United States of America

Shortly after takeoff from McCook-Ben Nelson Regional Airport, en route to Schreveport, Louisiana, the single engine airplane went out of control and crashed in a garden located in a residential area. One occupant was killed and the second one was injured. The airplane was destroyed.

The check pilot of the multi engine airplane reported that he was conducting a familiarization flight with a pilot that his company was in the process of hiring (pilot applicant.) On final approach, at approximately 100 ft above ground level, the pilot applicant made a pitch adjustment and the airplane’s nose pitched down excessively. Both pilots pulled back on the yokes to arrest the descent, but the airplane impacted terrain short of the runway, which resulted in substantial damage to the right wing and fuselage. The check pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.

The pilot reported that before takeoff on the cross-country flight, the airplane contained 100 gallons of fuel, with 11 gallons in the header fuel tank, and the airplane’s automatic fuel transfer system was configured as per the checklist. No anomalies were noted during the engine start, takeoff, and initial climb. About 7 minutes into the flight and climbing through 12,000 ft mean sea level (msl), the engine sustained an abrupt loss of power that was confirmed by the loss of torque and engine compressor turbine rpm (Ng) speed. The pilot noted no cockpit warning or abnormal indications before the loss of engine power. The pilot declared an emergency and then executed a 180° turn back to the departure airport. The pilot attempted two engine restarts, and both were unsuccessful. Unable to make it back to the airport, the pilot executed an off airport forced landing. During the forced landing, the airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage and both wings. A postaccident examination of the airframe, fuel system components, and functional engine test revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. The fuel transfer pump switch was found in the manual position. The engine’s fuel was provided by the airframe header tank. Avionics data indicated that during the short flight, the header fuel tank quantity consistently decreased, and the airplane’s automatic fuel system did not continually resupply fuel to the header tank. Based on the available data, a functional engine test, and functional testing of the airplane’s fuel system, it is likely the pilot improperly configured the airplane’s fuel transfer system, which prevented the header fuel tank from automatically refilling during the flight and resulted in fuel starvation and total loss of engine power. Although the pilot reported that he had configured the airplane’s automatic fuel transfer system per the checklist, it is likely that the fuel transfer switch was in the manual or OFF position during the flight. In addition, the pilot did not properly monitor the header tank’s fuel quantity.

The twin engine airplane departed Gonzales-Louisiana Regional Airport at 1456LT on a short flight to Patterson. Following a left hand turn, the airplane descended to Patterson-Harry P. Williams Airport when it crashed 300 feet short of runway 06 threshold, bursting into flames. The airplane was destroyed and both occupants were killed. Patterson-Harry P. Williams Airport is located 64 km southwest of Gonzales-Louisiana Regional Airport.

On October 4, 2023, about 23:47 eastern daylight time, Federal Express (FedEx) flight 1376, a Boeing 757-236, experienced a failure with its left hydraulic system shortly after takeoff from Chattanooga Metropolitan Airport-Lovell Field (CHA), Chattanooga, Tennessee. The airplane turned back to CHA, and, while preparing to land, the landing gear failed to extend normally. The landing gear also failed to extend using the alternate extend system. The flight crew declared an emergency and the airplane sustained substantial damage during the emergency landing. The two flight crew members and the jump seat occupant aboard the airplane were not injured. The flight was operating under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 as a non-scheduled domestic cargo flight from CHA to Memphis International Airport (MEM), Memphis, Tennessee. The flight crew reported that the airplane had no maintenance issues before the flight and that the push-back, engine start, and taxi were all uneventful. The captain was the pilot flying, and the first officer was the pilot monitoring. Digital flight data recorder (DFDR) data showed that the airplane departed CHA about 22:24. According to the flight crew, after rotation and confirmation of a positive rate of climb, the first officer (FO) raised the landing gear control lever to retract the landing gear. DFDR data showed that both the main gear and the nose gear retracted to their up and locked position. About 1 minute later, the flap handle was positioned in its up (flaps 0) position. The flight crew reported that immediately thereafter, a “TE FLAP DISAGREE” message was displayed on the engine indication and crew alerting system (EICAS), along with an associated master caution light, a “TRAILING EDGE” discrete light, and the aural alert caution beeper. Per the captain's direction, the FO began accomplishing the “TE FLAP DISAGREE” checklist in the Quick Reference Handbook (QRH). The FO was able to retract the flaps to their up position via alternate means in accordance with the appropriate checklist contained in the QRH. While completing this checklist, the flight crew received an “L HYD SYS PRESS” EICAS message at 22:24:33 at an altitude of about 1978 ft above ground level (agl). The status page showed that the left hydraulic system fluid quantity was near zero and that the system was not pressurized. The captain directed the FO to run the QRH checklist for “L HYD SYS PRESS”. The flight crew decided to return to CHA. Upon positioning the landing gear control lever to its down position to extend the gear for landing, the flight crew received a gear unsafe indication via illumination of the amber “GEAR” disagreement light and a “GEAR DISAGREE” message on the EICAS. Also, the lack of illumination of the three green landing gear indicator lights indicated that the gear was not down and locked. The FO then conducted the “Alternate Gear Extension” procedure embedded in the L HYD SYS PRESS checklist, which was unsuccessful. After multiple attempts to lower the landing gear, the flight crew declared an emergency. The flight crewmembers asked Chattanooga approach if they could conduct a low approach over the runway so that tower personnel could visually confirm the position of the landing gear. The airplane descended to about 150 ft agl and flew the length of the runway, which was followed by a go-around. Approach control relayed confirmation that the landing gear was not in the down position. Subsequently, the flight crew completed the deferred items on the “GEAR UNSAFE” QRH checklist and the airplane was cleared to land on runway 20. The flight crewmembers reported that during the initial touchdown, the airplane bounced slightly but they were able to maintain directional control and the runway’s centerline. The flight crew was unable to stop the airplane and it slid off the departure end of runway 20 and impacted localizer antennas before coming to rest about 830 ft beyond the end of the runway. After the airplane came to a complete stop, the flight crew performed the “EVACUATION” checklist, and the jump seat occupant attempted to open the left-hand door (L1). The door rotated halfway open and then became bound, and the slide did not deploy. The jump seat occupant then attempted to open the right-hand door (R1), but it became lodged on the packing of the raft/slide. The jump seat occupant subsequently forced the door open, and the slide deployed. The flight crew and the jump seat occupant then egressed the airplane via the R1 door/slide. Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed that the left main landing gear door actuator retract port hose was leaking hydraulic fluid. The hose was removed and retained by the NTSB for further investigation. The examination also found a discontinuity in the wiring of the landing gear alternate extension system. The section of that wire was retained for further examination. The following NTSB specialists were assigned to investigate the accident: systems, survival factors, cockpit voice recorder (CVR), and DFDR. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Federal Express, The Boeing Company, Safran Evacuation Systems, and the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) are parties to the investigation. The DFDR and the CVR were removed from the airplane and shipped to the NTSB’s Vehicle Recorder Laboratory in Washington, DC, for download of the data. The DFDR was downloaded, and a review of the preliminary data indicates that the left hydraulic system began losing pressure shortly after takeoff.

