United States of America

The airplane was in cruise flight at 16,000 feet, in instrument meteorological conditions. About two minutes after the crew ceased cross-feeding due to a fuel imbalance, the left engine experienced a total loss of power. About one minute later, the co-pilot indicated to the pilot-in-command (PIC) that the airplane was losing airspeed, and about 15 seconds later, the co-pilot remarked "keep it up, keep it up." Shortly thereafter, the airplane departed controlled flight and impacted terrain. The airplane was destroyed by fire and impact forces. Examination of the left engine revealed no evidence of any pre-impact failures that would have accounted for an uncommanded in-flight shut-down. A SIGMET for potential severe clear icing was effective for airplane's flight path; however, the flight crew did not report or discuss any weather related problems around the time of the accident. At the time of the accident, the airplane was above its single-engine service ceiling. The PIC had accumulated approximately 6,000 hours of total flight experience, of which, about 500 hours were as PIC in make and model. The co-pilot had approximately 600 hours of total fight experience, of which, 300 hours were in make and model.

The Learjet departed from an uncontrolled airport about 2 minutes before the accident on a on a VFR climb and was not talking to ATC. The Extra EA-300S departed VFR from a controlled airport and requested and received a frequency change from the control tower 2 minutes after departure. Review of radar data revealed that the Extra climbed to 2,500 feet on a heading of 346 degrees before descending to 2,400 at 1141:25. The Learjet was observed on radar in a right crosswind departure passing through 700 feet on a heading of 242 degrees at 1141:02. At 1141:16, the Learjet was at 1,400 feet heading 269. At 1141:30, the Extra is observed on radar at 2,400 feet, in a right turn heading 360 degrees. The Learjet is observed on radar at 1141:28 in a climbing left turn passing through 2,300 feet. The last radar return on both aircraft was at 1141:30.

The aircraft was parked at gate C115 awaiting for passengers on a flight (service CO481) from Newark to Detroit-Wayne County Airport. In unclear circumstances, a pilot attempted to make an engine run test while six employees were cleaning the cabin. The aircraft moved forward and collided with the main terminal, suffering major structural damages. There were no injuries among the seven occupants while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The purpose of the flight was for the instructor pilot to administer second-in-command (SIC) flight training to the commercial pilot in the twin-engine aircraft. According to the training manual, SIC training encompassed 4 hours of normal and emergency flight maneuvers to include stalls in the landing and takeoff configuration and while turning at a 15-30 degree bank. A witness heard the airplane's engines and observed the airplane from her driveway. The witness stated that as "the [engine] noise was getting louder and louder, I spotted it spiraling downward." The witness thought that the airplane was performing aerobatics; however, the airplane was getting too close to the ground. The witness heard a loud thud, and approximately 3 seconds later, she heard a loud boom and saw black smoke billow up. Another witness stated that she observed the airplane "going nose first straight down and spinning...counterclockwise." She thought the airplane was performing aerobatic maneuvers; however, the airplane did not stop descending. The airplane disappeared behind trees and the witness heard a loud explosion and saw smoke. She added that she did not observe what the airplane was doing prior to seeing it in a "downward spiral." Radar data depicted the airplane at 8,400 feet msl for the last 2 minutes and 26 seconds of the flight. The recorded aircraft ground speed during that time period fluctuated between 75 and 59 knots. The final radar returns depicted the airplane as making a 180 degree turn before radar contact was lost. No mayday calls were received from the airplane. The airplane impacted the ground in a near wings level attitude and was consumed by a post-crash fire. No anomalies were noted with the airplane or its engines during a post-accident examination. It is unknown which of the pilots was flying the airplane at the time of the accident.

During climbout, the airplane encountered an area of freezing rain resulting in rapid airframe ice accretion and loss of climb capability. The pilot informed ATC that he was unable to maintain altitude and requested and received clearance back to Great Falls, the departure airport. ATC radar showed that the airplane then began a right turn over mountainous terrain extending up to 8,309 feet prior to loss of radar contact (lower and relatively flat terrain, down to less than 5,000 feet, was located to the left of the aircraft's track.) During the last minute of radar contact, the aircraft was in a right turn at a descent rate of about 400 feet per minute; the aircraft passed less than 1/2 mile from the 8,309-foot mountain summit just prior to loss of radar contact, at an altitude of 8,400 to 8,500 feet. The aircraft crashed on the southwest flank of the 8,309-foot mountain about 1/2 mile south of the last recorded radar position. Wreckage and impact signatures at the crash site were indicative of an inverted, steep-angle, relatively low-speed, downhill impact with the terrain. The investigation revealed no evidence of any aircraft mechanical problems.

