United States of America

The pilot was taking the airplane on a flight to another airport for maintenance. During the preflight inspection, the pilot turned on the electrical power and noticed that the fuel gauge was indicating 80 gallons of fuel. The pilot reported the airplane holds a maximum of 156 gallons of fuel and he calculated that he needed 113 gallons of fuel to legally complete the flight. He informed the fixed base operator (FBO) that he wanted the fuel tanks topped off, but was informed by the ramp technician that the fuel tanks were full and he did not need fuel. The pilot went back to the airplane and removed the fuel cap. He noticed fuel in the filler neck and assumed the fuel tanks were full. He did not push open the anti-siphon fuel valve to see if the tanks were full or if residual fuel was pooled on top of the anti-siphon fuel valve. When the pilot started the engines, he noticed the fuel gauge was flickering and thought it was malfunctioning. He proceeded to depart for the maintenance base. After about 2 hours of flight time both engines lost power. Unable to reach the closest airport, the pilot executed an off field landing in a cotton field. After landing, the airplane rolled into the trees and the left wing separated from the fuselage. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the left and right wings. According to the fueler at the FBO, she drove out to the airplane to fuel it on the morning of the accident and, after removing the single fuel cap, saw fuel on top of the anti-siphon valve. She used her finger to push down the valve and felt fuel, so she believed the airplane was full of fuel and it did not need additional fuel. Both wing fuel bladders were breached during the accident and a minor amount of fuel was leaked onto the ground. Personnel from the company who recovered the wreckage stated that there was no fuel in the fuel tanks when the airplane was recovered. The fuel quantity transmitter was sent to the manufacturer for examination. Testing of the transmitter revealed no anomalies with the unit. Based on this information, it is likely that the pilot erred in his assessment of the airplane’s fuel quantity prior to departing on the accident flight and that the available quantity of fuel was exhausted, which resulted in the total loss of engine power and the subsequent forced landing.

Shortly after taking off, the pilot was instructed to change from the airport tower frequency to the departure control frequency. Numerous radio transmissions followed between tower personnel and the pilot that indicated the airplane’s radio was operating normally on the tower frequency, but the pilot could not change frequencies to departure control as directed. The pilot subsequently requested and received approval to return to the departure airport. During the flight back to the airport, the pilot made radio transmissions that indicated he continued to troubleshoot the radio problems. The airplane’s flight track showed the pilot flew directly toward the runway aimpoint about 1,000 ft from, and perpendicular to, the runway during the left base turn to final and allowed the airplane to descend as low as 200 ft pressure altitude (PA). The pilot then made a right turn about .5 miles from the runway followed by a left turn towards the runway. A pilot witness near the accident location observed the airplane maneuvering and predicted the airplane was going to stall. The airplane’s airspeed decreased to about 53 knots (kts) during the left turn and video showed the airplane’s bank angle increased before the airplane aerodynamically stalled and impacted terrain. Post accident examination of the airframe, engines, and review of recorded engine monitoring data revealed no evidence of any preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. Toxicology testing showed the pilot had diphenhydramine, a sedating antihistamine, in his liver and muscle tissue. While therapeutic levels could not be determined, side effects such as diminished psychomotor performance from his use of diphenhydramine were not evident from operational evidence. Thus, the effects of the pilot’s use of diphenhydramine was not a factor in this accident. The accident is consistent with the pilot becoming distracted by the reported non-critical radio anomaly and turning base leg of the traffic pattern too early during his return to the airport. The pilot then failed to maintain adequate airspeed and proper bank angle while maneuvering from base leg to final approach, resulting in an aerodynamic stall and impact with terrain.

While enroute in instrument meteorological (IMC) conditions, the pilot of the twin-engine, piston-powered airplane declared an emergency following a loss of power to the right engine. The pilot secured the engine and was provided vectors by air traffic control for an instrument approach procedure at the nearest airport, which he successfully completed. The pilot reported that he flew the approach and landing with the wing flaps retracted and visually acquired the runway about 500 ft above the ground. The airplane touched down on the first third of the runway at 120 knots. The pilot knew he would not be able to stop the airplane on the 3,500-ft long runway but committed to the landing rather than risking a single-engine go-around in IMC. After landing, the airplane continued beyond the departure end of the runway and impacted a berm, collapsing the landing gear and resulting in substantial damage to the airplane. Examination of the engine revealed catastrophic damage consistent with detonation and oil starvation. The damage to the No. 5 cylinder was consistent with a subsequent over pressurization of the crankcase, which likely expelled the crankshaft nose seal and the oil supply. Detonation of the cylinder(s) can create excessive crankcase pressures capable of expelling the crankshaft nose seal. The crankshaft nose seal displacement likely created a rapid loss of oil and the resulting oil starvation of the engine. The fractured connecting rod and high-temperature signatures were consistent with oil starvation. No source or anomaly that would result in engine detonation was identified. According to the Pilot’s Operating Handbook (POH) for the accident airplane, during a single engine inoperative approach, the pilot should maintain an airspeed of 116 kts indicated (KIAS) or above until landing is assured. Once landing is assured, the pilot should extend the gear and flaps, slowly retard the power on the operative engine, and land normally. The airplane’s best single-engine rate of climb speed (blue line) was 106 KIAS, and its minimum controllable airspeed with one engine inoperative (Vmca) was 76 KIAS. The maximum speed for full flap extension (40°) was 132 KIAS. The POH also stated that a single-engine go-around should be avoided if at all possible. The pilot’s decision to commit to the landing was reasonable given the circumstances and the guidance provided by the POH; however, it is likely that his decision to conduct the landing without flaps and the airplane’s excessive airspeed at touchdown resulted in the runway overrun.

