United States of America

The crew departed Martinsburg-Eastern West Virginia-Shepherd Field for a local training flight. While flying at low height, the four engine aircraft struck power cables and crashed onto a house located 3 km northwest of Berkeley Springs. All six crew members were killed while the unique person in the house was slightly injured.

According to the owner, he and the pilot had flown from Albany, Georgia to swap a Piper 28 for the Aero Commander 680. Prior to completing the trade, the previous owner reconstructed a set of aircraft maintenance logs which revealed the estimated total airframe time and engine serial numbers. The owner assumed that the airplane was airworthy. Since the pilot was not Aero Commander rated, they decided to taxi the airplane on the ramp and runway to gain some experience. While taxiing at a high rate of speed on runway 09, the owner reported that a gust of wind caught the airplane as the taxi speed approached 65 mph. The pilot lost control of the airplane as it became airborne. The airplane rotated to the right and the right wing struck the ground; the airplane cartwheeled to a stop facing the opposite direction. The wreckage examination failed to disclose a mechanical malfunction. Reportedly, the pilot completed a preflight but, the wreckage examination discovered a large bird's nest in the sump area of the left engine and a missing exhaust manifold. The pilot was not multi engine rated. The pilot was killed and the passenger was seriously injured.

Douglas DC-7B airtanker N848D had been operating from Stockton, CA (SCK) and had made several drops of retardant on the southeast edge of a fire on the El Dorado National Forest. Their first mission on October 1, 1992, had begun at 08:33. Their fourth mission had them departing the base at 11:56. Their departure was immediately followed by a Lockheed SP2H enroute to the same fire. The DC-7B arrived in the fire vicinity at an elevation of about 6,500 feet MSL at 12:20. Air attack briefed the DC-7B’s two-person flight crew for their retardant drop. Air attack was flying at approximately 7,500 feet MSL. The planned drop was to be made from north to south about one mile west of the upper dam on the reservoir. It was to be the air tanker’s first drop in this particular location. The visibility was good, in excess of ten miles, and turbulence was reported as mild, but bumpy. The area over the lake to the east of the drop pattern was experiencing reduced visibility due to smoke. According to occupants of the second airtanker, the DC-7B made a turn around the fire and was descending northbound for a drop out of a right hand pattern when the DC-7B captain indicated that he wanted to depart the pattern as he had a problem with an engine. He suggested the second airtanker perform the intended drop while he worked with his engine problem. The second airtanker then received attention from air attack and began a circle to fly a pattern similar to the pattern the DC-7B had flown. Shortly thereafter, air attack asked the DC-7B if he needed to abort (drop) his load of retardant. That captain replied that he might have to if he couldn’t solve his engine problem. All communications were normal. Air attack was operating without lead plane assistance as the lead plane had departed the scene for fuel a few minutes before, instructing air attack to perform drops on the west side of the reservoir. Another lead plane was about six minutes out. The mishap air tanker was reported to be descending at about 6,000 feet MSL heading in a north-northwesterly direction after departing the drop pattern, with no visible signs of engine problems and no indication of concern present in his radio transmissions. The DC-7B continued northbound toward gently rising terrain about two miles from the intended drop site and was next observed heading in an easterly direction and low to the ground. The airtanker was reported to be in a sharply pitched up attitude prior to dropping its retardant. Air attack reported that he observed the retardant start and stop, but did not know if a full load had been dropped. He said the load was continuous. The DC-7B was then reported to fall off on the right wing as it descended steeply toward the ground. During this sequence, the captain transmitted on the radio, "We’re going in, we’re going in." It was at this point that tree strikes occurred which removed the horizontal stabilizers and elevators from the tail of the airtanker. This entire sequence took place within the span of about 60 seconds. The airtanker then went behind a ridge and white smoke was observed rising from the site. The airtanker had impacted the ground in steep terrain at an elevation of approximately 5,100 feet MSL. Some of the wreckage was deposited in a creek bottom and the remainder was located on an adjacent south-facing slope. Both the captain and copilot were fatally injured. The aircraft was totally destroyed.

The pilot was conducting a functional test flight and qualitative engineering evaluation of the airplane's longitudinal control during landing. During final approach to runway 12L, he reduced the engines to the flight idle positions and established 95 kias. He was unable to raise the nose of the airplane during the flare to arrest the descent rate and landed hard onto the runway. The airplane was taxied to the ramp and secured. No mechanical failure was found or reported.

