United States of America

Flight 16 departed Miami at 2112 October 4, 1945, one hour and 15 minutes late due to rerouting of the aircraft from a previous schedule. The flight from Miami progressed uneventfully with routine stops being made at Fort Myers, Sarasota, St. Petersburg and Tampa. The aircraft was refueled at Tampa and under contact flight rules was cleared to Lakeland 33 Miles away. Departure was made at 0045 with a crew of three and twelve passengers. The flight climbed to an altitude of 1500 feet and continued towards Lakeland. At the time of departure the weather at Tampa was unlimited while Lakeland was reporting 9 miles visibility and scattered clouds at 500 feet. At 0058, when seven miles from the field, the first officer called Lakeland and made an “in-range” report to which the Lakeland tower replied, “In range, wind NE 7-8 mph, NE runway”. Although the pilots observed scattered stratus clouds over the lighted city of Lakeland, the airport was clearly visible. A descent was established for a straight-in approach to the NE runway and when at an altitude of about 900 feet and approximately three or four miles from the field the captain extended the gear, put the mixture in automatic rich and reduced the manifold pressure to 20 inches. At an altitude of 700 feet the propellers were placed in low pitch and the landing lights were turned on. When about 2 miles from the field at 600 feet the flaps wore extended fully. Shortly thereafter, according to the testimony of the pilot, the aircraft entered a cloud, however, ground witnesses at no time lost sight of the flight during its approach indicating that the cloudiness was not extensive. This cloud was above dark terrain and had not been seen by the pilots as were others above the lighted city. Because of the unexpected presence of a cloud during the approach, the captain remarked to the first officer that he was going around again and retracted the wheels. Some power was applied and, according to statements of the captain, the flaps were started up at that time. A number of witnesses on and near the airport observed the aircraft continue down the runway at a uniform altitude of 30 or 40 feet. As it passed beyond the runway, the captain stated that the throttles were opened to 45 inches of manifold pressure but that the plane settled rapidly into the lake. The plane struck the surface of the water approximately 1000 feet beyond the runway shedding some fuselage covering and apparently skipped an additional 1000 feet where it sank in 10 feet of water. The occupants of the aircraft, with the exception of two passengers, escaped from the wreckage and were rescued by local residents approximately thirty minutes later.

Few minutes after takeoff from Norton AFB, in San Bernardino, while cruising in poor weather conditions, the aircraft hit the west slope of Mt Baldy at a height of 10,064 feet. The wreckage was found a day later and all four occupants have been killed. At the time of the accident, visibility was poor due to low clouds and precipitations.

At 0930, Alaskan Standard Time, 3 October 1945, Lieutenant Commander George Richard SMITH, USN, (82426) Commanding Officer, Patrol Bombing Squadron SIXTY-TWO, took off from Army Air Base, Cold Bay, Alaska, in a PBY-5A airplane on an administrative flight carrying messengers and material to Kodiak, Alaska, for Commandant, SEVENTEENTH Naval District. No other plane accompanied him. At this time, Cold Bay had scattered clouds at 1500 - 2000 feet with higher alto-cumulus at 6000 - 7000 feet. The route forecast gave lowering ceilings to 1000 feet at Chirikof. Terminal forecast for Kodiak gave 500-600 feet ceiling visibility 4 miles in light rain. The flight plan gave Anchorage, Alaska, as alternate airport. The 1330 weather sequency for Anchorage gave an estimated 5000 feet overcast with lower broken clouds at 2000 feet, wind north-northwest six knots, visibility unrestricted. At 1246 Lieutenant Commander SMITH contacted Kodiak Flight Control and reported his position at Black Point Intersection, cruising 3200 feet. Kodiak Flight Control cleared him to Kodiak Range Station to climb 4000 feet and notified him that the present Kodiak ceiling was 500 feet, visibility 2-1/2 miles. This message was acknowledged. At 1252 Kodiak Flight Control cleared him from his present position to Kodiak Range Station for standard instrument approach, final approach on east leg, initial approach at 4000 feet. He acknowledged this message and requested permission for needle approach. Kodiak Flight Control cleared him for needle approach. At 1317 he contacted Kodiak Tower and reported over Point ABLE (Kodiak Range Station) and requested present wind direction and velocity. Kodiak Tower reported wind east-southease 20 knots with gusts to 28. This report was acknowledged. While Lieutenant Commander SMITH was making his needle approach, Kodiak Tower reported to him that visibility was now two miles, bartow lights on runway 25, and that he would be landing with approximately 20 knots downwind. This was acknowledged. The plane was first sighted by the tower operators approximately 1/4 mile north of runway 25 at an altitude of approximately 400 feet. No voice contact was made. He continued downwind on the north side of an paralleling runway 25 in an attempt to land on runway 7. The 400-500 feet ceiling and the hills back of runway 7 made this approach impossible even though he appeared to make an "S" turn in an attempt to get into position for a landing. He continued the traffic circle upwind on the south side of runway 7 for a downwind landing on runway 25. As he flew over the tower at an altitude of approximately 300 feet, he contacted Kodiak Tower and said, "Am going to land on runway 25 this pass." The approach turn was started too soon for a downwind landing and the plane crossed the end of runway 25 at approximately 100 fet and came closest to the runway (estimated 0-10 feet) at approximately 130 feet beyond the intersection of runways 25 and 28. The plane either bounced or was pulled up and a normal power climb was started straight ahead until the end of runway 7 was crossed at which point a steep climbing turn to the left was started. Insufficient altitude was obtained to clear the surrounding hills and the plane crashed from an apparent power on. Immediately after the airplane crashed at 1331, the Kodiak Control Tower Operator sounded the crash alarm and directed the crash truck and fire trucks by radio to proceed to disabled aircraft on hillside at end of runway 7. As the trucks proceeded to the end of runway 7, the Control Tower gave them more specific instructions as to the location of crash stating that the disabled aircraft was on the hillside at the end of runway 7 in back of SeaBee Hill. The trucks were directed up SeaBee Hill to SeaBee buildings then just beyond to the plane on the northeast slope of Old Woman Mountain. The vehicles could proceed to within approximately 150 yards of the crash. From this point a path was made through the thickly-growing scrub trees to the scene. A fire hose was run to the scene from the SeaBee buildings, but was not used since the plane did not burn. Ambulances, doctors, and hospital corps men from the dispensary proceeded to the scene immediately. The first fire and rescue personnel arrived at eh crash at approximately 1340. Personnel from the SeaBee buildings arrived at approximately 1334. The victims were removed as quickly as possible. The plane came to rest on the starboard side of the fuselage. The starboard wing was broken off at the root and was lying parallel to the fuselage. Both engines were broken loose from their mountings and were 20 25 feet from the wreckage, partly buried in the ground. The plane from No. 4 bulkhead forward was completely demolished and was piled in a twisted heap under the wings and cabane section. The starboard wing was broken and twisted about six feet from the wing tip and wa also broken near the center. The port wing was broken off at the root. Little visible damage was done to the fuselage aft of number four bulkhead, except that the tail section was twisted, apparently by being struck by the starboard wing. Both wheels, sidema, and tires appeared to be undamaged. The keep aft of number four bulkhead was undamaged. No evidence of engine failure was observed by the surviving crew members or passengers. Salvage operations carried on until the following day recovering all plane parts and confidential radio equipment. All classified publications and charts were recovered. Examination of the wreckage disclosed no evidence of material failure or sabotage.
Those killed were:
Lt Cdr George Richard Smith,
Lt (jg) John Kenneth McNeil,
Ens Willard Edwin Tostman,
Richard Knightly,
Jewell Franklin,
Roy George Nelson,
Keith Eugene Dugger,
LT Paul Porter Butler.

