La Grande-4 | Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Archives

The ski-equipped aircraft took off around 1130 eastern standard time from Mirage Outfitter, located 60 miles east of La Grande-4 Airport, Quebec, with a pilot and four passengers on board, to locate caribou herds. About 40 minutes after departure, the engine stopped as a result of fuel starvation. The pilot was not able to regain power and made a forced landing on rugged ground. The aircraft was heavily damaged and two passengers were seriously injured. The pilot used a satellite telephone to request assistance. First-aid assistance arrived by helicopter about 1 hour 30 minutes after the occurrence. The aircraft fuel system had been modified after the installation of wings made by Advanced Wing Technologies Corporation.

Probable cause:

Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors:
1. The engine stopped as a result of fuel starvation; the amount of fuel in the wings was less than the amount estimated by the pilot, the fuel senders gave an incorrect reading, and the low fuel pressure warning light could illuminate randomly.
2. The engine stopped at low altitude, which reduced the time needed to complete the emergency procedure. The pilot was unable to glide to the lake and made a forced landing on an unsuitable terrain, causing significant damage to the aircraft and injuries to the occupants.
Findings as to Risk:
1. The wing tank selection system was subject to icing in cold weather, and the pilots adopted the practice to place the wing tank selector in the middle position, which is contrary to the aircraft flight manual supplement instructions and a placard posted on the instrument panel.
2. When the change to the type design was approved through issuance of the Supplementary Type Certificate (STC), Transport Canada did not notice the fact that the fuel senders and triple fuel level gauge did not meet airworthiness standards; Transport Canada issued an STC that contained several deficiencies. 3. Storage of the shoulder harnesses underneath the aircraft interior covering made them inaccessible; since the pilot and the front seat passenger did not wear their shoulder harness, their protection was reduced.

Final Report:

Crash of a Convair CV-580 in La Grande-4

Date & Time: Sep 27, 2000 at 1038 LT

Type of aircraft:

Convair CV-580

Operator:

Registration:

C-GFHH

Flight Phase:

Landing (descent or approach)

Flight Type:

Charter/Taxi (Non Scheduled Revenue Flight)

Survivors:

Yes

Site:

Airport (less than 10 km from airport)

Schedule:

Montreal – Rouyn – La Grande-3 (LG-3) – La Grande-4 (LG-4) – Montreal

MSN:

109

YOM:

1953

Flight number:

APZ180

Location:

Country:

Region:

Crew on board:

Crew fatalities:

Pax on board:

Pax fatalities:

Other fatalities:

Total fatalities:

Captain / Total flying hours:

15500

Captain / Total hours on type:

6000.00

Copilot / Total flying hours:

11000

Copilot / Total hours on type:

4000

Aircraft flight hours:

78438

Circumstances:

The Hydro-Québec Convair 340 (580), registration C-GFHH, serial number 109, with 18 passengers and 4 crew members on board, made an instrument flight rules flight from La Grande 3 to La Grande 4, Quebec. The aircraft touched down on the snow-covered runway at La Grande 4 approximately 800 feet beyond the runway threshold. Shortly after the nose wheel touched down and the pilot set the propellers to reverse pitch, the aircraft drifted to the right. Despite the attempts of the pilot flying (the captain) to correct, the aircraft continued its course and exited the south side of Runway 09 at approximately 50 knots. The aircraft travelled 350 feet over soft, rocky ground and came to rest about 120 feet outside the runway edge, about 2500 feet from the runway threshold. The flight crew followed the procedure to shut down the engines, but the left engine would not stop. On the captain's order, the first officer went into the passenger cabin and ordered an evacuation. All passengers exited the aircraft via the window emergency exits over the right wing. The left engine eventually shut down on its own after about 15 minutes. Five persons sustained minor injuries. The aircraft sustained substantial damage but did not catch fire.

