United States of America

The airplane took off from the airport on a left downwind departure and after reaching an altitude of approximately 300 feet, banked steeply and dove into the ground. Witness statements indicated that the takeoff ground roll extended to midfield of the runway, a distance of 4,850 feet before the airplane lifted off. According to the Airplane Flight Manual performance charts, the normal ground roll should have been about 2,100 feet. While turning crosswind, the airplane steepened its bank and continued toward the downwind. As the angle of bank approached 90 degrees, the nose dropped and the airplane descended to impact with trees and the ground. Several trees were struck before the airplane came to rest on the underlying terrain in the backyard of a residence. The airplane was thermally destroyed in the impact sequence and post crash fire. Calculations of the airplane weight and balance data put it at least 251 pounds over maximum allowable gross takeoff weight. Remaining wreckage not consumed in the ground fire was examined and the engine was sent to the manufacturer for inspection. No discrepancies were found. Cockpit instrumentation and all autopilot components were thermally destroyed. Flaps and landing gear were found in the retracted position and the elevator trim surface was slightly nose up from the takeoff setting. The autopilot had a reported history of malfunction and the electric elevator trim system was scheduled for repair a week before the accident, but the owner took the airplane prior to the work being performed. The airplane had been modified with the addition of several Supplemental Type Certificates, one of which was a wing spoiler system. The controls and
many of the actuating linkages for the spoiler system were destroyed in the fire.

The pilot ditched the twin engine airplane in the Pacific ocean after experiencing a loss of engine power and an in-flight engine fire while in cruise flight. The flight was operating at 1,000 feet msl, when the pilot noticed a loss of engine power in the right engine. At the same time the pilot was noticing the power loss, passengers noted a fire coming from the right engine cowling. The pilot secured the right engine and feathered the propeller. He attempted to land the airplane at a nearby airport; however, when he realized that the airplane was unable to maintain altitude he elected to ditch the airplane in the ocean. Prior to executing the forced landing, the pilot instructed the passengers to don their life jackets and assume the crash position. After touchdown, all but one passenger exited the airplane through the main cabin and pilot doors. It was reported that the remaining passenger was frightened, and could not swim. One survivor saw the remaining passenger sitting in the seat with the seat belt still secured and the life vest inflated. The pilot and passengers were then rescued from the ocean via rescue helicopter and boat. Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed that the right engine's oil converter plate gasket had deteriorated and extruded from behind the converter plate, allowing oil to spray in the accessory section and resulting in the subsequent engine fire. The engine manufacturer had previously issued a mandatory service bulletin (MSB) requiring inspection of the gasket every 50 hours for evidence of gasket extrusion around the cover plate or oil leakage. Maintenance records revealed that the inspection had been conducted 18.3 hours prior to the accident. At the time of the accident, the right engine had accumulated 386.8 hours since its last overhaul, and gasket replacement. The MSB was issued one month prior to the accident, after the manufacturer received reports of certain oil filter converter plate gaskets extruding around the oil filter converter plate. The protruding or swelling of the gasket allowed oil to leak and spray from between the plate and the accessory housing. A series of tests were conducted on exemplar gaskets by submerging them in engine oil heated to 245 degrees F; after about 290 hours, the gasket material displayed signs of deterioration similar to that of the accident gasket. A subsequent investigation revealed that the engine manufacturer had recently changed gasket suppliers, which resulted in a shipment of gaskets getting into the supply chain that did not meet specifications. As a result of this accident, the engine manufacturer revised the MSB to require the replacement of the gasket every 50 hours. The FAA followed suit and issued an airworthiness directive to mandate the replacement of the gasket every 50 hours.

Approximately 8 months prior to the accident, during a cross country flight, the owner shutdown the left engine due to low oil pressure and diverted from his intended destination to a nearby airport. During descent, the right alternator failed, and the owner performed the emergency gear extension procedure. Following an emergency gear extension, the landing gear of this model airplane cannot be retracted until the system has been ground serviced. A mechanic reported that about 7 months prior to the accident, with the owner present, he removed the oil filter from the left engine, found it packed with metal shavings and told the owner that the engine needed overhaul. Two other mechanics reported that approximately three weeks before the accident, they installed an oil filter on the left engine, changed the oil, and cleaned the oil pressure regulator. They ground ran both engines with no discrepancies noted. One of the mechanics reported that following the engine run, the left engine oil filter was removed, examined, and no metal was found. The landing gear was not serviced. According to the owner, the pilot was "hired" by one of the two mechanics to ferry the airplane with the gear extended to a location where the gear could be serviced. While en route, the pilot reported a loss of power on the left engine, that he was having trouble feathering the engine, that the airplane would not maintain altitude and he was looking for a place to land. Witnesses observed the airplane flying low, wheels down and losing altitude. They further observed it roll into a steep left bank, hit trees and a fence, catch fire, come to rest inverted on a road and burn. Post accident examination of the left engine revealed a hole in the right crankcase half over the #3 cylinder attach point. Disassembly of the left engine revealed that the #3 connecting rod was separated from the crankshaft, and the rod bolts, rod cap, and top of the rod were deformed. The #5 piston pin had one cap missing. Scoring was noted on the crankshaft journals, and the main bearings exhibited discoloration and deformation consistent with oil starvation. The cylinders exhibited deformation, scoring in the barrels, and deposits on the domes. The camshaft exhibited discoloration and scoring on the camshaft lobes. Disassembly of the left propeller revealed that it was in the vicinity of low pitch/latch position and not rotating at impact. The disassembly of the right engine and propeller did not reveal any discrepancies that would have precluded operation prior to impact. Estimates of the airplane's climb performance indicated that with the landing gear down and the left propeller stopped, it was not capable of sustained flight.

