Lincoln

The pilot obtained a preflight weather briefing about 2.5 hours before departing on an instrument flight rules (IFR) cross-country flight. Automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) and weather data indicated the flight encountered low IFR (LIFR) conditions during the approach to the destination airport. These conditions included low ceilings, low visibility, localized areas of freezing precipitation, low-level turbulence and wind shear. The ADS-B data revealed that during the last minute of data, the airplane’s descent rate increased from 500 ft per minute to 3,000 ft per minute. In the last 30 seconds of the flight the airplane entered a 2,000 ft per minute climb followed by a descent that exceeded 5,000 ft per minute. The last data point was located about 1,000 ft from the accident site. There were no witnesses to the accident. A postaccident examination of the airframe and engine revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. The airplane’s flight instruments and avionics were destroyed during the accident and were unable to be functionally tested. The rapid ascents and descents near the end of the flight track were consistent with a pilot who was experiencing spatial disorientation, which resulted in a loss of control and high-speed impact with terrain. The pilot purchased the airplane about 3 weeks before the accident and received about 15 hours of transition training in the airplane, including 1 hour of actual instrument conditions during high-altitude training. The pilot’s logbook indicated he had 5.2 hours of actual instrument flight time. At the time of the pilot’s weather briefing, the destination airport was reporting marginal visual flight rules (MVFR) conditions with the terminal area forecast (TAF) in agreement, with MVFR conditions expected to prevail through the period of the accident flight. LIFR conditions were reported about 40 minutes before the airplane’s departure and continued to the time of the accident. Light freezing precipitation was reported intermittently before and after the accident, which was not included in the TAF. The destination airport’s automated surface observing system (ASOS) reported LIFR conditions with overcast ceilings at 300 ft above ground level (agl) and light freezing drizzle at the time of the accident. Low-level turbulence and wind shear were detected, which indicated a high probability of a moderate or greater turbulence layer between 3,600 and 5,500 ft mean sea level (msl) in the clouds. During the approach, the airplane was in instrument meteorological conditions with a high probability of encountering moderate and greater turbulence, with above freezing temperatures. The National Weather Service (NWS) had issued conflicting weather information during the accident time period. The pilot’s weather briefing indicated predominately MVFR conditions reported and forecasted by the TAFs along the route of flight, while both the NWS Aviation Weather Center (AWC) AIRMET (G-AIRMET) and the Graphic Forecast for Aviation (GFA) were depicting IFR conditions over the destination airport at the time of the briefing. The TAFs, GAIRMET, and Current Icing Product (CIP)/Forecast Icing Products (FIP) were not indicating any forecast for icing conditions or freezing precipitation surrounding the accident time. The pilot reviewed the TAF in his briefing, expecting MVFR conditions to prevail at his expected time of arrival. The TAF was amended twice between the period of his briefing and the time of the accident to indicate IFR to LIFR conditions with no mention of any potential freezing precipitation or low-level wind shear (LLWS) during the period. Given the pilot’s low actual instrument experience, minimal amount of flight experience in the accident airplane, and the instrument conditions encountered during the approach with a high probability of moderate or greater turbulence, it is likely that the pilot experienced spatial disorientation and lost control of the airplane.

The instrument-rated private pilot departed on an instrument flight rules (IFR) cross-country flight plan in near-zero visibility with mist, light freezing rain, and moderate mixed and clear icing. After departure, and as the airplane entered a climbing right turn to a track of about 260 degrees, the pilot reported to air traffic control that she was at 1,000 feet, climbing to 10,000 feet. The flight remained on a track of about 260 degrees and continued to accelerate and climb for 38 seconds. The pilot then declared an emergency, stating that she had an attitude indicator failure. At that moment, radar data depicted the airplane at 3,500 feet and 267 knots. Thirteen seconds later, the pilot radioed she wasn't sure which way she was turning. The transmission ended abruptly. Radar data indicated that at the time the transmission ended the airplane was in a steep, rapidly descending left turn. The fragmented airplane wreckage, due to impact and subsequent explosive forces, was located in a wooded area about 6 miles south-southwest of the departure airport. Examination of the accident site revealed a near vertical high-speed impact consistent with an in-flight loss of control. The on-site examination of the airframe remnants did not show evidence of preimpact malfunction. Examination of recovered engine remnants revealed evidence that both engines were producing power at the time of impact and no preimpact malfunctions with the engines were noted. The failure, single or dual, of the attitude indicator is listed as an abnormal event in the manufacturer's Pilot's Abbreviated Emergency/Abnormal Procedures. The airplane was equipped with three different sources of attitude information: one incorporated in the primary flight display unit on the pilot's side, another single instrument on the copilot's side, and the standby attitude indicator. In the event of a dual failure, on both the pilot and copilot sides, aircraft control could be maintained by referencing to the standby attitude indicator, which is in plain view of the pilot. The indicators are powered by separate sources and, during the course of the investigation, no evidence was identified that indicated any systems, including those needed to maintain aircraft control, failed. The pilot called for a weather briefing while en route to the airport 30 minutes prior to departure and acknowledged the deteriorating weather during the briefing. Additionally, the pilot was eager to depart, as indicated by comments that she made before her departure that she was glad to be leaving and that she had to go. Witnesses indicated that as she was departing the airport she failed to activate taxi and runway lights, taxied on grass areas off taxiways, and announced incorrect taxi instructions and runways. Additionally, no Federal Aviation Administration authorization for the pilot to operate an aircraft between 29,000 feet and 41,000 feet could be found; the IFR flight plan was filed with an en route altitude of 38,000 feet. The fact that the airplane was operating at night in instrument meteorological conditions and the departure was an accelerating climbing turn, along with the pilot's demonstrated complacency, created an environment conducive to spatial disorientation. Given the altitude and speed of the airplane, the pilot would have only had seconds to identify, overcome, and respond to the effects of spatial disorientation.

The airplane departed Appleton, Wisconsin, at 1245LT on a regular schedule service (ZW965) to Lincoln, Nebraska, with an intermediate stop in Minneapolis. En route, while cruising at 12,000 feet, the crew encountered moderate turbulences and precipitation and was cleared to descend to 8,000 feet then later at 6,000 feet. As turbulences were getting worse, the crew was later cleared to descend to 4,000 feet and finally 3,000 feet. While descending to 6,000 feet, massive water ingestion caused both engines to lose power simultaneously. Both engines were restarted but the Metro couldn't recover and struck a muddy field in a slight nose down, right wing-down attitude. The aircraft bounced and hit the ground 288 feet further on. The plane skidded 1,022 feet before coming to rest inverted. There was no fire. Two passengers were seriously injured while 13 other occupants were killed.

After a night takeoff from Rochester Airport in poor weather conditions, the airplane suffered an engine failure. The pilot lost control of the aircraft that crashed in flames past the runway end. The aircraft was destroyed and all four occupants were killed.

During a night approach to Kansas City Airport, while on a ferry flight from Lincoln, the airplane went out of control, rolled over and crashed in flames. The aircraft was totally destroyed and both occupants were killed.

The takeoff from Lincoln Airport was initiated in low ceiling and fog. Just after liftoff, the twin engine airplane went out of control and crashed. The aircraft was destroyed and all three occupants were killed.

The first officer, who was flying, started the approach to runway 17 which does not have approach lights nor Instrument landing System. At the time the aircraft was northbound in the holding pattern of the Grand Island VOR. A 90 degree left turn, then a 270 degree right turn was accomplished which aligned the aircraft, with the runway. The following sequence of events was described by the captain and substantiated by the first officer. The captain stated “. . . We completed the approach checklist and made a turn north of the low frequency range (8391 feet from the threshold of runway 17) which was visible as we went over it. The area around the range and the south half of the distance to the airport was absolutely clear. Our path was one which had the runway lights clearly aligned. (The runway lights were on at position 3 which is medium intensity.) The approach was a normal gradual descent. The radios were tuned to the low frequency range and the Omni. Since we were not ready to land our checklist was complete with the exception of approach flaps and landing flaps and ADI on. There were no ground witnesses to the approach or crash which was in a large level open field. There was no moonlight and the captain testified that except for the lights on the range station, there were no ground lights seen under the approach path. Both he and the first officer testified that they did not observe the runway light appear to "spread," which amounts to a visual warning of being very low - nearly at the level of the lights upon approaching the runway. A weather observation at 2037. seven minutes after the accident was: special, clear, visibility 7 miles, temperature 26 degrees F, dewpoint 26 degrees F, wind south 10 knots, altimeter setting 29.80 inches (aircraft accident) (observation recorded but not transmitted via teletype). The initial point of contact of the nosewheel was about three feet to the right of the extended centerline of runway 17 and approximately 4,061 feet short of the threshold of that runway. Additional marks indicate that the aircraft struck while nearly level longitudinally, in a yaw of about six degrees to the right, and in a shallow left bank. Upon initial impact, the left main landing gear collapsed and was torn free. Both propellers struck the ground and were also torn off with the nose cones of their respective engines. The left wing became detached as the aircraft rolled to the left onto its back and slid, inverted, swerving to the left and coming to rest on a heading of about 045 degrees at a distance of 1,275 feet from the place of first contact. Fire developed in the detached left wing, but not in the fuselage. Consequently all 43 occupants were able to evacuate the aircraft quickly, with the majority going out through the galley service door, which the stewardess opened and the others leaving via the emergency exit at seat 8D. The captain left through a cockpit window; the first officer and one passenger through a hole in the fuselage. Injuries were sustained by both pilots and three passengers. The aircraft was destroyed by a post crash fire.

During the takeoff roll, the nose gear collapsed. The airplane skidded for few dozen metres then veered off runway and collided with a fuel tank, bursting into flames. All 24 occupants evacuated, among them five were injured. The airplane was destroyed by a post crash fire.
Crew:
1st Lt William E. Novetzke, pilot,
Cpt Thomas L. Hedge, pilot,
1st Lt Thomas G. Artman, navigator,
A2C Wilbert T. Heath, boom operator.
Passengers:
S/Sgt Annas S. Thompson,
A1C Edward M. Sennett,
Maj Walter A. Arrington,
M/Sgt Robert L. Chapin,
T/Sgt Robert W. Watson,
A2C Lawrence E. Newton,
1st Lt Ronald L. Munn,
1st Lt Berthold Muecke,
A2C Eugene C. Shelton,
A1C Melvin R. Furgeson,
A2C Charles W. Samples,
A2C Lloyd C. Bray,
A1C Darr E. Martner,
A2C Clyde E. Rufener,
A3C Nroman S. Rydwell,
A2C Howard A. Betts,
A2C Ronald H Ragland,
S/Sgt James E. Briggs,
A2C Walt Coburn,
A2C Raymond A. Nelson.

The crew was engaged in a training flight from Lincoln and the mission consisted in a test of the embarked compass system. While flying in the region of Kansas City, the crew encountered technical problems with the compass and attempted an emergency landing when the aircraft hit tree tops, electric and telephone cables before crashing onto a house located in Merriam, in the suburb of Kansas City. Three crew members were killed while three others were injured. Four people on the ground were injured as well.

Crashed on take off for unknown reason. Two crew members were killed while five others were injured.