Cleveland-Hopkins

The airplane was destroyed by impact forces and fire after it impacted the intersection of runway 23 and 32 while attempting a missed-approach. The pilot's crew day started at 1300 and the 14 hour duty limit was 0300 the following morning. The second leg of the flight was delayed 1 hour and 36 minutes due to a freight delay. The operator reported the pilot exceeded his 14 hour crew day by 45 minutes as a result of the freight delay. The flight was cleared for the runway 23 ILS instrument approach. A witness, who was monitoring the Unicom radio frequency, reported that he heard clicking sounds on the Unicom frequency (to bring up the runway light intensity), but the pilot did not make any radio transmissions. The witness reported the ground fog was very thick. Two witnesses reported they heard the airplane's engines. They then heard the engines go to "full power," and then they heard the airplane impact the ground. They saw an initial flash, but could not see the airplane on fire from 2,500 feet away. FAR 135.213 requires that, "Weather observations made and furnished to pilots to conduct IFR operations at an airport must be made at the airport where those IFR operations are conducted." The destination did not have authorized weather reporting, and the operator's Operating Specifications did not list an alternate weather reporting source. At 0253, the observed weather 20 miles to the north, indicated the following: winds 190 at 4 knots, 1/4 statute mile visibility, fog, indefinite ceilings 100 feet, temperature 22 degrees C, dew point 22 degrees C, altimeter 30.00. From the initial point of impact (POI), the wreckage path continued for about 210 feet on a heading of about 180 degrees. The outboard section of the left wing outboard of the nacelle was found on runway 32, about 85 feet from the POI. Separated, unburned, portions of the left aileron and left flap were also found on the runway. The remaining pieces of the left wing were located with the main wreckage. The right wing was located with the main wreckage and the entire span of the right wing from the wing root to the wingtip exhibited continuity. The inspection of the airplane revealed no preexisting anomalies.

After rotation, during the initial climb, the nose of the airplane pitched up to approximately 60° above the horizon. The airplane continued to climb until about 250 feet above the ground, then rolled right, pitched down and descended. The airplane impacted the ground, approximately 45° nose down, 650 feet to the right of the runway. Post accident investigation of the wreckage revealed the elevator jammed in the full up deflection. The upper end of the elevator control rod was found not connected to the elevator, but was found laying aft, wedged between the tail cone and the elevator faring, holding the elevator in the full up position. The control rod connecting bolt was found laying in the bottom of the tail cone undamaged. The washer, nut and cotter pin related to the control rod connecting bolt were not found. The elevator had been removed, recovered and then installed by company maintenance personnel 166 flight hours prior to the accident. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

USAir flight 405 was scheduled to depart Jacksonville, FL (JAX) at 16:35 but was given a ground delay because of poor weather in the New-York-LaGuardia (LGA) area and was further delayed in order to remove the baggage of a passenger who chose to deplane. The Fokker F-28 jet departed Jacksonville at 17:15 and was cleared into the LaGuardia area without significant additional delays. The first officer accomplished an ILS approach to LaGuardia's runway 04 to minimums and initiated braking on the landing roll. Ramp congestion delayed taxiing to the parking gate. The airplane was parked at Gate 1 at approximately 19:49, 1 hour and 6 minutes behind schedule. After the airplane was parked at Gate 1, the line mechanic who met the flight was advised by the captain that the aircraft was "good to go." The captain left the cockpit and the first officer prepared for the next leg to Cleveland , OH (CLE) that had originally been scheduled to depart at 19:20. Snow was falling as the F-28 was prepared for departure. The airplane was de-iced with Type I fluid with a 50/50 water/glycol mixture, using two trucks. After the de-icing, about 20:26, one of the trucks experienced mechanical problems and was immobilized behind the airplane, resulting in a pushback delay of about 20 minutes. The captain then requested a second de-icing of the airplane. The airplane was pushed away from the gate to facilitate de-icing by one de-icing truck. The second de-icing was completed at approximately 21:00. At 21:05:37, the first officer contacted the LaGuardia ground controller and requested taxi clearance. The airplane was cleared to taxi to runway 13. At 21:07:12, the flightcrew switched to the LaGuardia ground sequence controller, which they continued to monitor until changing to the tower frequency at 21:25:42. The before-takeoff checklist was completed during the taxi. Engine anti-ice was selected for both engines during taxi. The captain announced that the flaps would remain up during taxi, and he placed an empty coffee cup on the flap handle as a reminder. The captain announced they would use US Air's contaminated runway procedures that included the use of 18 degrees flaps. They would use a reduced V1 speed of 110 knots. The first officer used the ice (wing) inspection light to examine the right wing a couple of times. He did not see any contamination on the wing or on the black strip and therefore did not consider a third de-icing. Flight 405 was cleared into the takeoff and hold position on runway 13 at 21:33:50. The airplane was cleared for takeoff at 21:34:51. The takeoff was initiated and the first officer made a callout of 80 knots, and, at 21:35:25, made a V1 callout. At 21:35:26, the first officer made a VR callout. Approximately 2.2 seconds after the VR callout, the nose landing gear left the ground. Approximately 4.8 seconds later, the sound of stick shaker began. Six stall warnings sounded. The airplane began rolling to the left. As the captain leveled the wings, they headed toward the blackness over the water. The crew used right rudder to maneuver the airplane back toward the ground and avoid the water. They continued to try to hold the nose up to impact in a flat attitude. The airplane came to rest partially inverted at the edge of Flushing Bay, and parts of the fuselage and cockpit were submerged in water. After the airplane came to rest, several small residual fires broke out on the water and on the wreckage debris.

