Nuiqsut

The crew was conducting a GPS instrument approach in a Douglas DC-6B airplane under IFR conditions. Both pilots were certificated and type-rated in the Douglas DC-6B airplane. The first pilot, seated in the right seat, was one of the company's senior check airman, and possessed a right seat dependency endorsement. The second pilot, seated in the left seat, had less experience in the DC-6B airplane. It had been previously agreed that the second pilot would fly the leg of the flight on which the accident occurred. The first pilot reported that light snow showers were present, with visibility reported at 4 miles. During final approach as the airplane passed over the airstrip threshold, a higher than normal sink rate was encountered. He said that the initial touchdown was "firm," but was thought to be within acceptable tolerances. Just after touchdown, the left wing broke free from the airplane at the wing to fuselage attach point. The airplane veered to the left, continued off the left side of the 5,000 feet long by 75 feet runway, down an embankment, and came to rest in an area of wet, tundra covered terrain. A postcrash fire heavily damaging the center section of the fuselage. The cockpit voice recorder (CVR) revealed that as the airplane progressed along the approach, the first pilot says: "You're only one mile from it....Take it on down ah three." As the airplane passes over the runway threshold, the first pilot says: "Keep that, keep that (expletive) power off.... Just push forward on the nose." The sound of impact is heard 4 seconds later. The minimum descent altitude (MDA) for the approach is 400 feet msl (383 feet agl). A contract weather observer reported lower ceilings, with about 1 mile visibility, over the approach end of the runway at the same time as the accident.

The airline transport certificated pilot was landing at a remote village on a scheduled domestic commuter flight with nine passengers. The accident airplane, a twin-engine turboprop certified for single-pilot operations, was equipped with a fuselage-mounted belly cargo pod. Witnesses saw the airplane touch down on the gravel runway with the landing gear retracted. The belly pod lightly scraped the runway for about 40 feet before the airplane transitioned to a climb. The propeller tips did not contact the runway. As the airplane began climbing away from the runway, the landing gear was extended. The airplane climbed to about 100 to 150 feet above the ground, and then began a descending left turn, colliding with tundra-covered terrain. A postcrash fire destroyed the fuselage, right wing, and the right engine. The flaps were found extended to 40 degrees. The balked landing procedure for the airplane states, in part: "power levers to maximum, flaps to 15 degrees, landing gear up, and then retract the flaps." Five passengers seated in the rear of the airplane survived the crash. The survivors did not recall hearing a gear warning horn before ground contact. The airplane was landed gear-up eight months before the accident. The airplane was nearly landed gear-up four months before the accident. Each time, a landing gear warning horn was not heard by the pilot or passengers. A postcrash examination of the airplane and engines did not locate any preimpact mechanical malfunction. The FAA's Fairbanks, Alaska, FSDO conducted an inspection of the operator six months before the accident, and recommended the operator utilize two pilots in the accident airplane. Following the accident, the Fairbanks FSDO required the operator to utilize two pilots for passenger flights in the accident airplane make and model.