United States of America

The pilot was conducting an approach to runway 8, during which the left wing contacted the ground approximately 75 feet from the approach end of the runway. The airplane came to rest about 160 feet down the runway, and off the right side. A pilot who landed on runway 26, about 30 minutes prior to the accident flight, stated that the winds were out of the northwest at 15 knots with gusts, and he experienced plus and minus 10 knots on the airspeed while on final approach. The winds 19 miles to the east, at 1045 eastern standard time, were reported from 310 degrees at 15 knots with gusts up to 20 knots. An AIRMET was issued at 0345, with an advisory for occasional moderate turbulence below 8,000 feet. The AIRMET was reissued at 0945, with the added advisory of, 'Low level wind shear potential over the Boston Area Forecast area east of an Erie-Bristol line due to gusty northwesterly surface winds. Conditions ending by 1600.' An FAA Inspector examined the wreckage and found no preimpact anomalies with the airplane.

Witnesses observed the aircraft departing from runway 14 with a rolling start. They said the aircraft rotated at the departure end of the runway and remained in ground effect with an excessive, nose high attitude. It then struck the airport perimeter fence, a barrier wall, and power lines. Power line wires were dragged through a residential area, resulting in additional damage. The airplane then crashed in a pasture and burned. Investigation revealed the airplane had been loaded to a gross weight (GW) of 50,870 lbs. Its maximum GW was limited to 48,000 lbs at sea level with the use of antidetonation injection (ADI) fluid and 40,900 lbs without ADI. Density altitude at the airport was 6200 feet. For conditions at the airport, maximum GW for takeoff with ADI and 15° of flaps was 43,205 lbs; without ADI and with 13 degrees of flaps, maximum GW was 38,909 lbs. The airplane flaps were found in the retracted position, but there was no performance data for takeoff with the flaps retracted. No ADI fluid was found in the line to the right engine, although it was intact; the ADI tank was destroyed; the ADI line to the left engine was damaged. The airplane was being flown under provision of a ferry permit, which did not provide for the cargo or the two passengers that were aboard. The first pilot (PIC) had accrued about 8 hours of flight experience in the make and model of airplane.

The pilot reported that as he overflew the Tri-City airport, Tennessee at 9,000 feet, the right engine power slowly decreased. The airplane was in the clouds with an outside air temperature of about zero degrees Celsius. Right engine manifold heat was applied for a few seconds, with no noticeable difference in engine performance. The right magnetos were also checked with no obvious malfunctions noted. A descent for landing was initiated to the Tri-City airport and manifold heat was applied and removed several times, with no appreciable effect. On short final approach, when the landing gear was extended, the right main gear did not indicate down. There was insufficient time to perform the emergency gear extension procedure. A go-around was initiated, during which the pilot discovered that the left manifold heat control was now stuck in the 'ON' position. The pilot stated that with less than full power available on the left engine, and the right propeller unfeathered, the airplane could be climbed to about 200 feet. He flew the airplane until terrain clearance was no longer possible, then landed in a field, gear up. The airplane slid into trees and was substantially damaged.

The pilot and 2 nurses departed IFR to transport a patient from another location. During the initial climb, the pilot observed a gear unsafe light. He requested clearance to an area of VFR conditions to address the gear problem. Subsequently, the gear was manually extended with safe gear indications. The flight department requested that the pilot return to base. The pilot obtained an IFR clearance to return for an ILS approach. After handoff to the tower, he was requested to report the FAF inbound after an eastbound procedure turn. That was the last communication from the pilot. Subsequently, the aircraft crashed on the southeast side of Humphreys Peak at an elevation of about 10,500 feet and about 10 miles west of the final approach course. Wreckage was scattered along a heading of 230 degrees. There was evidence that the airplane was in a steep descent when it crashed. Radar data revealed an outbound track west of the published course and no procedure turn. The weather was IMC with light snow and rain. Moderate to severe turbulence was forecast and confirmed by other pilots. The winds at 10,000 feet were forecast to be 50 knots out of the southwest. Moderate turbulence and light rime ice had been reported along the ILS approach course before to the accident time.

The aircraft departed at night from runway 4R on a flight to transport mail. The pilot-in-command (PIC) was in the left seat, a pilot-rated cargo loader was in the right seat, and another cargo loader was aboard the aircraft, but was not in a seat. During takeoff, the aircraft entered a turn and flew into gradually rising terrain. The initial impact point was about 15 feet higher than the runway elevation and about 0.3 miles abeam the departure end of the runway. Investigation revealed that the company allowed pilot-rated cargo loaders to fly the aircraft from the right seat during positioning and ferry flight segments (to build multiengine flight time) as part of their compensation. There was evidence that at the time of the accident, the aircraft was being piloted on this flight from the copilot's position. The right side of the instrument panel was equipped with only EGT gauges (no flight instruments on the copilot's side). There were cloud layers in the vicinity, no moon illumination, and no visible ground lighting in the direction of flight. No preimpact mechanical malfunction or failure was identified during the investigation. Except at the pilot and copilot positions, the airplane had no other seat and/or restraint system. The operator stated that the pilot was not authorized to carry company personnel or passengers without the required seating.

