United States of America

The VFR only part 135 on demand sightseeing flight entered instrument meteorological conditions and collided with terrain. The surviving passenger reported that as the flight progressed, the ceiling and visibility deteriorated. Witnesses in the area reported heavy fog and estimated the ceiling and visibility to be 50 feet and one-fourth of a mile. The company's training program and operations policies and procedures did not address VFR flight in marginal weather conditions. A passenger survived while six other occupants were killed, among them three Dutch and two Swiss citizens.

The airplane had undergone routine maintenance for slow acceleration on the right engine. Maintenance records revealed the fuel controls were changed from the right engine to the left engine. The airplane was released back to the pilot for service, and he departed for his home station. Several witnesses saw the airplane after takeoff at a low altitude, and at a slow speed. The airplane turned left, and the left wing struck the ground. Two witnesses saw the airplane pass by them at a low altitude, and wrote, '...at this point we could see the left (port) engine propeller was turning very slowly. You could actually see the individual blades of the propeller turning.' A complete disassembly of both engines, revealed no discrepancies other than impact, and post impact fire damage. Disassembly of the left propeller indicated that the propeller blades were at or near feather at impact. The pilot had a total of 106 flight hours in Beech A100 aircraft, all in the 90 days prior to the accident, and 56 hours in the 30 days prior to the accident.

The aircraft departed Missoula on a fire fighting mission under callsign Tanker 04. The crew apparently became fixated on the malfunction of the retardant-release doors and did not realize the tanker was entering a narrow box canyon when it struck the slope of Mt Squaw located about 20 miles northwest of Missoula Airport. The aircraft was destroyed and both pilots were killed.

The emergency medical service (EMS/medevac) flight was dispatched to transport a patient in response to a medical emergency. During arrival to the destination, the pilot contacted the airport unicom for advisories and was advised to land on runway 25. Runway 25 had a 2.2 percent uphill grade and was restricted to landings only. After landing, the airplane was refueled and the patient was put on board. The pilot back-taxied on runway 25 and proceeded to take off uphill with the airplane near its maximum gross weight. According to ground witnesses, there was a tailwind, which they estimated was between 4 and 15 knots. The temperature was about 100 degrees, and the density altitude was about 3,200 feet. After the airplane became airborne, the pilot started an immediate left turn to avoid rising terrain. However, the left tip tank contacted the ground, and the airplane cartwheeled. It came to rest about 711 feet from the departure end of the runway. The flaps and landing gear were found fully extended; the published configuration for takeoff data in the flight manual was for 'wing flaps - up.' The airport had no signs to indicate runway use restrictions; however, the restrictions were published in the airport facility directory.

The airplane was on takeoff climb, about 400 feet above the ground, when the engine partially and then totally lost power. The pilot did a forced landing in a bean field. The flight occurred following maintenance to check a low manifold pressure condition. According to the pilot, a 'full' engine runup was done before takeoff. He stated: 'the takeoff was smooth, we rotated at an airspeed of slightly more than 80 knots. The climb for the first 350 (feet of altitude), airspeed was routine... I felt a power loss and noticed the manifold pressure dropping. At this point I felt I had enough power to return to the airport... as the turn was being completed, power went out completely.' The post-accident examination of the airplane did not disclose evidence of mechanical malfunction.

During an aborted takeoff, the airplane overran the 4,451 foot long runway, went down a hill, and struck a fence. According to the pilot, 'during the takeoff roll, the indicated airspeed needle climbed to approximately 60 knots, but then would go no further... My attempts to dislodge it by tapping on the face of the gauge were futile...I pulled back the throttles and applied full brakes...' The pilot reported that based on the existing conditions 'the airplane can accelerate from rest to rotation speed and back to rest in less than 3,500 feet.' The examination of the airplane revealed the pitot tube was internally obstructed with an insect and mud.

The pilot was performing the initial takeoff, when he observed a loss of power, associated with a torque indication of zero. He force landed the aircraft in a wooded area when he could not make an open field. A post accident inspection of the engine revealed that the fuel control unit arm was loose, and the lock wire was not in place. The arm was positioned so that a maximum power demand from the throttle would correspond to an idle power demand at the fuel control. The engine underwent a 100 hour inspection, by company maintenance personnel, 8 days prior to the accident. The inspection checklist called for examining the fuel control linkage for security.

USAir Flight 1016 was a domestic flight from Columbia (CAE) to Charlotte (CLT). The DC-9 departed the gate on schedule at 18:10. The first officer was performing the duties of the flying pilot. The weather information provided to the flightcrew from USAir dispatch indicated that the conditions at Charlotte were similar to those encountered when the crew had departed there approximately one hour earlier. The only noted exception was the report of scattered thunderstorms in the area. Flight 1016 was airborne at 18:23 for the planned 35 minute flight. At 18:27, the captain of flight 1016 made initial contact with the Charlotte Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) controller and advised that the flight was at 12,000 feet mean sea level (msl). The controller replied "USAir ten sixteen ... expect runway one eight right." Shortly afterward the controller issued a clearance to the flightcrew to descend to 10,000 feet. At 18:29, the first officer commented "there's more rain than I thought there was ... it's startin ...pretty good a minute ago ... now it's held up." On their airborne weather radar the crew observed two cells, one located south and the second located east of the airport. The captain said "looks like that's [rain] setting just off the edge of the airport." One minute later, the captain contacted the controller and said "We're showing uh little buildup here it uh looks like it's sitting on the radial, we'd like to go about five degrees to the left to the ..." The controller replied "How far ahead are you looking ten sixteen?" The captain responded "About fifteen miles." The controller then replied "I'm going to turn you before you get there I'm going to turn you at about five miles northbound." The captain acknowledged the transmission, and, at 18:33, the controller directed the crew to turn the aircraft to a heading of three six zero. One minute later the flightcrew was issued a clearance to descend to 6,000 feet, and shortly thereafter contacted the Final Radar West controller. At 18:35 the Final Radar West controller transmitted "USAir ten sixteen ... maintain four thousand runway one eight right.'' The captain acknowledged the radio transmission and then stated to the first officer "approach brief." The first officer responded "visual back up ILS." Following the first officer's response, the controller issued a clearance to flight 1016 to "...turn ten degrees right descend and maintain two thousand three hundred vectors visual approach runway one eight right.'' At 18:36, the Final Radar West controller radioed flight 1016 and said "I'll tell you what USAir ten sixteen they got some rain just south of the field might be a little bit coming off north just expect the ILS now amend your altitude maintain three thousand." At 18:37, the controller instructed flight 1016 to ''turn right heading zero niner zero." At 18:38, the controller said "USAir ten sixteen turn right heading one seven zero four from SOPHE [the outer marker for runway 18R ILS] ... cross SOPHE at or above three thousand cleared ILS one eight right approach." As they were maneuvering the airplane from the base leg of the visual approach to final, both crew members had visual contact with the airport. The captain then contacted Charlotte Tower. The controller said "USAir ten sixteen ... runway one eight right cleared to land following an F-K one hundred short final, previous arrival reported a smooth ride all the way down the final." The pilot of the Fokker 100 in front also reported a "smooth ride". About 18:36, a special weather observation was recorded, which included: ... measured [cloud] ceiling 4,500 feet broken, visibility 6 miles, thunderstorm, light rain shower, haze, the temperature was 88 degrees Fahrenheit, the dewpoint was 67 degrees Fahrenheit, the wind was from 110 degrees at 16 knots .... This information was not broadcast until 1843; thus, the crew of flight 1016 did not receive the new ATIS. At 18:40, the Tower controller said "USAir ten sixteen the wind is showing one zero zero at one nine." This was followed a short time later by the controller saying "USAir ten sixteen wind now one one zero at two one." Then the Tower controller radioed a wind shear warning "windshear alert northeast boundary wind one nine zero at one three.'' On finals the DC-9 entered an area of rainfall and at 18:41:58, the first officer commented "there's, ooh, ten knots right there." This was followed by the captain saying "OK, you're plus twenty [knots] ... take it around, go to the right." A go around was initiated. The Tower controller noticed Flight 1016 going around "USAir ten sixteen understand you're on the go sir, fly runway heading, climb and maintain three thousand." The first officer initially rotated the airplane to the proper 15 degrees nose-up attitude during the missed approach. However, the thrust was set below the standard go-around EPR limit of 1.93, and the pitch attitude was reduced to 5 degrees nose down before the flightcrew recognized the dangerous situation. When the flaps were in transition from 40 to 15 degrees (about a 12-second cycle), the airplane encountered windshear. Although the DC-9 was equipped with an on-board windshear warning system, it did not activate for unknown reasons. The airplane stalled and impacted the ground at 18:42:35. Investigation revealed that the headwind encountered by flight 1016 during the approach between 18:40:40 and 18:42:00 was between 10 and 20 knots. The initial wind component, a headwind, increased from approximately 30 knots at 18:42:00 to 35 knots at 18:42:15. The maximum calculated headwind occurred at 18:42:17, and was calculated at about 39 knots. The airplane struck the ground after transitioning from a headwind of approximately 35 knots, at 18:42:21, to a tailwind of 26 knots (a change of 61 knots), over a 14 second period.