United States of America

The aircraft crashed on a visual approach to runway 09 left at Miami International Airport, Miami, Florida. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and an IFR flight plan was filed. The airplane was destroyed. The airline transport pilot sustained serious injuries. The flight originated from Marsh Harbor, Bahamas, about 1 hour 14 minutes before the accident. Witnesses stated they observed the airplane descending to the right of the final approach path for runway 09 left with the landing gear down and an engine was heard sputtering. The wings of the airplane were observed to be rocking back and forth. The airplane rolled right 90 degrees. The nose pitched up, the airplane rolled over inverted, the nose pitched down, the airplane collided with a parking lot and slid in between a front end loader and a dump truck coming to a complete stop. Transcripts of recorded transmissions between Miami Air Traffic Control Tower (ATCT), N7884J, and review of Miami ATCT continuous data recording radar revealed there were no airplanes in the vicinity of N7884J at the time of the accident.

A Douglas C-54G & Beech 58P were on a fire suppression mission with the USDA Forest Service. The C-54 (Tanker 19) was being used as an aerial tanker, while the Beech 58 (Lead 56) was on a lead operation. Lead 56 departed the fire area about 5 minutes before Tanker 19. Both airplanes proceeded to an uncontrolled airport at Ramona, CA, for landing on runway 27 with a 360° overhead approach. Tanker 19 was on the initial approach about 1 mile east of the airport, when the two planes collided. Investigation revealed that Lead 56 struck the vertical stabilizer of Tanker 19, while descending. The empennages of both airplanes separated, and both crashed in uncontrolled descents. Before the accident, a Grumman S2 pilot was following Tanker 19. While in a shallow descent to the airport, he saw Tanker 19 slightly below the horizon and heard Tanker 19 make two calls (at 8 and 2 miles on initial approach). He also heard a transmission from Lead 56 moments before the collision, but did not see Lead 56, nor was he watching Tanker 19 when the collision occurred. Investigators were unable to determine Lead 56's activities after departing the fire area. Transmissions were heard from Lead 56 on the forest service tactical (operations) frequency when the plane was within 10 miles of the airport. Moments before the collision, Lead 56 was heard on the airport's common traffic advisory frequency (ctaf). Forest service procedures required that all pilots transmit their position on the ctaf within 10 miles of the airport. The forest service had not made arrangements with the airport manager to perform overhead approaches, nor were parameters published for initial approach altitude or airspeed.

The certificated airline transport pilot of N1348 and 3 passengers were northwest bound at 200 feet over a remote river. The business flight was en route to a fishing lodge after picking up lodge clients from a remote lake. The certificated commercial pilot and sole occupant of N7832H was southbound at 200 feet over the same area of the river. Witnesses observed the two airplanes collide and descend into the river. The witnesses did not observe either airplane take evasive action. The weather conditions were reported as scattered clouds at 3,500 feet and a visibility of 25 miles.

ATC data indicated the airplane was in cruise flight at about 17,000 feet MSL, when the pilot deviated from the intended flight path to avoid thunderstorms. At 2150 EDT, the pilot requested clearance to climb to 19,000 MSL. At 2152, he requested a right turn out of weather and advised ATC that he was 'getting icing.' Between 2153 and 2154, the pilot's transmissions were garbled, then at 2154:38, he stated '...trying to get out of this mess.' Radar and radio contact with the airplane were lost. An in-flight breakup of the airplane occurred, and wreckage was found scattered over a 3 mile area. Postaccident examination revealed the outboard portion of the right wing had failed and separated in an upward and aft direction. Scrape marks were found on the right side of the fuselage, and there was damage to the right horizontal stabilizer and rudder. Also, there was evidence that both engines had separated in flight; they were found about 1 mile from the main wreckage. No preexisting mechanical malfunction or fatigue of the airplane was found. The pilot had received a complete weather briefing, and was advised of severe weather along the intended route of flight.

This was the first flight of the Grumman G-21 in two years. Also, the pilot had not flown the G-21 for two years. Before taking off, the pilot reported that three takeoffs and landings would be needed for purposes of becoming current. After takeoff, he flew the airplane approximately one hour and made two full stop landings. During the third takeoff, the airplane was described as lifting off in a short distance and going into a nose high attitude below an altitude of 100 feet. The airplane then rolled left, struck the ground in a steep descent, and burned. Witnesses reported that the engines were providing power until impact; the engines and propellers had evidence of rotational damage. The flap actuators were found extended to a position that equated with 30° of flaps (half flaps). Four G-21 pilots were interviewed. According to them, flaps were not normally used for takeoff in this airplane. They reported that the turboprop engines had substantial power for the weight of the airplane, especially when the plane was not loaded, and that the G-21 would tend to become airborne quickly with flaps extended. No pre impact mechanical problem was noted during the investigation.

As ValuJet Flight 597 began its takeoff roll, a 'loud Bang' was heard by the occupants, the right engine fire warning light illuminated, the crew of a following airplane reported to the ValuJet crew that the right engine was on fire, and the takeoff was rejected. Shrapnel from the right engine penetrated the fuselage and the right engine main fuel line, and a cabin fire erupted. The airplane was stopped on the runway, and the captain ordered evacuation of the airplane. A flight attendant (F/A) received serious puncture wounds from shrapnel and thermal injuries; another F/A and 5 passengers received minor injuries. Investigation revealed that an uncontained failure of the right engine had occurred due to fatigue failure of its 7th stage high compressor disc. The fatigue originated at a stress redistribution hole in the disc. Analysis of fatigue striation measurements indicated that the fatigue crack had originated before the disc was last overhauled at a repair station (Turk Hava Yollari) in 1991, but was not detected. Also, investigation of the repair station revealed evidence concerning a lack of adequate recordkeeping and a failure to use 'process sheets' to document the step-by-step overhaul/inspection procedures.

Approximately two minutes after takeoff, witnesses saw the airplane pull up sharply into a steep climb from underneath an 800-foot ceiling. The airplane went into an uncontrolled, nearly vertical dive and impacted into a river. The pilot did not hold multi-engine or instrument ratings. Individuals who knew the pilot, including an instructor who had flown with him, stated that they had doubted the pilot's competence but that the pilot had been confident of his own flying ability.

After departure from Boise-Gowen Field, en route to Peterson AFB in Colorado Springs, the crew encountered technical problems with the engine n°2. The crew declared an emergency and elected to divert to Mountain Home AFB. About 20 minutes into the flight, the engine n°2 compressor disintegrated. The aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed 12 miles north of Bliss. All six crew members were killed.
Crew:
Lt Col Robert Buckout, Commander
1st Lt Lance Daugherty, pilot,
Cpt Geoffery Boyd, navigator,
CMSgt Jimmy Vail, flight engineer,
M/Sgt Jay Kemp, loadmaster,
S/Sgt Michael Scheideman, loadmaster.

The pilot was cleared for the localizer runway 11 approach. The airplane impacted in an open field approximately 1 mile northeast of the airport and approximately 600 feet left of the extended centerline of the departure end of the runway. A witness saw the airplane at a low altitude, and stated 'it was foggy,' and he did not see the airplane until it was directly over his head. The witness stated that he saw the airplane for about '3 seconds,' at an altitude of 'between 50 and 100 feet above the ground,' and it did not sound like it was having 'mechanical difficulty.' The airplane turned left (north), and struck the ground with the left wing. The published missed approach called for a climbing 'right turn.' The olney airport automated weather observing system (awos) was operating and current at the time of the accident, but could only be obtained by telephone; hence atc could not provide the pilot with the current awos information. The pilot was provided the Evansville, Indiana (EVV) weather; 1,200 scattered, measured 4,500 overcast, visibility 5 miles, light rain and fog. Evansville was located approximately 20 miles southeast of Olney. The local (awos) weather was; partial obscuration, 100 feet overcast, visibility 3/4 mile.

The pilot was informed by another company pilot that the higher passes were closed. He then attempted to fly through 'high pass' located near old harbor. The pilot described the weather as overcast with ceilings obscured, and flight visibility was 2 to 3 miles. The pass was snow covered. As he entered the pass he lost visual reference due to whiteout conditions and he initiated a left turn to exit the pass. Approx half way through the turn the left wing struck the mountain.