The crew was performing a training flight in Topeka. For unknown reason, the aircraft landed on its belly and came to rest. There were no casualties but the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Shortly after a night takeoff from runway 35, the aircraft encountered problems to gain height. During the initial climb, at a height of some 30 feet, the Skytrain hit tree tops located 0.9 mile from the runway end, stalled and crashed in a wooded area, near the shore of the Missouri River. A passenger was seriously injured while 23 other occupants were killed.

The landing was completed on a very wet runway. After touchdown, the twin engine aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining distance, overran and came to rest partially submerged into the bay located past the runway end. All 14 occupants were quickly evacuated while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Flight 42 departed Miami for New York City at 2122LT, September 6, 1945, with routine stops at Jacksonville and Savannah. Having obtained an instrument clearance from Airway Traffic Control to cruise at 5,000 feet to Raleigh, the flight departed Savannah at 0041, September 7, with Washington and Baltimore listed as alternates. At 0150 the flight transmitted a position report to the company station at Washington indicating that it had passed over Florence at 0144 at 5,000 feet. The flight was advised that Raleigh, its next scheduled stop, was reporting a 300 foot overcast. Since the weather at Raleigh was below authorized minimums, Flight 42 requested permission from the company dispatcher to proceed past Raleigh without landing. The station at Washington advised the flight at 0155 that it had been re-cleared to Washington with Baltimore as an alternate, but no acknowledgement of the message was received. At 0205, a radio transmission from Flight 42 was intercepted in which it was indicated that the pilot intended to return to Florence and that he desired clearance to lend at Florence Field. Because of the unusually severe radio interference, the entire message was not readable and no reason was apparent at that time for the pilot's decision to return to Florence. Several subsequent attempts by company, CAA and army stations in the vicinity to contact the flight were unsuccessful. While attempting to return to Florence the aircraft crashed at 0213 in a swampy, wooded area 6 miles ENE of Florence Army Air Filed. The wreckage was located at approximately 1040, September 7.

While performing a night training mission off San Diego, the pilot lost control of the aircraft that dove into the sea and sank. There were no survivors.

The crew was performing a test flight while flying at low height, the seaplane (ski equipped) hit power cables and crashed into the Mission Gorge near the Mission Dam. Both pilots were killed.
Crew:
Cpt G. D. Ferrin,
Acmc F. S. Rakovic.

On approach to Grenier Field AFB, Manchester, the crew was hampered by poor visibility caused by night and low clouds. The aircraft crashed in a dense wood area located three miles south of the airport. Three crew members including Sgt Earl K. Allen. Two others survived, F/O William J. Anderson and Sgt Charles R. Jones.