The PA-32, N82419, had been receiving atc radar services en route to the Greenwood Municipal Airport. Radar services were terminated 3 miles from the airport. The MU-2, N74FB, had just taken off from the airport, and had reported to ATC in anticipation of receiving his IFR clearance. The flight had not yet been identified on radar. The two airplanes collided approximately 2 miles from the airport at 2,100 feet msl. The collision took place just outside and to the east of the Indianapolis airport radar service area (arsa). The MU-2 track was 066°, and the PA-32 track was 174°. The pax/pilot on the PA-32 took control of the airplane and was able to make a controlled landing. Guidance for traffic pattern operations and recommended arrival and departure procedures is found in the airman's information manual. All five occupants on board the MU-2 were killed.

The pilot was on second corporate flight of the day and complained to the avionics technician about the autopilot and asked him to adjust it. The technician said it would require a flight check. The pilot said he didn't have time for that, and got the technician to tell him how to perform the adjustment. Radar shows the airplane stable at 14,100 feet after departure. It then begins to deviate from cruise altitude between plus 100 feet to minus 200 feet. Center gives the pilot a 15° course change for traffic and the pilot acknowledges the instruction while the airplane is deviating off course. Radar contact was lost and no further radio transmissions were received from the pilot. Witnesses on the ground reported hearing a loud explosion followed by a muffled explosion, and seeing the airplane exit clouds vertically. The outboard six feet of both wings were found 1.25 miles from crash site. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

After takeoff, the airplane was seen at low altitude trailing smoke from the left engine. Witnesses saw the wings 'tipping' back and forth, then a wing dropped and hit the ground. Examination revealed that a supercharger bearing had failed in the left engine. The left engine had been recently installed by non-certificated personnel after being inactive for 18 years without preservation. The airplane had flown about 184 hours since the last annual inspection; no record of subsequent 100-hr inspection. The left prop blades were found in an intermediate position between the operating range and the feathered position. The left prop was changed several weeks prior to the accident. There is no evidence that the left prop had ever been successfully cycled to the full feather position. The operator and pilots were not aware of hamilton standard SB 657 recommending full-feather checks every 30 days. Left prop feathering motor relays not recovered. All 11 parachutists were found in center part of fuselage; no evidence of restraint usage. All 12 occupants were killed.

During a VOR runway 22 approach, the instrument rated pilot sighted the runway and cancelled his IFR flight plan. As he was circling to land, the airplane stalled and collided with terrain. Witnesses stated that the airplane made a steep left banking turn about 250 feet above the ground. According to witnesses, upon roll out of the turn, the airplane's wings rocked back and forth, the nose and right wing dropped below the horizon, and the airplane fell to the ground. Instrument meteorological conditions existed at the time of the accident and witnesses stated that the ceiling was about 400 to 500 feet above the ground. Weather facilities in the area were forecasting about 1,000 foot ceilings throughout the area. All three occupants were killed.

The aircraft was engaged in a voluntary relief flight for the victims of hurricane Andrew. All of the seats had been removed from the cabin section of the aircraft. There were no weight scales used in the loading of the cargo onto the aircraft. The private pilot did not have a multi engine rating on his pilot certificate. The aircraft crashed into a residence one half mile from the departure end of the runway. Witnesses stated that the aircraft used most of the available runway prior to liftoff. After liftoff, the aircraft appeared to climb in an unstable condition prior to the accident. Investigation revealed that the aircraft was 1112.2 pounds over the maximum gross takeoff weight at the time of the departure. All three occupants were killed.

The maintenance test flight was being flown following completion of airworthiness directive 87-02-02 requiring the mandatory replacement of all primary flight control cables. Following lift-off, witnesses observed the airplane start a rapid roll to the right until initial impact was made with the ground by the right wing tip. Examination of the wreckage revealed the a half turn in the routing of the replaced flight control cable was inadvertently omitted on both control columns which would result in the ailerons operating in reverse of the commanded input. The passenger was the quality control inspector who had inspected and signed off the maintenance performed. According to other company personnel, he had briefed the crew prior to the flight on the purpose of the test flight and the extent of the maintenance that the airplane had undergone. All three occupants were killed.