Kansas City

The pilot was en route on a positioning flight when the airplane’s right engine surged and experienced a partial loss of power. He adjusted the power and fuel mixture controls; however, a few seconds later, the engine surged again. The pilot noted that the fuel flow gauge was below 90 pounds, so he turned the right fuel pump on. The pilot then felt a surge on the left engine, so he performed the same actions he as did for the right engine. He believed that he had some sort of fuel starvation problem. The pilot then turned to an alternate airport, at which time both engines lost total power. The airplane impacted trees and terrain about 1.5 miles from the airport. The left side fuel tank was breached during the accident; however, there was no indication of a fuel leak, and about a gallon of fuel was recovered from the airplane during the wreckage retrieval. The company’s route coordinator reported that prior to the accident flight, the pilot checked the fuel gauge and said the airplane had 120 gallons of fuel. A review of the airplane’s flight history revealed that, following the flight immediately before the accident flight, the airplane was left with approximately 50 gallons of fuel on board; there was no record of the airplane having been refueled after that flight. Another company pilot reported the airplane fuel gauge had a unique trait in that, after the airplane’s electrical power has been turned off, the gauge will rise 40 to 60 gallons before returning to zero. When the master switch was turned to the battery position during an examination of another airplane belonging to the operator, the fuel gauge indicated approximately 100 gallons of fuel; however, when the master switch was turned to the off position, the fuel quantity on the gauge rose to 120 gallons, before dropping off scale, past empty. Additionally, the fuel cap was removed and fuel could be seen in the tank, but there was no way to visually verify the quantity of fuel in the tank.

Prior to departure, the pilot was informed that it had been raining; the roads were wet, but no mention of ice at his destination. During the approach to the destination airport, the runway appeared "wet", and a normal approach and landing was attempted. The airplane touched down at 110 knots, the pilot "then deployed lift dump and [then applied the] brakes". Unable to get braking action, the pilot tried to slide the airplane "left and right" to get traction, but could not. The airplane departed the south end of the 4,370-foot-long runway, went over the edge of an embankment and stopped next to a levee. There were no reported pre-impact malfunctions with the airplane. The Manufacturer Approved Airplane Flight Manual Supplement for Airplanes Operating on Wet and contaminated Runways; General Information Section, states operations on runways contaminated with ice or wet ice are not recommended and no operational information is provided. Using the supplement, the anticipated landing distance on a wet runway was calculated to be about 3,400 feet, the anticipated landing distance on an uncontaminated runway was calculated to be approximately 2,800 feet, and the prescribed landing speed (Vref) was determined to be about 111 knots. A braking action (runway condition) report for the private airfield's runway did not exist, nor was one required.

The airline's chief pilot was giving a newly-hired pilot a required competency/proficiency check. Memory data from the airplane's global positioning system showed the airplane made
steep 360-degree turns to the left and right before continuing towards a practice area at gradually decreasing airspeed and altitude. A low cloud ceiling prevailed. Witnesses said they
heard both engines "sputter, then quit," and saw the airplane clear a grove of trees, stall, and strike the ground. The landing gear was down and the flaps were in the approach setting. Both propellers were in the low pitch/high rpm setting, and bore little rotational signatures. Both engine fuel supply lines contained only residual fuel. Those familiar with the chief pilot's flying practices stated that he always followed a certain routine when giving a check ride. The routine consisted of the following: After performing steep 360-degree turns, he would ask the trainee to configure the airplane for landing and demonstrate minimum control maneuvers. Prior to executing steep turns, he would turn the boost pumps on. At the completion of the maneuver, the pumps would be turned off. The investigation revealed that there are unguarded fuel shutoff switches next to the boost pumps, and the circumstances of the accident are consistent with the these fuel shutoff switches being inadvertently placed in the off position, instead of the fuel boost pumps.

