Allentown-Lehigh Valley (Bethlehem-Easton)

According to a witness, prior to arriving in the run-up area the pilot lowered the airplane's flaps. After the right flap fully extended, the flap key on the drive shaft inside the 90-degree drive assembly adapter fractured, in overload, in the direction of flap extension. Before takeoff, the pilot raised the flaps; however, with the fractured key, the right flap would have remained fully extended. The pilot could have identified this condition prior to takeoff, either visually or by means of the flap indicator, which received its input from the right flap actuator. The pilot subsequently took off, and the airplane turned left, but it is unknown at what point the pilot would have noted a control problem. The pilot climbed the airplane to 250 to 300 feet and allowed the airspeed to bleed off to where the airplane stalled and subsequently spun into the ground. Airplane manufacturer calculations revealed that the pilot should have been able to maintain control of the airplane at airspeeds over 70 knots. According to the pilot's operating handbook, the best two-engine angle of climb airspeed was 99 knots and the best two-engine rate of climb airspeed was 120 knots.

During arrival at night, the flight was being controlled by a developmental controller (DC), who was being supervised by an instructor (IC). The pilot (plt) was instructed to descend & cross the STILL Intersection (Int) at 3,000 ft. STILL Int was aligned with the localizer (loc) approach (apch) course, 10.1 mi from the apch end of runway 17 (rwy 17); the final apch fix (FAF) was 3.9 mi from the rwy. About 5 mi before reaching STILL Int, while on course & level at 3,000 ft, the plt was cleared for a Loc Rwy 17 Apch. Radar data showed the aircraft (acft) continued to STILL Int, then it turned onto the loc course toward the FAF. Shortly after departing STILL Int, while inbound on the loc course, the acft began a descent. Before the acft reached the FAF, the DC issued a frequency change to go to UNICOM. During this transmission, the IC noticed a low altitude alert on the radar display, then issued a verbal low altitude alert, saying, 'check altitude, you should be at 1,500 ft (should have said '1,800 ft' as that was the minimum crossing altitude at the FAF), altitude's indicating 1,200, low altitude alert.' There was no response from the plt. This occurred about 2 mi before the FAF. Minimum descent altitude (MDA) for the apch was 720 ft. The acft struck tree tops at 750 ft, about 1/2 mi before the FAF. The IC's remark 'you should be at 1,500 ft' was based on an expired apch plate with a lower FAF minimum crossing altitude; the current minimum crossing altitude at the FAF was 1,800 ft. Apch control management had not made the current plate available to the controllers. Investigation could not determine whether a current apch plate would have prompted an earlier warning by the controllers.

All positions at LaGuardia Tower were combined to the local control position from 0011 EST until after the accident. At about 0430 EST, ground personnel in 'Vehicle 1277' (communicating on ground control frequency), were cleared on runway 13/31 to perform 'lighting maintenance.' Later, during repair of centerline lights and while N117FJ was inbound to the airport, Vehicle 1277 stalled on runway 13/31. Personnel of Vehicle 1277 attempted to restart the vehicle, but were unable, so they shut off all vehicle lights to reduce electrical load, and again attempted to restart the vehicle, but to no avail. At 0507 (during darkness), N117FJ made initial call to the tower for landing. The controller acknowledged the call, scanned runway 13/31, did not see Vehicle 1277, and cleared N117FJ to land on runway 31. At 0510, personnel of Vehicle 1277 observed N117FJ in the approach/landing phase and radioed ground controller that they were stuck on the runway. The controller then radioed, 'go-around, aircraft on the runway go-around, aircraft on the runway go-around, seven fox juliet go-around.' Moments later, N117FJ impacted Vehicle 1277. The FAA ATC Handbook stated, 'Ensure that the runway to be used is clear of all known ground vehicles, equipment, and personnel before a departing aircraft starts takeoff or a landing aircraft crosses the runway threshold.'

The flight was on the ILS approach to runway 6, broke out of the clouds at 500 feet, and then re-entered the clouds. The airplane had not yet touched down when it drifted to right of the runway centerline and struck a snow bank located in the grass to the right of the runway, between the runway and the taxiway. The pilot stated he was just starting the missed approach when the accident occurred, and '...that there was no indication of a malfunction of the aircraft.' The reported ceiling was, 100 sky obscured, and the visibility was 1/4 mile, wind 040 degrees, 6 knots.

The instrument rated pilot was en route to his granddaughter's graduation exercises scheduled for the following day. He had received two preflight weather briefings from flight service and he was advised that marginal VFR conditions existed en route, and instrument meteorological conditions at his destination, and that VFRflight was not recommended. A witness who was below the mountain said he heard a low flying aircraft overhead. He stated that he caught a glimpse of the airplane and said it was 'well below the crest of the mountain' heading south. The weather as reported by the witness was about 200 overcast and visibility below 1 mile in fog. He also mentioned that the clouds had obscured the mountain. Shortly thereafter, he heard what was later determined to be the collision. Search personnel located the burning wreckage on top of Mitchells mountain 50 miles north of Charlottesville. Both occupants were killed.

The crew was positioning the aircraft in preparation for a revenue flight and executing a non-directional beacon (NDB) approach to runway 05. The captain reported that the copilot was flying the aircraft. However, the captain stated that he took control of the aircraft during the approach and made some control corrections before returning control of the aircraft to the copilot. Radar data indicated that aircraft control was erratic throughout the approach and that the airspeed and descent rates were high (3,000 fpm sink rate) shortly before the accident. The aircraft struck a fence short of the runway and impacted the ground. The captain said he realized the aircraft was drifting left of course but did not correct it. He said he told the copilot to add power twice during the approach. The copilot's training history indicated difficulty in control, scan of instruments, and with instrument procedures. Company management described the captain as passive and the copilot as aggressive. Supervision of training and operations by management and surveillance of the company by the FAA was considered inadequate by NTSB.

The pilot obtained a weather briefing for his proposed flight from Birmingham, AL to Jasper, AL to Allentown, PA. He did not file a flight plan for the 35 mile flight from Birmingham to Jasper, however, he did file a flight plan for the proposed flight from Jasper to Allentown. He stated that he 'felt like he got a little slow and the tail stalled' during his VFR landing approach at Jasper. The aircraft contacted the ground at the east end of the east-west runway on a northerly track. The aircraft continued on the northerly track for 288 feet before colliding with trees. The aircraft was destroyed by the post crash fire. Witnesses reported fog in the area and the pilot reported that he had encountered patches of fog on the flight from Birmingham.

The pilot approached high and fast for landing on runway 04. The wind was from 240° at 10 to 12 knots. The aircraft floated and after touchdown, the pilot was unable to stop on the wet, downsloping runway. After departing the runway, the aircraft continued down a steeper slope and into an area of brush and trees. All three gear collapsed, there was leading edge spar damage on both wings, and the right side fuselage skin, forward of the right wing, was damaged.

On approach to Allentown-Bethlehem Easton Airport, the crew encountered limited visibility due to foggy conditions and low ceiling. The twin engine aircraft descended below the glide, struck trees and crashed in a wooded area located in Slatington, about 10,5 miles short of runway 13 threshold. The aircraft was destroyed and both occupants were injured.

On approach to Selfridge AFB, the pilot reported low fuel pressure when the left engine failed shortly later. In relative poor weather conditions with low ceiling, rain and fog, the airplane lost height then struck trees and crashed. The pilot, sole on board, was seriously injured.