Jeddah-King Abdulaziz

The aircraft departed Madinah-Mohammad Bin Abdulazziz Airport at 1724LT on a schedule service to Dhaka with 142 passengers and 10 crew members on board. At 1746LT, while cruising at FL370, the crew informed ATC about a malfunction of the green hydraulic system followed by a 'green hydraulic system reservoir low level' warning. The crew decided to return to Madinah but this was not possible due to deteriorating weather conditions, so it was decided to divert to Jeddah-King Abdulazziz Airport. Several attempts to lower the nose gear were unsuccessful and only both main landing gear seemed to be down. After a circuit to burn fuel, the crew was cleared to descent and expected to make a low pass over runway 16C but neither the control tower nor ground staff were able to confirm the nose gear extension. Eventually, the crew was cleared to land on runway 34R with the nose gear retracted. The aircraft landed 700 metres past the runway threshold and the nose landed 1,350 metres further, causing both engine nacelles to hit the runway surface. The airplane slid for few hundred metres and came to rest 700 metres from the runway end. All 152 occupants evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Following an uneventful cargo flight from Jeddah, the crew completed the approach and landing procedures on runway 04 at Abuja-Nnamdi Azikiwe Airport. During the landing roll, the aircraft overran the displaced threshold then veered to the right and veered off runway. While contacting a grassy area, the aircraft collided with several parked excavator equipment and trucks. The aircraft came to a halt and was severely damaged to both wings and engines. All six occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

On 1 May 2012, aircraft TC-OAG, an Airbus A300-605R was performing a commercial flight for Saudi Arabian Airlines (SVA) as SVA2865. SVA 2865 departed from Prince Mohammed Bin Abdulaziz International Airport (PMAI) Madinah at 08h50 en-route to the King Abdulaziz International Airport (KAIA) Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. SVA 2865 was on a positioning flight with 10 crew members and no passengers. No discrepancies were noted on this aircraft prior to departure from Madinah. The visibility at Jeddah was good with a few clouds present. During the initial ILS approach to runway 16 Right (16R), while at 8 nautical miles (nm) and 2600 feet (ft), the landing gear handle was lowered. Both main landing gear extended and locked down and, the nose gear doors opened but the nose landing gear did not lower. The Captain who was then the Pilot Monitoring (PM) took over the controls and carried out a missed approach. The First Officer (FO) became the Pilot Monitoring (PM). SVA 2865 was then given an area to the northeast of Jeddah to carry out attempts at lowering the nose gear. The flight crew attempted to manually free fall the nose landing gear at least ten (10) times. The nose landing gear would not lower into the locked position, but the nose gear doors remained open during all those attempts. As a precautionary measure, SVA 2865 performed a fly-by of runway 16R at 500 ft. The air traffic controller confirmed that the nose landing gear (NLG) was not down. SVA 2865 was vectored over the Red Sea to lower the fuel load, thus reducing the landing weight. During this period, the Fire & Rescue Services (FRS) at Jeddah foamed a portion of runway 16 Left (16L) between taxiway Kilo 5 (K5) and K2. The majority of the FRS vehicles were standing by at the junction of taxiways K4 and K3. SVA 2865 was vectored for an instrument approach for Runway 16L. The Auto Pilot and the Auto Throttle Systems were OFF. The surface winds were from 220° at 12 knots (kt), gusting to 19 kt and the temperature was + 37 Celsius (°C). The flight crew used the "Landing with Nose Landing Gear Abnormal" checklist ensuring the aircraft was properly prepared and configured for the approach, the before landing, the flare and the touchdown sequences, including when the aircraft stopped and the necessary procedures to secure the aircraft before evacuation. The aircraft landed on its main landing gear 4000 ft past the threshold of runway 16L. The nose of the aircraft was slowly lowered to the runway with the nose landing gear doors touching the runway within the foamed area 4500 ft from the end of runway 16L. The front of the fuselage then touched the runway within the last portion of foam, 3500 ft from the end of runway 16L. The nose area of the aircraft slid on the runway, where sparks were present until the aircraft came to a full stop 1500 ft prior to the end of runway 16L. As soon as the aircraft passed by the position of the FRS vehicles, the FRS vehicles gave chase to the aircraft and reached it within 30 seconds after it came to a full stop. Although there was no post-crash fire, the FRS personnel applied water and foam to the nose area of the aircraft. All of the crew members were evacuated from the aircraft by ladder provided by the FRS. The crew was taken to the airport clinic as a precautionary measure. All were released the same day. The accident occurred at 14h49 on runway 16L at the KAIA - Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

