft kept descending through the minimum descent altitude (MDA) of 730 ft and passed the missed approach point (MAPt). At about 400 ft, the pilot commenced a missed approach. After conducting the missed approach, the pilot immediately commenced a second RNAV GNSS approach to runway 30. During this approach, the pilot commenced descent from 3,500 ft about 2.7 NM prior to the intermediate fix (or 12.7 NM prior to the MAPt). The descent was flown at about a normal 3° flight path, although about 1,000 ft below the recommended descent profile. While continuing on this descent profile, the aircraft descended below the MDA. It then kept descending until it collided with terrain 6.4 km (3.5 NM) short of the runway. The pilot and 4 passengers were fatally injured, and the aircraft was destroyed.
Probable cause:
The accident was the consequence of a controlled flight into terrain.
The following contributing factors were identified:
• While the pilot was operating in the vicinity of Lockhart River Airport, there were areas of cloud and rain that significantly reduced visibility and increased the risk of controlled flight into terrain.
In particular, the aircraft probably entered areas of significantly reduced visibility during the second approach.
• After an area navigation (RNAV) global satellite system (GNSS) approach to runway 30 and missed approach, the pilot immediately conducted another approach to the same runway that was on a similar gradient to the recommended descent profile but displaced about 1,000 ft below that profile. While continuing on this descent profile, the aircraft descended below a segment minimum safe altitude and the minimum descent altitude, then kept descending until the collision with terrain about 6 km before the runway threshold.
• Although the exact reasons for the aircraft being significantly below the recommended descent profile and the continued descent below the minimum descent altitude could not be determined, it was evident that the pilot did not effectively monitor the aircraft’s altitude and descent rate for an extended period.
• When passing the final approach fix (FAF), the aircraft’s lateral position was at about full-scale deflection on the course deviation indicator (CDI), and it then exceeded full-scale deflection for
an extended period. In accordance with the operator’s stabilized approach procedures, a missed approach should have been conducted if the aircraft exceeded half full-scale deflection at the FAF, however a missed approach was not conducted.
• The pilot was probably experiencing a very high workload during periods of the second approach. In addition to the normal high workload associated with a single pilot hand flying an approach in instrument meteorological conditions, the pilot’s workload was elevated due to conducting an immediate entry into the second approach, conducting the approach in a different manner to their normal method, the need to correct lateral tracking deviations throughout the approach, and higher than appropriate speeds in the final approach segment.
• The aircraft was not fitted with a terrain avoidance and warning system (TAWS). Such a system would have provided visual and aural alerts to the pilot of the approaching terrain for an extended period, reducing the risk of controlled flight into terrain.
• Although the aircraft was fitted with a GPS/navigational system suitable for an area navigation (RNAV) global satellite system (GNSS) approach and other non-precision approaches, it was not fitted with a system that provided vertical guidance information, which would have explicitly indicated that the aircraft was well below the recommended descent profile. Although the operator had specified a flight profile for a straight-in approaches and stabilized approach criteria in its operations manual, and encouraged the use of stabilized approaches, there were limitations with the design of these procedures. In addition, there were limitations with other risk controls for minimizing the risk of controlled flight into terrain (CFIT), including no procedures or guidance for the use of the terrain awareness function on the aircraft’s GNS 430W GPS/navigational units and limited monitoring of the conduct of line operations.

Other factors that increased risk:
• Although an applicable height of 1,000 ft for stabilized approach criteria in instrument meteorological conditions has been widely recommended by organizations such as the International Civil Aviation Organization for over 20 years, the Civil Aviation Safety Authority had not provided formal guidance information to Australian operators regarding the content of stabilized approach criteria. (Safety issue)
• The Australian requirements for installing a terrain avoidance and warning system (TAWS) were less than those of other comparable countries for some types of small aeroplanes conducting air transport operations, and the requirements were not consistent with International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) standards and recommended practices. More specifically, although there was a TAWS requirement in Australia for turbine-engine aeroplanes carrying 10 or more passengers under the instrument flight rules:
- There was no requirement for piston-engine aeroplanes to be fitted with a TAWS, even though this was an ICAO standard for such aeroplanes authorized to carry 10 or more passengers, and this standard had been adopted as a requirement in many comparable countries.
- There was no requirement for turbine-engine aeroplanes authorized to carry 6–9 passengers to be fitted with a TAWS, even though this had been an ICAO recommended practice since 2007, and this recommended practice had been adopted as a requirement in many comparable countries. (Safety Issue)