On September 21, 2023, about 1436 eastern daylight time, an Embraer SA EMB-525, N434FX, operated by Flexjet LLC, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near St. Simons Island, Georgia. The pilot, copilot and six passengers were not injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91K fractional flight. The flight departed Westchester County Airport (HPN), White Plains, New York at 1239, destined for St. Simons Island Airport (SSI), St. Simons Island, Georgia. According to the pilot, the departure and en route phases of the flight were uneventful. During the arrival phase into SSI they elected to fly the RNAV (GPS) Runway 4 approach to allow them to be better aligned and setup for the landing. Checklists and callouts were conducted, and the approach was stable. After the 500 ft stable callout was made the airplane crossed over a small section of trees and rose slightly. The airplane then began to porpoise slightly when it was about 100 to 150 ft above mean sea level. The pilot tried to make corrections, but the airplane was not responding to his control inputs. The airplane then landed hard and slid along the runway, coming to rest in the grass off of runway 4. After the airplane came to rest, they evacuated the passengers safely and powered down the airplane. According to the copilot, the flight from HPN to SSI was uneventful until the final few seconds. When they were cleared for the approach, the pilot configured the airplane, slowed appropriately, and selected “Flaps 3” for the landing. The checklists were completed, and they had the runway in sight when they were 10 miles from the airport. No other traffic was identified as being in the airport traffic pattern and they prepared to land. The copilot made the “500’, Stabilized, 20 knot of headwind” callout at approximately 500 ft’. As the airplane crossed above the airport property, it began to pitch rapidly up and down. The copilot then looked over at the pilot’s hand on the control side sick and he could see him moving it back and forth excessively. He then said something along the lines of “Take it easy there,” and the pilot replied that the airplane was not responding. At that point the airplane was “maybe 50 ft” above the runway. The airplane touched down hard, prior to the runway threshold, on centerline, bounced and then touched down again. The airplane was listing to the right and skidding on the runway while slowly drifting to the right. The airplane slid off the runway and onto the grass where it hit a concrete sign base before it came to rest on the grass. Prior to opening the main cabin door, the copilot realized that both engines were still running. He then asked the pilot to shut down engines so that he could open the door to deplane the passengers. The copilot observed fuel gushing from the belly of the airplane when he exited. Examination of the accident site and airplane revealed that the airplane was substantially damaged. Both main landing gear were damaged, and the struts had punctured the top of the wings. During the impact sequence the airplane skidded down runway 4 for approximately 2,531 ft, then departed the right side of the runway, shearing off eight runway lights, one taxiway light, and destroying the taxiway A4 directional sign. The right main landing gear separated from the airplane and the leading edge of the right wing was damaged consistent with the impact with the taxiway sign. The airplane then went across taxiway A4, coming to rest between runway 4, taxiway A, and taxiway A4. The total distance from the airplane’s touchdown to where the airplane came to rest was approximately 3,083 ft. The reported wind at SSI about the time of the accident was from 050° at 13 knots, gusting to 23 knots. According to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and pilot records, the pilot held an airline transport pilot certificate, with a rating for airplane multi engine land, and commercial privileges for airplane single engine land and single engine sea. He also held type ratings on the BE-300, BE-400, CE-560XL, CE-650, CL-600, EMB-550, HS-125, and MU-300. His most recent FAA firstclass medical certificate was issued on June 13, 2023. He reported that he had accrued approximately 10,900 total flight hours, with 1,872 hours in the airplane make and model. According to FAA and pilot records, the copilot held an airline transport pilot certificate with a rating for airplane multi engine land, and commercial privileges for airplane single engine land. He also held type ratings on the A-310, A-320, B-757, B-767, DC-9, DC-10, EMB-550, and LR-JET. His most recent FAA first-class medical certificate was issued on June 13, 2023. He reported that he had accrued approximately 16,686 total flight hours, with 306 hours in the airplane make and model. According to FAA and maintenance records, the airplane was manufactured in 2020. The airplane’s most recent continuous airworthiness inspection was completed on April 11, 2023, at 2,863 total hours of operation.

