United States of America

After the completion of scheduled maintenance and a normal ground run up, the airplane departed the airport for a local test flight. Witnesses observed the airplane in a nose high attitude, turn to the left, and then saw the nose drop toward the ground approximately 1 1/2 miles from the departure end of the runway. The airplane impacted hilly terrain and was consumed by a post impact fire. Detailed examination of the airframe, engines, and propellers revealed no defects or anomalies that would have contributed to the accident.

The pilot reported that he ran the engines to full power before releasing the brakes. Immediately after lift-off, when he retracted the landing gear, he noticed a dramatic loss of airspeed. The airplane began to rock back and forth, and the pilot's efforts to increase the airspeed including lowering the nose and adding full power was unsuccessful. According to the Piper Information Manual for a short field takeoff, a lift-off speed of 85 mph and 15 degree of flaps is required. The reported winds were 010 degrees at 7 knots. The pilot departed runway 29 which is 2910 feet long. A witness who was refueling an airplane on the ramp stated that the airplane was still on the runway at the 500 foot mark from the end of runway 29.

The pilot was engaged in a local military mission at Tyndall AFB. On approach to runway 13L, conflicting traffic forced the pilot to initiate a go-around procedure. During the second approach, the pilot failed to follow the approach checklist and failed to lower the undercarriage. The aircraft landed on its belly and came to rest on the runway. The pilot escaped uninjured.

Recorded radar data showed the aircraft was flying in an area of mountainous terrain. Mountain tops in the area were reported to be obscured. Radar data showed that the aircraft first descended to a low altitude as it flew up a valley, then it climbed until impacting rising terrain about 7,200 feet msl. Wreckage was scattered over 300 feet up the mountain slope. About 32 miles southwest at Bakersfield (elevation 507 feet), the 1000 pdt weather was in part: 4500 feet scattered, 6000 feet overcase, visibility 20 miles, wind from 260 degrees at 10 knots. Nearby residents reported that the mountain was obscured in clouds at the time of the accident. During postmortem toxicology tests, a low level of ethanol (23 mg/dl) was detected in muscle fluid specimen, probably from post-mortem production. No ethanol was detected in brain fluid.

