United States of America

The pilot was departing a remote airport to begin a VFR cargo flight. The departure path took the airplane over ice covered terrain. The airport was considered to be below basic VFR conditions with light snow and fog, and the visual conditions in the area were considered to be 'flat' with the visibility from 2 to 3 miles. The pilot received a special VFR clearance out of the control zone by a flight service station specialist. After departure, witnesses observed the airplane climb to an estimated 500 feet above the ground and turn to the right. Shortly thereafter, the airplane banked to the right about 90 degrees, then descended to the ground in a wing and nose low attitude. A postaccident inspection of the airframe and engine did not reveal any mechanical malfunction.

The pilot reported that loss of power occurred in both engines after he entered the traffic pattern for a full stop landing. The airplane collided with trees during an emergency landing in a cotton field near the airport. Subsequent review of the aircraft maintenance logs disclosed that Mitsubishi MU-2 Service Bulletin (SB) 130A had not been accomplished on this airplane. According to the manufacturer, an inadvertent failure or the improper installation of a filler cap after refueling may cause an air pressure differential between the center and outboard portions of the main integral fuel tank. Air leakage from the filler cap may result in failure of the fuel transfer system to move fuel from the outboard tank section to the center tank section. To eliminate this possible malfunction, the operator was to remove vent check valves from the bulkhead between the tanks in accordance with SB 130A. The operator's maintenance policies required that, company jet and turbo propeller aircraft be maintained under a maintenance program in accordance with FAR Parts 135.415, 135.417, 135.423, 135.443, and a corporate flight management approved aircraft inspection program (AAIP). The maintenance inspection program also included compliance with manufacturers' service bulletins and service letters.

The airplane landed wheels up and slid 6,850 feet before coming to rest in grass about 140 feet left of the runway centerline. The cabin began to fill with smoke, and the airplane was evacuated. Investigation showed that because the captain had omitted the 'Hydraulics' item on the in-range checklist and the first officer failed to detect the the error, hydraulic pressure was not available to lower the landing gear and deploy the flaps. Both the captain and the first officer recognized that the flaps had not extended after the flaps were selected to 15°. The pilots then failed to perform the landing checklist and to detect the numerous cues alerting them to the status of the landing gear because of their focus on coping with the flap extension problem and the high level of workload as a result of the rapid sequence of events in the final minute of flight. The first officer attempted to communicate his concern about the excessive speed of the approach to the captain. There were deficiencies in Continental Airlines' (COA) oversight of its pilots and the principal operations inspector's oversight of COA. COA was aware of inconsistencies in flightcrew adherence to standard operating procedures within the airline; however, corrective actions taken before the accident had not resolved this problem.

Shortly after reaching a cruising altitude of 9,500 feet, the aircraft's course was observed on radar to change from southeasterly to southwesterly. Its average ground speed decreased from 170 knots to 108 knots during this track change. The pilot called ATC with his call sign, and about five seconds later, an unintelligible, one-second-long transmission was heard. At that same time, radar information showed the aircraft at 8,800 feet. Radar and radio contact were lost shortly thereafter. Three days later, wreckage was found where the aircraft had crashed. The crash site was 1,820 feet above sea level and 1/2 mile south-southwest of its last observed radar position; the aircraft's average descent angle from the 8,800-foot-altitude position to the crash site was about 51 degrees. The aircraft was extensively damaged during impact. No damage was noted on tall trees that surrounded the accident site. Also, no preimpact mechanical malfunction or failure of the aircraft or engines was found, and no pre-accident impairment of the pilot was found.