United States of America

The right engine lost power after an uncontained engine failure during the initial takeoff climb. The airplane would not climb and the pilot was forced to land. The pilot selected a street for a forced landing area. The pilot landed gear up while maneuvering to avoid hitting street light poles and automobiles. After touchdown, the airplane slid into a block wall. A fire erupted as a result of a post impact fuel leak in the left wing. The airplane's engines were examined at the manufacturer's facilities. The right engine exhibited evidence of an uncontained separation of the second stage turbine rotor disk. Examination of the disk fragments revealed a low cycle fatigue fracture mode. The fatigue initiated from multiple areas at and adjacent to the inside diameter bore surface near the aft side of the disk. According to the engine manufacturer, the multiple indication areas were associated with uninspectable size porosity and the primary carbides in the cast material. There were no material or casting defects detected on any of the fractures through the wheel.

The pilot of the air taxi cargo flight departed his base of operations in Juneau, Alaska for a series of flights in southeast Alaska that would ultimately return him to Juneau. On the accident leg of the intended round robin, the pilot was en route from Hoonah to Elfin Cove. The flight would originate and end at sea level, and traverse a mountain pass, with minimum obstruction clearance in the pass estimated at 500 feet msl. The airplane collided with steeply rising terrain at the 1,250-foot level about one mile south of the proposed flight path. The airplane was partially consumed by a post impact fire. The operator initiated a helicopter search within two hours of the time of the accident. The helicopter pilot and his passenger both reported that the area where the accident airplane was eventually located was obscured in low clouds, and that many of the other valleys and mountain sides were covered in clouds. Low clouds persisted in the area of the crash site for the following two days.

On July 17, 1996, about 2031 eastern daylight time, Trans World Airlines, Inc. (TWA) flight 800, a Boeing 747-131, N93119, crashed in the Atlantic Ocean near East Moriches, New York. TWA flight 800 was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 as a scheduled international passenger flight from John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK), New York, New York, to Charles De Gaulle International Airport, Paris, France. The flight departed JFK about 2019, with 2 pilots, 2 flight engineers, 14 flight attendants, and 212 passengers on board. All 230 people on board were killed, and the airplane was destroyed. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight, which operated on an instrument flight rules flight plan. The investigation revealed that the crash occurred as the result of a fuel/air explosion in the airplane's center wing fuel tank (CWT) and the subsequent in-flight breakup of the airplane. The investigation further revealed that the ignition energy for the CWT explosion most likely entered the CWT through the fuel quantity indication system wiring; neither the ignition energy release mechanism nor the location of the ignition inside the CWT could be determined from the available evidence. There was no evidence of a missile or bomb detonation.

The pilot reported that he performed a rolling takeoff from the 2315 ft runway. He said that as soon as the airplane broke ground on the takeoff roll, he experienced a loss of engine power. The pilot said that he retracted the gear to help clear a 42 ft dike at the departure end of the runway. Also, he reported that after clearing the dike, he turned gradually to the left, and the left wing stalled. Two witnesses reported hearing loud, steady sounds from the airplane's engine and propeller. They said they saw the airplane in a high nose-up attitude, and watched the airplane descend behind the dike. The engine could be heard until the airplane contacted the river. During an operational check after the accident, the engine performed at recommended levels. According to performance data provided by the FAA, at the given takeoff weight, with a zero degree flap setting, the airplane required 2850 feet of runway to clear a 50 ft obstacle. The charts were based on full power before brake release.

According to an FAA inspector, the airplane '...was unable to get airborne...' during the takeoff roll. He stated that after travelling the full length of the 4,997-foot runway, the airplane ran off the departure end of runway 5 and continued approximately 2,257 feet through an open field, a fence, a corn field and into a depression where it impacted terrain and came to rest. The pilot reported that during the takeoff roll he discovered that he had not removed the gust lock from the control column and that his attempts to remove it were unsuccessful. The pilot stated that the aircraft '...went off the end of the runway through a fence and impacted an earthen berm that collapsed the gear [and] blade strikes that stopped the engines.'

During initial takeoff climb the copilot who was manipulating the controls called for METO (maximum except takeoff) power. After the pilot-in-command set METO power, the left engine lost power. The PIC took the controls from the copilot and called for him to feather the left propeller. The copilot did not hear the call to feather the left propeller. Maintaining an indicated airspeed of 90 knots and wings level attitude, the airplane descended into trees and impacted a rural residential paved street. The cockpit area and main fuselage were consumed by a post crash fire. Examination of the throttle quadrant revealed the propeller control levers were forward, the mixture control levers were autorich, the throttle for the right engine was forward, and the throttle for the left engine was at idle. According to a FAA operations inspector maintaining 90 knots with the propeller not feathered would result in the aircraft descending. The pilot and copilot had not completed a proficiency check or flight check for the DC3 type aircraft within the previous 24 months. Examination of the left engine did not disclose any preexisting anomalies.

During departure climb, the airplane experienced a loss of engine power. Emergency procedures were executed and a forced approach/landing was initiated to a field. While on the approach, the pilot observed a ditch running across the proposed landing pathway. He turned the airplane right to parallel the ditch. During the landing roll, the pilot attempted to avoid a building by intentionally ground looping the airplane. During this avoidance maneuver, the left wing struck the building. Examination of the airplane revealed that the engine had seized due to an internal failure. The reason for the engine's internal failure was not determined.

The parents of the pilot/owner stated that he arrived late in the afternoon prior to the accident. They stayed up with their son until approximately 0100 the morning of the accident. They stated that their son was a doctor and kept a busy schedule. The son told the parents that he had to fly back in order to have new fuel cells installed in the airplane and to work at his clinic. The pilot was airborne by 0700. The weather at his destination had low ceilings and fog restricting the visibility. The pilot was cleared by ATC to fly the localizer approach to the runway. The pilot called his position at the outer marker on the unicom frequency and no further transmissions were heard. Witnesses on the airport heard and saw the bottom of the airplane and stated that the airplane's engines sounded normal as it went overhead. Radar data showed that the airplane's altitude fluctuated and ground speed decreased significantly during the missed approach flight path. The airplane impacted the ground in approximately 40- degree nose-low, right wing down attitude. The toxicology report revealed 0.005 ug/ml Tetrahydrocannabinol (Marihuana) in the blood, and 0.013 ug/ml and 0.017 ug/ml Tetrahydrocannabinol Carboxylic Acid (Marihuana) in the blood and kidney fluid respectively.

The pilot took off on runway 07 and was cleared direct to the Wiscasset NDB, east of the airport. Shortly after takeoff, the airplane began turning to the left. The pilot then asked the controller, '. . . can you tell if I'm in a turn? I have a problem here.' Soon thereafter, the airplane collided with terrain in an uncontrolled descent, about 1.6 miles north of the airport. Investigation revealed that three days before the accident, a refueler had fueled the airplane's left wing with 840 pounds of fuel, then the fuel farm ran out of fuel. No further fueling was accomplished, and the pilot was not advised of the uneven fuel load. Procedures in the Beech E90 Pilot's Operating Manual (POM) included a check of the fuel tanks during preflight. The Beech C90 POM specified a maximum fuel imbalance of 200 pounds, but the E90 POM did not specify a maximum fuel imbalance. During examination of the wreckage, no preimpact malfunction or failure was found.

The airplane was in cruise flight at 17,000 feet msl when the pilot told Minneapolis ARTCC 'We're picking up some ice and rain, and we're going to turn around.' ARTCC approved the request. Two minutes later the pilot told ARTCC that 'We're looking for some help to get around this weather southbound.' ARTCC told the pilot that he could turn either east or west. The pilot turned west, then 4 minutes later turned back to the south. The pilot then told ARTCC that they were still encountering weather. ARTCC directed the pilot to turn north and then east whenever he could. Approximately 1 minute later ARTCC radar showed the airplane in a rapid descent. The pilot then told ARTCC 'Minneapolis center, N9114Q is out of control.' The pilot had received a FSS briefing prior to takeoff, and was advised of convective conditions and precipitation building to the south along his intended route of flight. The airplane was approximately 548 pounds over maximum takeoff weight.