Other findings:
• The forecast weather at Lockhart River for the time of the aircraft’s arrival required the pilot to plan for 60 minutes holding or diversion to an alternate aerodrome. The aircraft had sufficient fuel for that purpose; and the aircraft had sufficient fuel to conduct the flight from Cairns to Lockhart River and return, with additional fuel for holding on both sectors if required.
• There was no evidence of any organizational or commercial pressure to conduct the flight to Lockhart River or to complete the flight once to commenced.
• Based on the available evidence, it is very unlikely that the pilot was incapacitated or impaired during the flight.
• There was no evidence of any aircraft system or mechanical anomalies that would have directly influenced the accident. However, as a consequence of extensive aircraft damage, it was not possible to be conclusive about the aircraft’s serviceability.
• The aircraft was fitted with Garmin GNS 430W GPS/navigational units that could be configured to provide visual (but not aural) terrain alerts. However, it could not be determined whether the
terrain awareness function was selected on during the accident flight.
Final Report:

Crash of a Learjet 55 Longhorn in Monmouth

Date & Time: Feb 25, 2020 at 2356 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
N135LR
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Richmond – Monmouth
MSN:
55-068
YOM:
1982
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
3
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
18288
Captain / Total hours on type:
2909.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
14759
Copilot / Total hours on type:
1978
Aircraft flight hours:
12792
Circumstances:
The pilot reported that he and the copilot were conducting an instrument approach to the runway in a business jet. He noted that the weather conditions included fog and mist. After touching down about 1,500 ft down the 7,300-ft-long runway, he engaged the thrust reversers and applied the brakes gradually because the runway was "slippery." As the airplane approached the end of the runway, he applied full braking, but the airplane departed the end of the runway and impacted a ditch, which resulted in the forward landing gear breaking and the airplane nosing down. The copilot corroborated the pilot's statement. The fuselage was substantially damaged. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
Probable cause:
The flight crew's failure to stop the airplane on the available runway, which was wet and resulted in the airplane impacting a ditch.
Final Report:

Crash of a PZL-Mielec AN-2R in Magadan

Date & Time: Feb 20, 2020 at 1032 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
RA-40642
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Magadan – Seymchan
MSN:
1G213-49
YOM:
1985
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
12
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
8750
Captain / Total hours on type:
4543.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
3865
Copilot / Total hours on type:
3865
Aircraft flight hours:
14822
Circumstances:
The single engine airplane, operated by T-Cement, was engaged in a charter flight from Magadan to Seymchan, carrying 12 pilots and 12 mining employees of the company and their 445 kilos of luggages and personal stuffs. After takeoff from the snowy runway 01, while climbing to a height of 10 metres, the aircraft entered a nose-up attitude while its speed dropped. At a height of about 30 metres, the angle of attack increased to 24° and the speed dropped to 65 km/h, causing the aircraft to stall and to crash in a snow covered field, some 240 metres past the runway end. All 14 occupants evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.
Probable cause:
The aircraft stalled during initial climb because its total weight was above the MTOW and the CofG was well beyond the aft limit. The crew failed to prepare the flight according to procedure and, failed to proceed with a mass and balance calculation and the passengers and lugages were incorrectly placed in the cabin according to the CofG.
Final Report:

