Cargo

The single engine airplane departed Tarakan on a cargo service to Binuang, carrying two crew members and a load of 583 kilos of food supplies. En route, the airplane collided with trees and crashed on the slope of a wooded mountain located in the Long Liku area. Rescue teams arrive on site the following day. The pilot was injured and the flight engineer was killed. The airplane was destroyed.

The twin engine airplane departed Manchester-Boston Regional Airport Runway 06 at 0709LT on a cargo service (flight WIG1046) to Presque Isle. After takeoff, the airplane entered a left turn and climbed to 2,700 feet when the pilot reported problems to ATC. He followed several circuits over Manchester, Auburn and Merrimack with erratic courses and varying altitude and speed. Finally, the airplane entered a right turn and crashed in a forest located near Londonderry, about 8 km south of Manchester Airport. The accident occurred 17 minutes after departure. The pilot was seriously injured and the airplane was destroyed.

The pilot in command of the airplane reported that, while on an instrument GPS approach, they listened to the automated surface observing system several times and determined that they would be landing with a “light quartering tailwind” on an upsloping runway. Once clear of clouds and with the runway in sight, the pilot canceled the instrument flight rules clearance, announced their position over the airport’s common traffic advisory frequency and received a reply with a report of 1/4 inch of dry snow covering the runway, unplowed. During the landing roll, they applied brakes, extended spoilers, and thrust reversers. Initially the airplane slowed; however, about halfway down the runway, the airplane’s antiskid system was functioning continuously, and the airplane’s rate of deceleration decreased. The pilot was unsure if the thrust reversers deployed, and he cycled the thrust reversers and did not feel any effects. The pilot stated that, in his experience, the airplane’s thrust reversers do not feel very effective. The pilot considered aborting the landing, started to clean up the airplane but thought it was too late. The airplane overran the departure end of the runway, onto a grass covered area and into a deep ravine, resulting in substantial damage to the fuselage and both wings. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation. The automated weather observation station located on the airport reported that, about 44 minutes before the accident, the wind was from 090° at 12 knots. The same automated station reported that, about 16 minutes after the accident, the wind was from 090° at 12 knots. The airplane landed on runway 22. The fixed based operator owner reported that, on the day of the accident, his review of the runway conditions at the airport appeared to be around an inch of snow on the runway surface. Additionally, plowing at the airport so far this year had been “abysmal.” Big windrows and ice chunks have been left; taxiway corners had been built up to the point there could be an occurrence should an airplane be taxiing by. Earlier this year, several departures were delayed due to the runway not being plowed. According to the chairman of the airport board, there is no formal process to conduct runway assessments. However, an airport board member lives in the area and routinely visits the airport to conduct runway assessments. The runway assessments and frequency of the observations are not documented but are conveyed verbally to the airport board via cell phone. To the best of his knowledge, there is no formal snow or ice removal plan. When the runway is required to be cleared, a board member will use county provided equipment to clear the runway. The frequency of the snow removal is not documented. The airport snow removal equipment is limited to clear substance to ½ inch of the runway surface. On the day of the accident, he was not aware of a Notice to Air Misson (NOTAM) issued for the conditions of the runway environment. According to the airplane manufacturer, the estimated landing distance on a dry runway was about 3,350 ft, with loose snow and no tailwind the estimated landing distance was about 6,700 ft, and on loose snow with tailwind, the estimated landing distance was 7,531 ft. According to the Federal Aviation Administration, the airport is not required to have a snow and ice control plan. However, the airport was provided federal funds (grant) to purchase/acquire a snowplow to maintain the airport surfaces during inclement weather conditions. There may be times where issues arise, and action is delayed. In that case it is expected that a NOTAM be issued as outlined in the grant agreement.

