United States of America

After climbing to 18,400 feet msl, the pilot reported a turbocharger problem and reversed course. He said he 'may lose the left engine' and that he was unable to maintain altitude. He diverted to an alternate airport. During a right turn onto final approach, the airplane was observed to cross (overshoot) the extended centerline of the runway. It continued in a right turn back toward the centerline, and then entered a left turn to intercept the inbound course. The turn steepened, and then the airplane entered a spin and crashed 1/2 mile short of the runway. A warped flange and evidence of exhaust gas leakage were found on the Inconel exhaust system Wye collector, at the wastegate outlet of the left engine. Neither propeller was in a feather position. There was evidence that the left engine was providing low power during impact. A note on the pilot's clipboard indicated that the (left engine) fuel flow and cylinder head temperature went to zero, and the manifold pressure dropped to 10 inches. The note also indicated that the pilot switched the 'boost pump' to high, the fuel flow went to 260 psi, and manifold pressure increased to 18.5 inches. Calculations showed that the airplane's gross weight (GW) and center-of-gravity (CG) were 7,645 pounds and 158.32 inches. The maximum allowable GW and CG were 7,450 pounds and 158 inches. During impact, the flaps were fully extended. The 'Engine Inoperative Landing' procedure stated, 'Wing Flaps - DOWN when landing is assured.' Most of the pilot's flight time in the Cessna 421 was before 1985; no record was found of recurrent training in the airplane since 1984. Annual and turbocharger inspections were made at 78 and 120 flight hours, respectively, before the accident, but no logbook entries were made concerning maintenance or replacement parts for the exhaust system. All eight occupants were killed.

The pilot had departed a remote airstrip on the return portion of a cargo flight. An instrument flight plan was on file with the ARTCC. After departure, the pilot attempted to contact ARTCC to open his flight plan but communications were not established. The airplane struck mountainous terrain about 6 miles south of the departure airport. Radar data showed that after departure, the airplane climbed westbound and then turned southbound toward higher terrain. It circled southwest of the airport and turned eastbound while climbing to 5,300 feet msl. The airplane then turned southbound again toward the accident site. The last recorded radar data was at 5,200 feet msl. The airplane struck a ridgeline about 4,800 feet msl. Airmets were in effect for IFR conditions, low ceilings, mountain obscurations, rain, fog, and icing in clouds and in precipitation. A witness reported that when the airplane arrived at the airport, the airframe had a coating of ice. When the airplane departed, snow was falling at the airport.

The local controller instructed the pilot to go-around because of inadequate spacing in the traffic pattern. While executing the go-around, the engine lost power and the airplane crashed on a bridge after colliding with the guard railing about 1 mile from the airport. The wreckage examination showed that the fuel line between the engine driven pump and the fuel control servo was empty. The left main tank leaked for about 5 minutes; the right main fuel tank was not compromised and contained between 5 and 10 gallons of fuel. Both auxiliary fuel tanks were empty. The fuel selector valve was found selected between the right main fuel tank and the off position. There were no other engine or airframe anomalies found.

The non-certificated pilot took a multiengine airplane without the owner's permission and attempted to fly around the traffic pattern. On base leg to final, the airplane was observed to stall, enter a nose down descent, and crash. The non-certificated pilot was apparently unaware that the static system ports had been taped over for avionics work.

Atlantic Southeast Airline Flight 529 was climbing through 18,000 feet, when a blade from the left propeller separated. This resulted in distortion of the left engine nacelle, excessive drag, loss of wing lift, and reduced directional control. The degraded performance resulted in a forced landing. While landing, the airplane passed through trees, impacted the ground, and was further damaged by post impact fire. An exam of the left propeller revealed the blade had failed due to a fatigue crack that originated from multiple corrosion pits in the taper bore surface of the blade spar. The crack had propagated toward the outside of the blade and around both sides of the taper bore. Due to 2 previous blade failures (separations), a borescope inspection procedure had been developed by Hamilton Standard to inspect returned blades (that had rejectable ultrasonic indications) for evidence of cracks, pits and corrosion. The accident blade was one of 490 rejected blades that had been sent to Hamilton Standard for further evaluation and possible repair. Maintenance technicians, who inspected the blade, lacked proper NDI familiarization training and specific equipment to identify the corrosion that resulted in fatigue. The captain and seven passengers were killed.

As the flight approached the airport, radar data showed that it went into a shallow descending left turn away from the airport. Radar data was lost at about 650 feet agl with the ground speed about 100 knots. Witnesses observed the aircraft flying on a southerly heading and enter a spin or spiral from which it crashed nose first into the ground. Post-crash examination of the aircraft structure, flight controls, and engines showed no precrash failure or malfunction. Post-mortem examination of the pilot showed he had suffered a heart attack. The pilot had a history of heart disease, a previous heart attack, and heart bypass surgery. He held a special issuance faa medical certificate, due to his history of heart disease.

After deplaning passengers at Thief River Falls after an air taxi flight, the pilot was reportedly anxious to return to his base in Minot to prepare for another trip the following day, and left for the return trip within a few minutes after his arrival at Thief River Falls. There was no record of a weather briefing. Observations of Doppler radar by the University of North Dakota, and a Safety Board meteorological study, show that the airplane had penetrated a thunderstorm when control was lost. The airplane had encountered the center of a microburst, and was located directly under the downdraft.

The flight departed Juneau, Alaska on a VFR flight to King Salmon, Alaska. When the flight was 50 miles southwest of the Yakutat VOR, the pilot requested an IFR clearance. He was cleared direct to Middleton Island VOR, then direct to King Salmon VOR. When the flight was 20 miles northwest of Middleton Island, the pilot contacted ARTCC and indicated his right engine had come apart. The pilot attempted to fly to and land at Middleton Island, Alaska. During the flight, the airplane consistently lost altitude. He flew past the island and was southeast of the island, when radar contact was lost. The airplane was not recovered. Flight crew of rescue aircraft stated they saw bubbles, an oil slick, and airplane debris in the ocean approximately 3 miles south of the Middleton Island Airport. The 1126 adt weather at the airport was in part: 600 feet broken, visibility 5 miles, wind from 117° at 17 gusting 25 knots.

The new owner/co-pilot of the 50-year-old airplane and another pilot, who was typed rated in the airplane, departed on a 1,700 mile ferry flight. After the first 250 mile leg, the airplane was landed at another airport with a right engine problem. The owner replaced the right engine and continued the ferry flight. Twenty minutes into the second flight, the replacement right engine lost power. The owner stated that they applied maximum power to the left engine, were unable to feather the right propeller, and performed a forced landing to a field. However, the airplane collided with trees before reaching the field, then burned after impact. Investigation revealed that during the past 5 years, the airplane had neither flown nor had an annual inspection, except for 3 recent maintenance flights, totaling 1.5 Hours. The right propeller blades had chordwise scratches. The left propeller blades had no chordwise scratches. Examination of the wreckage revealed three propeller strikes in the ground, near the right engine ground scar, and no propeller strikes in the ground, near the left engine ground scar. The right engine mixture was locked in the auto-cruise position, while the left was locked in the emergency position. Airplane charts listed the single-engine rate of climb with a feathered propeller to be 350 feet per minute, and 10 feet per minute with a windmilling propeller.

The pilot received an instrument approach clearance to a non tower airport surrounded by mountainous terrain. Weather conditions on the ground were VFR, and the pilot descended through an overcast. The approach environment was not serviced by any atc radar facility. The pilot declared a missed approach to the appropriate faa flight service station, and was advised to contact ARTCC. ARTCC never received a radio transmission from the pilot. The airplane wreckage was located approximately 6 miles beyond the airport, slightly to the north of the extended runway centerline. Missed approach procedures were for an immediate climb, and then a climbing right turn to reverse direction away from the airport. The missed approach segment began 5.2 DME miles prior to the airport. Minimum descent altitude (MDA) for the approach was 4,320 feet msl (4,200 feet above the runway elevation); impact with mountainous terrain occurred at about the same altitude. All four occupants were killed.