The pilot reported that while on approach for landing, the airplane started to lose altitude quickly. After the co-pilot noticed the high decent rate and the slow airspeed, he advised the pilot to add power. However, the airplane continued to descend and impacted terrain in a right wing and nose low attitude, about 30 yards short of the runway approach threshold, which resulted in substantial damage to the right wing. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.

Following an uneventful flight from Memphis at FL260, the pilot initiated the descent to Yoakum Airport, Texas. On final approach to runway 31, the single engine airplane went out of control and crashed in an open field located about one mile southeast of the airfield. A passenger was able to get out from the cabin and was slightly injured while all four other occupants were killed.

While taking off from Provo Airport runway 13/31, the airplane went out of control and crashed. Both passengers escaped with minor injuries while both pilots were seriously injured. One of them died from injuries sustained. The airplane was destroyed. It was snowing at the time of the accident.

The medical transport flight was en route to pick up a patient on a neighboring island on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan in dark night conditions over the ocean. About 13 minutes after departure, at 13,000 ft mean sea level (msl), the airplane’s vertical gyro failed, which subsequently failed the pilot’s Electric Attitude Director Indicator (EADI), which also caused the autopilot to disconnect. The failure of the EADI and autopilot disconnect required the pilot to manually fly the airplane using the copilot’s attitude gyro for his horizon information (bank angle and pitch attitude) for the duration of the flight. The pilot did not declare an emergency, nor did he inform air traffic control (ATC) that his electric attitude indicator had failed and that his autopilot had disengaged. After the instrumentation failure and autopilot disconnect, the airplane entered a series of right banks before being brought back to level, followed by a left turn, and then subsequent right banks. ATC asked the pilot to change course and the pilot agreed. The copilot attitude indicator indicated that the airplane entered a descending, steep right bank turn. Over the next 5 minutes, ATC issued varying instructions to the pilot. During this time, the airplane entered several right- and left-hand banks and rolls and descended 1,000 ft per minute (fpm), which increased to -3,500 fpm as the airplane’s airspeed increased. About 7 minutes after the instrumentation failure, the airplane was in a 65° bank angle when ATC asked the pilot to verify his heading. As the pilot responded, the airplane bank angle increased to 90° and the airspeed exceeded 260 knots. The bank angle and airspeed continued to increase; a loud metallic bang was recorded that was consistent with an in-flight separation of the empennage from the fuselage before impacting with the water. After an extensive underwater search, the main wreckage was located on the seabed at a depth of about 6,420 ft. The wreckage was recovered and transported to a facility for examination.

After landing on runway 08 at Lewistown Airport, the twin engine airplane started to skid then veered off runway to the left. While contact a snow covered terrain, it slid for few dozen metres and came to rest with its left wing severely damaged. All three occupants evacuated safely.

The two pilots were conducting a business flight with six passengers when the accident occurred. During the night arrival the captain flew a visual approach with excessive airspeed
and the airplane crossed the runway threshold more than 50 knots above approach speed (Vref). The before-landing checklist was not completed, and the flaps were at an incorrect 20° position instead of 40°. The airplane touched down near the midfield point of the 6,022 ft non grooved runway, which was wet due to earlier precipitation. The captain initially applied intermittent braking, then applied continuous braking starting about 2,069 ft from the end of the runway. The captain did not deploy the thrust reversers. The airplane exited the runway above 100 knots ground speed, then continued into a ditch and airport perimeter fence, which resulted in substantial damage to the forward fuselage. Examination of the airplane revealed no mechanical anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. The operator’s flight manual directed that all approaches were to be flown using the stabilized approach concept. For a visual approach, this included establishing and maintaining the proper approach speed and correct landing configuration at least 500 ft above the airport elevation. Neither pilot recognized the requirement to execute a go-around due to the excessive approach speed or the long landing on a wet runway, which resulted in the runway excursion.

The twin engine airplane departed Denton Enterprise Airport runway 36 at 1459LT and continued to the west at an altitude of 2,000 feet. Eight minutes later, the pilot initiated a left hand circuit to land at Decatur Airport. While descending on final, the speed decreased and the airplane crashed nearby a wooded area located 6 km short of runway 35. The aircraft was destroyed and the pilot, sole on board, was killed.