The single engine airplane departed Pevek on a cargo flight to Polyarny, carrying two passengers, one pilot and a load of 150 kg of various goods. Approaching the destination, weather conditions deteriorated with heavy rain falls. In limited visibility, the airplane impacted the ground and crashed in the snow covered tundra few km from Polyarny. The wreckage was found few hours later and all three occupants were injured, the captain seriously. The airplane was a TR-301, a version of the AN-2 without the lower wings. Modification were performed by Tekhnoregion under MSN ТR301.21.004.

The single engine airplane departed Pucallpa-Captain David Abensur Rengifo Airport around 1000LT on a cargo flight to Breu with two pilots on board. On approach to Breu-Tipishsa Airport, the airplane crashed in unknown circumstances in a wooded area located about 4 km northwest of Breu. The captain was killed and the copilot was injured.

On October 4, 2023, about 23:47 eastern daylight time, Federal Express (FedEx) flight 1376, a Boeing 757-236, experienced a failure with its left hydraulic system shortly after takeoff from Chattanooga Metropolitan Airport-Lovell Field (CHA), Chattanooga, Tennessee. The airplane turned back to CHA, and, while preparing to land, the landing gear failed to extend normally. The landing gear also failed to extend using the alternate extend system. The flight crew declared an emergency and the airplane sustained substantial damage during the emergency landing. The two flight crew members and the jump seat occupant aboard the airplane were not injured. The flight was operating under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 as a non-scheduled domestic cargo flight from CHA to Memphis International Airport (MEM), Memphis, Tennessee. The flight crew reported that the airplane had no maintenance issues before the flight and that the push-back, engine start, and taxi were all uneventful. The captain was the pilot flying, and the first officer was the pilot monitoring. Digital flight data recorder (DFDR) data showed that the airplane departed CHA about 22:24. According to the flight crew, after rotation and confirmation of a positive rate of climb, the first officer (FO) raised the landing gear control lever to retract the landing gear. DFDR data showed that both the main gear and the nose gear retracted to their up and locked position. About 1 minute later, the flap handle was positioned in its up (flaps 0) position. The flight crew reported that immediately thereafter, a “TE FLAP DISAGREE” message was displayed on the engine indication and crew alerting system (EICAS), along with an associated master caution light, a “TRAILING EDGE” discrete light, and the aural alert caution beeper. Per the captain's direction, the FO began accomplishing the “TE FLAP DISAGREE” checklist in the Quick Reference Handbook (QRH). The FO was able to retract the flaps to their up position via alternate means in accordance with the appropriate checklist contained in the QRH. While completing this checklist, the flight crew received an “L HYD SYS PRESS” EICAS message at 22:24:33 at an altitude of about 1978 ft above ground level (agl). The status page showed that the left hydraulic system fluid quantity was near zero and that the system was not pressurized. The captain directed the FO to run the QRH checklist for “L HYD SYS PRESS”. The flight crew decided to return to CHA. Upon positioning the landing gear control lever to its down position to extend the gear for landing, the flight crew received a gear unsafe indication via illumination of the amber “GEAR” disagreement light and a “GEAR DISAGREE” message on the EICAS. Also, the lack of illumination of the three green landing gear indicator lights indicated that the gear was not down and locked. The FO then conducted the “Alternate Gear Extension” procedure embedded in the L HYD SYS PRESS checklist, which was unsuccessful. After multiple attempts to lower the landing gear, the flight crew declared an emergency. The flight crewmembers asked Chattanooga approach if they could conduct a low approach over the runway so that tower personnel could visually confirm the position of the landing gear. The airplane descended to about 150 ft agl and flew the length of the runway, which was followed by a go-around. Approach control relayed confirmation that the landing gear was not in the down position. Subsequently, the flight crew completed the deferred items on the “GEAR UNSAFE” QRH checklist and the airplane was cleared to land on runway 20. The flight crewmembers reported that during the initial touchdown, the airplane bounced slightly but they were able to maintain directional control and the runway’s centerline. The flight crew was unable to stop the airplane and it slid off the departure end of runway 20 and impacted localizer antennas before coming to rest about 830 ft beyond the end of the runway. After the airplane came to a complete stop, the flight crew performed the “EVACUATION” checklist, and the jump seat occupant attempted to open the left-hand door (L1). The door rotated halfway open and then became bound, and the slide did not deploy. The jump seat occupant then attempted to open the right-hand door (R1), but it became lodged on the packing of the raft/slide. The jump seat occupant subsequently forced the door open, and the slide deployed. The flight crew and the jump seat occupant then egressed the airplane via the R1 door/slide. Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed that the left main landing gear door actuator retract port hose was leaking hydraulic fluid. The hose was removed and retained by the NTSB for further investigation. The examination also found a discontinuity in the wiring of the landing gear alternate extension system. The section of that wire was retained for further examination. The following NTSB specialists were assigned to investigate the accident: systems, survival factors, cockpit voice recorder (CVR), and DFDR. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Federal Express, The Boeing Company, Safran Evacuation Systems, and the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) are parties to the investigation. The DFDR and the CVR were removed from the airplane and shipped to the NTSB’s Vehicle Recorder Laboratory in Washington, DC, for download of the data. The DFDR was downloaded, and a review of the preliminary data indicates that the left hydraulic system began losing pressure shortly after takeoff.