The pilot had experienced engine problems during a flight and requested maintenance assistance from the local maintenance repair station. Before the maintenance personnel signed off and completed the repairs, the pilot refueled the airplane, and attempted an instrument flight back to the originating airport. While enroute, the pilot reported a low fuel situation, and deviated to a closer airport. During the approach, the airplane lost engine power on both engines, collided with trees, and subsequently the ground, about a half of a mile short of the intended runway. There was no fuel found in the fuel system at the accident site. No mechanical problems were discovered with the airplane during the post-accident examination. This accident was the second time the pilot had exhausted the fuel supply in this airplane.

The flight was cleared for an NDB or GPS runway 14 instrument approach. The pilot was instructed to report procedure turn. Center radar reported the airplane's altitude was last observed at 200 feet. A witness observed the airplane as it collided with trees and the ground and, subsequently burst into flames. No mechanical problem with the airplane was reported by the pilot or discovered during the wreckage examination. Weather minimums for the approach are 800 feet an one mile. Low clouds were reported in the area at the time of the accident.

The airplane impacted heavily wooded terrain after experiencing a dual engine failure due to a reported lightning strike. The pilot received a weather brief that included information concerning a Convective Sigmet and a Severe Weather Watch. The weather briefer informed the pilot that a route to the southeast would keep the flight out of the heavy weather, and that, "... you'll get clobbered if you go due east." After departure, the pilot requested a turn to the northeast to stay clear of weather. While in the climb, the flight was advised of a Weather Watch that covered the area of their flight. The CVR revealed that Continuous Ignition was not selected prior to encountering turbulence. About 23 minutes after takeoff, the airplane was climbing at about 30,800 feet msl when the pilot reported a dual engine failure due to a lightning strike. The CVR indicated one engine quit and the second quit about two seconds later. The copilot established a 170 kts descent airspeed for "best glide." The airplane was vectored near a level 5 thunderstorm during the emergency descent. Two air starts were attempted when the airplane's altitude was outside of the air start envelope. Two more air starts were attempted within the air start envelope but were unsuccessful. The minimum airspeed for an air restart is 160 kts and the maximum speed for air start is 358 kts. The CVR indicated that the pilots did not call for the airplane's checklist, and no challenge and response checklists were used during the emergency descent. The CVR indicated the pilots did not discuss load shedding any of the electrical components on the airplane. The CVR indicated the hydraulic system cycled twice during the emergency descent and the landing gear was lowered using the hydraulic system during descent. During the descent the pilots reported they had lost use of their navigation equipment. The airplane impacted the terrain located about 166 nautical miles from the departure airport on a bearing of 083 degrees. No preexisting engines or airframe anomalies were found.

A Piper PA-31-350 Navajo Chieftain, N27944, operated by Patuxent Airways, Inc., Hollywood, Maryland, and a Piper PA-44-180 Seminole, N2225G, operated by Hortman Aviation Services, Inc., Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, were destroyed when they collided in flight over Burlington Township, New Jersey. The airline transport pilot, commercial pilot, and seven passengers aboard the Navajo Chieftain were killed, as were the flight instructor and the private pilot aboard the Seminole. Day visual meteorological conditions existed at the time of the accident, and both airplanes were operating under visual flight rules when the collision occurred. The flight crews of both airplanes were properly certificated and qualified in accordance with applicable Federal regulations. None of these individuals was experiencing any personal problems or rest anomalies that would have affected their performance. The airplanes had undergone the required inspections. Examination of their maintenance documents revealed that both airplanes complied with all appropriate airworthiness directives. Evidence gathered from the wreckage indicated that neither airplane had experienced an in-flight fire, bird strike, or structural or mechanical failure. Tissue samples revealed that the pilot of the Seminole had taken doxylamine sometime before the accident. (Doxylamine is a sedating antihistamine that has substantial adverse effects on performance.) However, the amount of blood available for analysis was insufficient for determining exactly when the pilot may have ingested the medication or whether his performance was impaired by the effects of doxylamine. A partial cockpit visibility study revealed that the Seminole would have been visible to the pilots in the Chieftain for at least the 60 seconds before the collision. No stereo photographs from a Seminole cockpit were available to determine precise obstruction angles. However, because of the relative viewing angle, the Chieftain would have been visible to the pilots in the Seminole for most of the last 60 seconds. The study further revealed that about 4 seconds before impact, or about .11 nm separation, the angular width of each airplane in each pilot's field of vision would have been approximately 0.5 to 0.6 degrees or about 1/4 inch apparent size at the windscreen.

