Crash of a Learjet 25C near Iguape: 6 killed

Date & Time: Jul 28, 1992 at 0911 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
PT-LHU
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Curitiba - Rio de Janeiro
MSN:
25-099
YOM:
1972
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
4
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
6
Captain / Total flying hours:
6520
Captain / Total hours on type:
9.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
1950
Copilot / Total hours on type:
9
Aircraft flight hours:
5655
Circumstances:
The twin engine aircraft departed Curitiba-Afonso Pena Airport at 0850LT on an 'on demand' taxi flight to Rio de Janeiro, carrying four passengers and two pilots. Once the assigned altitude of 33,000 feet was reached, the crew failed to reduce the engine power when, 3 minutes and 10 seconds later, the stick puller activated. The aircraft climbed to 33,900 feet then entered an uncontrolled descent. With a rate of descent of 18,000 feet per minute, the aircraft crashed in a near vertical attitude in a field. All six occupants were killed.
Probable cause:
The exact cause of the accident could not be determined with certainty. However, the following findings were reported:
- a. Human Factor
(1) Undetermined Physiological Aspect
Given the characteristics of the accident, which resulted in the destruction of the bodies, making it impossible to carry out examinations, it cannot be specified whether it contributed or not. However one cannot rule out the possibility that one of the crew members has been affected by a sudden illness (2nd Hypothesis of the Analysis).
(2) Psychological Aspect - Undetermined
It may have influenced, to the extent that the commander was operating an aircraft in which he had little experience and little knowledge, and which was demonstrated by the insecurity in the operation, reported to other pilots.
b. Material Factor
(1) Design Deficiency - Undetermined
Despite the information provided by representatives of Learjet Corp. who participated in the investigations, that the compensator engine ('pitch trim') with which this aircraft was equipped, had already undergone the modifications determined by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), one cannot help but wonder about a possible firing and locking of the 'pitch trim' engine in the extreme position (3rd Hypothesis of the Analysis). This aspect was hampered as the destruction suffered by the aircraft made a detailed analysis of the pitch trim system impossible.
c. Operational Factor
(1) Disabled Instruction - Contributed.
The commander and the co-pilot received a less than desired instruction, in quantitative and qualitative terms. As a result, the pilots did not acquire the full technical conditions necessary for the proper operation of the aircraft. The failure to perform the standard procedure to be followed in the emergency that led to the accident, i.e. the lowering of the landing gear, attests to the poor instruction given.
(2) Deficient Application of Controls: - Contributed
The pilots did not adjust the engine power properly after leveling and, after the aircraft started to abruptly descend, as a result, the 'overspeed' occurred, they could not avoid the loss of control.
(3) Weak Cockpit Coordination - Contributed.
The pilots made inadequate use of the aircraft's resources for its operation.
(4) Forgetfulness - Contributed.
This aspect is in accordance with the previous one, since the lowering of the undercarriage is part of the standard procedure to be performed in cases of overspeed.
(5) Little Flight Experience in the Aircraft - Contributed
The captain, despite having 6,500 hours of flight time, had already intended to fly another jet plane, but had flown little on Learjet. The other pilot, in turn, had had less experience in jet flying as a co-pilot, and in the Learjet, specifically, flew less than the commander.
As a result, when they were faced with an emergency that required rapid identification in order to take the necessary measures to remedy it, they lacked the necessary experience.
(6) Deficient Supervisor - contributed.
The air taxi company, to which the pilots belonged, was in a hurry to train this new crew. This resulted in inadequate operational training for the pilots, which demonstrates poor supervision of the company. The Civil Aviation System, through the regional body that deals directly with general aviation, failed to carry out proper oversight, as it did not detect the errors in the statements of instruction, and allowed the checks of the captain and the co-pilot to be carried out without reaching the minimum amount of flight hours and landings on that aircraft.
Final Report:

