United States of America

The pilot was killed when the aircraft crashed in unknown circumstances in Highland Falls.

The flight was operating between North Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and Louisville. It departed North Philadelphia Airport at 1303 on a Visual Flight Rules flight plan. The crew consisted of Captain W. E. Moller, First Officer J. D. Pickel, and Stewardess D. J. Bush. At departure the gross weight of the aircraft was 44,940 pounds (allowable 45,300 pounds), with 775 gallons of fuel aboard. Distribution of the load was within prescribed center of gravity limitations. The trip between North Philadelphia and Louisville was normal and in good weather. In the vicinity of Standiford Airport, the pilot requested landing instructions and was cleared for landing on Runway 24 by the tower. The clearance was acknowledged by the pilot. One of the three controllers on duty observed that the approach appeared normal until the flare-out when the aircraft "ballooned" slightly, power was applied, and about 500 feet farther on entered a steep climb. The aircraft then yawed to the left and climbed with a steadily increasing angle of attack. At this point he noticed that a portion of the left elevator was hanging down and immediately advised the aircraft but received no acknowledgement of his warning. The aircraft continued in a steep climbing left turn until it reached an altitude of about 300 feet, stalled, fell off to the left, and struck the ground on the nose and left wing. The fuselage burst open upon impact. A number of the occupants were thrown free and emergency equipment immediately took survivors to nearby hospitals. Due to the severity of impact and the extent of damage, there was no organized evacuation by the occupants. Sixteen passengers were injured while 25 others occupants, among them all three crew members, were killed.

The airplane was completing a special flight from Seattle to Boston, carrying 37 Korean War veterans and a crew of seven. Shortly after takeoff from Miles City Airport, the right engine caught fire. The crew decided to return for a safe landing but the captain realized he could not make it so he reduced his altitude and made a belly landing in a field located few miles from the airport. The aircraft came to rest in flames, and while all 44 occupants were evacuated safely, the aircraft was totally consumed by fire.

American Airlines' Flight 723 of September 16, 1953, was a scheduled operation between Boston Massachusetts, and Chicago, Illinois, with intermediate stops among which were Hartford, Connecticut, and Albany, New York. The crew consisted of Captain J. W. Stentz, First Officer W. J. Schanken, and Stewardess J. G. Thornquist, Prior to departing Boston the crew filed a company VFR (Visual Flight Rules) flight plan to Chicago following which the company issued a flight clearance to proceed to Albany INSTOP (Instrument or On Top of Clouds Authorize d) 2 with an intermediate landing at Bradley Field, the airport serving Hartford, Connecticut, and Springfield, Massachusetts. The alternate airport was Syracuse, New York. At the time this flight clearance was issued, the weather en route to Albany was good mid the conditions at Albany were above minimums. The portion of the flight to Bradley Field was without incident and the aircraft arrived there at 0657. At Bradley Field Captain Stentz reviewed the latest weather reports in the company's operations office and was advised that Bradley Field had been added to his flight clearance as a second alternate in addition to Syracuse because the weather at Albany at this time was below the company's landing minimums 3 was forecast to improve to within limits by the time the flight arrived there. The special Albany 0642 weather report available to the captain at this time was: ceiling indefinite zero, sky obscured, visibility zero, fog. The en route weather was clear. According to the company's records, the gross takeoff weight of the aircraft at Hartford was 37,889 pounds which was within the allowable gross take-off weight of 40,503 pounds; the load was properly distributed with respect to the center of gravity limits of the aircraft. Departure from Bradley Field was made at 0714 with 25 passengers. Immediately before departing, the flight advised the tower it was proceeding to Albany VFR. At 0737, a message from the company's dispatcher at New York was relayed to Captain Stentz through the company radio at Albany as follows: "If Albany still below limits on your arrival, if OK with you, suggest hold vicinity until at least 0830 EST. Expect Albany to have limits 0730-0800 EST. Advise fuel on board when over Albany." Flight 723 acknowledged and advised. "We will hold." At 0740, the flight reported to Albany Approach Control that it was over Montgomery Ward, an in-range visual check point, VFR, and requested a clearance of at least 500 feet on top of clouds to the Albany Range Station. This request was approved and the flight was cleared to maintain at least 500 feet on top and to hold north of the Range Station. The 0739 Albany special weather report was given the flight: "Ceiling indefinite, 100 feet, sky obscured, visibility 1/4 mile, fog, wind west-southwest one mile per hour." Flight 723 reported aver the Range Station at 0742. During the holding period the number of aircraft in this pattern varied from six to nine. The special Albany weather report issued at 0750 indicated thin obscurement, ceiling estimated 4,000, overcast, fog, visibility 3/4 miles. At 0753, the first of the aircraft in the holding pattern, American Airlines' Flight 750, was cleared for an instrument approach to Runway 19. At 0800, this aircraft missed its approach and was immediately cleared to climb toward the south and to again remain at least 500 feet on top of clouds. A second aircraft which was holding was then cleared to make a similar approach and it too was forced to execute a missed approach procedure. At 08163 an instrument approach mid a landing on Runway 19 were successfully completed by one of the holding aircraft. Immediately following this landing. Flight 723 was cleared to make an instrument approach to Runway 19. Three minutes later the flight advised the tower that its approach was being abandoned because the aircraft's flaps could not be lowered. It was then still at least 500 feet on top of clouds and was advised by the tower to remain there until further advised. At approximately 0830, the following message was transmitted from the Albany Tower: "All aircraft holding Albany. It now appears to be pretty good for a contact approach from the west. It looks much better than to the north." Immediately following this message, Flight 723 was asked by the tower if it would accept a contact approach from the west for a landing on Runway 10. After requesting and receiving current weather including altimeter setting (29.74) and the length of Runway 10 (4,500 feet). the flight stated it would accept a contact approach. Clearance was then issued the flight to make a contact approach to Runway 10. Acknowledgement of this clearance was the last radio contact with the flight. At approximately 0834, Flight 723 struck the radio towers and crashed. The weather reported at the time of the accident was thin scattered clouds at 500 feet, ceiling estimated 4,500 feet, broken clouds, visibility 1-1/2 miles, fog.