The pilot reported that after a normal start and taxi, the airplane was cleared for takeoff. During the takeoff roll, the airplane drifted right and the pilot corrected with the left rudder. When the airplane reached 100 knots, he rotated the airplane, and about 30 feet in altitude, the airplane experienced a roll to the right. The pilot tried to correct the roll with left rudder but was unable to provide sufficient left rudder. At this point, the airplane had drifted to the right of the runway and over the adjacent parallel taxiway. He was able to regain partial control by reducing engine power and banking the airplane to the left. The pilot attempted to land on the taxiway but was unable to judge his height above ground due to the low visibility, and subsequently impacted terrain to the right of the taxiway. Both wings and the fuselage sustained substantial damage. Prior to exiting the airplane, the pilot noted that the rudder trim was set to the full nose-right position. The pilot reported no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation. Prior to the accident, maintenance was completed that consisted of an “Event II & Routine” inspection. The inspection procedure required the rudder trim system to be lubricated, a trim tab free play inspection, and an operational check prior to returning the airplane to service. Review of the maintenance procedures revealed there was no guidance on returning the rudder trim control system back to a neutral position at completion of the inspection.

The single engine airplane departed Juba Airport at 1400LT on a cargo flight to Walgak, carrying three passengers and two pilots. While on approach, in unclear circumstances, the crew apparently attempted to gain height when the airplane impacted a tree and crashed in an open field. All five occupants were injured and the airplane was damaged beyond repair.