Crash of a Boeing 737-2A1C in Cruzeiro do Sul: 3 killed

Date & Time: Jun 22, 1992 at 0605 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
PP-SND
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Rio Branco - Cruzeiro do Sul
MSN:
21188
YOM:
1975
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Captain / Total flying hours:
4581
Captain / Total hours on type:
3081.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
2437
Copilot / Total hours on type:
337
Aircraft flight hours:
31980
Circumstances:
While descending to Cruzeiro do Sul Airport by night and good weather conditions, the crew encountered problems with the intermittent activation of a warning light in the instrument panel, warning them of a fire in the cargo compartment. On final approach, the aircraft struck trees and crashed in a dense wooded area located in hilly terrain. The wreckage was found 15 km from runway 10 threshold and all three occupants were killed.
Probable cause:
The following findings were reported:
a. Human Factor
(1) Physiological Aspect
- There was no evidence of this aspect contributing to the occurrence of the accident.
(2) Psychological Aspect - Contributed
- The psychological aspect contributed through the generation of a high level of anxiety to perform the landing and in the diversion of the focus of attention during the approach manoeuvres to land.
- The psychological aspect was influenced by the activation of the smoke alarm which generated an increase in the workload on board.
b. Material Factor
- There were no indications that this factor contributed to the accident.
c. Operational Factor
(1) Deficient Instruction
- Although the instruction was carried out in accordance with what the standards recommend, the failures that contributed to the accident are characteristic of lack of experience in facing abnormalities simultaneously with the maintenance of flight control. Such failures could be avoided with more adequate simulator instructions and training involving the cockpit management aspects.
(2) Poor Maintenance - Undetermined .
- It was not possible to determine the cause of the activation of the 'Aft Cargo Smoke' alarm and whether the maintenance services contributed to this occurrence.
(3) Deficient Cockpit Coordination
- Inadequate performance of the duties assigned to each crew member. The procedures foreseen for the execution of descent by instrument have been modified and some have been deleted depending on the appearance of a complicator element (smoke alarm).
(4) Influence of the environment
- The dark night contributed to the creation of the 'black hole' phenomenon, or 'background figure', making it difficult to perceive external references for a possible identification of the vertical distance of the aircraft from the ground.
(5) Deficient Oversight
- The supervision, at cockpit level, contributed to the accident by the inadequate management of the resources available for the flight in the cockpit.
- Company level supervision contributed to the accident by not identifying the need for cockpit management training and providing it to the crew involved.
- Supervision, at company level, was also inadequate when climbing to the same mission, two pilots unfamiliar with the airplane to be used and in night operation.
(6) Other Operational Aspects
- The failure to comply with several 'Callouts', the non-use of the radio altimeter and the inadequate use of the 'altitude alert', as an aid to the accomplishment of the descent procedure, contributed to the occurrence of the accident.
Final Report:

Crash of an Embraer EMB-820C Carajá in Guapó: 9 killed

Date & Time: Feb 28, 1992
Registration:
PT-VLW
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Brasília - Rio Verde
MSN:
820165
YOM:
1989
Location:
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
7
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
9
Captain / Total flying hours:
5000
Captain / Total hours on type:
30.00
Circumstances:
Fifty minutes after takeoff, while in cruising altitude on a flight from Brasília to Rio Verde, the crew lost control of the aircraft that entered a dive and crashed in an open field located near Guapó. The aircraft was totally destroyed and all nine occupants were killed.
Probable cause:
At the time of impact, both engines were running at cruise power. On takeoff from Brasília Airport, the total weight ot the aircraft was 436 kilos above MTOW, which may contribute to the accident. Nevertheless, investigations were unable to determine the exact cause of the accident. Maybe the pilot-in-command made a brutal movement on the control column, causing the aircraft to become uncontrollable following a structural failure of both winglets that were recently installed.
Final Report:

Crash of an Embraer EMB-110C Bandeirante in Caetité: 12 killed

Date & Time: Feb 3, 1992 at 1120 LT
Operator:
Registration:
PT-TBB
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Salvador - Guanambi
MSN:
110-005
YOM:
1973
Flight number:
NES092
Location:
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
10
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
12
Captain / Total flying hours:
4068
Captain / Total hours on type:
2368.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
1321
Copilot / Total hours on type:
671
Circumstances:
While descending to Guanambi Airport, the crew encountered poor weather conditions and limited visibility. At an altitude of 3,400 feet, the twin engine aircraft struck the slope of Mt Taquari located near Caetité, about 35 km northeast of Guanambi. The aircraft was destroyed and all 12 occupants were killed.
Probable cause:
Wrong approach configuration on part of the crew who continued the descent below MDA of 5,000 feet in limited visibility. The following contributing factors were reported:
- Poor judgment on part of the crew,
- Lack of crew coordination,
- Poor approach planning,
- The crew failed to follow the published approach procedures,
- Lack of visibility due to low clouds (Mt Taquari was shrouded in clouds),
- The crew did not establish any visual contact with the runway,
- Deficiencies in crew management, recruiting, selection and training supervision.
Final Report:

Crash of a Beechcraft C-12F Huron in Corumbá

Date & Time: Jan 11, 1992
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
85-1269
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
MSN:
BP-60
YOM:
1986
Country:
Crew on board:
0
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
After landing at Corumbá Airport, the twin engine was unable to stop within the remaining distance, overran and came to rest in a grove. There were no casualties. Apparently, the crew got lost en route after the navigation system failed. As the aircraft was short of fuel, the crew diverted to Corumbá Airport for an emergency landing.

