United States of America

The purpose of the flight was to provide airborne intercept training for the US Navy. The mission had just been completed and the accident aircraft, FNT701, and another aircraft, FNT492, were returning home when the accident occurred. Radar data showed FNT701 was at 22,700 feet when it descended slightly to 22,500 feet. FNT701 remained at this altitude for approximately 2 minutes 37 seconds, then began a descent which resulted in impact with the ocean. This final descent rate initially was about 5,000 fpm and increased to 19,000 fpm. No distress calls were made; however, two transmissions were recorded which totaled approximately 30 seconds. There was no voice communication during these transmissions, only an open mike and the sound of prop(s). During the 1st transmission, the word 'oh' could be heard. FNT492 observed FNT701 descend below the clouds and did not detect any distress signals. Little wreckage was recovered during search and rescue operations. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

Witnesses reported aircraft was high during approach and landed nosewheel 1st about 1,600 feet beyond threshold, then became airborne and bounced 2 times. Pilot stated that before touchdown, he started to 'spool up' engines, but noted lack of response, then retarded throttles and landed. He said he applied brakes and selected 'full reverse' and noted no response. Reportedly, nosewheel 'skipped into air' while aircraft still had flying speed. With insufficient runway remaining to stop, he elected to stow reversers and began go-around. He noted no response from engines, tho aircraft had became airborne. Aircraft then settled beyond departure end of runway and crashed on rough terrain. Examination revealed engines had ingested twigs, grass and dirt. Reverse load limiters (l/l) on both engines were found in tripped position. Flight man stated that to avoid actuation of l/l, do not advance primary throttle after returning reverse thrust lever to stow until unlock light is out; maint required to reset actuated l/l. L/l was incorporated on thrust reverser to reduce engine power to idle, if inadvertently deployed in flight. During post-accident check, both engines were operated to 85% after l/l reset.

The C-141B departed Norton AFB for a flight to Hurlburt Field with an intermediate stop at Peterson Field near Colorado Springs. The crew had to return back to Norton due to a leaking comfort pallet. At the end of the second leg, the crew were confronted with thunderstorms covering the approach path for the ILS approach to runway 36 at Hurlburt Field, the primary instrument runway. The crew requested the TACAN approach to runway 18, which was an approach over swampy terrain. The aircraft entered a high rate of descent, causing the GPWS to sound. The copilot reset two GPWS warnings and the descent was continued below the Minimum Descent Altitude (MDA) of 345 feet agl. The airplane finally impacted terrain in a wings level, nose low attitude. All eight occupants were killed.

The pilot was operating an on-demand air taxi passenger flight to Santa Ana, CA. The accident occurred during descent, when the aircraft collided with a mountain at 2,060 feet msl. The pilot had received a preflight weather briefing in which he was advised of low ceilings and reduced visibility in the Los Angeles basin, surrounding mountains obscured by clouds, and that VFR flight to Santa Ana was not recommended. He departed VFR. While en route, the pilot was advised that Santa Ana was reporting 1,400 feet overcast with 5 miles visibility. A videotape recorded by a passenger showed mountain peaks protruding through a solid cloud layer and showed the aircraft descending into the clouds. Witnesses described a low cloud ceiling near the crash site and cloud tops at 5,000 feet. Examination of the wreckage revealed evidence of powered flight and no evidence of preimpact control or engine malfunction. Records indicated that the pilot had encountered IMC on only one flight in the previous 9 months. He was director of operations for the operator. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all 10 occupants were killed.

During arrival, the cargo flight (reliant 232) contacted Binghamton approach control and received vectors for an ILS runway 16 approach. At that time, the atis had information (information kilo) that there was light freezing rain, that all paved surfaces had a thin layer of ice, and that braking action was poor. The copilot made the approach and landing. The captain reported that touchdown was normal in the 1st 1,000 feet of the runway and that the airbrake was used, but they did not know that braking action was nil until they were on the landing roll. By the time they realized braking was nil, there was insufficient runway remaining for a safe go-around. The captain reported he deployed the drag chute, but a witness who saw the chute, reported it did not open. Subsequently, the aircraft continued off the departure end of the 6,298 feet runway, went down a steep embankment and was extensively damaged. The required distance to stop on an icy runway was estimated to be 5,344 feet.

During the night cross country flight at FL250, the pilot elected to leave the cockpit area and move to the rear of the aircraft to attend to physiological needs. Although oxygen was available in the cockpit, supplemental oxygen was not available in the rear. The aircraft was operated with a known pressurization system deficiency which limited the airplane to flight to 17,000 feet msl while maintaining a cabin altitude of 10,000 feet. After 2 hours and 10 minutes, atc declared the flight to be 'no radio'. At 3 hours and 57 minutes after departure, the airplane was plotted on radar in a descending left turn to ground impact. Fuel starvation resulted in power loss to the left engine. Propeller signatures indicated power on the right propeller at impact. The pilot's body was found in the aft cabin area on the aft cabin bulkhead.

During the climbout, in night visual meteorological conditions, the aircraft lost right engine power. The pilot was initially cleared for one runway, but was unable to get a safe gear indication. The pilot made a 180° turn to land on the opposite runway while attempting to get a safe gear indication. On turn from base to final, with the gear down and locked, the pilot overshot final approach. The pilot then chose an unlit parking lot to make an off-airport landing. The aircraft struck a tree and a power line. The aircraft struck several parked unoccupied vehicles during the landing. The faa reported that an on-site inspection revealed a failed right turbocharger. Both occupants were seriously injured.

Shortly after liftoff from runway 16 at Dyess AFB, while climbing to a height of about 60-100 feet, the aircraft banked right, causing the right wing to struck the ground. Out of control, the aircraft crashed in a huge explosion and was totally destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire. All 19 occupants were killed, among them army officer and family members including spouses and children.

On short final to Fort Wainwright AFB, the airplane lost height, struck approach equipments then an embankment and eventually crashed about 600 feet short of runway threshold. Both pilots and seven passengers were killed while nine other occupants were injured. The aircraft was destroyed. It was engaged in a combined exercice called 'Brim Frost'. At the time of the accident, the OAT was -46° C.

During flight, crew shut down the right engine when warning light for gearbox oil pressure illuminated and pressure was noted below minimum limit of 130 psi. Shortly after securing right engine, left engine lost power (fuel tank shutoff valve switch and fuel crossfeed valve switch were located near each other). Attempts to restart left engine were unsuccessful. With lack of alternative current electrical power, captain could not unfeather right engine for restart. During emergency landing, aircraft was damaged on uneven terrain. Operational check of right engine (at ground level) revealed no malfunction that would have prevented normal operation. Examination of left engine revealed turbine section had overheated and turbine blades had severe heat damage. Captain said that when he tried to restart left engine, fuel valves were in normal position and power lever was 1' above idle. He recalled an engine rpm of 8000, but didn't recall if he had used feather button to reduce rpm to 3000 (as directed by checklist). He verified fuel switches were 'on' and he tried to crossfeed fuel (in event of blockage). Cross feeding of fuel was not part of restart procedure. Flight manual cautioned about importance of reducing power to flight idle, to decrease fuel flow to engine and minimize possible overheating.