On 7 April 2023, the pilot of a Piper Aircraft Corporation PA-31-350 Chieftain (PA-31), registered VH-HJE and operated by Air Link, was conducting a freight charter flight from Archerfield, Queensland. The planned flight included one intermediate stop at Bankstown, New South Wales before returning to Archerfield, and was conducted under the instrument flight rules at night. The aircraft departed Archerfield at about 0024 local time and during the first leg to Bankstown, the pilot reported an intermittent fault with the autopilot, producing uncommanded pitch changes and associated rates of climb and descent of around 1,000 ft/min. As a result, much of the first leg was flown by hand. After landing at Bankstown at about 0248, a defect entry was made on the maintenance release; however, the pilot was confident that they would be able to hand fly the aircraft for the return leg and elected to continue with the planned flight. The aircraft was refueled to its maximum capacity for the return leg after which a small quantity of water was detected in the samples taken from both main fuel tanks. Additional fuel drains were conducted until the fuel sample was free of water. The manifested freight for the return leg was considered a light load and the aircraft was within weight and balance limitations. After taking off at 0351, the pilot climbed to the flight planned altitude of 9,000 ft. Once established in cruise, the pilot changed the left and right fuel selectors from the respective main tank to the auxiliary tank. The pilot advised that, during cruise, they engaged the autopilot and the uncommanded pitch events continued. Consequently, the pilot did not use the autopilot for part of the flight. Approaching top of descent, the pilot recalled conducting their normal flow checks by memory before referring to the checklist. During this time, the pilot completed a number of other tasks not related to the fuel system, such as changing the radio frequency, checking the weather at the destination and briefing themselves on the expected arrival into Archerfield. Shortly after, the pilot remembered changing from the auxiliary fuel tanks back to the main fuel tanks and using the fuel quantity gauges to confirm tank selection. The pilot calculated that 11 minutes of fuel remained in the auxiliary tanks (with an estimated 177 L in each main tank). Around eight minutes after commencing descent and 28 NM (52 km) south of Archerfield (at 0552), the pilot observed the right ‘low fuel flow’ warning light (or ‘low fuel pressure’) illuminate on the annunciator panel. This was followed soon after by a slight reduction in noise from the right engine. As the aircraft descended through approximately 4,700 ft, the ADS-B data showed a moderate deceleration with a gradual deviation right of track. While the power loss produced a minor yaw to the right, the pilot recalled that only a small amount of rudder input was required to counter the adverse yaw once the autopilot was disconnected. Without any sign of rough running or engine surging, they advised that had they not seen the annunciator light, they would not have thought there was a problem. Over the next few minutes, the pilot attempted to troubleshoot and diagnose the problem with the right engine. Immediately following power loss, the pilot reported they:
• switched on both emergency fuel boost pumps
• advanced both mixture levers to RICH
• cycled the throttle to full throttle and then returned it to its previous setting without fully closing the throttle
• moved the right fuel selector from main tank to auxiliary
• disconnected the autopilot and retrimmed the aircraft. This did not alter the abnormal operation of the right engine, and the pilot conducted the engine roughness checklist from the aircraft pilot’s operating handbook noting the following:
• oil temperature, oil pressure, and cylinder head temperature indicated normally
• manifold absolute pressure (MAP) had decreased from 31 in Hg to 27 inHg
• exhaust gas temperature (EGT) indicated in the green range
• fuel flow indicated zero.
With no indication of mechanical failure, the pilot advised they could not rule out the possibility of fuel contamination and chose not to reselect the main tank for the remainder of the flight. After considering the aircraft’s performance, handling characteristics and engine instrument indications, the pilot assessed that the right engine, while not able to generate normal power, was still producing some power and that this would assist in reaching Archerfield. Based on the partial power loss diagnosis, the pilot decided not to shut down and secure the engine which would have included feathering the propeller. At 0556, at about 20 NM south of Archerfield at approximately 3,300 ft, the pilot advised air traffic control (ATC) that they had experienced an engine malfunction and requested to maintain altitude. With maximum power being set on the fully operating left engine, the aircraft was unable to maintain height and was descending at about 100 ft/min. Even though the aircraft was unable to maintain height, the pilot calculated that the aircraft should have been able to make it to Archerfield and did not declare an emergency at that time. At 0602, about 12 minutes after the power loss on the right engine, the left engine began to run rough and the pilot observed the left low fuel flow warning light illuminate on the annunciator panel. This was followed by severe rough running and surging from the left engine which produced a series of pronounced yawing movements. The pilot did not run through the checklist a second time for the left engine, reporting that they completed the remaining item on the checklist for the left engine by switching the left engine’s fuel supply to the auxiliary tank. The pilot once again elected not to change tank selections back to mains. With both engines malfunctioning and both propellers unfeathered, the rate of descent increased to about 1,500 ft/min. The pilot advised that following the second power loss, it was clear that the aircraft would not be able to make it to Archerfield and their attention shifted from troubleshooting and performance management to finding somewhere to conduct a forced landing. ADS-B data showed the aircraft was at about 1,600 ft when the left engine malfunctioned. The pilot stated that they aimed to stay above the minimum control speed, which for VH-HJE was 72 kt. The aircraft was manoeuvred during the brief search), during which time the ground speed fluctuated from 110 kt to a low of 75 kt. It was calculated that in the prevailing wind, this would have provided an approximate indicated airspeed of 71 kt; equal to the aircraft’s clean configuration stall speed. The pilot declared an emergency and advised ATC that they were unable to make Archerfield Airport and would be conducting an off-airport forced landing. With very limited suitable landing areas available, the pilot elected to leave the flaps and gear retracted to minimize drag to ensure they would be able to make the selected landing area. At about 0605, the aircraft touched down in a rail corridor beside the railway line, and the aircraft’s left wing struck a wire fence. The aircraft hit several trees, sustaining substantial damage to the fuselage and wings. The pilot received only minor injuries in the accident and was able to exit through the rear door of the aircraft.