Crash of an Embraer C-95C Bandeirante near Guaratinguetá: 16 killed

Date & Time: Nov 29, 1991 at 0815 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
2333
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Brasília - Guaratinguetá
MSN:
110-473
YOM:
1988
Country:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
13
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
16
Circumstances:
The twin engine airplane departed Brasília at 0600LT on a flight to Guaratinguetá, carrying high ranking officers who should take part to a military parade. On approach to Guaratinguetá Airport, the crew encountered marginal weather conditions when the aircraft struck the slope of Mt Pico dos Marins located 33 km northeast of the airport. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and all 16 occupants were killed.
Probable cause:
Controlled flight into terrain after the crew decided to continue the descent under VFR mode in IMC conditions. It was reported that the wrong approach configuration adopted by the crew caused the aircraft to enter a valley which was not mentioned on approach charts. Due to poor visibility because of low clouds, the crew was unable to distinguish the mountain struck by the aircraft. The crew was misled by external factors inherent to weather conditions.

Crash of a Grumman S-2E Tracker off Santa Cruz AFB

Date & Time: Nov 20, 1991
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
7033
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Santa Cruz AFB - Santa Cruz AFB
MSN:
270
YOM:
1957
Country:
Crew on board:
0
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
Crashed in unknown circumstances in the sea off Santa Cruz AFB. There were no casualties while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Crash of an Embraer EMB-110P1 Bandeirante in Recife: 17 killed

Date & Time: Nov 11, 1991 at 2143 LT
Operator:
Registration:
PT-SCU
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Recife - Maceió - Aracajú - Salvador
MSN:
110-314
YOM:
1980
Flight number:
NES115
Country:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
12
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
17
Captain / Total flying hours:
4295
Captain / Total hours on type:
901.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
2604
Copilot / Total hours on type:
1401
Aircraft flight hours:
3973
Circumstances:
During the takeoff roll on runway 36 at Recife-Guararapes Airport, the right engine failed. The crew decided to continue the takeoff procedure and completed the rotation after a course of 900 metres. Thirty seconds after rotation, at a height of about 100 feet, the right engine caught fire and exploded. The crew lost control of the airplane that crashed in the district of Ipsep near the airport. The aircraft and several buildings were destroyed. All 15 occupants as well as two people on the ground were killed.
Probable cause:
The accident was the consequence of the failure of the right engine during takeoff. It was determined that the temperature indicator for the right engine was faulty, displaying a lower than actual temperature. The engine operated for some time at high temperatures because of the faulty system. It was also found that, after completion, some maintenance and inspection tasks were just signed by the maintenance engineer. Signatures from the maintenance inspector were missing.
The following contributing factors were reported:
- Poor crew reaction to an emergency situation,
- Poor maintenance,
- Manufacturing deficiency,
- The crew failed to abort the takeoff procedure.
Final Report:

Crash of a Learjet 25D in Brasilía: 7 killed

Date & Time: Mar 18, 1991
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
PT-LLL
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Uberaba - Brasilía
MSN:
25-258
YOM:
1978
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
5
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
7
Circumstances:
On a night approach to Brasilía Airport, the aircraft crashed 8 km short of runway. All seven occupants were killed.

Crash of a Learjet 35A in Uberlândia

Date & Time: Mar 15, 1991 at 2107 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
PT-LIH
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
São Paulo – Uberlândia
MSN:
35-433
YOM:
1981
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
2
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
3850
Captain / Total hours on type:
550.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
15175
Copilot / Total hours on type:
525
Circumstances:
The aircraft departed São Paulo-Congonhas Airport on an ambulance flight to Uberlândia, carrying two doctors and two pilots who should pick-up a patient. The copilot was pilot flying. This was his first flight on a Learjet without an instructor. This was against regulations since the copilot was not fully qualified yet and the captain was not qualified to act as an instructor. Upon arrival at Uberlândia, weather conditions were poor with a low ceiling at 100 meters (clouds 8/8), fog and an horizontal visibility less than 200 meters (below minimums weather conditions). The crew abandoned the approach and initiated a go-around procedure. Few minutes later, a second approach was also abandoned. Rather than diverting to the alternate airport, the crew attempted a third approach when the aircraft struck the ground and crashed short of runway threshold. All four occupants were seriously injured and the aircraft was destroyed.
Probable cause:
The accident was the consequence of the combination of the following factors:
- Poor flight preparation and planning,
- Poor approach planning,
- Wrong approach configuration,
- Poor crew coordination,
- Lack of visibility due to the night associated to below minimums weather conditions,
- The crew failed to initiate a go-around and to divert to the alternate airport,
- Poor crew resources management,
- Non observation of operational procedures,
- Lack of supervision on part of the captain,
- Poor operational organization on part of the operator.
Final Report: