Charter/Taxi (Non Scheduled Revenue Flight)

On Tuesday 25 July 2000 the Concorde registered F-BTSC, operated by Air France, took off from Paris Charles de Gaulle to undertake charter flight AF4590 to New York with nine crew members (3 FC, 6 CC) and 100 passengers on board. The Captain was Pilot Flying (PF), the First Officer was Pilot Not Flying (PNF). The total weights of the aircraft and of the fuel on board stated by the Flight Engineer (FE) at the time the aircraft started out were 186.9 t and 95 t respectively. The speeds selected by the crew were V1: 150 kt, VR: 198 kt, V2: 220 kt. At 13 h 58 min 27 s, the crew contacted ATC on the Flight data frequency and requested the whole length of runway 26 right for a takeoff at 14 h 30. At 14 h 07 min 22 s, the controller gave start-up clearance and confirmed runway 26 right for takeoff. At 14 h 34 min 38 s, the Ground controller cleared the aircraft to taxi towards the runway 26 right holding point via the Romeo taxiway. At 14 h 40 min 02 s, the Loc Sud controller cleared 4590 to line up. At 14 h 42 min 17 s, he gave it takeoff clearance, and announced a wind from 090° at 8kt. The crew read back the takeoff clearance. The FE stated that the aircraft had used eight hundred kilos of fuel during taxiing. At 14 h 42 min 31 s, the PF commenced takeoff. At 14 h 42 min 54.6 s, the PNF called one hundred knots, then V1 nine seconds later. A few seconds after that, tyre No 2 (right front) on the left main landing gear was destroyed after having run over a piece of metal lost by an aircraft that had taken off five minutes before. The destruction of the tyre in all probability resulted in large pieces of rubber being thrown against the underside of the left wing and the rupture of a part of tank 5. A severe fire broke out under the left wing and around the same time engines 1 and 2 suffered a loss of thrust, severe for engine 2, slight for engine 1. By 14 h 43 min 13 s, as the PF commenced the rotation, the controller informed the crew the presence of flames behind the aircraft. The PNF acknowledged this transmission and the FE announced the failure of engine 2. The recorded parameters show a transient loss of power on engine 1 that was not mentioned by the crew. At around 14 h 43 min 22 s the engine fire alarm sounded and the FE announced "shut down engine 2" then the Captain called for the "engine fire" procedure. A few seconds later, the engine 2 fire handle was pulled and the fire alarm stopped. The PNF drew the PF’s attention to the airspeed, which was 200 kt. At 14 h 43 min 30 s, the PF called for landing gear retraction. The controller confirmed the presence of large flames behind the aircraft. At 14 h 43 min 42 s the engine fire alarm sounded again for around 12 seconds. It sounded for the third time at about 14 h 43 58 s and continued until the end of the flight. At 14 h 43 min 56 s, the PNF commented that the landing gear had not retracted and made several callouts in relation to the airspeed. At 14 h 43 min 59 s, the GPWS alarm sounded several times. The FO informed ATC that they were trying for Le Bourget aerodrome. The recorded parameters then indicate a loss of power on engine 1. A few seconds later, the aircraft crashed onto a hotel at “La Patte d’Oie” in Gonesse at the intersection of the N17 and D902 roads. The aircraft was totally destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire and all 109 occupants were killed as well as four people working in the hotel. Five other employees were injured. The aircraft was chartered by the German Operator Deilmann to carry German tourists to New York. On board were nine French citizens (all crew members), 96 Germans, two Danish, one American and one Austrian.

