Charter/Taxi (Non Scheduled Revenue Flight)

After takeoff from runway 17 at São Paulo-Congonhas Airport, the crew was cleared to climb to 5,500 feet maintaining heading 270. Weather conditions were poor with clouds, atmospheric turbulences and strong winds. At an altitude of 5,300 feet, the aircraft lost height and descended to 4,700 feet, an altitude that was maintained for 17 seconds. Then the aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed in four houses located in the district of Vila Anhanguera, about 5,5 km southwest of the airport. The aircraft and all four houses were destroyed. All seven occupants were killed while on the ground, six people were injured, one seriously.

The aircraft departed Saurimo on a flight to Luanda, carrying 44 passengers and a crew of five. This was the last leg of day after two previous flights from Lucapa and Dundo. About 20 minutes into the flight, while in cruising altitude, the aircraft was hit by a surface-to-air missile, entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed in an open field located near Mona Quimbundo. The wreckage was found about 50 km southwest of Saurimo and all 49 occupants were killed.

The Hydro-Québec Convair 340 (580), registration C-GFHH, serial number 109, with 18 passengers and 4 crew members on board, made an instrument flight rules flight from La Grande 3 to La Grande 4, Quebec. The aircraft touched down on the snow-covered runway at La Grande 4 approximately 800 feet beyond the runway threshold. Shortly after the nose wheel touched down and the pilot set the propellers to reverse pitch, the aircraft drifted to the right. Despite the attempts of the pilot flying (the captain) to correct, the aircraft continued its course and exited the south side of Runway 09 at approximately 50 knots. The aircraft travelled 350 feet over soft, rocky ground and came to rest about 120 feet outside the runway edge, about 2500 feet from the runway threshold. The flight crew followed the procedure to shut down the engines, but the left engine would not stop. On the captain's order, the first officer went into the passenger cabin and ordered an evacuation. All passengers exited the aircraft via the window emergency exits over the right wing. The left engine eventually shut down on its own after about 15 minutes. Five persons sustained minor injuries. The aircraft sustained substantial damage but did not catch fire.

The airline transport certificated pilot was landing at a remote village on a scheduled domestic commuter flight with nine passengers. The accident airplane, a twin-engine turboprop certified for single-pilot operations, was equipped with a fuselage-mounted belly cargo pod. Witnesses saw the airplane touch down on the gravel runway with the landing gear retracted. The belly pod lightly scraped the runway for about 40 feet before the airplane transitioned to a climb. The propeller tips did not contact the runway. As the airplane began climbing away from the runway, the landing gear was extended. The airplane climbed to about 100 to 150 feet above the ground, and then began a descending left turn, colliding with tundra-covered terrain. A postcrash fire destroyed the fuselage, right wing, and the right engine. The flaps were found extended to 40 degrees. The balked landing procedure for the airplane states, in part: "power levers to maximum, flaps to 15 degrees, landing gear up, and then retract the flaps." Five passengers seated in the rear of the airplane survived the crash. The survivors did not recall hearing a gear warning horn before ground contact. The airplane was landed gear-up eight months before the accident. The airplane was nearly landed gear-up four months before the accident. Each time, a landing gear warning horn was not heard by the pilot or passengers. A postcrash examination of the airplane and engines did not locate any preimpact mechanical malfunction. The FAA's Fairbanks, Alaska, FSDO conducted an inspection of the operator six months before the accident, and recommended the operator utilize two pilots in the accident airplane. Following the accident, the Fairbanks FSDO required the operator to utilize two pilots for passenger flights in the accident airplane make and model.

On 4 September 2000, a Beech Super King Air 200 aircraft, VH-SKC, departed Perth, Western Australia at 1009 UTC on a charter flight to Leonora with one pilot and seven passengers on board. Until 1032 the operation of the aircraft and the communications with the pilot appeared normal. However, shortly after the aircraft had climbed through its assigned altitude, the pilot’s speech became significantly impaired and he appeared unable to respond to ATS instructions. Open microphone transmissions over the next 8-minutes revealed the progressive deterioration of the pilot towards unconsciousness and the absence of any sounds of passenger activity in the aircraft. No human response of any kind was detected for the remainder of the flight. Five hours after taking off from Perth, the aircraft impacted the ground near Burketown, Queensland, and was destroyed. There were no survivors.

