Greensboro

Following an uneventful cargo flight from Greensboro, NC, the aircraft made a wheels-up landing on runway 18 at Myrtle Beach Airport, SC. The aircraft slid on its belly for few dozen metres before coming to rest on the main runway. Both pilots escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The right main landing gear collapsed on landing. According to the flight crew, after departure they preceded to Mountain Air Airport, where they performed a "touch-and-go" landing. Upon raising the landing gear following the touch-and-go landing, they got an "unsafe gear" light. The crew stated they cycled the gear back down and got a "three green" normal indication. They cycled the gear back up and again got the "gear unsafe" light. They diverted to Greensboro, North Carolina, and upon landing in Greensboro the airplane's right main landing gear collapsed. After the accident, gear parts from the accident airplane were discovered on the runway at Mountain Air Airport. Metallurgical examination of the landing gear components revealed fractures consistent with overstress separation and there was no evidence of fatigue. Examination of the runway at Mountain Air Airport by an FAA Inspector showed evidence the accident airplane had touched down short of the runway.

At about the 3,000-foot marker on the 8,000-foot long runway witnesses saw the airplane at about 100 to 150-feet above the ground with the landing gear retracted when they heard a loud "bang". They said the airplane made no attempt to land on the remaining 5,000 feet of runway after the noise. The airplane continued climbing and seemed to gain a little altitude before passing the end of the runway. At that point the airplane began a right descending turn and was in a 60 to 80 degree right bank, nose low attitude when they lost sight of it. The airplane collided with the ground about 8/10 of a mile from the departure end of runway 34 in a residential area. Examination of the critical left engine found no pre-impact mechanical malfunction. Examination of the right engine found galling on all of the connecting rods. Dirt and particular contaminants were found embedded on all of the bearings, and spalling was observed on all of the cam followers. The oil suction screen was found clean, The oil filter was found contaminated with ferrous and non-ferrous small particles. The number 3 cylinder connecting rod yoke was broken on one side of the rod cap and separated into two pieces. Heavy secondary damage was noted with no signs of heat distress. Examination of the engine logbooks revealed that both engine's had been overhauled in 1986. In 1992, the airplane was registered in the Dominican Republic and the last maintenance entry indicated that the left and right engines underwent an inspection 754.3 hours since major overhaul. There were no other maintenance entries in the logbooks until the airplane was sold and moved to the United States in 2002. All three blades of the right propeller were found in the low pitch position, confirming that the pilot did not feather the right propeller as outlined in the pilot's operating handbook, under emergency procedures following a loss of engine power during takeoff.

According to the pilot, an unsafe right gear indication was received during the approach, and the control tower controller confirmed the right gear was not fully extended. On landing roll the right main landing gear collapsed and the airplane slid off of the runway. Examination of the right main landing gear revealed the drag brace was fractured. The fracture was located at the lower side of a transition from a smaller internal diameter on the upper piece to a larger internal diameter on the lower piece. The region of the fracture surface was flat and perpendicular to the tube longitudinal axis. The region had a smooth, curving boundary, also consistent with fatigue. The fatigue features emanated from multiple origins at the inner surface of the tube. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issued an Airworthiness Directive (AD) requiring an inspections of main landing gear drag stay units. The AD was prompted by the fracture of a drag stay tube from fatigue cracking that initiated from an improperly machined transition radius at the inner surface of the tube. According to Fokker ,the Fokker F27 Mark 500 airplanes (such as the incident airplane) were not equipped with drag stay units having part number 200261001, 200485001, or 200684001. One tube, part number 200259300, had a change in internal diameter (stepped bore), and the other tube, part number 200485300, had a straight internal bore. AD 97-04-08 required an ultrasonic inspection to determine if the installed tube had a straight or stepped bore. A review of maintenance records revealed that the failed drag stay tube had accumulated 28, 285 total cycles.

Examination of the area of the fire origin revealed that relay R2-53, the left heat exchanger cooling fan relay, was severely heat damaged, as were R2-54 and the other relays in this area. However, the R2-53 relay also exhibited loose terminal studs and several holes that had burned through the relay housing that the other relays did not exhibit. The wire bundles that run immediately below the left and right heat exchanger cooling fans and the ground service tie relays exhibited heat damage to the wire insulation, with the greatest damage located just below the R2-53 relay. The unique damage observed on the R2-53 relay and the wire damage directly below it indicates that fire initiation was caused by an internal failure of the R2-53 relay. Disassembly of the relay revealed that the R2-53 relay had been repaired but not to the manufacturer's standards. According to the manufacturer, the damage to the relay housing was consistent with a phase-to-phase arc between terminals A2 and B2 of the relay. During the on-scene portion of the investigation, three of the four circuit breakers in the left heat exchanger cooling fan were found in the tripped position. To determine why only three of the four circuit breakers tripped, all four were submitted to the Materials Integrity Branch at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton, Ohio, for further examination. The circuit breakers were visually examined and were subjected to an insulation resistance measurement, a contact resistance test, a voltage drop test, and a calibration test (which measured minimum and maximum ultimate trip times). Testing and examination determined that the circuit breaker that did not trip exhibited no anomalies that would prevent normal operation, met all specifications required for the selected tests, and operated properly during the calibration test. Although this circuit breaker appeared to have functioned properly during testing, the lab report noted that, as a thermal device, the circuit breaker is designed to trip when a sustained current overload exists and that it is possible during the event that intermittent arcing or a resistive short occurred or that the circuit opened before the breaker reached a temperature sufficient to trip the device.

