Magadan oblast

The aircraft stalled during initial climb because its total weight was above the MTOW and the CofG was well beyond the aft limit. The crew failed to prepare the flight according to procedure and, failed to proceed with a mass and balance calculation and the passengers and lugages were incorrectly placed in the cabin according to the CofG.

The accident occurred as result of the aircraft departing the side of the runway after the commander rejected takeoff after having been unable to use the elevator because of the yoke's locked position. The roll beyond the edge of the runway was likely caused by the flight engineer while attempting to operate the handle to release the flight controls lock while the aircraft was already accelerating for takeoff. The accident was thus caused by this combination of factors:
- violation of requirements by FCOM to ascertain the flight controls were free and usable before engine start,
- failure by the crew to execute the checklists to check elevator, rudder and ailerons were free to move before takeoff,
- flight crew receives insufficient practice in real flight to maintain skills acquired during simulator training in the management of the aircraft and its systems resulting in negative impact during emergency situations.

The probable causes of the crash were:
Following the inflight shut down of engine number one and feathering of the number one propeller the longitudinal (roll) control of the aircraft was lost due to load-bearing properties of the left wing and possible damage to the left hand aileron control wiring resulting in the aircraft's uncontrolled excessive roll to the left and subsequent impact with terrain. The fire started in the tail section of the #1 engine nacelle and spread forward and onto the wing. The fire was most likely fed by fuel leaking from a fuel line connection to the low pressure fuel pump at engine #1, the fuel most likely ignited due to contact with hot engine parts. Due to the disintegration of the aircraft and fire damage it was not possible to establish the location of fuel leaks and the cause with certainty. The inability of the fire suppression system to extinguish such a fire in its early stages as well as the lack of checklists/guidelines in the aircraft's flight manual for fuel leaks inside the engine nacelle contributed to the delay of more than 2 minutes to shut the engine down. The mountainous terrain underneath the aircraft, low level overcast cloud and lack of time due to continued fire did not permit the crew to select a proper site for an emergency landing.

The accident was the consequence of a poor flight preparation and wrong takeoff configuration on part of the crew. The following contributing factors were reported:
- The takeoff was rushed and the crew failed to follow the pre-takeoff checklist,
- The elevators were selected in an inappropriate angle during takeoff,
- The total weight of the aircraft was above MTOW,
- The crew did not have sufficient rest time,
- Due to fatigue, the crew performances were reduced,
- A certain level/degree of alcohol was found in the captain's blood,
- Poor crew coordination,
- Misunderstanding by the crew,
- The pilot-in-command failed to initiate the rotation,
- The crew failed to abandon the takeoff procedure while it was obviously compromised.

It was determined that the runway surface was contaminated with snow and has not been cleared prior to takeoff. It was also reported that the runway lights and edge markings were not clearly visible due to snow.

The crew decided to continue under VFR mode in IMC conditions. At the time of the accident, the visibility was poor due to low clouds and heavy snow falls. The crew failed to return and did not realize his was off course by 26 km due to limited visibility.

Premature gear retraction during takeoff. Poor crew coordination.

The exact cause of the accident could not be determined.

The crew continued the flight below the minimum prescribed altitude.