The pilot ditched the twin engine airplane in the Pacific ocean after experiencing a loss of engine power and an in-flight engine fire while in cruise flight. The flight was operating at 1,000 feet msl, when the pilot noticed a loss of engine power in the right engine. At the same time the pilot was noticing the power loss, passengers noted a fire coming from the right engine cowling. The pilot secured the right engine and feathered the propeller. He attempted to land the airplane at a nearby airport; however, when he realized that the airplane was unable to maintain altitude he elected to ditch the airplane in the ocean. Prior to executing the forced landing, the pilot instructed the passengers to don their life jackets and assume the crash position. After touchdown, all but one passenger exited the airplane through the main cabin and pilot doors. It was reported that the remaining passenger was frightened, and could not swim. One survivor saw the remaining passenger sitting in the seat with the seat belt still secured and the life vest inflated. The pilot and passengers were then rescued from the ocean via rescue helicopter and boat. Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed that the right engine's oil converter plate gasket had deteriorated and extruded from behind the converter plate, allowing oil to spray in the accessory section and resulting in the subsequent engine fire. The engine manufacturer had previously issued a mandatory service bulletin (MSB) requiring inspection of the gasket every 50 hours for evidence of gasket extrusion around the cover plate or oil leakage. Maintenance records revealed that the inspection had been conducted 18.3 hours prior to the accident. At the time of the accident, the right engine had accumulated 386.8 hours since its last overhaul, and gasket replacement. The MSB was issued one month prior to the accident, after the manufacturer received reports of certain oil filter converter plate gaskets extruding around the oil filter converter plate. The protruding or swelling of the gasket allowed oil to leak and spray from between the plate and the accessory housing. A series of tests were conducted on exemplar gaskets by submerging them in engine oil heated to 245 degrees F; after about 290 hours, the gasket material displayed signs of deterioration similar to that of the accident gasket. A subsequent investigation revealed that the engine manufacturer had recently changed gasket suppliers, which resulted in a shipment of gaskets getting into the supply chain that did not meet specifications. As a result of this accident, the engine manufacturer revised the MSB to require the replacement of the gasket every 50 hours. The FAA followed suit and issued an airworthiness directive to mandate the replacement of the gasket every 50 hours.

On final approach to San Juan de Manapiare Airport in bad weather conditions, the single engine aircraft crashed on hilly terrain. The pilot and two passengers were killed while three other occupants were injured.

The flight was cleared for an NDB or GPS runway 14 instrument approach. The pilot was instructed to report procedure turn. Center radar reported the airplane's altitude was last observed at 200 feet. A witness observed the airplane as it collided with trees and the ground and, subsequently burst into flames. No mechanical problem with the airplane was reported by the pilot or discovered during the wreckage examination. Weather minimums for the approach are 800 feet an one mile. Low clouds were reported in the area at the time of the accident.

A Piper PA-31-350 Navajo Chieftain, N27944, operated by Patuxent Airways, Inc., Hollywood, Maryland, and a Piper PA-44-180 Seminole, N2225G, operated by Hortman Aviation Services, Inc., Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, were destroyed when they collided in flight over Burlington Township, New Jersey. The airline transport pilot, commercial pilot, and seven passengers aboard the Navajo Chieftain were killed, as were the flight instructor and the private pilot aboard the Seminole. Day visual meteorological conditions existed at the time of the accident, and both airplanes were operating under visual flight rules when the collision occurred. The flight crews of both airplanes were properly certificated and qualified in accordance with applicable Federal regulations. None of these individuals was experiencing any personal problems or rest anomalies that would have affected their performance. The airplanes had undergone the required inspections. Examination of their maintenance documents revealed that both airplanes complied with all appropriate airworthiness directives. Evidence gathered from the wreckage indicated that neither airplane had experienced an in-flight fire, bird strike, or structural or mechanical failure. Tissue samples revealed that the pilot of the Seminole had taken doxylamine sometime before the accident. (Doxylamine is a sedating antihistamine that has substantial adverse effects on performance.) However, the amount of blood available for analysis was insufficient for determining exactly when the pilot may have ingested the medication or whether his performance was impaired by the effects of doxylamine. A partial cockpit visibility study revealed that the Seminole would have been visible to the pilots in the Chieftain for at least the 60 seconds before the collision. No stereo photographs from a Seminole cockpit were available to determine precise obstruction angles. However, because of the relative viewing angle, the Chieftain would have been visible to the pilots in the Seminole for most of the last 60 seconds. The study further revealed that about 4 seconds before impact, or about .11 nm separation, the angular width of each airplane in each pilot's field of vision would have been approximately 0.5 to 0.6 degrees or about 1/4 inch apparent size at the windscreen.

A DHC-3 and a Cessna 185 (both float equipped aircraft) had been chartered to move equipment from an outpost camp which was being threatened by forest fires in the Tadoule Lake (Lac Brochet, MB) area. Takeoff was conducted in a westerly direction into light winds estimated to be 5 to 8 knots. Besides the pilot there were two passengers (the camp owner and his son), two 45 gallon drums of #2 gas, a propane cylinder, battery chargers plus other sundry items. It was reported that once the aircraft was airborne, a windshift occurred which may have resulted in rollover and a downdraft situation. The aircraft began to descend, despite the application of full engine power, and settled into the trees with little forward speed and the wings in a near level attitude. The aircraft was then consumed by fire, the pilot and his two passengers were able to escape with minor scrapes and bruises. The pilot of the Cessna 185 witnessed the accident while airborne and he then returned and landed and rendered assistance to the three occupants. The local temperature was 27 degrees C, and the aircraft was near its maximum gross weight. It was reported that the aircraft had a headwind in proximity to the forest fire on takeoff, and that it flew into the area of a tailwind during initial climb.