Crash of a Piper PA-31-310 Navajo in Bogotá: 4 killed

Date & Time: Feb 12, 2020 at 1544 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
HK-4686
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Bogotá – Villagarzón
MSN:
31-344
YOM:
1968
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
2
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
4
Captain / Total flying hours:
1890
Captain / Total hours on type:
250.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
646
Aircraft flight hours:
10251
Circumstances:
Shortly after takeoff from Bogotá-Guaymaral Airport, while in initial climb, the crew informed ATC about the failure of the right engine. He was cleared to return for an emergency and completed a circuit to land on ruwnay 11. On final, the airplane lost height and crashed in a wooded area located about 800 metres short of runway, bursting into flames. The aircraft was destroyed by a post crash fire and all four occupants were killed.
Probable cause:
The investigation determined that the accident was caused by the following probable cause(s):
- Loss of in-flight control as a result of slowing below Minimum Control Speed and drag, generated by the failure of the right engine (No. 2).
- Failure of engine No. 2, due to lack of lubrication, possibly caused by oil leakage through an 11.5 mm fracture, found in one of the sides of cylinder No. 2 at the height of the intake valves.
- Inappropriate application by the crew of the emergency procedure for landing with an inoperative engine, by not declaring the emergency, not feathering the propeller of the inoperative engine and configuring the aircraft early for landing (with landing gear and flaps) without having a safe runway, making it difficult to control the aircraft and placing it in a condition of loss of lift and control.

Contributing Factors:
- Failure of the operator to emphasize in the crew training program the techniques and procedures to be followed in the event of engine failure, among others, the declaration of emergency to ATC, the flagging of the propeller of the inoperative engine, the care in the application of power to the good engine so as not to increase yaw and not to configure the aircraft until landing has been assured.
- Lack of emergency calls by the crew, which denotes deficiencies in the Operator's Safety Management System, and which prevented the early warning of the aerodrome support services and deprived the crew of possible assistance from other aircraft or from the same operator.
Final Report:

Crash of a De Havilland DHC-3 Otter off Little Grand Rapids: 3 killed

Date & Time: Oct 26, 2019 at 0845 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
C-GBTU
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Bissett - Little Grand Rapids
MSN:
209
YOM:
1957
Country:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
2
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Captain / Total flying hours:
9500
Captain / Total hours on type:
5800.00
Aircraft flight hours:
16474
Circumstances:
At approximately 0745 Central Daylight Time on 26 October 2019, the Blue Water Aviation float-equipped deHavillandDHC-3 Otteraircraft (registration C-GBTU, serial number 209) departed Bissett Water Aerodrome, Manitoba, with the pilot, 2 passengers, and approximately 800 pounds of freight on board. The destination was Little Grand Rapids, Manitoba, on the eastern shore of Family Lake. At approximately 0845, while on approach to Family Lake, the aircraft’s right wing separated from the fuselage. The aircraft then entered a nose-down attitudeand struck the water surface of the lake. The pilot and the 2 passengers were fatally injured. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces. The emergency locator transmitter activated momentarily.
Probable cause:
Findings as to causes and contributing factors:
These are conditions, acts or safety deficiencies that were found to have caused or contributed to this occurrence.
1. A fatigue fracture originated in the bolt hole bore of the right-hand wing lift strut’s upper outboard lug plate, and eventually led to an overstress fracture of the right-hand wing lift strut’s upper outboard and inboard lug plates during the left turn prior to the final approach.
2. The failure of the outboard and inboard lug plates led to the separation of the righthand wing lift strut from the wing and, subsequently, the separation of the right wing from the aircraft.

Findings as to risk:
These are conditions, unsafe acts or safety deficiencies that were found not to be a factor in this occurrence but could have adverse consequences in future occurrences.
1. If operational flight plans data and load calculations are not available, there is a risk that, in the event of a missing aircraft or accident, aircraft information, including its number of occupants, route, cargo, and weight and balance information, will not be available for search and rescue operations or accident investigation.

Other findings:
These items could enhance safety, resolve an issue of controversy, or provide a data point for future safety studies.
1. The detailed visual inspection prescribed in the Viking Air Ltd. Supplementary Inspection and Corrosion Control Manual, and required by Airworthiness DirectiveCF2018-4, did not identify cracks that could form in the right-hand wing strut’s upper outboard lug plate.
Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 402B in Coronel Oviedo

Date & Time: Sep 26, 2019 at 1830 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
ZP-BAE
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Ciudad del Este – Asunción
MSN:
402B-0310
YOM:
1972
Country:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
3
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
En route from Ciudad del Este to Asunción, the pilot encountered technical problems and reduced his altitude to attempt an emergency landing. The twin engine airplane belly landed in a prairie and slid for few dozen metres before coming to rest. All four occupants evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Crash of a Cessna 560XL Citation Excel in Oroville

Date & Time: Aug 21, 2019 at 1132 LT
Operator:
Registration:
N91GY
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Oroville - Portland
MSN:
560-5314
YOM:
2003
Flight number:
DPJ91
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
8
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
6482
Captain / Total hours on type:
192.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
4748
Copilot / Total hours on type:
858
Aircraft flight hours:
9876
Circumstances:
The crew was conducting an on-demand charter flight with eight passengers onboard. As the flight crew taxied the airplane to the departure runway, the copilot called air traffic control using his mobile phone to obtain the departure clearance and release. According to the pilot, while continuing to taxi, he stopped the airplane short of the runway where he performed a rudder bias check (the last item in the taxi checklist) and applied the parking brake without verbalizing the parking brake or rudder bias actions because the copilot was on the phone. After the pilot lined up on the runway and shortly before takeoff, the flight crew discussed and corrected a NO TAKEOFF annunciation for an unsafe trim setting. After the copilot confirmed takeoff power was set, he stated that the airplane was barely moving then said that something was not right, to which the pilot replied the airplane was rolling and to call the airspeeds. About 16 seconds later, the pilot indicated that the airplane was using more runway than he expected then made callouts for takeoff-decision speed and rotation speed. The pilot stated that he pulled the yoke back twice, but the airplane did not lift off. Shortly after, the pilot applied full thrust reversers and maximum braking, then the airplane exited the departure end of the runway, impacted a ditch, and came to rest 1,990 ft beyond the departure end of the runway. The airplane was destroyed by a postcrash fire, and the crew and passengers were not injured.
Probable cause:
The pilot’s failure to release the parking brake before attempting to initiate the takeoff, which produced an unexpected retarding force and airplane nose down pitching moment. Also causal was the flight crew’s delayed decision to abort the takeoff, which resulted in a runway excursion. Contributing to the accident was the lack of a NO TAKEOFF annunciation warning that the parking brake was engaged, and lack of a checklist item to ensure the parking brake was fully released immediately before takeoff.
Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 208B Grand Caravan near Mayo: 2 killed

Date & Time: Aug 6, 2019 at 1113 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
C-FSKF
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Rackla - Mayo
MSN:
208B-0673
YOM:
1998
Location:
Country:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Captain / Total flying hours:
1694
Captain / Total hours on type:
212.00
Aircraft flight hours:
19060
Circumstances:
At 1101 Pacific Daylight Time on 06 August 2019, the Alkan Air Ltd. Cessna 208B Grand Caravan aircraft (registration C‐FSKF, serial number 208B0673) departed Rau Strip, Yukon, on a visual flight rules company flight itinerary to Mayo Airport, Yukon. The aircraft had 1 pilot, 1 passenger, and cargo on board. At 1113, the aircraft entered instrument meteorological conditions and struck rising terrain in a box canyon shortly after. The crash occurred approximately 25 nautical miles east‐northeast of Mayo Airport, at an elevation of 5500 feet above sea level. The Canadian Mission Control Centre did not receive a signal from the aircraft’s 406 MHz emergency locator transmitter. Eyewitnesses from a nearby exploration camp arrived at the site after approximately 1 hour. Royal Canadian Mounted Police and emergency medical services arrived on site approximately 90 minutes after the accident. The pilot and passenger received fatal injuries. The aircraft was destroyed; there was a brief post‐impact fire.
Probable cause:
Findings as to causes and contributing factors:
These are conditions, acts or safety deficiencies that were found to have caused or contributed to this occurrence.
1. The pilot’s decision making was influenced by several biases and, as a result, the flight departed and subsequently continued into poor weather conditions in mountainous terrain.
2. The high speed at low altitude and low forward visibility reduced the opportunities for the pilot to take alternative action to avoid terrain.
3. Within the box canyon, the canyon floor elevation increased abruptly within less than 1 NM and the low visibility prevented the pilot from detecting this and taking sufficient actions to prevent collision with terrain.
4. When the pilot turned into the box canyon, the terrain awareness and warning system aural alerts were ineffective in warning the pilot about the rising terrain either because he had already heard multiple similar alerts in the preceding minutes, or because he had silenced the alerts.

Findings as to risk:
These are conditions, unsafe acts, or safety deficiencies that were found not to be a factor in this occurrence but could have adverse consequences in future occurrences.
1. If administrative safety defences are not used as intended, it increases the risk that the hazards associated with the flight will not be identified and mitigated.

Other findings:
These items could enhance safety, resolve an issue of controversy, or provide a data point for future safety studies.
1. The pilot held a valid instrument rating and the aircraft was equipped to fly in instrument meteorological conditions. However, there were no scenarios in the pilot’s flying history on the Cessna 208B Grand Caravan or in his training where a transition from visual flight rules to a flight under instrument flight rules in an emergency was performed.
Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 560XLS+ Citation Excel in Aarhus

Date & Time: Aug 6, 2019 at 0036 LT
Operator:
Registration:
D-CAWM
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Oslo - Aarhus
MSN:
560-6002
YOM:
2008
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
7
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The accident occurred during an IFR air taxi flight from Oslo (ENGM) to Aarhus (EKAH). The flight was uneventful until the landing phase. The commander was the pilot flying, and the first officer was the pilot monitoring. En route, the flight crew set the Vapp 15° to 123 knots (kt) and the Vref 35° to 116 kt and agreed upon, if foggy at EKAH, to pull the curtains between the cockpit and the passenger cabin in order to avoid blinding from lights in the passenger cabin. During the descent, the flight crew decided not to descend below Flight Level (FL) 170, if the weather did not allow an approach and landing in EKAH. Instead they would continue to a pre-planned destination alternate. The pre-planned and nearest useable destination alternate was Billund (EKBI) at a great circle distance of 60 nautical miles southwest of EKAH. At 22:09 hrs, the first officer established preliminary radio contact with Aarhus Tower (118.525 MegaHertz (MHz)) in order to obtain the latest weather report for EKAH. The air traffic controller at Aarhus Tower communicated the following landing details:
- Expected landing on runway 10R.
- Wind conditions to be 140° 2 kt.
- Meteorological visibility to be 250 meters (m).
- Runway Visual Range (RVR) at landing to be 900 m, 750 m, and 400 m in fog patches.
- Few clouds at 200 feet (ft), few clouds at 6500 ft.
- Temperature 16° Celcius (C) and Dewpoint 15° C.
- QNH 1008 Hectopascal (hPa).
The first officer read back a meteorological visibility of 2500 m to the commander. The flight crew discussed the reported RVR values and agreed that runway 10R would be the preferable landing runway. The commander made an approach briefing for the Instrument Landing System (ILS) for runway 10R including a summary of SOP in case of a missed approach. The first officer pulled the curtain between the cockpit and the passenger cabin. At established radio contact with Aarhus Approach (119.275 MHz) at 22:20 hrs, the air traffic controller instructed the flight crew to descend to altitude 3000 feet on QNH 1008 hPa and to expect radar vectors for an ILS approach to runway 10R. The flight crew performed the approach checklist. The flight crew discussed the weather situation at EKAH with expected shallow fog and fog patches at landing. At 22:28 hrs, the air traffic controller instructed the flight crew to turn right by 10°, descend to 2000 ft on QNH 1008 hPa, and informed that Low Visibility Procedures (LVP) were in operation at EKAH. Due the weather conditions, the air traffic controller radar vectored the aircraft for a long final allowing the flight crew to be properly established before the final approach. The commander called out the instrument presentation of an operative radio altimeter. At 22:31 hrs, the air traffic controller instructed the flight crew to turn left on heading 130° and cleared the flight crew to perform an ILS approach to runway 10R. The commander armed the approach mode of the aircraft Automatic Flight Control System and ordered a flap setting of 15°. When established on the LLZ for runway 10R and shortly before leaving 2000 ft on the GS, the commander through shallow fog obtained and called visual contact with the approach and runway lighting system. At that point, the first officer as well noted the approach and runway lighting system including the position of the green threshold identification lights. The commander ordered a landing gear down selection. The flight crew observed that a fog layer was situated above the middle of the runway. Though visual contact with the approach and runway lighting system, the commander requested altitude call-outs on approach. The commander ordered a flap setting of 35°. The aircraft was established on the ILS (LLZ and GS) for runway 10R in landing configuration. At 22:32 hrs, the first officer reported to Aarhus Approach that the aircraft was established on the ILS for runway 10R. The air traffic controller reported the wind conditions to be 150° 2 kt and cleared the aircraft to land on runway 10R. The flight crew initiated the final checklist. The landing lights were on. The first officer noted two white and two red lights of the Precision Approach Path Indicator (PAPI) to the left of runway 10R. Passing approximately 1500 ft Radio Height (RH), the first officer reported to the commander visual contact with the approach and runway lighting system, fog above the middle of the runway, and that the touchdown zone and the runway end were both visible. The commander confirmed. At approximately 900 ft RH, the commander disengaged the autopilot, and the flight crew completed the final checklist. The aircraft was established on the ILS (LLZ and GS) for runway 10R in landing configuration at a recorded computed airspeed of approximately 128 kt. The first officer called: 500 to minimum (passing approximately 800 ft RH), and the commander called: Runway in sight. The commander confirmed that the intensity of the approach and runway lighting system was okay. The commander informed the first officer that the intention was to touch down at the beginning of the runway. In order to avoid entering fog patches during the landing roll, the commander planned flying one dot below the GS, performing a towed approach, and touching down on the threshold. However, the commander did not communicate this plan of action to the first officer. The aircraft started descending below the GS for runway 10R. The first officer asked the commander whether to cancel potential Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System (EGPWS) GS warnings. The commander confirmed. At approximately 500 ft RH, the Solid State Flight Data Recorder (SSFDR) recorded cancellation of potential EGPWS GS warnings. The aircraft aural alert warning system announced passing 500 feet RH. The recorded computed airspeed was 125 kt, the recorded vertical speed was approximately 700 ft/minute, and the GS deviation approached one dot below the GS. The commander noted the PAPI indicating the aircraft flying below the GS (one white and three red lights). The first officer called: Approaching minimum. Shortly after, the aircraft aural alert warning system announced: Minimums Minimums. The SSFDR recorded a beginning thrust reduction towards flight idle and a full scale GS deviation (flying below). The commander called: Continue. The commander had visual contact with the approach and runway lighting system. It was the perception of the first officer that the commander had sufficient visual cues to continue the approach and landing. The first officer as pilot monitoring neither made callouts on altitude nor deviation from GS. The commander noticed passing a white crossbar, a second white crossbar and then red lights. To the commander, the red lights indicated the beginning of runway 10R, and the commander initiated the flare. The aircraft collided with the antenna mast system of the LLZ for runway 28L, touched down in the grass RESA for runway 28L, and the nose landing gear collided with a near field antenna (LLZ for runway 28L) and collapsed. The aircraft ended up on runway 10R. Throughout the sequence of events and due to fog, the air traffic controller in the control tower (Aarhus Approach) had neither visual contact with the approach sector, the threshold for runway 10R nor the aircraft on ground, when it came to a full stop. Upon full stop on runway 10R, the first officer with a calm voice reported to Aarhus Approach: Aarhus Tower, Delta Whiskey Mike, we had a crash landing. The air traffic controller did not quite perceive the reporting and was uncertain on the content of the reporting and replied: Say again. The cabin crewmember without instructions from the flight crew initiated the evacuation of the passengers via the cabin entry door. The aircraft caught fire. Aarhus Approach and the Aerodrome Office in cooperation activated the aerodrome firefighting services and the area emergency dispatch centre. Upon completion of the on ground emergency procedure and the evacuation of the aircraft, the flight crew met the cabin crewmember and the passengers at a safe distance in front of the aircraft.
Probable cause:
The following factors were identified:
1. Deviations from SOP in dark night and low visibility combined with the cancellation of a hardware safety barrier compromised flight safety.
2. The commander started flying below the GS.
3. Both pilots accepted and instituted a deactivation of a hardware safety barrier by cancelling potential EGPWS GS alerts for excessive GS deviations.
4. Both pilots accepted and instituted a deviation from SOP by not maintaining the GS upon runway visual references in sight.
5. At low altitude, the first officer made no corrective call-outs on altitude, GS deviation or unstabilized approach.
6. The confusion over and misinterpretation of the CAT 1 approach and runway lighting system resulted in a too early flare and consequently a CFIT.
Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 208 Caravan 675 on Addenbroke Island: 4 killed

Date & Time: Jul 26, 2019 at 1104 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
C-GURL
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Site:
MSN:
208-0501
YOM:
2008
Country:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
8
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
4
Captain / Total flying hours:
8500
Captain / Total hours on type:
504.00
Aircraft flight hours:
4576
Circumstances:
Seair Seaplanes (Seair) was contracted by a remote fishing lodge on the central coast of British Columbia (BC) (Figure 1) to provide seasonal transport of guests and supplies between Vancouver International Water Aerodrome (CAM9), BC, and the lodge, which is located about 66 nautical miles (NM) north-northwest of Port Hardy Airport (CYZT), BC, and about 29 NM southeast of Bella Bella (Campbell Island) Airport (CBBC), BC. On 26 July 2019, the occurrence pilot arrived at Seair’s CAM9 base at approximately 0630. Over the next hour, the pilot completed a daily inspection of the Cessna 208 Caravan aircraft (registration C-GURL, serial number 20800501), added 300 L of fuel to the aircraft, and began flight planning activities, which included gathering and interpreting weather information. On the morning of the occurrence, 4 Seair visual flight rules (VFR) flights were scheduled to fly to the central coast of BC, all on Caravan aircraft: C-GURL (the occurrence aircraft) was to depart CAM9 at 0730, C-GSAS at 0745, C-FLAC at 0800, and C-GUUS at 0900. The first 3 flights were direct flights to the fishing lodge, while the 4th flight had an intermediate stop at the Campbell River Water Aerodrome (CAE3), BC, to pick up passengers before heading to a research institute located approximately 4 NM southwest of the fishing lodge. Because of poor weather conditions in the central coast region, however, all of the flights were delayed. After the crews referred to weather cameras along the central coast region, the flights began to depart, but in a different order than originally scheduled. It is not uncommon for the order of departure to change when groups of aircraft are going to the same general location. One of Seair’s senior operational staff (operations manager) departed CAM9 at 0850 aboard C-FLAC. C-GUUS, bound for the research institute, departed CAM9 next at 0906, and then the occurrence aircraft departed at 0932 (Table 1). The pilot originally scheduled to fly C-GSAS declined the flight. This pilot had recently upgraded to the Caravan, had never flown to this destination before, and was concerned about the weather at the destination. When Seair’s chief pilot returned to CAM9 at 0953 after a series of scheduled flights on a different type of aircraft, he assumed the last remaining flight to the lodge and C-GSAS departed CAM9 at 1024.After departing the Vancouver terminal control area, the occurrence aircraft climbed to 4500 feet above sea level (ASL) and remained at this altitude until 1023, when a slow descent was initiated. The aircraft levelled off at approximately 1300 feet ASL at 1044, when it was approximately 18 NM northeast of Port Hardy Airport (CYZT), BC, and 57 NM southeast of the destination. At 1050, the occurrence aircraft slowly descended again as the flight continued northbound. During this descent, the aircraft’s flaps were extended to the 10° position. At this point, the occurrence aircraft was 37 NM south-southeast of the fishing lodge. The aircraft continued to descend until it reached an altitude of approximately 330 feet ASL, at 1056. By this point, the occurrence aircraft was being operated along the coastline, but over the ocean. C-FLAC departed from the fishing lodge at 1056 on the return flight to CAM9. C-FLAC flew into the Fitz Hugh Sound and proceeded southbound along the western shoreline. At approximately 1100, it flew through an area of heavy rain where visibility was reduced to about 1 statute mile (SM). C-FLAC descended to about 170 feet ASL and maintained this altitude for the next 5 minutes before climbing to about 300 feet ASL. As the southbound C-FLAC entered Fitz Hugh Sound from the north at Hecate Island, the occurrence aircraft entered Fitz Hugh Sound from the south, near the southern tip of Calvert Island. The occurrence aircraft then changed course from the western to the eastern shoreline, and descended again to about 230 feet ASL (Figure 2), while maintaining an airspeed of approximately 125 knots. The 2 aircraft established 2-way radio contact. The pilot of C-FLAC indicated that Addenbroke Island was visible when he flew past it, and described the weather conditions in the Fitz Hugh Sound to the occurrence pilot as heavy rain showers and visibility of approximately 1 SM around Kelpie Point. The occurrence pilot then indicated that he would maintain a course along the eastern shoreline of the sound. At 1103, the 2 aircraft were separated by 2 NM and passed each other on reciprocal tracks, approximately 4 NM south of the accident site. The occurrence aircraft maintained a consistent track and altitude for the next 54 seconds, then slowly began a 25° change in track to the west (0.35 NM from the Addenbroke Island shoreline). Seven seconds after the turn started (0.12 NM from the island’s shoreline), the aircraft entered a shallow climb averaging 665 fpm. At 1104:55, the occurrence aircraft struck trees on Addenbroke Island at an altitude of approximately 490 feet ASL, at an airspeed of 114 knots, and in a relatively straight and level attitude. The aircraft then continued through the heavily forested hillside for approximately 450 feet, coming to rest at an elevation of 425 feet ASL, 9.7 NM east-southeast of the destination fishing lodge. The pilot and three passengers were killed and five other occupants were injured, four seriously.
Probable cause:
Findings as to causes and contributing factors:
These are conditions, acts or safety deficiencies that were found to have caused or contributed to this occurrence.
1. The flight departed Vancouver International Water Aerodrome even though the reported and forecast weather conditions in the vicinity of the destination were below visual flight rules minima; the decision to depart may have been influenced by the group dynamics of Seair pilots and senior staff at the flight planning stage.
2. The pilot continued flight in reduced visibility, without recognizing the proximity to terrain, and subsequently impacted the rising terrain of Addenbroke Island.
3. The configuration of the visual and aural alerting systems and the colouration ambiguity in the primary flight display of the Garmin G1000 was ineffective at alerting the occurrence pilot to the rising terrain ahead.
4. The occurrence pilot’s attention, vigilance, and general cognitive function were most likely influenced to some degree by fatigue.