The pilot reported that he had completed a charter flight and departed to pick up new passengers at an airport about 200 nautical miles away. While on approach to the destination airport, the previous passengers notified the pilot that they were ready to be picked up, so the pilot did not land and turned the airplane back toward the departure airport. The pilot climbed to 10,000 ft and noticed the airplane’s fuel burn was high, so he climbed to 16,000 ft. The pilot reported that “everything was routine until about a 3-mile final” to the runway, when the controller asked the pilot to slow to a final approach speed. An airplane was still on the runway, so the controller told the pilot to go around. The pilot told controllers twice that he had minimum fuel available. The pilot continued on a visual approach for the same runway when the right engine lost power followed by the left engine. He feathered both propellers and made a forced landing to a wooded area. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage, both wings, and the empennage. The pilot reported that there were no preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. The pilot later stated that he was “trying to do too much with too little” fuel and the accident was a result of poor fuel management. Although the controller directed the pilot to go around, the pilot should have recognized the criticality of the minimum fuel situation and landed the airplane.

The crew departed Auburn-Lewiston Municipal Airport on a local training mission under callsign WIG634. After making a circuit over Sebago Lake located southwest of the airport, the crew continued to the northeast when control was lost. The airplane entered a descent with a rate of 7,300 feet per minute until it crashed in a wooded area located near Mt Oak Hill, about 25 km northeast of Auburn-Lewiston Municipal Airport. The airplane was destroyed and both occupants were killed.

On August 21, 2023, about 1315 central daylight time, an Israel Aircraft Industries 1125 Westwind Astra airplane, N39TT, sustained substantial damage when it was involved in an accident near Wheeling, Illinois. The pilot and co-pilot were not injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 positioning flight. According to the flight crew, they were cleared to land on runway 16 at Chicago Executive Airport, Wheeling, Illinois, and the airplane touched down within the touchdown zone. The pilot applied the brakes and deployed the thrust reversers. The pilot applied additional brake pressure and “found they were not grabbing.” The pilot released the brakes and reapplied brake pressure with no effect and advised the co-pilot he had no brakes. The co-pilot applied his brakes with no effect. The pilot selected the emergency brake handle and applied emergency braking. The pilot reported the emergency braking produced some slowing, and with the airplane’s nose wheel tiller, he attempted a right turn to exit the runway onto the 45° taxiway D, which he thought provided additional stopping distance. Due to the airplane’s energy and momentum, the airplane slid off the taxiway and into the adjacent grass. The airplane’s right main landing gear collapsed, and the airplane came to rest upright.

While in flight, the pilot heard and felt a bang from the right side of the airplane. He saw that the right engine nacelle had a hole in it and the engine was on fire. He secured the engine and diverted to a nearby airport. While on final approach for landing, the engine fire reignited. The pilot landed the airplane, taxied clear of the runway, shut down the left engine, and egressed. The engine fire continued to burn and consumed the right engine and a majority of the fuselage. Examination revealed that the right engine’s No. 2 cylinder was displaced from the engine case but remained attached via the injector manifold vent tube and injector lines. All eight of the No. 2 cylinder’s attach bolts were broken off at the case. The connecting rod cap was found lodged in the bottom of the piston. One connecting rod bolt was found broken off flush in the connecting rod; the top portion was not located. The other connecting rod bolt remained in the connecting rod cap with the nut also not located. One side of the lower connecting rod flange was bent back towards the piston, capturing the nut and remaining portion of the broken bolt. Neither bearing half could be identified in the remaining material. Numerous impact marks were noted on the piston, cylinder, and case. A review of maintenance records found that the engine was last overhauled about 4 ½ years before the accident and had accrued about 900 hours since the overhaul. Based on the available information, it is likely that the nut that secured one side of the connecting rod cap became loose, resulting the separation of the cap and subsequent damage to the No. 2 cylinder. Since the nut could not be located, the reason it did not remain secure could not be determined.