Sacramento

The commercial pilot, who was the pilot flying (PF), and the airplane transport pilot, who was the pilot not flying (PNF), were conducting an aeromedical positioning flight. The pilots reported that, during a night approach, they visually identified the airport, activated the runway lighting system, and then canceled the instrument flight plan for a visual approach. The PNF reported that, after turning onto the final approach, the flaps were fully lowered and that the airplane was in a “wings level, stabilized approach.” The PF reported that he was initially using the vertical approach slope indicator (VASI) for guidance but that the airplane drifted below the glidepath during the approach, and he did not correct back to the glidepath. On short final, the pilots verified that the landing gear were in the down-and-locked position by noting the illumination of the three green landing gear indicator lights, and the airspeed indicator indicated 110 knots. Both pilots reported that the landing was “firm” and that it was followed by a loud bang and the subsequent failure of all three landing gear. The airplane slid on its belly for about 825 ft down the runway before coming to rest. Both pilots evacuated the airplane, which was subsequently consumed by a postaccident fire. Both pilots reported that the airplane was operating normally with no discrepancies noted. Postaccident examination of the wreckage at the accident site revealed that the airplane impacted the runway about 100 ft short of its displaced threshold. Broken components of the landing gear were located along the debris field, which extended about 565 ft beyond the initial impact point. It is likely that the PF's failure to correct and maintain the VASI glidepath after allowing the airplane to descend below the glidepath and the touchdown at a high descent rate resulted in a hard landing and the subsequent failure of all three landing gear.

The airplane collided with obstructions following a loss of power in one engine during a missed approach. Following the collision sequence the airplane came to rest upright about 500 feet from the approach end of the runway and was destroyed in a post-impact ground fire. The pilot told a responding sheriff's deputy and a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector that he made the ILS approach to land and initiated a missed approach. When he added power, the left engine sputtered and the airplane veered to the left. He activated the fuel boost pump, but the airplane contacted obstructions and crashed. The responding sheriff's deputy also observed the accident. He heard an engine of an airplane making unusual sounds. The engine "seemed to get quiet and then revved higher as if to climb." He looked in the direction of the sound and saw a series of blue flashes and then an orange fireball. The deputy reported that there was a dense fog in the area at the time. At the time of the accident, the airport's weather conditions were reported as 100 feet overcast and 1/4-mile visibility in fog. The landing minimums for the ILS approach are 200 feet and 1/2-mile. According to the operator's records, when the airplane departed from Ukiah, its gross takeoff weight was about 5,909 pounds. The pilot operating handbook (POH) for the airplane lists the following items in the single engine go around checklist: 1) Throttle full forward; 2) wing flaps up; 3) when positive climb rate achieved, gear up; 4) ensure the inoperative engine is feathered. For a gross weight of 5,900 pounds, and the existing atmospheric conditions, the single engine climb performance chart shows an expected positive rate of climb of 500 feet per minute if the airplane was configured correctly. The chart also lists the following subtractions from that performance for the listed condition: 1) -400 fpm for wind milling inoperative engine; 2) -350 feet for landing gear down; 3) -200 fpm for flaps extended to 15 degrees. Examination of the wreckage disclosed that neither engine's propeller was feathered, the landing gear was down and the flaps were extended to 10 degrees. Without the airplane configured correctly for the single engine missed approach, the net climb performance would be a negative 400 feet per minute. There were no discrepancies noted with the airframe examination. The engine examination revealed no mechanical anomalies with either engine that would have precluded normal operation. 14 CFR 135.224 states that a pilot cannot initiate an approach if the weather conditions are below landing minimums if the approach is started outside of the final approach fix. The pilot can continue the landing if they are already established on the approach and the airport goes below landing minimums. According to the operator's FAA approved operating specifications, the operator had not been approved for lower than standard landing minimums.

The Co-Pilot was the flying pilot with the Captain giving directions throughout the approach phase. The Captain stated that he extended the flaps and the landing gear. When the aircraft touched down, the landing gear was not extended. The Co-Pilot reported that she did look down at the landing gear lever and at "three green lights" on the approach. The CVR was read out which indicated that the Co-Pilot directed the Captain to call inbound. The Captain acknowledged this and stated "fifteen flaps." The Co-Pilot then stated "fifteen flaps, before landing." The Captain did not respond to the Co-Pilot but instead made a radio transmission. The Captain shortly thereafter, stated that he was extending the flaps to 25 degrees. The Captain made another radio transmission to the tower when the Co-Pilot stated "final, sync, ignitions." The Captain responded "ignitions on." Full flaps were then extended. The Captain gave the Co-Pilot continued directions while on the approach for heading, speed and altitude. At approximately 300 feet, the Captain stated, "yaw damper's off, air valves are off, ready to land." The Captain reported that it was obvious that touchdown was on the flaps and keel. The Captain stated that he raised the flaps, shutdown the engines, and confirmed that the landing gear handle was down. During the gear swing test the landing gear cycled several times with no difficulties. All red and green lights illuminated at the proper positions. During the test, it was found that the gear not extended horn did not function with the gear retracted, the flaps fully extended and the power levers at idle. Later a bad set of contacts to the relay was found. When the relay was jumped, the horn sounded. Inspection of the damage to the aircraft revealed that the outer rims of both outer tires displayed scrape marks around the circumference of the rim. The outer surface of the gear door fairings were scraped and the flap hinge fairings was ground down.