On July 29, 2011, the said Boeing 777-200, Egyptian registration SU-GBP, operated by EgyptAir, arrived from Madina, Saudi Arabia (Flight No 678) and stopped at Gate F7, terminal 3, Cairo international airport almost at 0500 UTC time. Necessary maintenance actions (After Landing Check ALC, Transit Check) have been performed by EgyptAir engineers and technicians, to prepare the aircraft for the following scheduled flight (Cairo/Jeddah, scheduled at 0730 UTC, same day 29 July 2011, flight number 667). The cockpit crew (Captain and F/O) for the event flight (Cairo/Jeddah), started the cockpit preparation including checking the cockpit crew oxygen system as per normal procedures. The F/O reported that the oxygen pressure was within normal range (730 psi). At almost 0711 UTC, and while waiting for the last passengers to board the aircraft, the F/O officer reported that a pop, hissing sound originating from the right side of his seat was heard, associated with fire and smoke coming from the right side console area below F/O window #3 (right hand lower portion of the cockpit area) [The aircraft was still preparing for departure at Gate F7, Terminal 3 at Cairo Airport at the time the crew detected the fire]. The Captain requested the F/O to leave the cockpit immediately and notify for cockpit fire. The captain used the cockpit fire extinguisher bottle located behind his seat in attempt to fight and extinguish the fire. The attempt was unsuccessful, the fire continued in the cockpit. The F/O left the cockpit, he asked the cabin crew to deplane all the passengers and crew from the aircraft, based on captain’s order. He moved to the stairs and then underneath the aircraft in attempt to find anyone with a radio unit but he could not. He returned to the service road in front of the aircraft and stopped one car and asked the person in the car to notify the fire department that the aircraft is burning on the stand F7 using his radio unit. The cabin crew deplaned the passengers using the two doors 1L and 2L. The passenger bridge was still connected to the entry doors that were used for deplaning. The first fire brigade arrived to the aircraft after three minutes. The fire was extinguished. Extinguishing actions and cooling of the aircraft were terminated at 0845 UTC (1045 Cairo local time). The aircraft experienced major damage resulting from the fire and smoke. Passengers deplaned safely, some (passengers, employees) suffered mild asphyxia caused by smoke inhalation. Passengers and crew were as follows: Passengers 307, Cockpit Crew 2, Cabin Crew 8.

The crew was completing a positioning flight from Cairo to Jeddah. During the takeoff roll, the engine n°4 experienced an uncontained failure. The takeoff procedure was rejected and the aircraft came to a halt and later transferred to a hangar. All 22 crew members escaped uninjured while the aircraft was considered as damaged beyond repair.