The aircraft collided with the ground in a steep nose down descent angle while maneuvering to return to the runway during the takeoff initial climb from the airport. Pilot and mechanic witnesses on the airport described the engine sounds during the takeoff as abnormal. The takeoff ground roll was over 3,000 feet in length, and the airplane's climb out angle was much shallower than usual. Two other witnesses said the engine sounded "like a radial engine," and both believed that the power output was lower than normal. One mechanic witness said the engine was surging and not developing full power; he believed the symptoms could be associated with a fuel feed problem, a turbocharger surge, or an excessively lean running condition. The ground witnesses located near the impact site said the airplane began a steep left turn between 1/4- and 1/2-mile from the runway's end at a lower than normal altitude. The bank angle was estimated by the witnesses as 45 degrees or greater. The turn continued until the nose suddenly dropped and the airplane entered a spiraling descent to ground impact. The majority of these witnesses stated that they heard "sputtering" or "popping" noises coming from the airplane. Engineering personnel from the manufacturer developed a performance profile for a normal takeoff and climb under the ambient conditions of the accident and at gross weight. The profile was compared to the actual aircraft performance derived from recorded radar data and the witness observations. The ground roll was 1,300 feet longer than it should have been, and the speed/acceleration and climb performance were consistently well below the profile's predictions. Based on the radar data and factoring in the winds, the airplane's estimated indicated airspeed during the final turn was 82 knots; the stall speed at 45 degrees of bank is 82 knots and it increases linearly to 96 knots at 60 degrees of bank. No evidence was found that the pilot flew the airplane from December until the date of the accident. The airplane sat outside during the rainy season with only 10 gallons of fuel in each tank. Comparison of the time the fueling began and the communications transcripts disclosed that the pilot had 17 minutes 41 seconds to refuel the airplane with 120 gallons, reboard the airplane, and start the engine for taxi; the maximum nozzle discharge flow rate of the pump he used is 24 gallons per minute. Review of the communications transcripts found that a time interval of 3 minutes 35 seconds elapsed from the time the pilot asked for a taxi clearance from the fuel facility until he reported ready for takeoff following a taxi distance of at least 2,000 feet. During the 8 seconds following the pilot's acknowledgment of his takeoff clearance, he and the local controller carried on a non pertinent personal exchange. The aircraft was almost completely consumed in the post crash fire; however, extensive investigation of the remains failed to identify a preimpact mechanical malfunction or failure in the engine or airframe systems. The pistons, cylinder interiors, and spark plugs from all six cylinders were clean without combustion deposits. The cockpit fuel selector lever, the intermediate linkages, and the valve itself were found in the OFF position; however, an engineering analysis established that insufficient fuel was available in the lines forward of the selector to start, taxi, and perform a takeoff with the selector in the OFF position.