The pilot was reported to be in a hurry as he positioned two aircraft and picked up the accident aircraft for his final positioning leg. He told company personnel he had a birthday party to go to and his family confirmed this. The pilot reported to company personnel that he was departing on runway 3 and that he would report in on his arrival at the destination. No further contacts with the flight were made and the wreckage of the aircraft was discovered off the end of the departure runway about 40 minutes after his reported takeoff. Examination showed the aircraft had run off the left side of the runway about 800 feet from the end and then crossed over the runway and entered into the woods at the departure end of the runway. Post crash examination showed no evidence of pre crash failure or malfunction of the aircraft structure, flight controls, or engine. The onboard engine computer showed the engine was producing normal engine power and the aircraft was traveling at 98 knots when electrical power was lost as it collided with trees. The aircraft's control lock was found tangled in the instrument panel near the left control yoke where it is normally installed and the lock had multiple abnormal bends, including a 90 degree bend in the last 1/2 inch of the lock where it engages the control column. Removal of the control lock and checking the flight controls for freedom is on the normal pilots checklist. The pilot was also found to not be wearing his shoulder harness.

The airplane impacted mountainous terrain while on a post-modification functional evaluation flight (FEF). The pilot flying (PF) had applied inappropriate control column back pressure during the clean stall maneuver recovery attempt in an inadequate performance of the stall recovery procedure established in ABX's (Airborne Express) operations manual. The pilot not flying (PNF), in the right seat, was serving as the pilot-in-command and was conducting instruction in FEF procedures. The PNF failed to recognize, address and correct the PF's inappropriate control inputs. An inoperative stall warning system failed to reinforce to the flightcrew the indications that the airplane was in a full stall during the recovery attempt. The flightcrew's exposure to a low fidelity reproduction of the DC-8's stall characteristics in the ABX DC-8 flight training simulator was a factor in the PF holding aft (stall-inducing) control column inputs when the airplane began to pitch down and roll. The accident could have been prevented if ABX had institutionalized and the flightcrew had used the revised FEF flight stall recovery procedure agreed upon by ABX in 1991. The informality of the ABX FEF training program permitted the inappropriate pairing of two pilots for an FEF, neither of whom had handled the flight controls during an actual stall in the DC-8.

Flight 3379 departed Greensboro at 18:03 with a little delay due to baggage rearrangement. The aircraft climbed to a 9,000 feet cruising altitude and contacted Raleigh approach control at 18:14, receiving an instruction to reduce the speed to 180 knots and descend to 6,000 feet. Raleigh final radar control was contacted at 18:25 and instructions were received to reduce the speed to 170 knots and to descend to 3,000 feet. At 18:30 the flight was advised to turn left and join the localizer course at or above 2,100 feet for a runway 05L ILS approach. Shortly after receiving clearance to land, the n°1 engine ignition light illuminated in the cockpit as a result of a momentary negative torque condition when the propeller speed levers were advanced to 100% and the power levers were at flight idle. The captain suspected an engine flame out and eventually decided to execute a missed approach. The speed had decreased to 122 knots and two momentary stall warnings sounded as the pilot called for max power. The aircraft was in a left turn at 1,800 feet and the speed continued to decrease to 103 knots, followed by stall warnings. The rate of descent then increased rapidly to more than 10,000 feet/min. The aircraft eventually struck some trees and crashed about 4 nm southwest of the runway 05L threshold. Five passengers survived while 15 other occupants were killed.

As the pilot was en route to Greensboro (his destination), he flew past Shiloh and noted that weather at the airport was clear, but from about 10 south of Shiloh, ground fog extended to the south. At 0634 est, he contacted Greensboro tower and was advised the RVR was 1,600 feet. His minimums were 1,800 feet. He held for a period of time, but the weather continued to deteriorate, so he diverted to the Rockingham County-Shiloh Airport, where no weather reporting facilities were available. After being vectored over the alternate airport, he was unable to get enough visual cues for a visual approach, so he elected to make an sdf approach. The pilot stated that when he reached the minimum descent altitude (MDA), he saw the runway and proceeded to make a visual approach. As he continued, patchy fog began to obscure the runway, so he maneuvered the aircraft to keep it in site, then elected to go around. However, as he began the go-around, the aircraft hit trees and crashed. Elevation of the crash site was approximately 700 feet. MDA for the approach was 1,120 feet msl.

While approaching Winston-Salem Airport, the pilot informed ATC about engine problems. Shortly later, the twin engine airplane went out of control, entered a dive and crashed in flames in a field located in Greensboro. The aircraft was destroyed and the pilot, sole on board, was killed.