Bartlesville-Frank Phillips

About 3 months before the accident, the pilot received about 9 hours of flight instruction, including completion of an instrument proficiency check, in the airplane. The accident flight was a personal cross-country flight operated under instrument flight rules (IFR). Radar track data depicted the flight proceeding on a west-southwest course at 15,800 ft mean sea level (msl) as it approached the destination airport. The flight was cleared by the air traffic controller for a GPS approach, passed the initial approach fix, and, shortly afterward, began a descent as permitted by the approach procedure. The track data indicated that the flight became established on the initial approach segment and remained above the designated minimum altitude of 12,000 ft msl. Average descent rates based on the available altitude data ranged from 500 feet per minute (fpm) to 1,000 fpm during this portion of the flight. At the intermediate navigation fix, the approach procedure required pilots to turn right and track a north-northwest course toward the airport. The track data indicated that the flight entered a right turn about 1 mile before reaching the intermediate fix. As the airplane entered the right turn, its average descent rate reached 4,000 fpm. The flight subsequently tracked northbound for nearly 1-1/2 miles. During this portion of the flight, the airplane initially descended at an average rate of 3,500 fpm then climbed at a rate of 1,800 fpm. The airplane subsequently entered a second right turn. The final three radar data points were each located within 505 ft laterally of each other and near the approximate accident site location. The average descent rate between the final two data points (altitudes of 10,100 ft msl and 8,700 ft msl) was 7,000 fpm. About the time that the final data point was recorded, the pilot informed the air traffic controller that the airplane was in a spin and that he was attempting to recover. No further communications were received from the pilot. The airplane subsequently impacted the surface of a reservoir at an elevation of about 6,780 ft and came to rest in 60 ft of water. A detailed postaccident examination of the airframe, engine and propeller assembly did not reveal any anomalies consistent with a preimpact failure or malfunction. The available meteorological data suggested that the airplane encountered clouds (tops about 16,000 ft msl or higher and bases about 10,000 ft msl) and was likely operating in IFR conditions during the final 15 minutes of the flight; however, no determination could be made regarding whether the clouds that the airplane descended through were solid or layered. In addition, the data suggested the possibility of both light icing and light turbulence between 12,000 ft msl and 16,000 ft msl along the flight path. Although the pilot appeared to be managing the flight appropriately during the initial descent, it could not be determined why he was unable to navigate to the approach fixes and maintain control of the airplane as he turned toward the airport and continued the descent.

The pilot was en route on a positioning flight when the airplane’s right engine surged and experienced a partial loss of power. He adjusted the power and fuel mixture controls; however, a few seconds later, the engine surged again. The pilot noted that the fuel flow gauge was below 90 pounds, so he turned the right fuel pump on. The pilot then felt a surge on the left engine, so he performed the same actions he as did for the right engine. He believed that he had some sort of fuel starvation problem. The pilot then turned to an alternate airport, at which time both engines lost total power. The airplane impacted trees and terrain about 1.5 miles from the airport. The left side fuel tank was breached during the accident; however, there was no indication of a fuel leak, and about a gallon of fuel was recovered from the airplane during the wreckage retrieval. The company’s route coordinator reported that prior to the accident flight, the pilot checked the fuel gauge and said the airplane had 120 gallons of fuel. A review of the airplane’s flight history revealed that, following the flight immediately before the accident flight, the airplane was left with approximately 50 gallons of fuel on board; there was no record of the airplane having been refueled after that flight. Another company pilot reported the airplane fuel gauge had a unique trait in that, after the airplane’s electrical power has been turned off, the gauge will rise 40 to 60 gallons before returning to zero. When the master switch was turned to the battery position during an examination of another airplane belonging to the operator, the fuel gauge indicated approximately 100 gallons of fuel; however, when the master switch was turned to the off position, the fuel quantity on the gauge rose to 120 gallons, before dropping off scale, past empty. Additionally, the fuel cap was removed and fuel could be seen in the tank, but there was no way to visually verify the quantity of fuel in the tank.