On 28 February 2023, the Cessna 208B Caravan (208B) aircraft (registration C-GMVB) operated by 1401380 Ontario Limited, doing business as Wilderness North Air (WNA), was scheduled for 2 cargo flights from Nakina Airport (CYQN), Ontario, to Fort Hope Airport (CYFH), Ontario. The occurrence pilot, who had recently been promoted to pilot-in-command (PIC) on the 208B aircraft, was scheduled to fly alone in daytime visual flight rules (VFR) conditions. After reviewing the weather information with his colleagues at their morning briefing, he assessed that the weather was satisfactory for the flight and noted that the winds were forecast to be gusty. A pilot who was present at the briefing but was not scheduled for flight duty that day offered to accompany him. For all flights that day, the occurrence pilot would be the PIC and occupy the left seat, and the 2nd pilot went along as an extra crew member without any assigned duties, occupying the right seat. The cargo was loaded onto the aircraft, and the 1st flight of the day departed CYQN at 1020 and landed in CYFH at 1055. After unloading the cargo, they departed CYFH at 1120 and returned to CYQN at 1156. The pilots loaded the aircraft with cargo for their 2nd flight to CYFH. According to the load sheet, there were 3320 pounds of groceries and household goods on board. The pilots refuelled the aircraft and departed from Runway 27 at approximately 1245. A few minutes after departure, it was reported that they made a radio call on the aerodrome traffic frequency, indicating their location and an estimated time of arrival at CYFH of 1330. Approximately 30 minutes after the occurrence flight departed, a 2nd 208B aircraft (registration C-FUYC) operated by WNA departed also from CYQN to CYFH, with cargo for a different customer. The flight crew encountered snow showers en route, and shortly after they arrived at CYFH at 1400, there was a snow squall, which significantly reduced visibility. At that time, 2 customers were waiting at CYFH for their cargo, and it soon became apparent that the occurrence aircraft had not yet arrived. At approximately 1430, WNA personnel at CYQN were informed that the occurrence aircraft had not arrived at 1330 as expected. At 1445, management at WNA notified the Joint Rescue Coordination Centre (JRCC), in Trenton, Ontario, that the aircraft was overdue. WNA began its own aerial search along the flight path using C-FUYC, which departed CYFH at 1510 with 2 crew members on board, flew along the direct route of flight of the missing aircraft, and returned to CYQN at 1546. They refuelled the aircraft and departed on another search flight at 1620, with 2 additional pilots in the back to act as spotters. They searched along the route of flight until 1840 and returned to CYQN. JRCC had initiated its response at 1500, and the first tasked aircraft arrived in the search area at 1700. The search continued over the following 4 days. The occurrence aircraft was found on 04 March 2023, 30.8 nautical miles north-northwest of CYQN along the direct track to CYFH. Both pilots were fatally injured. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces. There was no post-crash fire. There was no emergency locator transmitter (ELT) on the occurrence aircraft because it had been removed for recertification.