Examination of the area of the fire origin revealed that relay R2-53, the left heat exchanger cooling fan relay, was severely heat damaged, as were R2-54 and the other relays in this area. However, the R2-53 relay also exhibited loose terminal studs and several holes that had burned through the relay housing that the other relays did not exhibit. The wire bundles that run immediately below the left and right heat exchanger cooling fans and the ground service tie relays exhibited heat damage to the wire insulation, with the greatest damage located just below the R2-53 relay. The unique damage observed on the R2-53 relay and the wire damage directly below it indicates that fire initiation was caused by an internal failure of the R2-53 relay. Disassembly of the relay revealed that the R2-53 relay had been repaired but not to the manufacturer's standards. According to the manufacturer, the damage to the relay housing was consistent with a phase-to-phase arc between terminals A2 and B2 of the relay. During the on-scene portion of the investigation, three of the four circuit breakers in the left heat exchanger cooling fan were found in the tripped position. To determine why only three of the four circuit breakers tripped, all four were submitted to the Materials Integrity Branch at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton, Ohio, for further examination. The circuit breakers were visually examined and were subjected to an insulation resistance measurement, a contact resistance test, a voltage drop test, and a calibration test (which measured minimum and maximum ultimate trip times). Testing and examination determined that the circuit breaker that did not trip exhibited no anomalies that would prevent normal operation, met all specifications required for the selected tests, and operated properly during the calibration test. Although this circuit breaker appeared to have functioned properly during testing, the lab report noted that, as a thermal device, the circuit breaker is designed to trip when a sustained current overload exists and that it is possible during the event that intermittent arcing or a resistive short occurred or that the circuit opened before the breaker reached a temperature sufficient to trip the device.

Witness's reported that the airplane took off from runway 05, which has an up slope of 1.2 degrees. The airplane was observed at approximately 10 feet above ground level, in a nose high attitude traveling parallel to the ground and not climbing. The airplane narrowly cleared a 6- foot fence off the departure end of runway 05. Shortly thereafter, the airplane impacted a utility pole, the roof of a bus stop, which was followed by a brick wall. At the time of the accident runway 23, which has a 1.2-degree down slope and has a clear-cut area on the departure end, was available for use. The basic empty weight for this airplane is 3,097 pounds; the useful load is 1,201.7 pounds. The actual load at the time of the accident was in excess of the useful load. There is no record of the pilot completing a weight and balance computation prior to take-off. The toxicology examinations were negative for carbon monoxide, cyanide, drugs and alcohol. The toxicology examination revealed that 1175(mg/dl) glucose was detected in the urine. Examination of the airplane and subsystems failed to disclose any mechanical or component failures.

The flight had proceeded without incident until a visual approach was made to the destination airport, but a landing was not completed because of poor visibility due to ground fog. The pilot then requested vectors to another airport, and was advised by ATC that he was below radar coverage, and he could not be radar identified. The pilot stated he would proceed to a third airport; he was given a heading, instructed to proceed direct to the airport, and report the field in sight. He was told to over-fly the airport, and might be able to descend through a clearing in the clouds. An inbound air carrier flight reported instrument meteorological conditions on the final approach to a parallel runway. At a location of 1.13 miles east of the airport, the flight, for no apparent reason, turned south, away from the airport. The last radio contact with pilot was after ATC told him his heading was taking him away from the airport and he said he was turning back. The last known position of N201RH was 1.95 miles southeast of the airport, at 500 feet MSL. According to the statement of the passenger that was sitting in the co-pilot's seat, "...all we could see were city lights and darkness underneath us. We were in a right turn, when I saw the trees and subsequently hit it." According to the pilot's log book and FAA records revealed a limitation on his commercial pilot certificate prohibited him from carrying passengers for hire at night and on cross-country flights of more than 50 nautical miles. The records did not show any instrument rating. As per the entries in his personal flight logbook, he had accumulated a total of 1,725.2 total flight hours, 1,550.9 total single engine flight hours, and 184.3 total flight hours in multi-engine aircraft of which 145.6 hours were in this make and model airplane. In addition, the logbooks showed that he had a total of 487.3 cross country flight hours, 61.9 total night flight hours, and 21.6 simulated instrument flight hours.