The airplane collided with mountainous terrain during climb to cruise on a night departure. The pilot of the on-demand cargo flight was brought in off reserve to replace the scheduled pilot who was ill. The flight was behind schedule because the cargo was late. When the instrument flight release created further delay, the pilot opted to depart into the clear, dark night under visual flight rules (VFR) with the intention of picking up his instrument clearance when airborne. When clearing the flight for takeoff, the tower controller issued a suggested heading of 340 degrees, which headed the aircraft toward mountainous terrain 11 miles north of the airport. The purpose of the suggested heading was never stated to the pilot as required by FAA Order 7110.65L. After a frequency change to radar departure control, the controller asked the pilot 'are you direct [the initial (route) fix] at this time?' and the pilot replied, 'we can go ahead and we'll go direct [the initial fix].' A turn toward the initial fix would have headed the aircraft away from high terrain. The controller then diverted his attention to servicing another VFR aircraft and the accident aircraft continued to fly heading 340 degrees until impacting the mountain. ATC personnel said the 340-degree heading was routinely issued to departing aircraft to avoid them entering Class B airspace 3 miles from the airport. The approach control supervisor said this flight departs daily, often VFR, and routinely turns toward the initial fix, avoiding mountainous terrain. When the pilot said that he would go to the initial fix, the controller expected him to turn away from the terrain. Minimum Safe Altitude Warning (MSAW) was not enabled for the flight because the original, instrument flight plan did not route the aircraft through this approach control's airspace and the controller had not had time to manually enter the flight data. High terrain was not displayed on the controller's radar display and no safety alert was issued.

Approaching Reno, the pilot received an instrument clearance to perform a Localizer DME-1, Rwy 16R, approach, which the FAA had previously approved for the operator's use. The localizer centerline passed over a 6,161-foot msl mountain, which was depicted on the chart. The pilot was familiar with the area, having transported cargo from Sacramento to Reno for 5 days each week since December, 1994. IMC existed and light snow showers were present. ATC issued the pilot a series of instructions as he was radar vectored toward the final approach fix (FAF), which had a minimum crossing altitude of 6,700 feet msl. The pilot misstated four of the instructions during clearance readbacks and was corrected by ATC each time. Contact with the pilot was lost following issuance of his landing clearance. The airplane impacted the mountainside at an elevation of about 6,050 feet, while tracking inbound near the centerline of the localizer course, about 2.7 nautical miles before reaching the FAF. The airframe, engine, and avionics equipment were examined. No mechanical malfunctions were found.

On final approach to Hollywood-Burbank Airport, one of the engine failed. The pilot decided to attempt an emergency landing when the airplane crash landed in a rough terrain located few miles from the airfield. All three occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was destroyed.

After liftoff, the right engine lost power. The airplane encountered difficulties to gain height, struck tree tops and crashed near the runway end. All six occupants were injured, four of them seriously. The aircraft was destroyed.

While in cruising altitude on a flight from Portland from Sacramento in marginal weather conditions, the twin engine airplane suffered an airframe failure. It entered a dive and crashed in a field located near Cheshire, northwest of Eugene. The aircraft was totally destroyed and all seven occupants were killed.

While in cruising altitude, the pilot encountered poor weather conditions with rain, turbulences and thunderstorm activity. While flying under VFR mode, he lost control of the airplane that entered a dive. It suffered an in-flight failure then crashed inverted in water near Walnut Grove. All six occupants were killed. VFR flight was not recommended by FSS.

The flight departed Burbank, California, at 1420, bound for Oakland and Sacramento, with a crew consisting of James S. Garnett, pilot, Joseph Dillon, copilot and Susan DeVore, stewardess. Takeoff was accomplished from Oakland at 1656 at which time the aircraft carried six passengers, out no cargo. Total aircraft weight was within the certificated limits and the load was properly distributed. The aircraft carried fuel sufficient for a flight of two hours and thirty minutes and the estimated flight time to Sacramento was thirty minutes. Following take off, the flight cruised five miles northwest of the Oakland Airport for seven minutes while waiting for receipt of an instrument flight clearance which provided for a cruising altitude of 4,000 feet to Sacramento. The flight then proceeded on course, and at 1708 reported over the Richmond Radio flange Intersection, 16 miles northwest of Oakland, stating that it would be over the Fairfield Radio flange Station, 41 miles northeast of Richmond, at 1723. Since there was no routine mention of altitude, Air Route Traffic Control immediately requested the information, and the flight replied that at was at 4,000 feet. This was the last communication received from the flight. Approximately one hour after the position report over Richmond, CAA Communications received a report that the flight had crashed six miles east of Vallejo. All occupants were killed and the aircraft was destroyed.