After takeoff from Chania-Souda Airport, the crew reported technical problems with the right main gear that could not be raised properly in its wheel well. The captain decided to continue to Munich in a gear down configuration but the fuel consumption increased. En route, the crew realized he could not make it to Munich so diverted to Vienna-Schwechat Airport. At a distance of about 12 NM from the airport, at an altitude of 4,000 feet, both engines failed due to fuel exhaustion. One of the engine could be restarted for a short period of time but on short final, the aircraft stalled and struck the ground (a grassy area) about 500 metres short of runway 34. The left main gear broke off, the aircraft slid for some 600 metres then veered to the left and came to rest on its left wing. All 151 occupants were rescued, among them 26 passengers were slightly injured. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

At liftoff, the engine failed. The aircraft stalled and crashed along the runway. There were no casualties but the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The aircraft, registered to a private individual, departed Villavicencio-La Vanguardia Airport on a charter flight to Mitú, carrying 17 passengers and two pilots while the aircraft was certified to carry 13 passengers maximum. The crew filed an flight plan with only six people on board. Shortly after takeoff, while in initial climb, the right engine caught fire. The crew activated the fire extinguishing system but as both bottles were empty, the fire could not be contained. The captain initiated a right hand turn to return to the airport when the aircraft stalled and crashed, bursting into flames, two minutes after takeoff. Both pilots and eight passengers were killed while nine other people were injured. The aircraft was totally destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire.

The Beechcraft Queen Air and Rockwell Aero Commander were being used by a company to conduct private category passenger-carrying flights to transport its workers from Leonora to Laverton in Western Australia. The Aero Commander had departed and was established in the Leonora circuit area when the Queen Air took off. The pilot and one of the passengers of the Queen Air reported the take-off roll appeared normal until the aircraft crossed the runway intersection, when they felt a bump in the aircraft. The pilot reported hearing a loud bang and noticed that the inboard cowl of the right engine had opened. He also reported that he believed he had insufficient runway remaining to stop safely, so he continued the takeoff. The cowl separated from the aircraft at the time, or just after the pilot rotated the aircraft to the take-off attitude. He reported that although the aircraft had left the ground after the rotation, it then would not climb. The aircraft remained at almost treetop level until the pilot and front-seat passenger noticed the side of a tailings dump immediately in front of the aircraft. The pilot said that he pulled the control column fully back. The aircraft hit the hillside parallel to the slope of the embankment, with little forward speed. The impact destroyed the aircraft. Although the occupants sustained serious injuries, they evacuated the aircraft without external assistance. There was no post-impact fire. The aircraft-mounted emergency locator transmitter (ELT) did not activate.

The de Havilland DHC-2 (Beaver) floatplane, serial number 841, departed Hotnarko Lake, British Columbia, at about 1630 Pacific daylight time. The pilot and six passengers were on board, with fishing gear and fish. Soon after take-off, the pilot entered a left turn. Before the turn was completed, the aircraft rolled, without command, further left to about 40 degrees of bank and the nose dropped. The aircraft did not respond to initial pilot inputs and continued in a left, diving turn toward the trees at the edge of the lake. The pilot tried to get the aircraft back onto the lake. The aircraft started to recover from the bank and the nose started to come up; however, the aircraft struck the lake surface before a level attitude could be regained. It broke apart on contact with the water and sank soon after. The pilot and four of the passengers managed to free themselves from the wreckage, but only three passengers and the pilot managed to swim to shore. One passenger slipped below the water surface before reaching the shore and drowned. Two passengers remained in the aircraft below the water surface, one secured by his seat belt, and drowned.