On February 9, 1998, about 0954 central standard time (CST), a Boeing 727-223 (727), N845AA, operated by American Airlines as flight 1340, impacted the ground short of the runway 14R threshold at Chicago O'Hare International Airport (ORD) while conducting a Category II (CAT II) instrument landing system (ILS) coupled approach. Twenty-two passengers and one flight attendant received minor injuries, and the airplane was substantially damaged. The airplane, being operated by American Airlines as a scheduled domestic passenger flight under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121, with 116 passengers, 3 flight crewmembers, and 3 flight attendants on board, was destined for Chicago, Illinois, from Kansas City International Airport (MCI), Kansas City, Missouri. Daylight instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident.

The new owner/co-pilot of the 50-year-old airplane and another pilot, who was typed rated in the airplane, departed on a 1,700 mile ferry flight. After the first 250 mile leg, the airplane was landed at another airport with a right engine problem. The owner replaced the right engine and continued the ferry flight. Twenty minutes into the second flight, the replacement right engine lost power. The owner stated that they applied maximum power to the left engine, were unable to feather the right propeller, and performed a forced landing to a field. However, the airplane collided with trees before reaching the field, then burned after impact. Investigation revealed that during the past 5 years, the airplane had neither flown nor had an annual inspection, except for 3 recent maintenance flights, totaling 1.5 Hours. The right propeller blades had chordwise scratches. The left propeller blades had no chordwise scratches. Examination of the wreckage revealed three propeller strikes in the ground, near the right engine ground scar, and no propeller strikes in the ground, near the left engine ground scar. The right engine mixture was locked in the auto-cruise position, while the left was locked in the emergency position. Airplane charts listed the single-engine rate of climb with a feathered propeller to be 350 feet per minute, and 10 feet per minute with a windmilling propeller.

The airplane crashed immediately after liftoff during a three-engine takeoff. Flightcrew had shortened rest break; rest periods not required for ferry flights. Flight crew fatigue from lack of rest, sleep, and disruption of circadian rhythms. Flightcrew did not have adequate, realistic training in three-engine takeoff techniques or procedures. Flight crew did not adequately understand three-engine takeoff procedures, including significance of vmcg. Flight engineer improperly determined vmcg speed, resulting in value 9 knots too low. During first takeoff attempt, captain applied power to asymmetrical engine too soon, was unable to maintain directional control, and rejected the takeoff. Captain agreed to modify procedure by allowing flight engineer to advance throttle, a deviation of prescribed procedure. FAA oversight of operator was inadequate because the poi and geographic inspectors were unable to effectively monitor domestic crew training and international operations. Existing far part 121 flight time limits & rest requirements that pertained to the flights that the flightcrew flew prior to the ferry flights did not apply to the ferry flights flown under far part 91. Current one-engine inoperative takeoff procedures do not provide adequate rudder availability for correcting directional deviations during the takeoff roll compatible with the achievement of maximum asymmetric thrust at an appropriate speed greater than ground minimum control speed. All three crew members were killed.

During arrival at night in fog and drizzle, the pilot was cleared for an ILS runway 1l approach. While on the approach, she reported encountering moderate rime ice. Radar data showed that the airplane continued inbound on the localizer until it neared the middle marker, then it deviated about 20° left and collided with the ground, about 300 feet short and 300 feet left of the threshold. According to witnesses, the airplane stopped its descent and slowed down, shortly before entering a steep descent and a spin. An on-scene investigation revealed no preimpact airframe, control system, or powerplant anomalies. The wings had 1/4 inch of ice on the leading edge and a 1/2 inch high ridge of ice, parallel to the deicing boots, about 3 inches aft of the boots. The cockpit and windshield heating system were found in the 'off' position. The pilot's logbook was not available for inspection. Company records showed she had passed a 14 cfr part 135 checkride on may 20, 1994. The faa checkride form was administered and signed by the chief pilot. However, other records/information showed the chief pilot would not have been able to have given the checkride on that date.

During the second ILS approach the airplane descended below the glidepath and impacted the terrain 2,500 feet short of the intended landing runway. The pilot indicated that a failure in the approach lighting system contributed to the accident. A post accident functional check of the approach lighting system failed to reveal any anomalies.