Benton Harbor

The pilot was landing at a large fly-in/airshow and following the airshow arrival procedures that were in use. While descending on the downwind leg for runway 27, the pilot was cleared by a controller to turn right onto the base leg abeam the runway numbers and to land on the green dot (located about 2,500 ft from the runway's displaced threshold). About the time the pilot turned onto the base leg, he observed an airplane taxi onto the runway and start its takeoff roll. The controller instructed the pilot to continue the approach and land on the orange dot (located about 1,000 ft from the runway's displaced threshold) instead of the green dot. The pilot reported that he considered performing a go-around but decided to continue the approach. As the pilot reduced power, the airplane entered a stall and impacted the runway in a right-wing-low, nose-down attitude. Witnesses estimated that the bank angle before impact was greater than 60 degrees. A postaccident examination of the airframe and engine revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation.
Analysis of a video recording of the accident showed that the airplane was about 180 ft above ground level (agl) when the turn onto the base leg began, and it descended to about 140 ft agl during the turn. The airplane's total inertial speed (the calculated vector sums of the airplane's ground speeds and vertical speeds) decreased from 98 knots (kts) to 80 kts during the turn. During the last 8 seconds of flight, the speed decreased below 70 kts, and the airplane descended from about 130 ft agl to ground impact. The wings-level stall speed of the airplane at maximum gross weight with landing gear and flaps down was 59 kts. In the same configuration at 60 degrees of bank, the stall speed was 86 kts and would have been higher at a bank angle greater than 60 degrees. Reduced runway separation standards for airplanes were in effect due to the airshow. When the accident airplane reached the runway threshold, the minimum distance required by the standards between the arriving accident airplane and the departing airplane was 1,500 ft. The video analysis indicated that it was likely that a minimum of 1,500 ft of separation was maintained during the accident sequence. Although the pilot was familiar with the procedures for flying into the airshow, the departing airplane
and the modified landing clearance during a period of typically high workload likely interfered with the pilot's ability to adequately monitor his airspeed and altitude. As a result, the airplane entered an accelerated stall when the pilot turned the airplane at a steep bank angle and a low airspeed in an attempt to make the landing spot, which resulted in the airplane exceeding its critical angle of attack. At such a low altitude, recovery from the stall was not possible. Although the airshow arrival procedures stated that pilots have the option to go around if necessary, and the pilot considered going around, he instead continued the unstable landing approach and lost control of the airplane.

The single-engine airplane experienced a loss of engine power during cruise flight at flight level 190 (19,000 feet) and impacted the terrain while performing a forced landing to a nearby airport. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident with clear skies and unrestricted visibilities. The pilot reported the loss of engine power about 16 minutes prior to the accident and requested clearance to the nearest airport. Air traffic control (ATC) issued vectors to the Southwest Michigan Regional Airport (BEH). About 10 minutes prior to the accident, the airplane was positioned approximately 1.3 nm north of BEH at 13,500 feet. The pilot elected to follow ATC vectors verses circling down over BEH. ATC provided vectors for runway 27 at BEH. Witnesses to the accident reported seeing the airplane "spiraling down and crashing into the ground." The wreckage was located on the extended runway 27 centerline, about 1.12 nm from the runway threshold. The distribution of the wreckage was consistent with a stall/spin accident. Approximately four minutes before the accident, the airplane was on a 9.5 nm final approach at 6,700 feet. Between 9.5 and 5.3 nm the airspeed fluctuated between 119 and 155 knots, and the descent rate varied between 1,550 and 2,600 feet/min. Between 5.3 nm and the last radar return at 1.5 nm the airspeed dropped from 155 to 78 knots. According to the Pilot Operating Handbook (POH) the accident airplane should be flown at best glide speed (92 knots) after a loss of engine power. An average engine-out descent rate of 700 feet/min is achieved when best glide speed is maintained during engine-out descents. An engine teardown inspection revealed that the crankshaft was fractured at the number five crankpin journal. Visual examination of the crankshaft (p/n 13F27738, s/n V537920968) showed a fatigue-type fracture through the cheek, aft of the number five crankpin journal. The exact cause of the crankshaft failure could not be determined, due to mechanical damage at the fatigue initiation point. The fracture features for the accident crankshaft was consistent with 14 previous failures of the same part number. The engine manufacturer determined the failures were most likely due to the overheating of the steel during the forging process.

The pilot said that during the landing approach, the flight visibility was inadequate for landing, and he aborted the landing. Witnesses observed the airplane touchdown long and fast, then it
entered fog that shrouded the runway. Subsequently, the airplane collided with trees, then impacted on marshland about 70 feet below the runway elevation. No mechanical anomalies were found with the airplane or engines that would prevent flight. On the day before the accident, the pilot's duty day began at 0500. He had a 9-hour rest period (during the day) that did not involve any sleep. The pilot said that after work on the day before the accident, he arrived home about 2300. His wife said he awoke about 0230 on the accident date, then he returned to bed and arose between 0430 and 0500, departing for work about 0530. During his regular duty day rest period, the pilot would drive a total of 4 hours to and from his home each day. The pilot said he would generally get to bed about 2300 to 2330, arising about 0430 each work day. Also, he said he needed between 6 and 8 hours of sleep at night.

On approach to Racine-Batten Airport, the crew failed to realize his altitude was insufficient when the airplane struck the water surface and crashed into Lake Michigan, few miles offshore. The floating wreckage was recovered but all seven occupants were killed.

While in cruising altitude in poor weather conditions, the pilot lost control of the airplane that entered a dive and crashed few dozen seconds later in a huge explosion. All five occupants were killed.