On May 21, 2000, about 1128 eastern daylight time (EDT), a British Aerospace Jetstream 3101, N16EJ, operated by East Coast Aviation Services (doing business as Executive Airlines) crashed
about 11 miles south of Wilkes-Barre/Scranton International Airport (AVP), Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania. The airplane was destroyed by impact and a post crash fire, and 17 passengers and two flight crewmembers were killed. The flight was being conducted under 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 135 as an on-demand charter flight for Caesar’s Palace Casino in Atlantic City, New Jersey. An instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan had been filed for the flight from Atlantic City International Airport (ACY) to AVP. The captain checked in for duty about 0800 at Republic Airport (FRG) in Farmingdale, New York, on the day of the accident. The airplane was originally scheduled to depart FRG at 0900 for ACY and to remain in ACY until 1900, when it was scheduled to return to FRG. While the pilots were conducting preflight inspections, they received a telephone call from Executive Airlines’ owner and chief executive officer (CEO) advising them that they had been assigned an additional flight from ACY to AVP with a return flight to ACY later in the day, instead of the scheduled break in ACY. Fuel records at FRG indicated that 90 gallons of fuel were added to the accident airplane’s tanks before departure to ACY. According to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) air traffic control (ATC) records, the flight departed at 0921 (with 12 passengers on board) and arrived in ACY at 0949. According to passenger statements, the captain was the pilot flying from FRG to ACY. After arrival in ACY, the flight crew checked the weather for AVP and filed an IFR flight plan. Fuel facility records at ACY indicated that no additional fuel was added. The accident flight to AVP, which departed ACY about 1030, had been chartered by Caesar’s Palace. According to ATC records, the flight to AVP was never cleared to fly above 5,000 feet mean sea level (msl). According to ATC transcripts, the pilots first contacted AVP approach controllers at 1057 and were vectored for an instrument landing system (ILS) approach to runway 4. The flight was cleared for approach at 1102:07, and the approach controller advised the pilots that they were 5 nautical miles (nm) from Crystal Lake, which is the initial approach fix (IAF) for the ILS approach to runway 4. The pilots were told to maintain 4,000 feet until established on the localizer. At 1104:16, the approach controller advised that a “previous landing…aircraft picked up the airport at minimums [decision altitude].” The pilots were instructed to contact the AVP local (tower) controller at 1105:09, which they did 3 seconds later. The airplane then descended to about 2,200 feet, flew level at 2,200 feet for about 20 seconds, and began to climb again about 2.2 nm from the runway threshold when a missed approach was executed (see the Airplane Performance section for more information). At 1107:26 the captain reported executing the missed approach but provided no explanation to air traffic controllers. The tower controller informed the North Radar approach controllers of the missed approach and then instructed the accident flight crew to fly runway heading, climb to 4,000 feet, and contact approach control on frequency 124.5 (the procedure published on the approach chart). The pilots reestablished contact with the approach controllers at 1108:04 as they climbed through 3,500 feet to 4,000 feet and requested another ILS approach to runway 4. The flight was vectored for another ILS approach, and at 1110:07 the approach controller advised the pilots of traffic 2 nm miles away at 5,000 feet. The captain responded that they were in the clouds. At 1014:38, the controller directed the pilots to reduce speed to follow a Cessna 172 on approach to the airport, and the captain responded, “ok we’re slowing.” The flight was cleared for a second approach at 1120:45 and advised to maintain 4,000 feet until the airplane was established on the localizer. At 1123:49 the captain transmitted, “for uh one six echo juliet we’d like to declare an emergency.” At 1123:53, the approach controller asked the nature of the problem, and the captain responded, “engine failure.” The approach controller acknowledged the information, informed the pilots that the airplane appeared to be south of the localizer (off course to the right), and asked if they wanted a vector back to the localizer course. The flight crew accepted, and at 1124:10 the controller directed a left turn to heading 010, which the captain acknowledged. At 1124:33, the controller asked for verification that the airplane was turning left. The captain responded, “we’re trying six echo juliet.” At 1124:38, the controller asked if a right turn would be better. The captain asked the controller to “stand by.” At 1125:07, the controller advised the pilots that the minimum vectoring altitude (MVA) in the area was 3,300 feet. At 1125:12, the captain transmitted, “standby for six echo juliet tell them we lost both engines for six echo juliet.” At that time, ATC radar data indicated that the airplane was descending through 3,000 feet. The controller immediately issued the weather conditions in the vicinity of the airport and informed the flight crew about the location of nearby highways. At 1126:17, the captain asked, “how’s the altitude look for where we’re at.” The controller responded that he was not showing an altitude readout from the airplane and issued the visibility (2.5 miles) and altimeter setting. At 1126:43, the captain transmitted, “just give us a vector back to the airport please.” The controller cleared the accident flight to fly heading 340, advised the flight crew that radar contact was lost, and asked the pilots to verify their altitude. The captain responded that they were “level at 2,000.” At 1126:54, the controller again advised the flight crew of the 3,300-foot MVA and suggested a 330° heading to bring the airplane back to the localizer. At 1127:14 the controller asked, “do you have any engines,” and the captain responded that they appeared to have gotten back “the left engine now.” At 1127:23, the controller informed the pilots that he saw them on radar at 2,000 feet and that there was a ridgeline between them and the airport. The captain responded, “that’s us” and “we’re at 2,000 feet over the trees.” The controller instructed the pilots to fly a 360° heading and advised them of high antennas about 2 nm west of their position. At 1127:46, the captain transmitted, “we’re losing both engines.” Two seconds later the controller advised that the Pennsylvania Turnpike was right below the airplane and instructed the flight crew to “let me know if you can get your engines back.” There was no further radio contact with the accident airplane. The ATC supervisor initiated emergency notification procedures. A Pennsylvania State Police helicopter located the wreckage about 1236, and emergency rescue units arrived at the accident site about 1306. The accident occurred in daylight instrument meteorological conditions (IMC). The location of the accident was 41° 9 minutes, 23 seconds north latitude, 75° 45 minutes, 53 seconds west longitude, about 11 miles south of the airport at an elevation of 1,755 feet msl.

The airplane bounced on landing and started to swerve on the landing roll. The pilot attempted a go-around. The left engine hesitated and the right engine developed power. The pilot lost directional control, the airplane went off the left side of the runway and collapsed the left main landing gear.

The airplane collided with mountainous terrain after the flight crew terminated the instrument approach and proceeded visually at night. The flight crew failed to brief or review the instrument approach procedure prior to takeoff and exhibited various cognitive task deficiencies during the approach. These cognitive task deficiencies included selection of the wrong frequency for pilot controlled lighting, concluding that the airport was obscured by clouds despite weather information to the contrary, stating inaccurate information regarding instrument approach headings and descent altitudes, and descending below appropriate altitudes during the approach. This resulted in the crew's lack of awareness regarding terrain in the approach path. Pilots approaching a runway over a dark featureless terrain may experience an illusion that the airplane is at a higher altitude that it actually is. In response to this illusion, referred to as the featureless terrain illusion or black hole phenomenon, a pilot may fly a lower than normal approach potentially compromising terrain clearance requirements. The dark visual scene on the approach path and the absence of a visual glideslope indicator were conducive to producing a false perception that the airplane was at a higher altitude. A ground proximity warning device may have alerted the crew prior to impact. However, the amount of advanced warning that may have been provided by such a device was not determined. Although the flight crew's performance was consistent with fatigue-related impairment, based on available information, the Safety Board staff was unable to determine to what extent the cognitive task deficiencies exhibited by the flight crew were attributable to fatigue and decreased alertness.

Shortly after liftoff from Point Mugu NAS, the aircraft collided with a flock of pelicans. The crew attempted an emergency landing and the aircraft belly landed before coming to rest. All three crew members escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.