On May 21, 2000, about 1128 eastern daylight time (EDT), a British Aerospace Jetstream 3101, N16EJ, operated by East Coast Aviation Services (doing business as Executive Airlines) crashed
about 11 miles south of Wilkes-Barre/Scranton International Airport (AVP), Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania. The airplane was destroyed by impact and a post crash fire, and 17 passengers and two flight crewmembers were killed. The flight was being conducted under 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 135 as an on-demand charter flight for Caesar’s Palace Casino in Atlantic City, New Jersey. An instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan had been filed for the flight from Atlantic City International Airport (ACY) to AVP. The captain checked in for duty about 0800 at Republic Airport (FRG) in Farmingdale, New York, on the day of the accident. The airplane was originally scheduled to depart FRG at 0900 for ACY and to remain in ACY until 1900, when it was scheduled to return to FRG. While the pilots were conducting preflight inspections, they received a telephone call from Executive Airlines’ owner and chief executive officer (CEO) advising them that they had been assigned an additional flight from ACY to AVP with a return flight to ACY later in the day, instead of the scheduled break in ACY. Fuel records at FRG indicated that 90 gallons of fuel were added to the accident airplane’s tanks before departure to ACY. According to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) air traffic control (ATC) records, the flight departed at 0921 (with 12 passengers on board) and arrived in ACY at 0949. According to passenger statements, the captain was the pilot flying from FRG to ACY. After arrival in ACY, the flight crew checked the weather for AVP and filed an IFR flight plan. Fuel facility records at ACY indicated that no additional fuel was added. The accident flight to AVP, which departed ACY about 1030, had been chartered by Caesar’s Palace. According to ATC records, the flight to AVP was never cleared to fly above 5,000 feet mean sea level (msl). According to ATC transcripts, the pilots first contacted AVP approach controllers at 1057 and were vectored for an instrument landing system (ILS) approach to runway 4. The flight was cleared for approach at 1102:07, and the approach controller advised the pilots that they were 5 nautical miles (nm) from Crystal Lake, which is the initial approach fix (IAF) for the ILS approach to runway 4. The pilots were told to maintain 4,000 feet until established on the localizer. At 1104:16, the approach controller advised that a “previous landing…aircraft picked up the airport at minimums [decision altitude].” The pilots were instructed to contact the AVP local (tower) controller at 1105:09, which they did 3 seconds later. The airplane then descended to about 2,200 feet, flew level at 2,200 feet for about 20 seconds, and began to climb again about 2.2 nm from the runway threshold when a missed approach was executed (see the Airplane Performance section for more information). At 1107:26 the captain reported executing the missed approach but provided no explanation to air traffic controllers. The tower controller informed the North Radar approach controllers of the missed approach and then instructed the accident flight crew to fly runway heading, climb to 4,000 feet, and contact approach control on frequency 124.5 (the procedure published on the approach chart). The pilots reestablished contact with the approach controllers at 1108:04 as they climbed through 3,500 feet to 4,000 feet and requested another ILS approach to runway 4. The flight was vectored for another ILS approach, and at 1110:07 the approach controller advised the pilots of traffic 2 nm miles away at 5,000 feet. The captain responded that they were in the clouds. At 1014:38, the controller directed the pilots to reduce speed to follow a Cessna 172 on approach to the airport, and the captain responded, “ok we’re slowing.” The flight was cleared for a second approach at 1120:45 and advised to maintain 4,000 feet until the airplane was established on the localizer. At 1123:49 the captain transmitted, “for uh one six echo juliet we’d like to declare an emergency.” At 1123:53, the approach controller asked the nature of the problem, and the captain responded, “engine failure.” The approach controller acknowledged the information, informed the pilots that the airplane appeared to be south of the localizer (off course to the right), and asked if they wanted a vector back to the localizer course. The flight crew accepted, and at 1124:10 the controller directed a left turn to heading 010, which the captain acknowledged. At 1124:33, the controller asked for verification that the airplane was turning left. The captain responded, “we’re trying six echo juliet.” At 1124:38, the controller asked if a right turn would be better. The captain asked the controller to “stand by.” At 1125:07, the controller advised the pilots that the minimum vectoring altitude (MVA) in the area was 3,300 feet. At 1125:12, the captain transmitted, “standby for six echo juliet tell them we lost both engines for six echo juliet.” At that time, ATC radar data indicated that the airplane was descending through 3,000 feet. The controller immediately issued the weather conditions in the vicinity of the airport and informed the flight crew about the location of nearby highways. At 1126:17, the captain asked, “how’s the altitude look for where we’re at.” The controller responded that he was not showing an altitude readout from the airplane and issued the visibility (2.5 miles) and altimeter setting. At 1126:43, the captain transmitted, “just give us a vector back to the airport please.” The controller cleared the accident flight to fly heading 340, advised the flight crew that radar contact was lost, and asked the pilots to verify their altitude. The captain responded that they were “level at 2,000.” At 1126:54, the controller again advised the flight crew of the 3,300-foot MVA and suggested a 330° heading to bring the airplane back to the localizer. At 1127:14 the controller asked, “do you have any engines,” and the captain responded that they appeared to have gotten back “the left engine now.” At 1127:23, the controller informed the pilots that he saw them on radar at 2,000 feet and that there was a ridgeline between them and the airport. The captain responded, “that’s us” and “we’re at 2,000 feet over the trees.” The controller instructed the pilots to fly a 360° heading and advised them of high antennas about 2 nm west of their position. At 1127:46, the captain transmitted, “we’re losing both engines.” Two seconds later the controller advised that the Pennsylvania Turnpike was right below the airplane and instructed the flight crew to “let me know if you can get your engines back.” There was no further radio contact with the accident airplane. The ATC supervisor initiated emergency notification procedures. A Pennsylvania State Police helicopter located the wreckage about 1236, and emergency rescue units arrived at the accident site about 1306. The accident occurred in daylight instrument meteorological conditions (IMC). The location of the accident was 41° 9 minutes, 23 seconds north latitude, 75° 45 minutes, 53 seconds west longitude, about 11 miles south of the airport at an elevation of 1,755 feet msl.

