Flagstaff

The captain initially flew the GPS (global positioning system) runway 2 approach down to minimums and executed a missed approach. The approach chart listed the minimum visibility for the straight-in approach as 1 mile, the minimum descent altitude (MDA) as 6,860 feet mean sea level (329 feet above ground level), and the missed approach point as the runway threshold. The audio information extracted from the CVR indicated the flight crew listened to the automated weather station at the airport twice during the second approach; both times the report stated, in part, "visibility one half [mile] light snow sky conditions ceiling two hundred broken one thousand overcast." At 0744:09, the first officer said, "there's MDA," and at 0744:27, "there's the runway right below ya." The CVR recorded the ground proximity warning system (GPWS) audio alert "sink rate, sink rate, sink rate, sink rate" at 0744:37, the sound of touchdown at 0744:52, and the sound of impact at 0745:00. According to both pilots, the airplane touched down even with the midfield windsock. The captain applied brakes and full reverse on both propellers; however, the airplane did not slow down and continued off the end of the runway, impacted and knocked down a chain link fence, and continued into downsloping rough terrain. The landing gear collapsed and the airplane slid to a stop. The operator reported that there was 2 to 3 inches of slush on the runway. The runway was equipped with pilot activated medium intensity runway lights, runway end identifier lights, and a visual approach slope indicator. The first officer said that on both approaches, he attempted to turn on the lights, but the lights did not activate. The Federal Aviation Regulation that specifies the instrument flight rules for takeoff and landing states, in part, that no pilot may operate an aircraft below the authorized MDA unless (1) the aircraft is continuously in a position from which a descent to a landing on the intended runway can be made at a normal rate of descent using normal maneuvers, and (2) the flight visibility is not less than the visibility prescribed in the standard instrument approach being used. The regulation further states that if these conditions are not met when the aircraft is being operated below the MDA or upon arrival at the missed approach point, the pilot shall immediately execute an appropriate missed approach procedure. In this case, the minimum required visibility was 1 mile versus the 1/2- mile visibility reported by the automated weather station. Additionally, the activation of the GPWS "sink rate" audio alert indicates a normal rate of descent was exceeded during the landing. Both of these conditions should have prompted the flight crew to execute a missed approach, which would have prevented the accident.

The airplane collided with an airport boundary fence during an aborted landing. The pilot made a normal approach following the visual approach slope indicator (VASI) with gear down and full flaps and touched down just past the numbers and began to decelerate. The pilot selected reverse thrust with both engines. As he added power to decelerate, the airplane suddenly veered to the left and off the runway when the right engine did not go into reverse thrust. He deselected reverse thrust and aligned the airplane with the runway. He was approaching the end of the runway at high speed and elected to attempt a takeoff. The airplane went off the end of the runway onto smooth grass. The pilot rotated the airplane, but the airplane collided with an airport boundary fence and came to rest in a field. In a post accident examination, when the power levers were placed in the full reverse position, the left fuel control measured 4°, while the right measured 0°. The left pitch control measured 10°, while the right measured 0°; the controls should have read 0°. A controls engineer determined that during landing, there would be a 10° propeller pitch control (PPC) angle mismatch, which would be about 2.5° of BETA angle. With matched levers, there would be asymmetric reverse thrust with the left engine lower in torque. This would result in the airplane turning towards the left if both propellers had gone into reverse pitch.

The pilot and 2 nurses departed IFR to transport a patient from another location. During the initial climb, the pilot observed a gear unsafe light. He requested clearance to an area of VFR conditions to address the gear problem. Subsequently, the gear was manually extended with safe gear indications. The flight department requested that the pilot return to base. The pilot obtained an IFR clearance to return for an ILS approach. After handoff to the tower, he was requested to report the FAF inbound after an eastbound procedure turn. That was the last communication from the pilot. Subsequently, the aircraft crashed on the southeast side of Humphreys Peak at an elevation of about 10,500 feet and about 10 miles west of the final approach course. Wreckage was scattered along a heading of 230 degrees. There was evidence that the airplane was in a steep descent when it crashed. Radar data revealed an outbound track west of the published course and no procedure turn. The weather was IMC with light snow and rain. Moderate to severe turbulence was forecast and confirmed by other pilots. The winds at 10,000 feet were forecast to be 50 knots out of the southwest. Moderate turbulence and light rime ice had been reported along the ILS approach course before to the accident time.

