Binghamton

The airport's instrument approach procedures included a very high frequency, omnidirectional range (VOR) approach, and a global positioning system (GPS) approach that was not an overlay. The VOR approach procedure included an inbound course to the VOR, and after passage, a descent along the same course to a missed approach point. The missed approach point was defined as 6 nautical miles beyond the VOR, as well as by timing. The pilot twice attempted the VOR approach in instrument meteorological conditions. He flew the first approach to the missed approach point, initiated a missed approach, contacted the controller, and requested a second VOR approach. He then received vectors to rejoin the approach course inbound to the VOR. The airplane subsequently passed over the VOR, on course, about 100 feet above the minimum altitude. However, instead of descending as described in the procedure, the airplane maintained that altitude until reaching the airport, then began a descent. The airplane continued to travel outbound along the same approach course until it impacted rising terrain about 6.5 miles beyond the airport. There was no dedicated distance measuring equipment (DME) onboard the airplane. Instead, distance was determined by the use of an instrument flight rules (IFR)-approved GPS unit. Due to the non-storage capability of the unit, historical waypoint selection could not be determined. The pilot could have selected the airport as a "direct to" waypoint, or, if he had entered flight plan waypoints, the unit would have sequenced from the VOR to the airport during the first approach. In either case, unless the pilot reprogrammed the unit, the last waypoint entered would have remained at the airport, rather than the VOR. The pilot then most likely mistook the airport position for the VOR position, and displaced the beginning of the descent by 6 nautical miles. Also noted, was that once the airplane passed over the VOR en route to the airport, the HSI would have indicated a change of "to" to "from". There were no medical anomalies noted with the pilot and no mechanical anomalies noted with the airplane.

While in cruise flight, at 6,000 feet, the left engine lost power. The pilot attempted a restart of the engine, but only about one-half rotation of the left engine propeller was observed, and the engine was secured. The pilot stated that he was unable to maintain altitude and initiated a decent. He requested and was cleared for an instrument approach at an airport where the weather conditions were, 1/4 statute mile of visibility, fog, and a vertical visibility of 100 feet. On the approach, at the minimum descent altitude, the pilot executed a missed approach. As the airplane climbed, the pilot reported to the controller that the 'best altitude [he] could get was 2,200 feet.' A second approach was initiated to the reciprocal runway. While on the second approach, the pilot 'was going to fly the aircraft right to the runway, and told the controller so.' He put the gear down, reduced power, and decided there was 'no hope for a go-around.' He then 'flew down past the decision height,' and about 70-80 feet above the ground, 'added a little power to smooth the landing.' The pilot also stated, 'The last thing I remember was the aircraft nose contacting the runway.' A passenger stated that once the pilot could not see the runway, [the pilot] 'applied power, pitched the nose up,' and attempted a 'go-around' similar to the one that was executed on the first approach. Disassembly of the left engine revealed that the crankshaft was fatigue fractured between connecting rod journal number 2 and main journal number 2. Review of the pilot's operating handbook revealed that the single engine service ceiling, at a weight of 4,800 pounds, was 11,700 feet. The average single engine rate of climb, at a pressure altitude of 6,000 feet, was 295 feet per minute. The average single engine rate of climb, at a pressure altitude of 1,625 feet, was 314 feet per minute. Review of the ILS approach plate for Runway 34 revealed that the decision height was 200 feet above the ground.

During arrival, the cargo flight (reliant 232) contacted Binghamton approach control and received vectors for an ILS runway 16 approach. At that time, the atis had information (information kilo) that there was light freezing rain, that all paved surfaces had a thin layer of ice, and that braking action was poor. The copilot made the approach and landing. The captain reported that touchdown was normal in the 1st 1,000 feet of the runway and that the airbrake was used, but they did not know that braking action was nil until they were on the landing roll. By the time they realized braking was nil, there was insufficient runway remaining for a safe go-around. The captain reported he deployed the drag chute, but a witness who saw the chute, reported it did not open. Subsequently, the aircraft continued off the departure end of the 6,298 feet runway, went down a steep embankment and was extensively damaged. The required distance to stop on an icy runway was estimated to be 5,344 feet.

At liftoff from Binghamton-Broome County Airport, the twin engine airplane encountered serious difficulties to gain height. Suddenly, it stalled and crashed in flames in an open field located near the airport. A pilot and two passengers were killed while eight other occupants were seriously injured.

The crew was performing a flight from Hartford to Binghamton, carrying a load of various equipments. En route, one of the engine failed and the pilot was unable to maintain a safe altitude. At an altitude of 2,000 feet, the mechanic bailed out when the airplane dove into the ground and crashed onto a house located in Scranton. Both pilots were killed as well as a boy on the ground.

The approach to Binghamton Airport was completed at an insufficient altitude. On short final, the aircraft struck a concrete wall. Upon impact, the undercarriage were torn off and the aircraft crash landed. There were no casualties but the aircraft was written off.

Just after takeoff from Binghamton-Tri-Cities Airport, while climbing sharply to a height of 100 feet above the runway, the single engine airplane appeared to be 'mushing' with the wings unsteady. According to eyewitnesses, the plane swung around in a left turn, and started for the ground and for a short time, it appeared that the pilot might recover control, but the plane 'mushed' again and then dove motor first into the ground, tearing off the engine and spinning around. The pilot and two passengers were killed while a fourth occupant was seriously injured.
Crew:
Dan McNally, pilot. †
Passengers:
Dorothy McNally, †
Kathleen McNally, †
Mary P. Wiekes.