Mansfield-Lahm

The accident flight was the first flight following maintenance that included flight control cable rigging. The flight was also intended to provide cockpit familiarization for the first officer and the pilot observer, and as a training flight for the first officer. About one minute after takeoff, the first officer contacted the tower and stated that they needed to return to land. The airplane impacted a cornfield about one mile southwest of the approach end of the runway, and 2 minutes 40 seconds after the initiation of the takeoff roll. The cockpit voice recorder (CVR) indicated that, during the flight, neither the captain nor the first officer called for the landing gear to be raised, the flaps to be retracted, or the power levers to be reduced from full power. From the time the first officer called "rotate" until the impact, the captain repeated the word "pull" about 27 times. When the observer pilot asked, "Come back on the trim?" the captain responded, "There's nothing anymore on the trim." The inspection of the airplane revealed that the elevator trim cables were rigged improperly, which resulted in the trim cables being reversed. As a result, when the pilot applied nose-up trim, the elevator trim system actually applied nose-down trim. The flight crew was briefed on the maintenance work that had been performed on the airplane; therefore, when the captain’s nose-up trim inputs were affecting his ability to control the airplane, at a minimum, he should have stopped making additional inputs and returned the airplane to the configuration it was in before the problem worsened. An examination of the maintenance instruction cards used to conduct the last inspection revealed that the inspector's block on numerous checks were not signed off by the Required Inspection Item (RII) inspector. The RII inspector did not sign the item that stated: "Connect elevator servo trim tab cables and rig in accordance with Allison Convair [maintenance manual]...” The item had been signed off by the mechanic, but not by the RII inspector. The card also contained a NOTE, which stated in bold type, "A complete inspection of all elevator controls must be accomplished and signed off by an RII qualified inspector and a logbook entry made to this effect." The RII inspector block was not signed off.

During the landing approach, a witness saw the twin-engine airplane slow and stall. The airplane crashed short of the runway, in a residential backyard. An airport manager flew with the pilot 8 days before the accident. The manager reported that during his flight the pilot flew the approach and landing with the aural stall warning horn activated. The manager advised the pilot of the aural warning, however no corrective action was taken by the pilot during that flight. An on-scene investigation revealed no preimpact mechanical anomalies. The pilot had about 12.6 hours of flight time in the accident airplane, of which 7.7 hours were dual instruction. Due to the lack of any mechanical problems with the airplane, the pilot's minimal experience in twin-engine airplanes, and his history of flying the airplane too slow, it is probable that he allowed the airspeed to decay below a safe speed, and inadvertently stalled it.

After 2 previous attempts, the pilot was cleared for a third VOR Runway 14 Approach. He was issued landing information, and he reported the airport in sight. The minimum descent altitude (MDA) for the approach was 1,620 ft msl. The airport elevation was 1297 ft. The airplane was observed by an ATC controller to descend, and the controller's Brite scope (radar) displayed 1,400 ft. The controller observed the airplane's landing light bob up and down, followed by the nose pitching up. At about the same time, a ground witness in the area saw the airplane at low altitude; according to this witness, the pilot tried to 'pull the plane up' just before it collided with the static cable of a power line. The cable was about 85 feet above ground level (1,382 feet MSL) and approximately 2 miles from the approach end of the runway. No preimpact malfunction of the airplane, engine, or VOR was found.

During arrival, the flight was vectored for an ILS runway 32 approach. As the arrival continued, the ATC controller provided the latest info on cloud tops and in-cloud icing. The pilot acknowledged, then inquired about the status of the 'locator.' The controller advised that all components of the ILS, including the outer marker locator, were monitoring normal. Four miles from the outer marker/faf, the pilot was given a final vector, was cleared for the approach and was cleared to circle and land on runway 23. He acknowledged, then radio and radar contact with the aircraft were lost. The aircraft crashed approximately 2 miles southeast of the faf, while in a steep descent on a heading of 140°. No preimpact part failure/malfunction of the aircraft was found, though it was extensively damaged. About three weeks after a boating accident on 7/2/88, the pilot was admitted to a hospital and treated for a stroke, but an autopsy and toxicological checks failed to reveal any condition which would have prevented the pilot from performing his duties. Ad 88-13-01, concerning aircraft equipped with m-4c/d autopilots, was not complied with. All four occupants were killed.

The pilot departed Louisville, KY reportedly with a known oil leak in the right engine and was on the second leg of an on-demand air taxi cargo flight. About 14 minutes after entering Mansfield approach control airspace, the pilot requested and received an altitude change from 5,000 to 3,000 ft because he 'was picking up a lot of ice.' After entering Cleveland approach airspace he reported the right engine had failed and requested to return to Mansfield. The pilot was informed of Mansfield weather. He then indicated he wanted to try Cleveland, then reported he could not maintain altitude and wanted to go to Mansfield. The pilot was receiving vectors from Mansfield for an ASR approach to runway 23 and at about 1 1/2 miles from the threshold the pilot reported he was lowering the landing gear. The aircraft then disappeared from the radar scope. Investigation revealed improper weld repairs to the right engine case and separation of the number six cylinder from the case due to fatigue cracking in the through bolts and studs.

Following an uneventful flight from Mansfield, the crew was cleared to land at Cleveland-Hopkins Airport. After touchdown, while decelerating on runway, the four engine airplane collided with an airport vehicle that was crossing the runway from a position on airport to terminal area. Following the collision, the crew stopped the airplane on runway and all 17 occupants were evacuated safely. The aircraft was however considered as damaged beyond repair.

While in normal cruise, both engines stopped. The pilot reduced his altitude and completed a belly landing in an open field located near Henderson. Two passengers were seriously injured while four other occupants were slightly injured. The aircraft was written off.

While cruising by night on a cargo flight from Elyria to Cincinnati, the pilot encountered technical problems with an engine and was cleared to divert to Mansfield-Lahm Airport. While completing a last turn, the airplane stalled and crashed few miles from the airfield. The aircraft was destroyed and the pilot, sole on board, was seriously injured.