United States of America

The airplane was observed to depart normally for a positioning flight conducted during night visual meteorological conditions. In addition, the landing gear was observed to retract after takeoff. A witness who lived near the accident site heard a "loud" engine noise and observed the airplane just above the trees. The airplane then pitched down, impacted the ground, and exploded. The airplane impacted in a soybean field about a 1/2 mile from the departure end of the runway. Two pairs of ground scars were observed at the beginning of the debris path. The initial pair of ground scars were about 2 to 3 feet in length and were located about 380 feet south of the main wreckage. A pair of 10 to 12 foot long ground scars were located about 10 feet forward of the initial ground scars and they contained portions of the left and right engines; respectively. There was no impact damage observed to the portion of the soy bean field located in-between the second ground scar and the main wreckage. Prior to the flight, maintenance personnel replaced a frayed elevator trim cable. The work was supervised and checked by the accident pilot. Examination of the airplane did not reveal any evidence of a preimpact failure; however, a significant portion of the airplane was consumed in a post crash fire. Examination of the propellers revealed damage consistent with engine operation at the time of impact. The pilot reported 22,500 hours of total flight experience, with over 17,00 flight hours in make and model.

With a reported ceiling of 500 feet and visibility of 2 miles, the pilot requested and received a Special Visual Flight Rules (VFR) clearance to depart the Bellingham airport. He then took off and called clear of Bellingham's Class D airspace. A witness reported seeing the aircraft flying very low over water near the accident site, appearing to go in and out of clouds, and subsequently seeing it turn toward rising wooded terrain and disappear into the clouds. The aircraft crashed shortly thereafter. Witnesses reported very low ceilings and fog in the accident area at the time. Pieces of the aircraft's left wing and left horizontal stabilizer, along with a felled treetop, were found between the location of the witness's sighting and the main crash site, on or near the crest of a hill about 1/4 mile from the main crash site. These pieces exhibited leading-edge and primary structure damage, and leading-edge-embedded plant material, consistent with the pieces separating from the aircraft upon contact with trees. Wreckage and impact signatures at the main crash site were indicative of an uncontrolled impact with the ground. Investigators found no evidence of any aircraft malfunctions or cargo anomalies occurring prior to the apparent tree strikes.

The pilot departed on a night cross-country flight without obtaining a weather briefing or flight plan. Arriving in the area of the destination airport, the weather was reported as, 2 statute miles of visibility and mist; overcast cloud layer at 100 feet. The pilot requested an instrument flight rules clearance from the approach controller, and was vectored and cleared for the ILS 24 approach. The clearance included an altitude restriction of 1,500 feet msl, until the airplane was established on the localizer. As the pilot contacted the control tower, the tower controller issued a low altitude alert to the pilot. The pilot replied that he was climbing and the tower controller cleared the pilot to land, which the pilot acknowledged. No further pertinent radio transmissions were received from the airplane. The airplane came to rest in a wooded area about 3/4-mile from the runway threshold, and about 50 feet right of the extended centerline. Review of the approach plate for the ILS 24 approach revealed that the minimum glide slope intercept altitude at the beginning of the final approach segment on the precision approach was 1,500 feet. The glide slope altitude at the final approach fix for the non-precision approach, which was located about 4 miles from the approach end of the runway, was 1,407 feet. The glide slope altitude at the middle marker, which was located about 0.6 miles from the approach end of the runway, was 299 feet. Review of radar data revealed that the airplane was observed at 700 feet, about 4 miles from the airport, and at 300 feet, about 1.5 miles from the airport. The pilot had accumulated about 1,946 hours of total flight experience, with about 252 hours in make and model. The pilot had attended initial and recurrent training for the make and model airplane; however, did not complete the training. The pilot, aged 61, was Charles B. Yates, member of the New Jersey Senate, who was flying to Martha's Vineyard with his wife and two of his three children.

After an approach to runway 5, and touched down at 85 knots, the airplane yawed right, exited the runway, the right main landing gear collapsed, and the airplane nosed over. Examination of the airplane revealed that a right main wheel brake had locked up, and the landing gear had collapsed. Inspection of the right main landing gear assembly and all associated components could not provide any determination as to what caused the main wheel brake to lockup. The brake assembly was broken down into its component parts and inspected. No evidence of malfunction could be detected. No contamination of the hydraulic fluid was evident.

According to the pilot, he was conducting a GPS approach during occasional low ceilings, reduced visibility and rain. At the minimum descent altitude, the ground was 'occasionally' visible through fog and rain. Near the missed approach point, the runway lights were visible, so he continued the descent. He lost visual contact with the runway, and began a missed approach, but collided with trees. The accident site was 2 miles prior to the runway, on rising terrain, 200 feet below the runway elevation. The missed approach point was over the approach end of the runway.