Probable cause:

Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors:
1. The steering control valve lever was not reassembled in accordance with the specifications and the drawings in the overhaul manual and the maintenance manual: the lever was assembled with two washers instead of one, and the circumference of the bushing was 0.0005 inch greater than the circumference of the hole in the lever. These two deficiencies created additional resistance that
impeded the pivoting of the aircraft steering wheel.
2. The nylon locknuts were reinstalled during the repair of the steering control valve, contrary to the recommendation that they be used only once. The locknuts then came loose in service, creating play in the parts of the valve.
3. Incorrect interpretation of the problem and the influence of previous experience using the nose-gear steering wheel led the crew to make the flight despite their concern about the aircraft's nose-gear steering system.
Findings as to Risk:
1. The maintenance personnel of Precision Aero Components Inc. used the (incomplete) maintenance manual instead of the overhaul manual to overhaul and repair the steering control valve,
contributing to the incorrect reassembly of the valve.
2. The steering control valve lever was not fitted with a grease fitting, and the outside of the bushing was not grooved to allow adequate lubrication, thereby risking corrosion and seizure of the bushing inside the lever.
3. The limited experience and the lack of formal training of the maintenance personnel concerning the repair and the overhaul on the steering control valve might have contributed to the incorrect
reassembly of the steering control valve.
4. The pilot flying cut the electrical power, as required by the hard landing procedure. The left engine could therefore not be shut down, causing a risk of injury when the passengers evacuated.
5. The pilot flying cut the electrical power after the aircraft exited the runway, as required by the hard landing procedure. The electrical power required to operate the public address and alarm systems was thereby lost, and the evacuation could not be ordered promptly.
6. The evacuation slide automatic deployment system was inadvertently deactivated, which could have delayed the evacuation and compromised passenger safety.
7. After separating from the engine, the left propeller blades entered the fuselage and damaged an unoccupied seat.
Other Findings:
1. The numerous changes in ownership of the Convair type certificate and the lack of technical support from the current holder caused maintenance problems for Convair operators and approved
maintenance organizations (AMOs), particularly for recently established AMOs.

Crash of a Douglas C-47A-30-DK in La Grande-4: 2 killed

Date & Time: Feb 28, 1989 at 0633 LT

Type of aircraft:

Douglas C-47 Skytrain (DC-3)

Operator:

Registration:

C-FBZN

Flight Phase:

Takeoff (climb)

Flight Type:

Cargo

Survivors:

Site:

Airport (less than 10 km from airport)

Schedule:

La Grande-4 - Lake Bienville

MSN:

13845/25290

YOM:

1944

Location:

Country:

Region:

Crew on board:

Crew fatalities:

Pax on board:

Pax fatalities:

Other fatalities:

Total fatalities:

Circumstances:

A DC-3C, registration C-FBZN, owned by Transfair was destroyed in an accident shortly after take off from the La Grande-LG-4 airstrip, QC. Both crew members were fatally injured. The system used for de-icing the wings on the ground was available at the airport, but it was not used. A broom was used to remove snow and ice from the wings. The airplane departed with some ice still present on the wings. The airplane took off at 06:35 for a visual flight rules (VFR) charter flight to Lac Bienville, QC. The aircraft, with two crew members, was transporting drums of kerosene (Jet B) for a Hydro-Quebec contractor. An eye witness said that the takeoff from runway 10 was normal and that the pilot initiated a left turn at low altitude immediately after the landing gear was retracted. But shortly after takeoff the crankshaft of the left engine failed between the two banks of cylinders. The rear section of the engine continued to operate because it was still connected to its key accessories, including the magnetos; however, its power could not be transmitted to the propeller. The tachometer, which was also mounted on the rear section of the engine, was still providing an engine rpm reading. The failure of the crankshaft caused the front part of the engine to misfire, and the pistons were no longer synchronized with the ignition timing of the magnetos. This seriously disrupted engine operation and caused a rapid decay of rpm in the front section of the engine, which drives the propeller governor. The propeller governor regulates propeller rpm by adjusting the blade pitch angle, thus maintaining the selected rpm despite variations in engine power. When the propeller governor detected a decrease in engine power, it adjusted the blades to a lower pitch angle to reduce the torque required to maintain rpm. The additional drag generated by the left propeller operating at a low pitch angle was further aggravated by the requirement for more power to windmill the propeller, as it was affected by the resistance created by the erratic functioning of the cylinder bank with which it was engaged. The crew may not have recognized the engine failure and was not able to feather the left propeller in time. A left hand turn was initiated in an attempt to return for a landing. While the pilot was trying to maintain the aircraft in flight, its critical angle of attack was probably exceeded, and the aircraft stalled in the turn.

Probable cause:

There was ice on the wings of the aircraft on take-off. Following the failure of the left engine after take-off, and while the pilot may have been attempting to return to land, the aircraft stalled in the turn and crashed.