The pilot stated that the airplane was in cruise flight at 8,000 feet MSL, when the right engine lost power. He advised ATC of the loss of power and received radar vectors toward an airport. The pilot said he maintained the best single-engine rate-of-climb speed, but the airplane's altitude 'drifted down.' When the airplane entered clouds, it began to accumulate structural icing and would not maintain sufficient altitude. The airplane impacted mountainous terrain about 16 miles northwest of the airport. The pilot stated that he had departed on the cargo flight with 5 hours of fuel on board for what he estimated to be a 2 1/2 hour flight. Also, he reported that conditions were dark and foggy, when the accident occurred. Postaccident examination of the engines and their systems revealed no evidence of preimpact mechanical malfunction. Examination of the airplane wreckage revealed no evidence of preimpact failure of the airframe or its systems. During a postaccident engine test run, the right engine started normally and operated satisfactorily.

The pilot reported getting an unsafe indication on the right main landing gear when the landing gear was lowered. The crew recycled the landing gear and got the same unsafe indication. The crew retracted the gear and diverted to Detroit. On arrival, the crew performed the 'landing gear abnormal extension checklist,' but the unsafe indication remained. The air traffic control tower reported that the gear appeared normal. During the landing, the right main landing gear retracted. The airplane slid sideways, striking a runway marker as it departed the runway, and came to rest in a field. Examination revealed that the right landing gear downlock mechanism could be overcome with physical force. Examination of the right landing gear actuator revealed that one of the six shims which separate the spacers and help guide the safety lock switch was out of position and lying on top of the lock assembly.

During flight, the airplane was cruising at flight level 210 in IFR conditions with turbulence and with the wind from about 255 degrees at 70 knots. The airplane drifted off course at about 1600 cst. At 1610:09, after about ten minutes of unrecognized heading changes, the pilot stated '. . . I've lost my gyro.' At 1610:15, the controller issued a no-gyro vector. At 1611:29, as the airplane was still turning (to a heading that would intercept the original course), the pilot stated 'we've lost aLL our instruments . . . please direct me towards VFR.' He was cleared to descend to 14,000 feet. At about that same time, he stated 'we're in trouble' and 'we've lost all vacuum,' then there was no further radio transmission from the airplane. The airplane entered a steep, downward spiraling, right turn. The left outer wing panel separated up and aft (in flight) from overload and impacted the left stabilizer. The airplane crashed, and parts that separated from the airplane were found over a four mile area. Investigation revealed evidence that the HSI heading card can fail without the HDG flag appearing. Although the pilot had reported the loss of instruments and vacuum, examination of the airplane revealed that the engine, flight controls, electrical system, pitot/static system and vacuum systems exhibited continuity. No malfunction was found that would have led to loss of pressurization or hypoxia.

The flight was on the ILS approach to runway 6, broke out of the clouds at 500 feet, and then re-entered the clouds. The airplane had not yet touched down when it drifted to right of the runway centerline and struck a snow bank located in the grass to the right of the runway, between the runway and the taxiway. The pilot stated he was just starting the missed approach when the accident occurred, and '...that there was no indication of a malfunction of the aircraft.' The reported ceiling was, 100 sky obscured, and the visibility was 1/4 mile, wind 040 degrees, 6 knots.

The flight departed on a maintenance test flight with known wind gusts to 27 knots. Before takeoff the pilot performed an NTS check to each engine with no discrepancies noted. During flight the pilot performed an NTS check to the left engine. Two attempts to restart the left engine were unsuccessful. Each time the propeller came out of the feathered position and started to rotate but there was no fuel flow or ignition. The flight returned to land and while on short final to runway 29 with the wind from 250 degrees at 20 knots, a witness observed the airplane pitch nose up then down then heard the sound of power applied to the right engine. The airplane than rolled to the left, pitched nose down, impacted the ground coming to rest nearly inverted with the wing section separated. Postaccident examination of the left engine and accessories revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction. The left engine fuel shutoff valve was found in the 'closed' position and no fuel was found aft of the fuel shutoff valve. The pilot stated that he has no recollection of the accident. The left and right engines had just been installed following 'hot section' work to both, and both were then started the day after installation with no discrepancies noted by company maintenance personnel.