Northwest Airlines' Flight 8 departed Seattle-Tacoma Airport at 0148, September 6, 1953, for a nonstop flight to Chicago, Illinois. Gross weight on takeoff was 105,839 pounds; maximum allowable for takeoff was 116,740; maximum allowable for landing was 98.500 pounds. The location of the center of gravity was within prescribed limits. Weather at Seattle-Tacoma Airport during takeoff was: ceiling 200 feet and one-fourth mile visibility. Just after the aircraft became airborne No. 3 propeller oversped. Attempts by the flight engineer to correct this condition were unsuccessful and feathering was started one and one-half minutes later. However, the propeller continued to rotate at about 400 r.p.m. The flight's takeoff alternate was Yakima, Washington (a distance of 122 miles), but due to high terrain en route the captain elected to request clearance to proceed to Portland, Oregon (a distance of 132 miles), at 5,000 feet. This clearance was granted immediately. Using METO 2 power the aircraft reached 5,000 feet, well above the overcast, about 14 minutes after takeoff. Near the end of this climb the oil temperature of No. 4 engine was exceeding limits and the oil supply was being rapidly reduced. The flight engineer attempted to lower the temperature by fully opening the oil cooler flap. Temperature, however, remained high and the oil quantity continued to dwindle fast. Accordingly, the No. 4 propeller was feathered at about 0205 at the order of the captain who then declared an emergency and elected to land at McChord Air Force Base. Radio communication was established with McChord and arrangements made for a GCA approach after a short delay in establishing a frequency. No. 3 propeller had not feathered fully and was still windmilling at approximately 400 r.p.m. Meanwhile the captain had requested "takeoff" flaps, but the flaps would not extend hydraulically, and the copilot went to the cabin to crank them down. He stated that he turned the crank about 15-20 turns, at which point he found that it would no longer turn freely, whereupon he backed it to its original position. He was then called back to the cockpit to assist the captain in controlling the aircraft. Control difficulty had been continuously experienced with the aircraft yawing sharply and dropping a wing. The captain had placed the trim controls approximately in neutral, believing that he had a better feel and control of the aircraft without them at the recommended minimum speed of 130 knots. The aircraft, which had re-entered the overcast at about 2,000 feet, was then several miles from McChord Field under GCA direction on its first approach when its position and heading became such that the GCA operator directed a box pattern be flown to establish a proper approach. The second approach was executed in accordance with the directed pattern and the final approach was in line with Runway 34. The landing gear control was not actuated for gear extension until the aircraft broke out of the overcast at an altitude estimated at between 500 and 800 feet on a GCA controlled straight-in approach to Runway 34. At this time the captain ordered that No. 3 be unfeathered but it would not unfeather and continued to windmill. Only the right main gear extended fully and locked, as Indicated by its green light, but the landing was then committed. Shortly after touchdown retraction of the unlocked nose and left main gears allowed the aircraft to veer off the runway to the left. It then skidded sideways to its right, folding the right main gear inward, and the No. 2 engine was torn free. The aircraft came to rest on a heading of 212 degrees some 3,000 feet from the point of touch and about 7,000 feet short of the far end of the 10,000-foot runway. At about that time a gasoline fire started and spread rapidly over the ground below the airplane. Previously alerted fire apparatus, already standing by, kept the fire from spreading while all passengers and four of the crew left quickly by the main cabin door, the door sill being five or six feet above the ground. The flight engineer and the captain left by the cockpit crew door after ascertaining the cabin to be empty. All 32 occupants ware clear within an estimated two minutes. There were no fatalities although several persons were treated for burns at the McChord Air Force Base Hospital.

The aircraft was performing a special flight from Fort Ord AFB (Monterey) to McChord AFB, carrying 19 military passengers and two pilots. En route, the crew cancelled the IFR flight plan and continued under VFR in poor weather conditions. At an altitude of 2,600 feet in foggy conditions, the aircraft hit the slope of a mountain, was totally destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire and all 21 occupants were killed.

The twin engine aircraft was completing a flight from New York City to Grove City. On approach, it crashed in unknown circumstances in a field, killing both occupants, a pilot and his passenger.

While performing a training flight, the aircraft suffered an engine failure. The captain attempted an emergency landing in a desert area located 12 miles south of Caprock. The airplane was damaged beyond repair but there were no casualties.

Crashed in unknown circumstances five miles west of Vega. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

Few minutes after takeoff from Davis-Monthan AFB, while cruising at an altitude of 15,000 feet, the crew encountered an unexpected situation. Immediately, the captain ordered his crew to bail out and all 12 occupants abandoned the aircraft that dove into the ground and crashed in a huge explosion on the slope of the Picacho Peak, southeast of Picacho. The airplane disintegrated on impact and debris were found on a wide area. Ten crew members were injured while two others were killed.
Crew:
Cpt John D. Winters, pilot,
1st Lt William H. Montgomery, copilot,
William Reale, flight engineer,
Cpt John A. Barnes, navigator,
S/Sgt David Fry, radio operator,
William P. Cooke, gunner,
A1c Richard W. Dickey, gunner
A3c Charles R. Stewart, gunner,
Cpt Charles D. Bostick, †
S/Sgt Herbert G. Emberton, †
Cpt Lee F. Aubechon 1.