Augusta

The instrument-rated private pilot departed on an instrument flight rules (IFR) cross-country flight plan in near-zero visibility with mist, light freezing rain, and moderate mixed and clear icing. After departure, and as the airplane entered a climbing right turn to a track of about 260 degrees, the pilot reported to air traffic control that she was at 1,000 feet, climbing to 10,000 feet. The flight remained on a track of about 260 degrees and continued to accelerate and climb for 38 seconds. The pilot then declared an emergency, stating that she had an attitude indicator failure. At that moment, radar data depicted the airplane at 3,500 feet and 267 knots. Thirteen seconds later, the pilot radioed she wasn't sure which way she was turning. The transmission ended abruptly. Radar data indicated that at the time the transmission ended the airplane was in a steep, rapidly descending left turn. The fragmented airplane wreckage, due to impact and subsequent explosive forces, was located in a wooded area about 6 miles south-southwest of the departure airport. Examination of the accident site revealed a near vertical high-speed impact consistent with an in-flight loss of control. The on-site examination of the airframe remnants did not show evidence of preimpact malfunction. Examination of recovered engine remnants revealed evidence that both engines were producing power at the time of impact and no preimpact malfunctions with the engines were noted. The failure, single or dual, of the attitude indicator is listed as an abnormal event in the manufacturer's Pilot's Abbreviated Emergency/Abnormal Procedures. The airplane was equipped with three different sources of attitude information: one incorporated in the primary flight display unit on the pilot's side, another single instrument on the copilot's side, and the standby attitude indicator. In the event of a dual failure, on both the pilot and copilot sides, aircraft control could be maintained by referencing to the standby attitude indicator, which is in plain view of the pilot. The indicators are powered by separate sources and, during the course of the investigation, no evidence was identified that indicated any systems, including those needed to maintain aircraft control, failed. The pilot called for a weather briefing while en route to the airport 30 minutes prior to departure and acknowledged the deteriorating weather during the briefing. Additionally, the pilot was eager to depart, as indicated by comments that she made before her departure that she was glad to be leaving and that she had to go. Witnesses indicated that as she was departing the airport she failed to activate taxi and runway lights, taxied on grass areas off taxiways, and announced incorrect taxi instructions and runways. Additionally, no Federal Aviation Administration authorization for the pilot to operate an aircraft between 29,000 feet and 41,000 feet could be found; the IFR flight plan was filed with an en route altitude of 38,000 feet. The fact that the airplane was operating at night in instrument meteorological conditions and the departure was an accelerating climbing turn, along with the pilot's demonstrated complacency, created an environment conducive to spatial disorientation. Given the altitude and speed of the airplane, the pilot would have only had seconds to identify, overcome, and respond to the effects of spatial disorientation.

The airplane's left engine had been overhauled and required an in-flight Negative Torque Sensing (NTS) check. The procedures required that the left engine be shut down during the test flight. The test flight was conducted at night. The pilots were briefed that there was icing and moderate rime icing mixed below 15,000 feet in clouds and precipitation. The cloud bases were between 2,500 to 2,900 feet agl. After departure, the pilot reported to ATC that they were clear and on top of the clouds at about 6,500 feet msl. N5LN was assigned a 180 degree heading at an assigned altitude of 8,000 feet. Without notification to ATC, N5LN turned to a southeast heading, descended from 7,700 feet to about 5,500 feet, and decelerated from about 182 kts to about 138 kts. ATC assigned N5LN a block altitude of 6,000 to 8,000 feet and a VFR-On-Top clearance. ATC instructed N5LN to turn right to stay in the assigned airspace. N5LN turned right but continued to descend from about 5,500 feet to the last radar indication of 4,500 feet. The airplane impacted the ground in a steep attitude. The inspection of the wreckage indicated the landing gear was down, and with full right rudder trim and about six degrees nose up trim. The examination of the engines indicated both engines were rotating and operating at the time of impact. The examination of the airframe and propellers found no pre-existing anomalies that would have precluded normal operation.

