United States of America

The pilot stated that during takeoff from runway 35L, the copilot on the flight controls reduced left propeller and right engine power at an altitude of less than 100 feet agl. He attempted to restore takeoff power while applying forward pressure on the control yoke, but lost control of the aircraft and impacted the terrain adjacent to the departure runway. He further stated that the cargo may have shifted to the rear of the aircraft during takeoff. The aircraft was destroyed and both pilots were seriously injured.

After departing the floatplane base on a company VFR flight plan, the scheduled commuter flight proceeded northwest along a saltwater strait at a low altitude above water. Two miles northwest of the airport the aircraft entered a snow squall and the pilot attempted a steep turn to reverse course. During the turn the aircraft impacted and sank in 167 feet deep water. Search and rescue efforts were suspended after 4 days.

For unknown reasons, the aircraft landed hard at Whidbey Island NAS and was considered as damaged beyond repair. There were no casualties.

During night cargo operation, check captain (right seat) was evaluating the 1st officer (f/o, left seat) for possible upgrade to captain. Before departing, flight was cleared for right turn after takeoff to 020°. Takeoff began at 0441:11. Water/methanol injection was used (to 1st power reduction). At 0441:49, landing gear was retracted; 8 seconds later 1st power reduction was made, then a frequency change was approved. Captain noted they should climb to 1,500 feet msl (approximately 500 feet agl) before turning. At about 300 feet agl, aircraft entered overcast and began a steep right turn. CVR indicated captain was performing cockpit duties at this time and giving info to f/o about the departure. FDR showed aircraft reached max alt of 423 feet agl and began descending. At 0442:22, captain remarked to f/o, 'don't go down . . . Get up . . . Up up up . . . Up, oh!' At about that time, aircraft hit in an open field, but continued flying for approximately 3/4 mile. It then hit a tree and crashed in a wooded area. Investigation revealed that during several training flights and 2 check flights, the f/o demonstrated difficulty in performing instrument flight due to disorientation, narrow focus of attention, or lack of instrument scan (instrument fixation), especially during high task workload. Both pilots were killed.

As the pilot was en route to Greensboro (his destination), he flew past Shiloh and noted that weather at the airport was clear, but from about 10 south of Shiloh, ground fog extended to the south. At 0634 est, he contacted Greensboro tower and was advised the RVR was 1,600 feet. His minimums were 1,800 feet. He held for a period of time, but the weather continued to deteriorate, so he diverted to the Rockingham County-Shiloh Airport, where no weather reporting facilities were available. After being vectored over the alternate airport, he was unable to get enough visual cues for a visual approach, so he elected to make an sdf approach. The pilot stated that when he reached the minimum descent altitude (MDA), he saw the runway and proceeded to make a visual approach. As he continued, patchy fog began to obscure the runway, so he maneuvered the aircraft to keep it in site, then elected to go around. However, as he began the go-around, the aircraft hit trees and crashed. Elevation of the crash site was approximately 700 feet. MDA for the approach was 1,120 feet msl.

During arrival, the pilot was cleared for an ILS runway 27R approach to the metro Oakland Intl Airport. As she began the approach, the ATC controller noted the aircraft had descended thru 2,900 feet msl. He provided a low altitude alert to the pilot and warned her the aircraft should be at 3,300 feet. The pilot acknowledged by saying 'thank you.' The ATC controller suggested the pilot climb to 3,300 feet immediately, then he canceled the clearance and told the pilot to climb immediately to 3,300 feet. Subsequently, the aircraft crashed approximately 15 miles east of the airport. Impact occurred with a 1,500 feet ridge at about the 1,000 feet level. No preimpact part failure or malfunction of the aircraft was found. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

During a return flight at night to Decatur, AL, the pilot noted his weather radar was inoperative. He visually avoided thunderstorms (tstms), which had been forecasted. While avoiding tstms, he noted a reduction in engine power, a slight yaw, indications of fuel flow irregularity and that the left and right boost pumps were inoperative. These occurred at about the time, he saw a white arc which he said had jumped from the prop, spinner or nacelle area to the aircraft's nose. Due to the weather, he elected to divert to Paducah. After the airport was in sight, he needed to lose altitude before landing and was cleared to make a 360° turn. While turning, he lost sight of the airport, then rolled out on the wrong heading and started flying toward a strobe light at an industrial complex. When he realized his error and saw the airport, he turned toward the runway; but as he was maneuvering, the aircraft lost altitude, hit trees and crashed. An examination of the engines and fuel pumps revealed no indication of a preimpact failure. No physical evidence of a lightning strike was found, but the nose and engines were badly damaged from impact.

Pilot said he encountered severe to extreme turbulence upon reaching missed approach point and felt aircraft might stall if he began immediate right turn as called for in missed approach procedure. Pilot said he made left turn at 15 DME (missed approach point is at 11.5 DME) because there was higher terrain to right. Aircraft collided with trees on mountain 3 miles east of airport. Weather analysis indicated potential for light to moderate turbulence but not severe to extreme turbulence. Pilots landing and departing airport prior to and after accident reported light to moderate chop. Radar showed aircraft speed at 183.1 kts between iaf and faf. Between faf and missed approach point, aircraft speed was 95.7 kts. Pilot said he referred to current commercial instrument approach chart while executing approach. Only obsolete government instrument approach book was found in aircraft. Radios were not tuned to missed approach navaids. Pilot-rated passenger said pilot panicked after encountering turbulence.

The pilot was making a contract cargo flight under far 91 rules and had experienced icing enroute. When just past Dayton, he indicated that he 'had a little fuel problem' and needed to get into OSU without delays. A short time later he indicated that he needed to go to the nearest airport. He was vectored toward SGH for landing. He then indicated that he had lost an engine and a short time later indicated that he had lost the other engine. The aircraft crashed in a residential area. There was no fire and only residual fuel was found in the airplane. The company president indicated that he did not encourage his pilots to carry 'excess fuel'. It was reported that this pilot, along with others, had been 'chewed out' for carrying 'excess fuel'. The operation should have been conducted under far 135 rules since the company had retained operational control of the operation. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

During arrival, the flight was vectored for an ILS runway 32 approach. As the arrival continued, the ATC controller provided the latest info on cloud tops and in-cloud icing. The pilot acknowledged, then inquired about the status of the 'locator.' The controller advised that all components of the ILS, including the outer marker locator, were monitoring normal. Four miles from the outer marker/faf, the pilot was given a final vector, was cleared for the approach and was cleared to circle and land on runway 23. He acknowledged, then radio and radar contact with the aircraft were lost. The aircraft crashed approximately 2 miles southeast of the faf, while in a steep descent on a heading of 140°. No preimpact part failure/malfunction of the aircraft was found, though it was extensively damaged. About three weeks after a boating accident on 7/2/88, the pilot was admitted to a hospital and treated for a stroke, but an autopsy and toxicological checks failed to reveal any condition which would have prevented the pilot from performing his duties. Ad 88-13-01, concerning aircraft equipped with m-4c/d autopilots, was not complied with. All four occupants were killed.