The twin engine aircraft departed Libreville on a charter flight to Moanda, carrying employees of the Société d’Électricité et d’Énergie du Gabon (S.E.E.G.). While approaching Moanda, the crew was cleared to descent to 4,100 feet and encountered poor visibility due to fog. On short final, the aircraft struck the ground and crashed 1,600 metres short of runway 14. A pilot and two passengers were killed while seven other occupants were injured.

The aircraft departed Farnborough Airport at 11h22 on a charter flight to Nice with two pilots and three passengers on board, among them the F1 driver David Coulthard. At 12h22, cruising at FL390, the left engine of the aircraft suffered a failure. The crew shut down and began to descend. They declared an emergency and asked to fly to the nearest aerodrome with a runway longer than one thousand six hundred metres. Lyon-Satolas Airport, located about 62 NM away left abeam of the aircraft, was proposed. The descent with one engine shut down towards Lyon-Satolas was undertaken under radar guidance, at a high speed and with a high rate of descent. At 12h35, the pilot stabilised the aircraft at 3,000 feet, intercepted the runway 36L ILS and was cleared to land. The final was started at 233 knots according to radar data and the slow down progressive. At 12h36 min 45 s, the flaps were extended to 8°. According to the radar data, the aircraft was then at 2,400 feet, 4,4 NM from the runway threshold and at a speed of 184 knots. At 12h36 min 58 s, the landing gear was extended. At 12h37 in 03 s, the flaps were set to 20°. According to the radar data, the aircraft was then at 2,100 feet, 3,5 NM from the runway threshold at a speed of 180 knots. No malfunctions or additional problems were announced to the ATC by the crew during the final approach. At 12h38 min 08 s, the copilot told the captain that the aircraft was a little low. According to the radar data, the aircraft was then at 1,100 feet, 0,9 NM from the runway threshold at a speed of 155 knots. At 12h38 min 17 s, he repeated his warning and announced a speed 10 knots above the approach reference speed. At 12h38 min 22 s, the copilot again stated that the aircraft was a little low on the approach path and immediately afterwards asked the captain to increase the thrust. According to the radar data, the aircraft was then at 900 feet, 0,1 NM from the runway threshold at a speed of 150 knots. At 12h38 min 24 s, the captain indicated that he was losing control of the aircraft. The aircraft, over the runway threshold, banked sharply to the left, touched the ground with its wing, crashed and caught fire. Both pilots were killed while all three passengers evacuated with minor injuries.

Crashed in unknown circumstances in the Kahuzi-Biega National Park near Bukavu, killing both occupants.