ValuJet Flight 592 was a scheduled flight from Miami (MIA) to Atlanta (ATL). The inbound flight had been delayed and arrived at Miami at 13:10. Flight 592 had been scheduled to depart at 13:00. The cruising altitude was to be flight level 350 with an estimated time en route of 1 hour 32 minutes. The DC-9 was loaded with 4,109 pounds of cargo (baggage, mail, and company-owned material (COMAT)). The COMAT consisted of two main tires and wheels, a nose tire and wheel, and five boxes that were described as "Oxy Cannisters -‘Empty.’" This cargo was loaded in the forward cargo compartment. Flight 592 was pushed back from the gate shortly before 13:40. The DC-9 then taxied to runway 09L. At 14:03:24, ATC cleared the flight for takeoff and the flightcrew acknowledged the clearance. At 14:04:24, the flightcrew was instructed by ATC to contact the north departure controller. At 1404:32, the first officer made initial radio contact with the departure controller, advising that the airplane was climbing to 5,000 feet. Four seconds later, the departure controller advised flight 592 to climb and maintain 7,000 feet. The first officer acknowledged the transmission. At 14:07:22, the departure controller instructed flight 592 to "turn left heading three zero zero join the WINCO transition climb and maintain one six thousand," which was acknowledged. At 14:10:03, the flight crew heard a sound, after which the captain remarked, "What was that?" At that moment, the airplane was at 10,634 feet msl, 260 knots indicated airspeed (KIAS), and both engine pressure ratios (EPRs) were 1.84. At 14:10:15, the captain stated, "We got some electrical problem," followed 5 seconds later with, "We’re losing everything." At 14:10:21, the departure controller advised flight 592 to contact Miami on frequency 132.45 mHz. At 14:10:22, the captain stated, "We need, we need to go back to Miami," followed 3 seconds later by shouts in the background of "fire, fire, fire, fire." At 14:10:27, the CVR recorded a male voice saying, "We’re on fire, we’re on fire." At 14:10:28, the controller again instructed flight 592 to contact Miami Center. At 14:10:31, the first officer radioed that the flight needed an immediate return to Miami. The controller replied, "Critter five ninety two uh roger turn left heading two seven zero descend and maintain seven thousand." The first officer acknowledged the heading and altitude. The peak altitude reached was 10,879 feet msl at 14:10:31, and about 10 seconds a wings-level descent started. Shouting in the cabin subsided. The controller then queried flight 592 about the nature of the problem. The captain stated "fire" and the first officer replied, "uh smoke in the cockp... smoke in the cabin." The controller responded, "roger" and instructed flight 592, when able, to turn left to a heading of two five zero and to descend and maintain 5,000 feet. At 14:11:12, a flight attendant was heard shouting, "completely on fire." The DC-9 began to change heading to a southerly direction and at 14:11:26, the north departure controller advised the controller at Miami Center that flight 592 was returning to Miami with an emergency. At 14:11:37, the first officer transmitted that they needed the closest available airport. At 1411:41, the controller replied, "Critter five ninety two they’re gonna be standing (unintelligible) standing by for you, you can plan runway one two when able direct to Dolphin [a navaid] now." At 14:11:46, the first officer responded that the flight needed radar vectors. At 14:11:49, the controller instructed flight 592 to turn left heading one four zero. The first officer acknowledged the transmission. At 14:12:45, the controller transmitted, "Critter five ninety two keep the turn around heading uh one two zero." There was no response from the flightcrew. The last recorded FDR data showed the airplane at 7,200 feet msl, at a speed of 260 KIAS, and on a heading of 218 degrees. At 14:12:48, the FDR stopped recording data. The airplane’s radar transponder continued to function; thus, airplane position and altitude data were recorded by ATC after the FDR stopped. At 14:13:18, the departure controller instructed, "Critter five ninety two you can uh turn left heading one zero zero and join the runway one two localizer at Miami." Again there was no response. At 14:13:27, the controller instructed flight 592 to descend and maintain 3,000 feet. At 1413:37, an unintelligible transmission was intermingled with a transmission from another airplane. No further radio transmissions were received from flight 592. At 14:13:43, the departure controller advised flight 592, "Opa Locka airport’s about 12 o’clock at 15 miles." The accident occurred at 14:13:42. Ground scars and wreckage scatter indicated that the airplane crashed into the Everglades in a right wing down, nose down attitude.

According to passenger's accounts, the airplane was flying low and approached the runway at an angle. The airplane made a right turn and dragged the right wing on the runway's surface. The airplane landed hard and sheared off the right main landing gear and the nose gear. The weather reported by AWOS was 300 foot overcast with a visibility of 2.5 miles with fog. The Captain stated the airplane drifted to the left side of the runway due to the crosswind, and he executed a right turn to realign with the runway. The cockpit voice recorder indicated that the stall warning horn sounded as the First Officer called for the application of power.

During departure, the rubber connector for the fuel supply line to the right engine oil dilution valve split at the dilution valve on the aft side of the firewall. The engine would not operate unless the electric boost pump was turned on. While returning to the departure airport, a fire erupted in the right wheel after the landing gear was extended. The cockpit filled with smoke during the landing rollout, and the pilot lost directional control do to not being able to see. The aircraft rolled into a canal and came to rest. The split rubber fuel line connector was dry and brittle and did not have any fire damage. No other sources of fuel leakage was found.

During flight, the pilot reported shutting down the left engine due to a loss of oil pressure. He declared an emergency and diverted toward an alternate airport. However, while diverting, radar and radio contact were lost, and the airplane crashed. The wreckage path covered a distance of approximately 60 feet; the descent angle during impact was estimated to be about 45°. Oil was found behind the left engine, on the left flap, on the bottom of the left horizontal stabilizer, and on the bottom of the fuselage. Also, fuel stains were seen in the grass around the airplane. No preimpact fire indications were found. The pilot had reported low oil pressure in the left engine before the accident flight, and purchased seven quarts of oil before departing. No indications of power at impact were seen on either engine or propeller. Numerous abnormalities existed with the left engine. No discrepancies were noted with the right engine. The farmer who found the wreckage reported that sleet was falling at the time of the accident. The pilot of another aircraft reported structural icing conditions.