The captain was cross-feeding both engines from the right tank while the first officer (f/o) was flying, without informing the f/o. The captain then left the cockpit while cross-feeding. Both tank valves and the right boost pump were on. The right tank ran dry, the right engine failed, and the prop autofeathered while the captain was absent. The captain returned, turned on the left boost pump, but left the right boost pump and the valves open, and attempted to restart the right engine. The left engine then failed but this was not recognized by the crew. The electrical system failed due to the attempted restarts and the fact that nonessential equipment was not turned off. The captain did not apply sufficient pull to the emergency gear handle to lower the gear manually. The aircraft was landed on a short wet sod runway, with the gear and flaps up, at a high rate of speed. The aircraft ran off the end of the runway, through a ditch, across a road, and into trees. Both pilots escaped uninjured.

The pilot initiated a takeoff on a hot afternoon with 7 passengers on board. Shortly after liftoff, two witnesses observed what they described as a puff of black smoke from the right engine. According to witnesses, the aircraft turned to the left before crossing the departure end of the runway at low altitude and low speed. Subsequently, the aircraft rolled rapidly to the left and impacted the ground in a near flat attitude, with a high rate of sink, and sufficient forward velocity to slide or bounce about 70 feet before coming to rest and burning. An exam of the wreckage, including teardowns of both engines, revealed no pre-impact/mechanical malfunction or failure. The aircraft was estimated to be 80 lbs below its max design gross weight. Its center of gravity was computed to be 1.45 inches aft of its rear limit. The temperature was 101° and the density altitude was about 4,000 feet. All eight occupants were killed.

After touchdown on runway 04 at Taos Airport, the airplane went out of control and crashed on a snowbank. All 10 occupants escaped with minor injuries while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The purpose of this flight was to take six passengers, all Phillips' employees. from Bartlesville, Oklahoma, to Salt Lake City, Utah. Company Pilot Joe Mark Bower and company Copilot-Mechanic Robert Ellwood Ulrich were assigned to the flight by the Aviation Department of Phillips. When the aircraft was loaded and prior to leaving the ramp Copilot Ulrich called the company radio station, located on the airport, requested taxiing instructions, and asked for an IFR clearance to Salt Lake City, nonstop. The company radio operator obtained the desired clearance from ARTC through Tulsa, and immediately relayed it to the aircraft. A flight plan previously prepared contained the following information: Proposed time of departure 0805; estimated elapsed time 5 hours, 15 minutes; fuel on board 6 hours. Departure was at 0826. At that time the gross weight of the aircraft was 19,284 pounds (maximum allowable was 19.500 pounds), and the load was properly distributed with respect to allowable center of gravity limitations. About 14 minutes after takeoff, at approximately 0840, Copilot Ulrich called Bartlesville Radio and stated that the flight was having engine trouble, with an oil temperature over 100 degrees, and requested that the IFR flight plan be canceled as they might return. The Bartlesville operator complied and notified Tulsa. At the next contact, about 0845, the copilot again called Bartlesville Radio stating that they could not unfeather the propeller. At that time he asked the Bartlesville operator to determine the condition of the runways at Tulsa (about 40 miles to the south). This information was obtained and immediately relayed to the copilot, whereupon he said. "Going to Tulsa, changing over." Bartlesville's single 4,600-foot runway had patches of snow and ice while all runways at Tulsa Airport were clear. This was the last radio contact with the flight. None of the messages had mentioned which engine was giving trouble; none indicated any anxiety or stress. There is no known record of N 28366 having made radio contact with any ground station or aircraft other than Bartlesville Radio. About the same time as the last radio contact, the Bartlesville radio operator and Phillips' chief pilot saw the aircraft passing south of the Bartlesville Airport heading easterly. They estimated its altitude to be 3,000 feet above the ground. The aircraft continued east for about 4-1/2 miles, until beyond the more congested part of Bartlesville, and then turned to the right about 90 degrees toward Tulsa. A number of persons saw the flight after it turned toward Tulsa. When it had been on this southerly heading for about four miles the aircraft was seen to plunge to earth in a manner described by several witnesses as a spin. Impact with the rolling terrain was on a heading of about 240 degrees, while the wings were about level, and while the nose-down angle was close to vertical. An explosion and intense fire ensued, largely destroying the general structure of the aircraft.