Findings as to risk:
These are conditions, unsafe acts or safety deficiencies that were found not to be a factor in this occurrence but could have adverse consequences in future occurrences.
1. If pilots do not receive specialized training that addresses the hazards of their flying environment, there is a risk that they will not be proficient in the specific skills necessary to maintain safety margins.
2. If aircraft are operated in excess of the maximum allowable take-off weight, there is a risk of performance degradation and adverse flight characteristics, which could jeopardize the safety of the flight.
3. If cargo is stowed in front of emergency exits, there is a risk that egress may be impeded in an emergency situation, potentially increasing evacuation time and risk of injuries.
4. If air operators do not employ a methodology to accurately assess threats inherent to daily operations, then there is a risk that unsafe practices will become routine and operators will be unaware of the increased risk.
5. If air operators that have flight data monitoring capabilities do not actively monitor their flight operations, they may not be able to identify drift toward unsafe practices that increase the risk to flight crew and passengers.
6. If Transport Canada’s oversight of operators is insufficient, there is a risk that air operators will be non-compliant with regulations or drift toward unsafe practices, thereby reducing safety margins.
7. If Transport Canada does not make safety management systems mandatory, and does not assess and monitor these systems, there is an increased risk that companies will be unable to effectively identify and mitigate the hazards associated within their operations.

Other findings:
These items could enhance safety, resolve an issue of controversy, or provide a data point for future safety studies.
1. The pilot was actively using a cellphone throughout the flight; the operator provided no guidance or limitations on approved cellphone use in flight.
Final Report: