United States of America

The pilot received a full weather briefing from a Flight Service Station (FSS) on the morning of the accident. The FSS briefer told the pilot that moderate turbulence and icing prevailed along the pilot's intended route of flight, and that there were forecasts for isolated thundershowers. The briefer advised the pilot to call for an update just prior to departure. The pilot departed on the flight almost 3 hours later without calling for an update. He received an IFR clearance after 15 minutes of delays, then proceeded on course to his destination. About 35 minutes after departure, while cruising at 16,000 feet, the pilot reported that he was 'in the clouds and the bumps are big time.' About 3 minutes later, the pilot radioed that he was 'in a dive and I don't...' The airplane impacted terrain in a nose-down, inverted attitude and exploded. Analysis of recorded radar and meteorological data indicates that the airplane encountered a thunderstorm, strong updrafts, downdrafts, and turbulence.

The airplane was at FL 330 when the flightcrew determined that there was smoke in the cabin cargo compartment. An emergency was declared and the flight diverted to Newburgh/Stewart International Airport and landed. The airplane was destroyed by fire after landing. The fire had burned for about 4 hours after after smoke was first detected. Investigation revealed that the deepest and most severe heat and fire damage occurred in and around container 06R, which contained a DNA synthesizer containing flammable liquids. More of 06R's structure was consumed than of any other container, and it was the only container that exhibited severe floor damage. Further, 06R was the only container to exhibit heat damage on its bottom surface, and the area below container 06R showed the most extensive evidence of scorching of the composite flooring material. However, there was insufficient reliable evidence to reach a conclusion as to where the fire originated. The presence of flammable chemicals in the DNA synthesizer was wholly unintended and unknown to the preparer of the package and shipper. The captain did not adequately manage his crew resources when he failed to call for checklists or to monitor and facilitate the accomplishment of required checklist items. The Department of Transportation hazardous materials regulations do not adequately address the need for hazardous materials information on file at a carrier to be quickly retrievable in a format useful to emergency responders.

At 1615, the pilot called FSS for a weather briefing and to file an IFR flight plan. He was told that there was thunderstorm activity, which was building in intensity, extending from Raton, New Mexico, to Garden City, Kansas, with some scattered activity in the Oklahoma panhandle. The briefer further reported that the thunderstorm activity was moving east, southeast. The pilot checked in with Albuquerque Center at 1750 during his departure climb to 21,000 feet. At 1755, convective SIGMET 70C was issued for isolated severe thunderstorms located 10 miles north, northeast, of Las Vegas, New Mexico. FAA Order 7110.65J, Air Traffic Control, section 2-6-2, states that 'controllers shall advise pilots of hazardous weather that may impact operations within 150 NM of their sector or area of jurisdiction.' SIGMET 70C was not given to the pilot by the center controller. Radio contact was lost at 1823. The pilot reported that the airplane was in VMC, approaching precipitation, when they encountered hail and the pilot's windshield was broken out which resulted in the airplane's depressurization.

The aircraft departed Jackson Hole Airport at 2245LT on a flight to New York-JFK, carrying eight crew members and a U.S. Secret Service agent. The purpose of the flight was to transport a U.S. Secret Service communications vehicle to New York after President Bill Clinton spent some vacations in Jackson Hole. Five minutes after takeoff, while climbing by night, the four engine aircraft struck the slope of Mt Sleeping Indian (Mt Sheep - 3,427 metres high) located about 18 km southeast of the airport. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all nine occupants were killed.

During an attempted takeoff, the airplane collided with a taxiway sign, a fence, a light pole and came to rest between two buildings. According to the pilot in command (seated in the right seat), a preflight and run-up inspection was completed successfully. He stated that a pilot rated passenger (in the left front seat) was following along with a placard checklist. He stated that the airplane was accelerated for takeoff on runway 7, and at 500 feet down the 2700 foot long runway with the airspeed at redline, rotation was initiated and the airplane veered to the right. He stated that shortly thereafter the right engine surged and he noted the matched power levers, but he did not record the engine power instruments. A passenger (seated in a forward facing seat behind the pilot in command) reported that the pilot rated passenger's hand was on the throttle(yellow-knobbed handles) at the time of the accident The reported visibility was 1/8 mile in fog. The prescribed takeoff minimums for that airport is 400 feet and 1 mile visibility. Post accident examination of the engines and their systems revealed no evidence of preimpact mechanical malfunction. The pilot reported that there was no mechanical malfunction.

On August 11, 1996, about 1615 Alaska daylight time, an amphibious Grumman G21-G, N660PA, is presumed to have been involved in a fatal accident about 20 miles south of Dutch Harbor, Alaska. The airplane was being operated as a visual flight rules (VFR) cross-country on demand passenger flight under Title 14 CFR Part 135 when the accident occurred. The airplane, registered to and operated by Peninsula Airways Inc., Anchorage, Alaska, is presumed to have been destroyed. The certificated airline transport pilot, and the sole passenger are presumed to have received fatal injuries. Low ceilings were reported in the area of departure by the operator. VFR company flight following procedures were in effect. The flight originated from Anderson Bay, on the Island of Unalaska, about 1610.

The pilot said that during the landing approach, the flight visibility was inadequate for landing, and he aborted the landing. Witnesses observed the airplane touchdown long and fast, then it
entered fog that shrouded the runway. Subsequently, the airplane collided with trees, then impacted on marshland about 70 feet below the runway elevation. No mechanical anomalies were found with the airplane or engines that would prevent flight. On the day before the accident, the pilot's duty day began at 0500. He had a 9-hour rest period (during the day) that did not involve any sleep. The pilot said that after work on the day before the accident, he arrived home about 2300. His wife said he awoke about 0230 on the accident date, then he returned to bed and arose between 0430 and 0500, departing for work about 0530. During his regular duty day rest period, the pilot would drive a total of 4 hours to and from his home each day. The pilot said he would generally get to bed about 2300 to 2330, arising about 0430 each work day. Also, he said he needed between 6 and 8 hours of sleep at night.

The airplane's nose gear collapsed during a landing roll on a gravel airstrip. Subsequent examination of the nose gear locking mechanism disclosed a failed hydraulic drag strut locking actuator.

The pilot-under-instruction (PUI) who possessed an expired medical, and the pilot-in-command (PIC), an ATP pilot with 1240 hours in the Cessna 340, departed on the third training flight for the PUI in the aircraft. The second training flight, flown the previous Saturday, had included single-engine work. The aircraft was observed in the vicinity of the Richland airport by witnesses, several of whom reported the left propeller turning slowly. All witnesses reported seeing the aircraft descending rapidly to the ground in a nose down attitude and several witnesses described the descent as a spin. The aircraft impacted the ground in a near vertical, nose low attitude and was destroyed by fire. Postcrash examination of the aircraft revealed the left propeller in the feathered position and power signatures on the blades of the right propeller. Disassembly of both engines revealed no pre-impact mechanical malfunction. The gear and flaps were up and the rudder trim tab showed about 5 degrees of left tab trim. The information manual for the Cessna 340 indicates that the air minimum control speed (single engine), Vmca is 82 KIAS. The manual also indicates that a more suitable airspeed for one engine inoperative training events is 91 KIAS.

The cargo flight was en route, when a fire erupted in or near the #3 engine. During subsequent emergency procedures, the flight crew pulled the fire handle first. Later, they feathered the #3 engine. The fire did not extinguish. During an attempt to land at a rural, intermediate airstrip, while the airplane was in the traffic pattern, witnesses saw fire coming from the area of the #3 engine. They stated the right wing buckled upward, and the airplane crashed. Examination of the wreckage revealed a failure of the master rod in the front bank of cylinders of the #3 engine. Metallurgical tests revealed a crack in the top of the master rod head, which had resulted from corrosion pits. The side of the master rod head was measured and found to be out of round. The master rod shank also fractured due to fatigue. The operator's training procedures and the Douglas Aircraft emergency checklist procedures, required that the engine's propeller be feathered first, and then the fire extinguishing system to be activated. According to information derived from the airplane's cockpit voice recorder, the flight crew reversed that order. The effectiveness of the fire suppression system is diminished if the propeller is not feathered first.