About two minutes into the flight, the pilot noticed a high cylinder head temperature on the right engine. The pilot opened the cowl flap doors and the cylinder head temperature dropped 200 degrees. When the pilot noticed a reduction in right engine power, he elected to shut down the engine. The copilot was instructed to secure the right engine in accordance with the emergency procedures. Unable to maintain altitude, the pilot selected an emergency landing to a large open field, and the landing gear collapsed during the landing. Examination of the airplane at the accident site disclosed that the engine cowl flaps on both engines were in the open position. Examinations of the right engine subsystems failed to disclose a mechanical malfunction or component failure. A review of the normal and emergency procedures for the aircraft disclosed that the cowl flaps normal position for the shutdown engine is closed. A review of the aircraft performance data revealed that the airplane was capable of maintaining flight and a climb attitude with one engine. There was no cargo on the airplane. During the pilot's subsequent type rating reexamination in the Convair 240-27, the pilot failed to demonstrate a satisfactory level of knowledge in emergency procedures during the oral examination. The pilot subsequently surrendered the Convair 240-27 type rating to the FAA.

The ATP and his passenger were en route to pick up a patient for transport to a VA hospital. The destination airport was uncontrolled, and VFR only. The pilot cancelled with ATC and reported the field in sight. The airport was reporting VFR conditions, but rising, mountainous terrain existed to the northeast, and local authorities reported that the top third of the mountain was obscured in clouds during the morning of the accident. After cancelling IFR, no subsequent radio calls were received from the flight, and the flight did not arrive at its destination. The wreckage was found several hours later near the crest of holston mountain, 1/2 mile east of the Holston mountain VOR. An examination of the wreckage indicated the aircraft impacted upsloping, wooded terrain, while at a climb angle of 8°. Disintegration of the wreckage was indicative of a high speed impact. No evidence of mechanical malfunction or failure was found during the examination of the wreckage. Both occupants were killed.

The airplane overran the end of runway 23, following an instrument landing system (ILS) approach, crashed, and burned at the Mercer County Airport, Bluefield, West Virginia. The aircraft touched down between 500 and 2,000 feet on the runway which was covered with wet snow, and it did not decelerate normally. About 1,200 feet from the departure end of the runway, the pilot added engine thrust and rotated the aircraft for liftoff; however, it did not get airborne because of insufficient flying speed. The aircraft overran the end of the runway and struck three localizer antennas and a 10-foot embankment before it plunged down a steep, densely wooded hillside. The five occupants were killed, and the aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and postcrash fire.

The crew was completing a ferry flight from Atlanta to Augusta. On approach to Augusta Airport, both engines flamed out almost simultaneously. The crew elected to make an emergency landing when the airplane struck trees and crashed in rough terrain. The aircraft was destroyed and both occupants were seriously injured.

Just after liftoff, the single engine airplane encountered serious difficulties to gain height. It stalled and crashed in flames by the runway. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

While cruising in level altitude in poor weather conditions, the twin engine airplane struck a mountain and crashed in flames near Burnsville, North Carolina. The wreckage was found two days later near the mountain top and both occupants have been killed.

The aircraft departed Boston-Logan at 2028LT bound to Augusta with seven passengers and a pilot on board. At the origin, the flight was scheduled to Rockland but it was not possible to land there due to foggy conditions. The flight was cleared for a VOR approach at 2114LT. At 2127LT, flight 88 reported a missed approach and was cleared for another VOR approach at that time. At 2140LT, the flight reported 'four miles out'. This was the last known transmission made by the flight. The wreckage was located in a heavily wooded area on Allen Hill at approximately the 520 foot level. Allen Hill is a prominent terrain feature which is 640 feet high, located approximately 4 nautical miles from the threshold of runway 17 and eight-tenth of a mile west of the approach radial. The pilot and two passengers were killed, two passengers received serious injuries and three passengers received minor injuries.

On final approach to Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood Airport, the pilot was too close to a preceding Boeing 727 and was cautioned by ATC about wake turbulences. Shortly later, the twin engine aircraft went out of control, dove into the ground and crashed few miles short of runway threshold. The aircraft was destroyed and all four occupants were killed.