The aircraft experienced an uncontained failure of the high pressure turbine stage 1 disk in the No. 1 engine during a high-power ground run for maintenance. Because of a report of an in-flight loss of oil, US Airways mechanics had replaced a seal on the n°1 engine’s integral drive generator and were performing the high-power engine run to check for any oil leakage. For the maintenance check, the mechanics had taxied the airplane to a remote taxiway on the airport and had performed three runups for which no anomalies were noted. During the fourth excursion to high power, at around 93 percent N1 rpm, there was a loud explosion followed by a fire under the left wing of the airplane. The mechanics shut down the engines, discharged both fire bottles into the No. 1 engine nacelle, and evacuated the airplane. Although both fire bottles were discharged, the fire continued until it was extinguished by airport fire department personnel. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The pilot said that he 'landed properly' on the runway, touching down at about 700 feet from the approach end. He said that he 'applied brakes, which had no effect, ran out of runway, and turned to the right to avoid trees. [The] Grassy field should have worked out, except for the drainage ditch.' The pilot said that later he was told that there was a tail wind estimated at 45 knots, when he landed. Examination of the airplane revealed no anomalies. Approximately 34 minutes before the accident, the weather observation at Louisville, Kentucky, 11 miles south of the accident site, reported winds of 320 degrees at 16 knots, with gusts to 20 knots.

The air taxi pilot had flown to a remote airstrip and lodge in a company airplane to go hunting. He was scheduled the next morning for a flight from his company's base of operations, his original departure airport. According to a hunting guide at the lodge, the pilot departed the lodge's airstrip about 0608, with a load of revenue cargo. A few minutes later, the guide heard the sound of an airplane, and then a loud impact. The guide could not see the wreckage because it was too dark outside. He departed in his own airplane, but entered clouds shortly after takeoff, and had to return. The guide commented he thought the accident pilot was trying to return to the lodge airstrip because of the poor weather and darkness. The wreckage was located on a nearby mountain in daylight hours after the cloud cover had dissipated. Post accident inspection disclosed no evidence of any preimpact mechanical anomalies with the airplane. Official sunrise was 0813; official civil twilight was 0730. The time of the accident was approximately 0615.

The airline transport certificated pilot was landing at a remote village on a scheduled domestic commuter flight with nine passengers. The accident airplane, a twin-engine turboprop certified for single-pilot operations, was equipped with a fuselage-mounted belly cargo pod. Witnesses saw the airplane touch down on the gravel runway with the landing gear retracted. The belly pod lightly scraped the runway for about 40 feet before the airplane transitioned to a climb. The propeller tips did not contact the runway. As the airplane began climbing away from the runway, the landing gear was extended. The airplane climbed to about 100 to 150 feet above the ground, and then began a descending left turn, colliding with tundra-covered terrain. A postcrash fire destroyed the fuselage, right wing, and the right engine. The flaps were found extended to 40 degrees. The balked landing procedure for the airplane states, in part: "power levers to maximum, flaps to 15 degrees, landing gear up, and then retract the flaps." Five passengers seated in the rear of the airplane survived the crash. The survivors did not recall hearing a gear warning horn before ground contact. The airplane was landed gear-up eight months before the accident. The airplane was nearly landed gear-up four months before the accident. Each time, a landing gear warning horn was not heard by the pilot or passengers. A postcrash examination of the airplane and engines did not locate any preimpact mechanical malfunction. The FAA's Fairbanks, Alaska, FSDO conducted an inspection of the operator six months before the accident, and recommended the operator utilize two pilots in the accident airplane. Following the accident, the Fairbanks FSDO required the operator to utilize two pilots for passenger flights in the accident airplane make and model.

The airport consisted of a single runway oriented on a heading of 140/320 degrees. A taxiway oriented on a 120 degree heading intersected the runway at its midpoint. The pilot reported that the visibility was 500-1,000 feet with fog at the time of departure. Before he took off, the pilot asked his passenger to walk the length of the runway to observe any obstructions, due to the reduced visibility. The pilot then taxied to the run-up pad, set the heading of his HSI to 120 degrees, and initiated the takeoff. When the airspeed reached 80 knots, the pilot realized he had initiated the takeoff on the taxiway instead of the runway. He aborted the takeoff and attempted to maneuver the airplane to the runway. The airplane crossed the runway, impacted a tree, and came to rest upright in a cornfield. The weather reported at the time of the accident at an airport 9 miles away was: wind from 320 degrees at 2 knots; visibility 1/16 mile with fog; sky partially obscured; ceiling 200 feet overcast.