The flight had flown through weather conducive to airframe ice about 40 minutes prior to the accident during descent into Cleveland. During the 35-minute turnaround at Cleveland the crew did not exit the airplane to conduct an exterior preflight inspection to verify that the wings were free of ice contamination. It was snowing while they were on the ground. The airplane stalled and rolled into the ground immediately after takeoff. There was no operator requirement for the preflight. The flight had not been given training regarding the effects of wing contamination on the airplane. The FAA and the manufacturer have been aware for several years of the propensity of the DC-9 series 10 to the loss of control caused by wing contamination, but neither of them took positive action to include related information in the approved airplane flight manual. Both pilots were killed.

The pilot departed Louisville, KY reportedly with a known oil leak in the right engine and was on the second leg of an on-demand air taxi cargo flight. About 14 minutes after entering Mansfield approach control airspace, the pilot requested and received an altitude change from 5,000 to 3,000 ft because he 'was picking up a lot of ice.' After entering Cleveland approach airspace he reported the right engine had failed and requested to return to Mansfield. The pilot was informed of Mansfield weather. He then indicated he wanted to try Cleveland, then reported he could not maintain altitude and wanted to go to Mansfield. The pilot was receiving vectors from Mansfield for an ASR approach to runway 23 and at about 1 1/2 miles from the threshold the pilot reported he was lowering the landing gear. The aircraft then disappeared from the radar scope. Investigation revealed improper weld repairs to the right engine case and separation of the number six cylinder from the case due to fatigue cracking in the through bolts and studs.

The aircraft was at cruise altitude (9,000 feet) for approximately 20 minutes when the pilot reported the loss of right engine power. Chicago ARTCC reported the closest airport was Kalamazoo, 28 miles west. The aircraft began to descend and at 0330:53 Chicago ARTCC reported N554AC was approximately 6 miles from Kalamazoo Airport. The pilot reported 'my right engine cowling is gone...I don't know if I'm going to make it.' Witnesses observed the aircraft at 'tree top level' and impact in a heavily wooded area near interstate 94, 5 miles from the airport. Investigation revealed improper weld repairs to the right engine case and separation of the number 2 cylinder from the case due to fatigue cracking in the through bolts and studs. The top section of the engine cowling separated due to the force of the cylinder separation. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

At 14:30 the flight was cleared for a runway 21R visual approach and was cleared to land one minute later, At a height of 60-70 feet the aircraft suddenly yawed violently to the left and banked left 80-90° in a descent. The aircraft then rolled right and struck the ramp area 1,010 feet inside and to the left of the runway 21R threshold. It then skidded 398 feet, struck three ground support vehicles in front of Gate F10 at Concourse F and caught fire. Both pilots and seven passengers were killed, 10 other occupants were injured.

N4877V arrived over Clarion County Airport at about 2100 hours, and commenced a visual approach for landing. Marginal visual weather conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. The flight was observed by another pilot waiting on the ground for the aircraft. This pilot reported that the aircraft was seen through a break in the clouds as it turned left, southwest, as if to establish a left downwind for runway 05. The aircraft was located in a wooded area southwest of the airport. An examination of the wreckage failed to indicate any malfunction or system failure. The aircraft impacted the ground in a nose low attitude and the wreckage was confined to an area indicative with a stall type accident. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

During a normal IFR cruise flight, the pilot of Air Ohio flight 21, did not respond to ATC instructions. Air Ohio flight 21 continued for 40 minutes with no reply and without deviation in altitude or heading until the discrete target disappeared from radar over lake Erie. The pilot had not slept for approximately 30 hours prior to the loss of communication response. Both occupants were killed.

The flight departed and proceeded en route without incident. Radar and radio contact was maintained until the flight proceeded over Lake Erie. The flight did not arrive at its destination. The aircraft is presumed to have crashed in Lake Erie. One identifiable 3 feet x 4 feet section of floor panel was located. Two smaller pieces of wreckage were also found which may have been portions of C-FFLC.