A witness located near the departure end of the runway saw the airplane initially climb in a normal manner, then stay below the clouds and make a shallow bank 180-degree left turn and descend below a tree line. Tower tapes revealed that the pilot twice transmitted that he was "coming back" to the airport during which the background sound of the "fuel selector off" warning horn was heard. The pilot then informed the controller "I've got to get back", and no warning horn was heard. The airplane collided with trees and came to rest about 6,500 feet sse of the runway's end. Prior to departure, the airplane was refueled with 40 gals of jet a (20 gals per tank), which increased the total fuel load to 148 gals. The flight manual required that the fuel balance between the left and right tanks be kept within 200 pounds, and suggested turning off one fuel selector to correct unbalance situations. The condition of one fuel selector turned off will cause the "fuel selector off" warning horn to sound. Exam of the aircraft revealed no evidence of preimpact failures. Prop blade butt signatures indicated it was operating in the governing range, and engine power was being produced at impact.

The pilot stated that 15 minutes prior to arrival he notified the hospital and asked them to check the runway. As he entered downwind security advised him of animals on the runway so he circled until they called back stating it was clear. Just as the airplane was touching down, two horses began to cross the runway. The pilot attempted to go-around; however, the airplane contacted both animals and the pilot elected to abort the go-around. The left main landing gear collapsed and the airplane slid to a stop. A post crash fire ignited and was extinguished shortly thereafter. The landing was being made during dark night conditions.

The aircraft was on an emergency medical service (ems/medevac) flight with a pilot and a flight nurse aboard to transport a maternity patient from Flagstaff to Phoenix. During a night arrival, the pilot began a VOR-A approach in IMC, then he reported a problem with his avionics and elected to make a missed approach. During the missed approach, he said that he 'lost' an inverter, then reported the gyros were inoperative. Radar vectors were being provided when he stated 'we have big trouble here.' Soon thereafter, radar and radio contacts were lost and the aircraft crashed approximately 7 miles southeast of the airport. During impact, the aircraft made a deep crater and was demolished. No preimpact engine or airframe failure was found. An investigation revealed the #2 (copilot's) attitude indicator was inoperative on the previous flight. A discrepancy report was taken to the avionics department, but the requested entry was not made in the aircraft form-4. The pilot took off before corrective action was taken. The operations manual requested 1,000 hours multi-engine time as pic and training by esignated cfi's. The pilot had approximately 837 hours multi-engine time, recorded 9 training flights in N6858S with non-designated instructors, completed a part 135 flight check on 2/17/88. Both occupants were killed.

While in cruising altitude on a ferry flight from Flagstaff to Silver City, the pilot lost control of the airplane that entered a dive and crashed in flames near Show Low. The aircraft was totally destroyed and the pilot, sole occupant, was killed.

The crew was performing a flight from Bakersfield to the Kirtland Field AFB in New Mexico. While cruising by night at an altitude of 12,000 feet, the crew maintained a last contact radio with ATC at 0302LT. Less than thirty minutes later, the bomber aircraft hit the west slope of Mt Humphreys located some 10 miles north of Flagstaff and disintegrated. The wreckage was reached by the SAR teams in the next early morning and all eight occupants perished.
Photos available on:
http://www.lostflights.com/Other-1/91544-USAAF-Consolidated-B-24J/5673630_LqhLS2

In flight, the twin engine aircraft hit the slope of Fremont Peak located 7 miles north of Flagstaff. The aircraft was destroyed upon impact and all six crew members were killed.

While cruising in poor weather conditions (stormy conditions), the twin engine airplane entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed in a huge explosion north of Flagstaff. All six occupants were killed.
Crew:
2nd Lt Donald Gladney Boyd,
2nd Lt R. H. Conway,
2nd Lt William Wesley Crim,
Cpl Leo E. Gillem,
1st Lt Arnold T. King,
Pfc Lawrence T. Morfeld.