A Saudi Arabian Airlines MD-90 was substantially damaged during a runway excursion accident Riyadh (RUH). The seven crew members escaped unhurt. The airplane operated on a repositioning flight from Jeddah. During the flight, the captain discussed the use of manual spoilers during landing with the first officer. He further stated that; as he "had only around 400 hours in the aircraft" as a captain, he wanted to "see the effect' of landing with manual spoilers. He further explained that the flight provided an opportunity to "do it manually" (use manual spoilers) as it was a repositioning flight and, the weather and dry runway conditions were ideal. As such, he discussed the procedure with the first officer and elected to land with the auto ground spoiler system unarmed. The flight was uneventful. During the approach to Riyadh the Landing Checklist was completed, which included the arming of the auto ground spoiler system for landing. After the Landing Checklist was completed, the captain disarmed the auto ground spoiler system with the intention of applying manual ground spoilers after landing. The auto braking system was also not armed prior to landing. The final approach and touchdown to runway 15 Left at Riyadh were uneventful. The touchdown airspeed was 135 knots calibrated air speed (CAS). On touchdown, the captain manually extended the spoiler/speed brake lever, but did not latch it in the fully extended (EXT) position (fully aft and latched upwards). The captain then removed his right hand from the speed brake lever in order to deploy the thrust reversers. The first officer noted the movement of the spoiler/speed brake lever and called "Spoilers Deployed". Since the spoiler/speed brake lever was not fully pulled aft and latched upwards, the lever automatically returned to the forward retracted (RET) position. This movement of the spoiler/speed brake lever was not noticed by the captain and the first officer. In response, the ground spoilers re-stowed before being fully deployed and, a speed brake/flap configuration (SPD BRK/FLP CONFIG) Level 1 Amber Alert occurred. This alert occurred as the aircraft was not yet fully weight on wheels (WOW) and the aircraft still sensed a flight condition with speed brakes deployed and flaps extended beyond six degrees. Six seconds after touchdown on the right main landing gear, the nose gear touched down and the aircraft transferred to a ground condition (WOW on nose gear and main wheel spin up). The SPD BRK/FLP CONFIG alert extinguished when the nose gear oleo actuated ground shift on landing. After touchdown, the aircraft banked to the right and began to drift right of the runway centerline. In response, he applied left rudder, deployed the thrust reversers and applied left aileron. But this did not have any noticeable effect. The captain saw the approaching G4 taxiway exit and in an attempt to keep the aircraft from leaving the runway surface beyond the G4 taxiway exit, he decided to direct the aircraft towards the taxiway. He then applied a right rudder input which caused the aircraft to commence a rapid sweeping turn to the right towards the G4 taxiway exit. The aircraft left the runway at high speed, traversed the full width of the G4 taxiway, and exited the surface at its southern edge. The aircraft then entered a sand section and travelled the distance infield between the edge of the G4 taxiway and the adjacent section of taxiway GOLF. The left main landing gear collapsed during this time. The aircraft came to rest on taxiway GOLF. There was no post impact fire.

During the takeoff roll on runway 34 at Jeddah-King Abdulaziz Airport, ATC informed the crew about a fire on the left main gear. The captain rejected takeoff and was able to stop the aircraft within the remaining distance. All 273 occupants evacuated safely but the aircraft was considered as damaged beyond repair.

Following technical problems with the engines, the aircraft was transferred to a hangar at Kuala Lumpur for maintenance. In the evening, a team of six technicians was dispatched to convoy the aircraft to the main terminal where 319 passengers should embark on a flight to Jeddah. While on a taxiway, the engineers attempted to turn to another taxiway when control was lost. The aircraft veered off taxiway and came to rest, nose first, in a drainage ditch. All six occupants were injured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. At the time of the accident, only the engine n°2 and 3 only were running and it is believed that the auxiliary hydraulic pump switches were in the OFF position. Thus, the nosewheel steering system was inoperative as well as the brakes.

On a night approach to Monrovia-Roberts Airport, at an altitude of about 600 feet, the crew encountered local patches of fog and visual contact with the runway was momentarily lost by the pilot-in-command. Nevertheless, he decided to continue the approach when the aircraft landed hard on runway 04. The aircraft bounced twice then lost its both right engines. Out of control, it veered off runway and came to rest about 200 metres further. All 182 occupants evacuated safely while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The aircraft departed Adana Airport runway 05 at 0036LT on a positioning flight to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, to pick up Turkish pilgrims. Nine minutes after takeoff, while climbing to an altitude of 4,000 metres in poor weather conditions, the aircraft nosed down, entered a dive and crashed in a near vertical attitude in an open field located near Ceyhan, about 30 km east of Adana Airport. The aircraft disintegrated on impact, causing a large crater. Debris were found at a depth of 10 metres. The accident was not survivable.